Patrick A. Mello

International Politics, Security, and Methods

Tag: Oxford University Press

  • Foreign Policy Analysis

    Joining the Editorial Board of Foreign Policy Analysis

    I am honored to be joining the Editorial Board of Foreign Policy Analysis, led by Editor-in-Chief Cameron G. Thies and Associate Editors Klaus Brummer, Juliet Kaarbo, Brian Lai, Deborah Welch Larson, and Arlene B. Tickner. I look forward to meeting everyone at ISA San Francisco (Editorial Board Meeting: April 4, 4:30 PM, Parlor 1-4278, Hilton San Francisco Union Square).

    “Reflecting the diverse, comparative and multidisciplinary nature of the field, Foreign Policy Analysis provides an open forum for research publication that enhances the communication of concepts and ideas across theoretical, methodological, geographical and disciplinary boundaries. By emphasizing accessibility of content for scholars of all perspectives and approaches in the editorial and review process, Foreign Policy Analysis serves as a source for efforts at theoretical and methodological integration and deepening the conceptual debates throughout this rich and complex academic research tradition. Foreign policy analysis, as a field of study, is characterized by its actor-specific focus. The underlying, often implicit argument is that the source of international politics and change in international politics is human beings, acting individually or in groups. In the simplest terms, foreign policy analysis is the study of the process, effects, causes or outputs of foreign policy decision-making in either a comparative or case-specific manner.” [Read More]

    For the current issue of Foreign Policy Analysis, see here.

    Reproduced with permission from cover image. Foreign Policy Analysis is published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. All rights reserved. Available online at: https://academic.oup.com/fpa. For permissions contact Journals.permissions@OUP.com.

  • Two-Level Games in Foreign Policy Analysis

    Chapter Published in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics

    da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia and Patrick A. Mello (2017) Two-Level Games in Foreign Policy Analysis, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press (DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.496).

    Article Summary: “Whether in multilateral negotiations or bilateral meetings, government leaders regularly engage in “two-level games” played simultaneously at the domestic and the international level. From the two-level-games perspective, executives are seen as “chief negotiators” that are involved in some form of international negotiations for which they ultimately need to gain domestic approval at the ratification stage. This ratification requirement provides the critical link between the international and domestic level but it can be based on formal voting requirements (for instance, mandatory legislative approval in a certain policy area) or more informal ways of ratification such as measures of public opinion and public approval ratings.

    With its focus on government leaders as “gatekeepers” and central actors in international negotiations, the two-level games perspective constitutes a distinct approach in foreign policy analysis and serves to reintegrate the subfields of comparative politics and international relations. While there are similarities to a liberal perspective, two-level games emphasize that executives hold a certain degree of autonomy in their decision-making, which cannot be purely derived from their constituencies. Unlike realism, however, the approach recognizes the importance of domestic veto players and institutional constraints. Since its inception in the late 1980s, a vast literature on two-level games has evolved including refinements of its theoretical foundation and applications in various policy areas. Against this background, this essay engages with key controversies in two-level games and foreign policy analysis throughout the last three decades. The discussion is organized along six debates concerning the levels of analysis, domestic political institutions, the interaction between the domestic and international level, relevant actors, their interests and preferences, and the relationship between comparative politics and international relations. The essay concludes with some thoughts on possible future research agendas“ [Read Further]

    Keywords: bargaining, domestic politics, two-level games, interests, levels of analysis, negotiation analysis, ratification, veto players, win sets

    da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia and Patrick A. Mello (2017) Two-Level Games in Foreign Policy Analysis, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press (DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.496).

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