DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION IN ARMED CONFLICT

Military Involvement in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq

Patrick A. Mello
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Military Involvement in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq

Patrick A. Mello
For Tanja and Henry
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Parts of Chapter 7 are based on the article ‘Parliamentary Peace or Partisan Politics? Democracies’ Participation in the Iraq War’, published in the *Journal of International Relations and Development* (15) 3: 420–453 (Mello, 2012b). The analysis presented in this book applies a more comprehensive analytical framework and takes into account additional sources that have become available since the publication of the article.

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*Patrick A. Mello, Dresden, January 2014*
1
Introduction

Compared to the amount of research devoted to the interdemocratic peace proposition, the “flipside” of democratic participation in armed conflict has received considerably less attention. Moreover, due to a widespread focus on regime type differences, many studies in International Relations (IR) implicitly treat democratic regimes as a homogeneous group and thus fail to account for substantial variation within the group of democracies. While scholars have persuasively made the case that “democracy” needs to be unpacked to be meaningful (Elman, 2000), this remains rarely done in the field of international politics and conflict research. In Comparative Politics, on the other hand, research on democratic subtypes and their virtues and weaknesses abounds, but this knowledge is seldom applied to matters of security policy.

In this book, I investigate the conditions under which democracies participate in armed conflict. Based on the premise that substantial variation exists among democratic systems and that this variation might account toward an explanation for democracies’ external conflict behavior, relevant institutional and political differences are identified across contemporary democracies. My integrative theoretical approach highlights the importance of domestic factors, such as partisan politics, executive–legislative relations, constitutional differences and public opinion but further takes into account systemic factors, such as a country’s relative power status.

This study resonates with a renewed emphasis on the link between domestic politics and international relations. While IR scholars have long neglected domestic politics in favor of systemic variables, it is by now widely acknowledged that domestic factors and international relations are highly inter-connected and that a focus on the former can enhance the understanding of the latter (Gourevitch, 2002: 309). In this
context, a number of publications have initiated what may constitute a “democratic turn” in security studies (Geis and Wagner, 2011). Works in this vein have broadened the democratic peace research program by focusing on the conditions under which democracies use military force, democracy’s inherent ambiguities, and the differences between democratic states regarding their constitutional structure, domestic institutions, political culture, and partisan politics. Yet the insights of these works have only sparsely made their way into comparative studies.

Against this backdrop, three general questions arise, concerning the domestic sources of democratic foreign policy and the interaction of domestic and international factors in relation to conflict behavior. First, when do domestic institutions constrain or enable government use of force? Previous research has conceptualized “institutional constraints” in various ways, ranging from abstract considerations of the democratic process, to the prospect of electoral backlash and concrete veto opportunities that arise in distinct political constellations. At the same time, it has been suggested that democracies are somehow able to alter their behavior when faced with non-democracies, sidestepping existing institutional constraints and “the due political process” (Maoz and Russett, 1993: 626; Russett, 1993: 38–40). This underlines the need to investigate more specific forms of institutional constraints such as parliamentary veto rights and constitutional restrictions on the use of force and the conditions under which these become effective. Second, to what extent do partisanship and public opinion matter in military deployment decisions? The traditional (realist) perspective suggests that “politics stops at the waters’ edge” (Gowa, 1998); thus, we should expect a foreign policy consensus between political parties on decisions over war and peace. This conception seems to be misguided, however, since studies have repeatedly demonstrated partisan divides on security issues. Relatedly, the role of public opinion in foreign policy decision-making remains heavily contested. While proponents of liberal arguments suggest that democracies are constrained by public opinion, others hold that democratic leaders are hardly affected by public opinion in their decision-making, even when substantial parts of the citizenry oppose a military commitment. Third, how do international organizational frameworks influence democracies’ participation in military operations? It seems plausible to assume that the organizational auspices under which an operation is run affect government decisions, that is, whether missions are carried out through the United Nations, by regional organizations such as the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or in ad hoc coalition frameworks. Since the latter have become increasingly
common for enforcement operations, an investigation into the conditions that foster the participation in *ad hoc* coalition frameworks should be a pressing concern.

Recent studies have suggested promising explanations of democratic conflict behavior, but the question of how to conceptualize military participation remains. What kind of contribution counts as war involvement? Does it suffice if a country provides logistical support to an operation or should only the large-scale deployment of combat forces be considered military participation? To which extent is the timing of a military deployment relevant? In this book, I address these questions in the specific historical context of the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Based on a comparative framework that includes 30 democracies and five causal conditions, I offer an integrative theoretical explanation for military involvement and non-involvement in each of these conflicts.

The central argument of this book consists of three propositions. First, I argue that many generalizations about democracy obscure rather than help further our understanding of international politics. While the democratic peace research program has yielded a host of empirical observations and valuable insights about the conflict behavior of democracies and non-democracies, it has also reified the dividing line between these regime types. The result is that important sources of intra-democratic variance often get overlooked, which could partially explain why scholars report conflicting findings on the relationship between regime type and conflict behavior (cf. Mintz, 2005: 5). The second claim flows from the first: variation among democracies needs to be taken more seriously. Though scholars have paid lip service to the mutual benefit of an increased awareness of each other’s work in the subfields of International Relations and Comparative Politics, few studies in conflict research have taken aboard richer conceptions of democracy. In fact, most studies base their conceptualization of democracy on lean models that do not take into account the institutional variety across Western democracies, much less the diversity that characterizes non-Western countries. Finally, I argue that our notions of democratic war involvement need to be brought in line with the nature of contemporary armed conflict and reconnected to processes of political decision-making. The democratic peace research program has relied, for the most part, on what constitutes an anachronistic conception of war involvement. Hence, frequently used measures of military participation tend to be far removed from the actual deployments made. However, in order to gain confidence about the conditions that lead toward
Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict

war involvement and abstention, we also require a more fine-grained qualitative assessment of democratic war participation in the historical context of a given conflict.

The remainder of this introductory chapter introduces the book’s research design, including definitions of key concepts and a detailed discussion of the criteria that guided the case selection for the conflicts and countries examined. The final section provides a concise book outline.

Research design

This book investigates democratic war involvement. Conceived primarily as a comparative study, a two-fold emphasis is placed on exploring institutional and political sources of variation across consolidated democracies and examining their participation in armed conflict. Given these aims, the research design combines a comparative perspective on an intermediate number of democracies with a focus on three contemporary cases of armed conflict. The remainder of this section defines the book’s conception of military participation and relates it to existing definitions of similar terms. This is followed by an explication of the criteria that guided the case selection, both in terms of armed conflicts and for the democracies included in this study.

Defining participation in multilateral military operations

For the purposes of the present study, I define military participation as the deployment of combat-ready, regular military forces across international borders to engage in the use of force inside or against a target country as part of a multilateral military operation.

This definition comprises several components that delineate the universe of cases. First, it entails a range of military operations where units are authorized to use force, from humanitarian military intervention to peace enforcement operations and interstate war. At the same time, it excludes traditional peacekeeping missions, where the use of force is restricted to purposes of self-defense. Second, the definition covers various kinds of military deployments, including ground, air and naval units, but these must be directed at a regime or against non-state actors within a country. Hence, the definition discounts involvement in naval operations, such as anti-piracy missions. It further focuses on the deployment of regular forces to ensure comparability, which eliminates the contracting of private military and security companies. Finally, this study concentrates on multilateral military operations, because unilateral engagements, by definition, preclude within-case comparisons
across countries. Multilateralism is understood here in a minimal sense as coordination between “three or more states, through *ad hoc* arrangements or by means of institutions” (Keohane, 1990: 731).³ Hence the definition applies to *ad hoc* coalitions as well as military operations under the auspices of international organizations.

My conception of military participation relates to established definitions of military intervention.⁴ Unlike some prior studies, however, I do not differentiate war from military intervention for my case selection or for analytical purposes. As other authors acknowledge, there is a substantial gray area between military intervention and war (Finnemore, 2003: 9). This ambiguity puts into question the analytical value of the distinction between these two concepts. In legal terms, both military intervention and war constitute *armed conflicts*. However, a distinction should be made on the grounds of whether or not a case falls under one of the two stated exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force under Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter. These entail individual or collective self-defense, based on Article 51, and the use of force under authorization from the Security Council, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Greenwood, 2008: 1). In political terms, the distinction between military intervention and war traditionally serves to separate action on behalf of a regime or a powerful faction within a country from conflict between two or more sovereign states (Bennett, 1999: 14; Levite et al., 1992: 5). This view sees military intervention as directed toward “changing or preserving the structure of political authority in the target society” (Rosenau, 1969: 161), whereas interstate war is held to primarily serve the aim of territorial conquest (Levite et al., 1992: 6).

These distinctions notwithstanding, complications arise when trying to categorize particular historical cases. For instance, the Persian Gulf War that began with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 has been termed “fundamentally an interstate war” because the US-led multinational coalition had the objective “to restore internationally recognized territorial boundaries” (Levite et al., 1992). At the same time, scholars have classified the Gulf War as a military intervention to acknowledge the fact that an outside power intervened on behalf of the regime in Kuwait (Kreps, 2011: 15, 51; Saunders, 2011: 15, 22). To take another example, the American engagement in Vietnam began in 1950 as military assistance to the French and later to the South Vietnamese government, but this support incrementally turned into a military intervention and by 1965 it had escalated into full-scale war (Krepinevich, 1988: 258–275). These two cases illustrate that the search for a sharp dividing line
between war and military intervention is fraught with difficulties, if not illusory. Hence, for the purposes of this book, I apply the inclusive definition of military participation stated above. With regard to the observed conflicts and the outcome to be explained this allows for variation within well-defined limits.

Case selection

The comparative design of this study essentially requires two case selection decisions. The first concerns the armed conflicts to be investigated, which are drawn from the universe of cases circumscribed by my definition of military participation. The second decision relates to the democracies that ought to be considered potential military participators in the selected conflicts. I address each in turn.

With regard to armed conflicts, the book’s inclusive definition of military participation yields a fairly large number of potential cases. Hence, for case selection purposes, three scope conditions are applied to narrow down the population and to enhance comparability. First, the observed timeframe is restricted to the post-Cold War period (1990–2011). This way systemic factors are held largely constant. Second, conflicts are only included if they contain at least one military operation with personnel equal to or above 5,000 soldiers. Finally, in order to be considered for case selection, several Western democracies need to have made sizable military contributions to a given conflict. This criterion eliminates many UN peace support operations, where non-Western countries are often the major troop contributors. Given these scope conditions, the universe of cases consists of 11 armed conflicts and 28 military operations. These are listed in Table 1.1.

Of the potential case studies, the book investigates democratic participation and non-participation in the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. These cases were selected for several reasons. First, the three conflicts are among the most extensive uses of force by democracies in the post-Cold War era, both in terms of combat intensity and the duration of the multilateral military engagement, if one includes operations that followed upon the initial invasion. This makes them particularly interesting cases for study. Second, each conflict reached a certain issue salience and was surrounded by substantial political conflict and public contestation across Western democracies. Thus, if approaches that emphasize partisanship or public opinion have any explanatory value, then they should apply to these cases. Finally, democratic governments have shown substantial variance in their responses to these conflicts. While some countries became involved militarily in all three cases,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Military operation</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>Military personnel</th>
<th>UN authorization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Allied Force</td>
<td>03/1999–06/1999</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>50,500 (1999)</td>
<td>not authorized</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The aerial operations in Kosovo and Libya comprised 29,000 and 26,500 sorties, respectively. UN authorization indicates the initial Security Council resolution for each mission, excluding mandate renewals or alterations.

several governments abstained entirely and still others made selective deployments. At the same time, the conflicts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq vary with respect to their political legitimation, legality in international law, the involvement of international organizations, and the intensity of armed conflict, which enhances their inferential value from a comparative perspective.

One might object that the selected cases are too dissimilar for comparative purposes. However, this study focuses primarily on comparing democracies’ responses within each case. Only in the final chapter is the attempt made to compare across conflicts and to draw out similarities and generalizable patterns. The Kosovo case set a precedent as a military operation under NATO auspices that was not authorized by the UN Security Council, yet widely conceived as a legitimate use of force. Due to the tension between legal principles and appeals to humanitarian norms, Kosovo is an illuminating case to examine the role of domestic constraints on the use of force. By contrast, the war in Afghanistan was initiated by an ad hoc coalition outside existing organizational frameworks. It lacked formal UN authorization, though the Security Council acknowledged the right to individual and collective self-defense. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and subsequent declarations of solidarity with the United States across the international community make Afghanistan a “most-likely case” for the involvement of NATO allies and partner countries. Finally, the Iraq War represents an “extreme case” that was widely perceived as an illegal preventive war. Because it damaged transatlantic relations and polarized the political debate in many countries it is also a most-likely case for arguments on partisan politics.9

With regard to the democracies selected for study, the procedure is based on two criteria: (1) the presence of uncontested democratic political institutions and (2) institutionalized security cooperation with other democracies. As a threshold for the first criterion, I employ the Polity IV data to exclude countries with a score of seven and below on the combined autocracy-democracy scale.10 The second criterion of institutionalized security cooperation refers to countries with EU or NATO membership, or those that have cooperation agreements with either regional organization. In addition to these criteria and to enhance cross-case comparability, I further apply a scope condition that excludes countries with a population size below one million inhabitants. This is based on the premise that very small countries, due to a lack of military capability, are often not in a position to participate militarily. For instance, Iceland has a coast guard but no armed forces, while Luxembourg has a single infantry battalion but no air force (IISS, 2003: 47, 49).
For the Kosovo case study, this selection procedure yields 23 democracies from Europe and North America, while the chapters on Afghanistan and Iraq are based on a sample of 30 democracies, adding the Baltic countries and Slovenia, as well as Japan, New Zealand, and Australia from the Pacific region. In other words, a core sample of 23 countries is present across all three cases. Table 1.2 lists the selected democracies by region and organizational membership. Since the units of analysis are country cabinets, each chapter specifies the relevant governments for the case at hand.

Table 1.2  Case selection: Democracies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Western Europe</th>
<th>Central &amp; Eastern Europe</th>
<th>North America, Pacific</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy 1949</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Hungary 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium 1949</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Poland 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany 1955</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Latvia 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain 1982</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Lithuania 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway 1949</td>
<td>1994b</td>
<td>Slovenia 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland 1994c</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden 1994c</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria 1995c</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland 1999c</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Years indicate date of accession or cooperation agreement.
a NATO cooperation agreement.
b European Economic Area agreement.
c NATO Individual Partnership Programme.

For the Kosovo case study, this selection procedure yields 23 democracies from Europe and North America, while the chapters on Afghanistan and Iraq are based on a sample of 30 democracies, adding the Baltic countries and Slovenia, as well as Japan, New Zealand, and Australia from the Pacific region. In other words, a core sample of 23 countries is present across all three cases. Table 1.2 lists the selected democracies by region and organizational membership. Since the units of analysis are country cabinets, each chapter specifies the relevant governments for the case at hand.

Book outline

This chapter has delineated the book’s research aim, its core argument and analytical strategy. In the chapters that follow, I first revisit the debate on democracy and war involvement before introducing my own theoretical framework and methodological approach. The ensuing case study chapters provide empirical evidence for the existence of distinct pathways toward democratic war involvement and, *vice versa,*
war abstention. These chapters further demonstrate substantial variance across the observed democracies, both in terms of their institutional and political characteristics and their involvement in armed conflict. The final chapter draws together the separate findings and makes a modest attempt at generalizing the results beyond the observed cases, including a discussion of more recent conflicts, such as the military intervention in Libya and the civil war in Syria.

Chapter 2 examines prevalent explanations of democratic conflict behavior, which are divided three-fold into institutional constraints, political preferences, and external constraints and inducements. Beginning with institutionalist arguments on the restraining effects of democratic systems, the first section revisits the Kantian notion of participatory constraints, studies on democratic subtypes, and veto rights approaches. The second part focuses on political preferences, starting with the connection between public opinion and foreign policy decision-making. This is trailed by a review of studies that emphasize culture, identity, and role conceptions as factors that shape foreign policy behavior. The chapter closes with a survey of systemic theories that highlight external constraints and inducements, including burden-sharing arguments derived from collective action theory and realist approaches that underline external threats or alliance dependence as principal causes of war involvement.

Set against the explanatory approaches introduced previously, Chapter 3 advances the theoretical framework that guides the empirical analysis in the case study chapters. I develop an integrative theoretical approach that combines explanatory factors from various IR perspectives. Specifically, the framework includes the analysis of domestic factors, such as different forms of institutional constraints, political ideology, and public opinion, in addition to structural factors, such as a country's relative power position. The approach thus conjoins factors that prior studies have identified as crucial in accounting for democratic war involvement but whose interaction has gone largely unobserved.

While the initial chapters focus on substantive arguments, they also show that some theoretical divisions arise from differences over methods. Against this backdrop, Chapter 4 provides a concise methodological review of extant studies in democratic peace research before introducing the approach of fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) as an alternative that holds specific advantages over traditional approaches. The chapter introduces the method and procedure of fsQCA, including the basic principles of fuzzy sets and their coding procedures, conceptions of complex causation, the calculation
of consistency and coverage measures, as well as details regarding the analytical procedure and documentation of fsQCA results.

Chapter 5 examines the Kosovo War. Following an account of the historical and legal context, I review prevailing explanations for the conflict and identify issues that have not been sufficiently addressed with regard to democracies’ participation in Operation Allied Force. The main part provides a comparative analysis of war involvement in Kosovo. While some countries fully participated in the air strikes, others restricted their contribution to support functions and explicitly ruled out combat operations. Still others did not participate at all, or provided mere logistical support to the mission. The analysis yields explanations for these different outcomes. In brief, constitutional restrictions are identified as an almost necessary condition for military abstention. Yet I also document that several countries overstepped their constitutional frameworks by joining a military operation that was out of bounds with the UN Charter, even when there was a legitimate humanitarian concern on which the action was justified. It is further shown that, contrary to the free-rider hypothesis, pathways exist under which weak states did indeed participate militarily. Concerning partisanship, evidence is found suggesting that right executives were more willing than their left counterparts to use military force even in the absence of public support.

Chapter 6 investigates democratic participation in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. The chapter begins with a portrayal of the historical and legal background that emphasizes important differences between OEF as the military response to 9/11 and the ISAF mission that had initially been conceived as a peace support operation restricted to the Kabul area. The comparative analysis focuses on OEF, where 12 out of 30 countries participated with combat forces, while 18 countries abstained from participation or provided non-combat support. NATO countries were evenly split: half of them participated militarily, whereas the other half abstained or fulfilled limited support functions. Among other findings, the analysis reveals substantial empirical evidence in support of the participatory constraints argument, which holds that democratic governments require popular support to deploy armed forces to a conflict. This contrasts with recent arguments made in the literature. While NATO members were most-likely cases for military participation, my analysis finds a correspondence between public support and military participation, since those alliance members with low public support ended up not participating or reducing their participation to nominal contributions.
Chapter 7 analyzes democracies’ military participation in the Iraq War. The initial section traces the conflict’s political and legal background, which benefits from material made public in legislative inquiries and recently declassified documents. The historical account is complemented with a review of extant academic work on the Iraq War. Whereas previous studies identified partisan and institutional differences as explanations for the observed variance in war involvement, the interaction of partisanship and institutions has remained essentially unobserved. I argue that these factors should be analyzed in combination: institutional constraints become veto points only when actors hold preferences that stand in conflict with the executive. Similarly, partisan politics must be seen in the context of specific institutional frameworks that enable or constrain decision-making. The analysis of partisanship reveals distinct cross-country patterns, most pronounced among Western democracies. Contrary to prior work on parliamentary war powers, the study finds no supportive evidence for the suggested “parliamentary peace” in the context of the Iraq War. However, with regard to constitutional restrictions, it is shown that these present a structural veto against military participation. No democracy with constitutional restrictions on the scope of permissible military operations has become involved in the Iraq War.

Chapter 8 investigates cross-case patterns of war participation, based on the preceding case studies. What follows is a discussion of the theoretical contributions made in this study. I argue that the introduction of parliamentary veto rights and constitutional restrictions has enriched institutionalist approaches and that these factors should see wider usage in the future development of the democratic peace research program. I further line out the book’s methodological contribution, arguing that fuzzy-set analysis provides a novel perspective that allows for the discovery of new insights based on its focus on the interaction and combination of conditions. This is complemented by an attempt to generalize beyond the observed cases, examining the recent conflicts in Libya and Syria and Western democracies’ dissimilar responses to them. The closing section summarizes key findings and suggests prospects for future research. Finally, the Appendix provides replication data for the fuzzy-set analyses of the empirical chapters as well as alternative analyses for the Afghanistan study.
2
Democracy and War Involvement

This chapter traces the debate about democracy and war involvement.¹ Prevailing explanations of democratic conflict behavior can be grouped along three broad categories that emphasize distinct causal factors: domestic institutional constraints, political preferences, and external constraints and inducements. The first section revisits arguments on the constraining effects of democratic systems, beginning with the Kantian proposition that influenced subsequent liberal-institutionalist thinking of participatory constraints. Next, insights from Comparative Politics are brought in, examining findings from studies on democratic subtypes before assessing veto point and veto player approaches and their potential for explaining foreign policy outcomes. The second section focuses on political preferences broadly conceived, starting with the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy decision-making. This is trailed by a review of what are mostly constructivist approaches that emphasize national culture, identity, or role conceptions as factors that shape foreign policy behavior. The final section surveys systemic arguments on external constraints and inducements. Starting with a discussion of collective action theory, the section moves to established realist approaches that highlight external threats or alliance dependence as principal causes of war involvement.

Though potential explanatory factors are discussed individually in this chapter, a central argument of this book is that a thorough explanation of foreign policy outcomes requires a consideration of multiple causes and their interaction. Hence, while the discussed perspectives emphasize distinct causal factors, it is acknowledged that an explanatory framework of democratic conflict behavior needs to integrate several approaches. Furthermore, some prevalent explanations and their suggested causal factors are too far removed from foreign policy decision-making to allow for the formulation of concrete theoretical
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expectations. Against this backdrop, Chapter 3 introduces an integrative theoretical framework that combines various approaches and allows for an analysis of multiple interactive causes.

Institutional constraints

Explanations of democratic conflict behavior have long emphasized the centrality of institutional constraints that potentially rein in governments’ use of force (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Reiter and Stam, 2002). The underlying argument is stated concisely by Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett: “due to the complexity of the democratic process and the requirements of securing a broad base of support for risky policies, democratic leaders are reluctant to wage wars” (1993: 626). Similarly, Dan Reiter and Allan Stam assert that, “institutional structures force leaders to be concerned with maintaining the consent of the governed [...] Democratic decisions for war are determined and constrained by public consent” (2002: 144). Yet, at the same time, it is acknowledged that the institutional argument implies the existence of variation between democracies. As Maoz and Russett explain, “[p]residential systems should be less constrained than parliamentary systems, in which the government is far more dependent on the support it gets from the legislature. Coalition governments or minority cabinets are far more constrained than are governments controlled by a single party” (1993: 626, emphasis added). It follows that differences across democratic subtypes and in the number of veto opportunities should, in principle, affect the likelihood of war involvement. However, taken as a whole, the literature on the democratic peace has neglected this source of variation among democracies.2 On the other hand, proponents of the institutionalist argument also hold that with regard to democracies’ relations with other regime types, executives are not subject to the same constraints: “Conflicts between a democracy and a nondemocracy [...] are driven by the lack of structural constraints [...] the democratic state finds itself in a no-choice situation. Leaders are forced to find ways to circumvent the due political process” (Maoz and Russett, 1993: 626). This proposition has been rightly criticized as inconsistent with prior assumptions, since it is not evident why previously instituted constraints should dissolve in conflicts with non-democracies (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999: 792).

Participatory constraints

The idea that ordinary citizens could act as a constraint on governments that harbor war ambitions features prominently in democratic
peace theory. Moreover, Immanuel Kant’s often cited proposition from the first definitive article of Perpetual Peace [1795] that states would be greatly discouraged from waging war if the decision were to require citizens’ approval has served as the backdrop for a range of arguments on “participatory constraints”:

If, as is inevitably the case under this constitution, the consent of the citizens is required to decide whether or not war is to be declared, it is very natural that they will have great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise. For this would mean calling upon themselves all the miseries of war, such as doing the fighting themselves, supplying the costs of the war from their own resources [...] and, as the crowning evil, having to take upon themselves a burden of debt which will embitter peace itself and which can never be paid off on account of the constant threat of new wars. (Kant, 2007: 100)

Yet, while Kant’s reasoning is convincing in principle, it opens room for debate when applied to contemporary democracies. Particular concerns regard the nature of democratic institutions and the foundations of the cost–benefit calculations that are implied in Kant’s argument. What kind of institutional provisions are adequate to allow the “consent of the citizens” entry into the political process on decisions over war and peace? How is public consent to be measured? And is it correct to assume that all citizens are equally affected by the “miseries of war”, or do some carry a disproportionate share of the burden?

It is peculiar to observe how differently studies on democracy and war have interpreted Kant’s famous proposition. Works in the rational choice tradition have read Kant as specifying the political costs that democratic leaders face when initiating war (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Lake, 1992; Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Schultz, 1999). For instance, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman (1992) apply a strategic choice framework to different forms of conflict interaction. The authors expect democratic governments to confront severe political costs in using force, regardless of the target, due to potential domestic opposition, public protest, legislative interference, and the loss of life and national wealth (1992: 45). It follows that risk-averse leaders are generally assumed to be reluctant to use force. However, since this could leave democracies “vulnerable to threats of war or exploitation” by non-democracies, and because democratic leaders are aware of this risk, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman expect democracies to initiate occasional “preemptive attacks against presumed attackers” (1992: 159).
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Besides the question of whether preemptive strikes correspond to the broader framework provided by Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, their study does not empirically examine the role of the general public or the conditions under which it constrains or permits war involvement.

Russett and John Oneal (2001) provide a related, but more encompassing treatment of Kant. Their study combines accounts based on arguments that relate to democratic institutions, international organizations, and economic interdependence, which are seen as mutually enforcing factors that lead to peaceful interdemocratic relations. In contrast to game-theoretic approaches, Russett and Oneal treat the requirement of public support not as a constant but as a variable that affects government choices. They assume that citizens in a democracy have a direct or indirect influence on foreign and security policy, which forces governments “to consider the will of the people”, primarily due to leaders’ desire to become re-elected (Russett and Oneal, 2001: 274). This argument dovetails with Michael Doyle’s well-known proposition that because of their domestic constraints, democracies will only fight wars for “popular, liberal purposes” (1983a: 230).

By contrast, Ernst Czempiel (1996) takes a profoundly democratic perspective in his reading of Kant. Czempiel argues that as long as the transfer of societal demands into the political process is not taking place one cannot speak of a sufficiently democratic political system. Based on Kant’s theorem, Czempiel derives the hypothesis that a country’s degree of democratic participation is inversely related to its war-proneness (1996: 97). Faced with the empirical record of democratic wars against non-democracies, Czempiel consequently explains this fact on the basis of insufficient degrees of democratization, even among mature democracies (1996: 98). Concerning cost–benefit calculations implied in Kant’s argument, Thomas Risse points out what he regards as a shortcoming in rational choice studies, since these cannot account for the non-occurrence of wars between democracies with highly asymmetrical power relations, “in which the costs of attack are low for the more powerful state” (1995b: 497). Sebastian Rosato complements this critique, arguing that the costs of war are typically relegated to a “small subset of the population” while the majority of citizens are not personally affected by military conflict (2003: 594).

Democratic subtypes

At the most general level, democracies can be differentiated by their constitutional structure. This includes the sources of executive authority and the nature of the electoral system, as two key characteristics of
democratic systems. The first of these yields the distinction between parliamentary and presidential democracy, which has been of central concern for comparativist scholars (Lijphart, 1992; Linz, 1990a; 1990b; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). While executives in parliamentary systems rely on legislative confidence, presidents receive their political authority in direct elections separate from the legislature. In practice, however, a variety of democratic regimes exist that do not fall neatly into either category. Semi-presidentialism, for instance, is a hybrid form of government that combines elements of parliamentarism and presidentialism in a “dual leadership” model that entails a directly elected president and a prime minister reliant on legislative confidence (Blondel, 1977; Duverger, 1980).

Electoral systems, as another characteristic to distinguish democracies, are acknowledged to have a mediated influence on the party system, since majoritarian electoral rules tend to favor two-party systems while proportional representation typically fosters multiparty systems (Duverger, 1951). Due to the strong link between electoral rules and the party system, differences in the former ultimately affect the very nature of political competition in a country – ranging from a “winner takes all” mentality in two-party systems to more compromise-oriented politics in multiparty systems. In sum, based on the balance of executive-legislative relations and the proportionality of the electoral system, the “classical subtypes” of democracy can be derived (Collier and Levitsky, 1997: 435).

Recent work in international security has begun to examine varying institutional settings in relation to conflict behavior. While the theoretical assumption is widely shared that presidential democracies should be less constrained domestically and thus more likely to become involved in military conflict (cf. Maoz and Russett, 1993: 626), quantitative empirical studies that investigated this nexus report no statistically significant results for the parliamentary-presidential distinction in relation to dispute involvement (Leblang and Chan, 2003; Reiter and Tillman, 2002).

With regard to the effects of cabinet structure in parliamentary democracies, studies have also failed to reach a consensus. Some argue on the basis of historical cases that coalition governments should be more restrained in their use of force than single-party governments (Auerswald, 1999). Others report contrary findings, indicating that coalition governments are more likely to reciprocate disputes than single-party governments (Prins and Sprecher, 1999). Finally, some studies find no evidence for differences in the conflict initiation propensity between single-party and coalition governments but clear indication
that minority governments are least likely to initiate international conflicts (Ireland and Gartner, 2001: 561),\textsuperscript{11} and that “coalitions engage in more extreme behaviors” – whether cooperative or conflictual (Kaarbo and Beasley, 2008: 79).

Concerning electoral rules, studies find that proportional representation systems are less likely to get involved in war (Leblang and Chan, 2003: 396) and that increased electoral participation reduces the likelihood of conflict initiation (Reiter and Tillman, 2002: 820). These results correspond with a study by Arend Lijphart and Peter Bowman, who conduct an indirect test of the democratic peace proposition and find that, “the typical consensus democracy gave about 0.20 percentage points more of its GDP in foreign aid than the typical majoritarian democracy”, even when controlling for population size and economic development (2008: 242).

**Veto points and veto players**

Work on democratic subtypes, by its nature, emphasizes institutional differences and focuses on subsets of democratic systems. Veto point and veto player approaches, by contrast, take into view the political and institutional configurations that constrain democratic governments in their ability to enact policy, which allows for a comparison that spans across distinctions between parliamentary and presidential regimes, coalition and single-party cabinets, or majority and minority governments.

Institutional **veto points** are understood as the “political arenas” where policy proposals may be overturned. Whether or not a political arena constitutes a veto point in a given situation depends foremost on its constitutional right to veto. In addition, one needs to consider intraparty cohesion and the partisan composition of the executive and the legislature (Immergut, 1990: 396–397; Immergut and Abou-Chadi, 2010: 8). Veto points can arise along the chain of decision-making, from the executive to the legislative and electoral arena. For example, a coalition partner could block a policy proposal. Or an unstable parliamentary majority could threaten its ratification. Finally, instruments of direct democracy, such as referenda, could overturn an unpopular policy.

**Veto players** are defined as the “individual and collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo”. A further distinction is made between institutional and partisan veto players, where the former are constitutionally created and the latter refer to actors that are “generated by the political game” (Tsebelis, 2002: 19). A basic premise of veto player theory as outlined by George Tsebelis is that an increase in
the number of veto players fosters policy stability, that is, a preservation of the status quo (2002: 25). However, because their policy preferences are also taken into account, not all veto players are equally important. Assuming a one-dimensional scale of policy preferences, veto players whose preferred policy is located between other veto players’ ideal points are “absorbed”, since these have no effect on policy stability (Tsebelis, 2002: 28–29).

Due to their parsimony and analytical reach, veto point and veto player approaches have been widely applied in the subfield of Comparative Politics. This includes studies on the ratification of preferential trading arrangements (Mansfield and Milner, 2010), interest group pressure and public infrastructure investments (Henisz and Zelner, 2006), the reform capacity of modern democracies (König et al., 2010), or the introduction of economic reforms (Zohlnhöfer, 2003), to cite just a few examples from this burgeoning literature. Security-related work, however, has been slow to adopt the veto point and veto player frameworks. Of course, part of this could be due to the fact that there is less legislative activity in foreign and security policy, especially when compared to public policy. Another reason could be that executives traditionally enjoy greater autonomy in foreign affairs, which coincides with a far reduced number of potential veto players when compared to domestic policy.

Nonetheless, some studies in international security have picked up the veto player concept (Choi, 2010: 440; Reiter and Tillman, 2002: 813). Dan Reiter and Erik Tillman explore the effects of various constraints on executive conflict initiation. Their study refers to veto players (2002: 813), but it does not assess these directly. Instead, a variable is introduced that measures whether the legislature is required to ratify international treaties, which is taken as a general indicator of legislative “foreign policy-making power” (2002: 819). Among other results, Reiter and Tillman find that in states with this form of legislative power, conflict initiation does indeed become less likely, which resonates with the traditional view of institutional constraints (2002: 822). Seung-Whan Choi (2010) aims to test Tsebelis’ theory with a research design that investigates the effect of veto players on executive conflict behavior in democratic, non-democratic, and mixed dyads. He employs a dataset by Witold Henisz (2000) that provides a general indicator of institutional constraints resembling the veto player approach. The study finds that, in general terms, “rising legislative constraints decrease the likelihood of conflict”, while “mixed dyads are as peaceful as democratic dyads”, which is taken as confirmative evidence for the constraining effect of legislative constraints and the veto player argument (Choi, 2010: 463).
Despite these advances in the extension of veto point and veto player approaches to conflict studies, empirical research has, for the most part, neglected the distinction between different policy areas. Moreover, prevailing measures of institutional constraints remain abstract and far removed from processes of decision-making. However, these shortcomings are addressed by recent work on “parliamentary war powers” that specifically investigates veto rights in the field of security and military deployment policy (Dieterich et al., 2010; Peters and Wagner, 2011). Though these authors do not directly refer to the veto point or veto player approaches, their work serves to fill some of the research gaps that previous studies have uncovered. The literature on parliamentary veto rights is addressed in detail in Chapter 3.

Political preferences

Institutions alone cannot explain why particular governments choose to go to war and others abstain from military participation. Thus, in order to account for foreign policy outcomes, we also have to consider preference distributions within and outside of government. While government preferences, and specifically partisanship, will be discussed in Chapter 3, this section revisits broader societal currents as reflected in the debate on the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy and approaches that emphasize national culture, identity, or role conceptions.

Public opinion and foreign policy

If proponents of the democratic peace are correct in their assumption that democratic leaders are constrained by a requirement to gather citizens’ support for their policies, then public opinion should be a critical factor in assessing whether or not a country is likely to engage in military conflict. Of the large body of work on public opinion and foreign policy, three areas are of particular importance for the present study: (1) the nature of public and elite attitudes toward foreign affairs, (2) the comparability of research findings across Western democracies, and (3) the question of whether a causal mechanism exists that links public opinion to foreign policy outcomes.13

Nowadays most scholars reject the notion that the public is indifferent to foreign policy or that citizens’ attitudes “lack intellectual structure and factual content”, as Gabriel Almond found in his classic study (1950: 69). To Almond, the relationship between citizen preferences and decision-making was burdened by the volatility of public attitudes: “Perhaps the gravest general problem confronting policymakers is that
of the instability of mass moods, and cyclical fluctuations which stand in the way of policy stability” (1950: 239). Almond’s findings received initial support from several studies and agreed with widespread notions among policy analysts that public opinion is volatile and detrimental to consistent policies.14 Walter Lippmann, an influential political journalist at the time, articulated this rather bleak view of public opinion and its injurious effect on policymaking:

The unhappy truth is that the prevailing public opinion has been destructively wrong at the critical junctures. The people have imposed a veto upon the judgments of informed and responsible officials. They have compelled the governments, which usually knew what would have been wiser, or was necessary, or was more expedient, to be too late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacifist in peace and too bellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing in negotiations or too intransigent. (Lippmann, 1955: 20; emphasis added)

Up until the escalation of the Vietnam War in the 1960s, most scholars and policymakers shared the pessimistic view of public opinion articulated by Almond and Lippmann, an understanding that came to be known as the “Almond-Lippmann consensus” (Holsti, 1992: 442). But the consensus eroded as scholars began to question its empirical foundations. William Caspary provided the first rigorous challenge to Almond’s study, concluding that public opinion is characterized by a “strong and stable permissive mood toward international involvements” (1970: 546; original emphasis). Against the backdrop of an increasingly brutal war in Vietnam, Caspary warned, however, that policymakers could exploit this mood:

[T]he support by the long-suffering American public of 10 years of fighting – and 4 years of heavy combat – in Vietnam is an indication of the existence of a permissive mood. It also indicates that such a mood provides a blank check for foreign policy adventures, not just a responsible support for international organization, genuine foreign assistance, and basic defense measures. (Caspary, 1970: 546)

While Caspary’s study cast serious doubt on Almond’s theory of volatile public moods, a later series of publications by Robert Shapiro and Benjamin Page “essentially destroyed” any remnants of it, as Russett puts it (1990: 92). Shapiro and Page (1988) conducted extensive quantitative analyses based on data from over fifty years of survey research.15
Their findings led them to assert that public opinion is, in general, quite stable and that when change occurs it can be explained on the grounds of external circumstances or the introduction of new information:

The quality of public opinion tends to reflect the quality of the information and the choices with which the public is presented. If the public seems foolish or confused on some issue, the fault may very well lie with the providers of information—or misinformation. When leaders explain international realities clearly and correctly, the public generally responds sensibly, based on its underlying values. When information is unbiased, public opinion is very much worth taking into account in policymaking. There is no need to fear democracy. (Shapiro and Page, 1988: 244)

Though scholars refuted the notion that public opinion is unstructured and incoherent, few debate the claim that the mass public is only modestly informed about foreign policy issues—a fact that studies have repeatedly confirmed (Holsti, 1992: 447). But how do citizens form their attitudes on foreign policy issues and how do these differ from elite attitudes? Scholars have proposed various conceptual frameworks to differentiate within and across public and elite foreign policy outlooks. Whereas Ole Holsti (1979) suggested a trichotomous “three-headed eagle” model that comprised fixed types, later work emphasized that two or three dimensions more appropriately characterize foreign policy beliefs among leaders and the general public.16

Eugene Wittkopf’s *Faces of Internationalism* (1990) had a lasting influence on subsequent research. Based on a secondary analysis of Chicago Council on Foreign Relations surveys, Wittkopf inductively derived two dimensions that structure foreign policy attitudes: support for “militant internationalism” (MI) and support for “cooperative internationalism” (CI). On this basis, Wittkopf derived four types of foreign policy attitudes: “internationalists”, who support MI and CI, “hardliners”, who support MI but oppose CI, “accomodationists” who oppose MI but support CI, and “isolationists” who oppose both MI and CI (1990: 24–27). Wittkopf demonstrated empirically that these types were represented almost equally among the American public between 1974 and 1986.

While subsequent work confirmed the validity of the MI/CI scheme and its continued relevance after the Cold War (Holsti, 2004: 176), others have suggested a three-dimensional model to incorporate the distinction between multilateralism and unilateralism (Chittick et al., 1995), or between hierarchy and community as core values (Rathbun, 2007).
Brian Rathbun’s re-analysis of data used by Holsti and Rosenau (1996) demonstrates significant similarity between domestic and foreign policy variables, which suggests that these go back to shared core values. The study also finds evidence for a separate isolationist dimension outside the MI/CI framework (Rathbun, 2007: 396–397).

To which extent are these conceptions of foreign policy attitudes applicable outside the United States? Although the majority of studies focus on the United States, some have extended the analysis to other countries, while arguments about cleavage structures, as suggested by Rathbun (2007), could be applied to advanced democracies more broadly. As an early adaptation of Wittkopf’s typology, Andrew Ziegler (1987) demonstrated the existence of four types of attitude structures in Western Europe. Ulf Bjereld and Ann-Marie Ekengren (1999) conducted a comparison of foreign policy attitudes between citizens in the United States and Sweden, based on the theoretical frames of Wittkopf (1990) and Chittick et al. (1995). Their findings indicated that, by and large, “Swedish people are isolationist: almost half the population fit into this group” (1999: 510).

A recent article examines the structure of foreign policy beliefs in Britain, identifying two dimensions that closely relate to Wittkopf’s scheme of militant and cooperative internationalism (Reifler et al., 2011). The study finds significant covariation between foreign policy beliefs, voting intentions and partisanship, demonstrating that the identified foreign policy attitudes are further relevant to domestic political competition (Reifler et al., 2011: 263). These studies demonstrate the general applicability of the suggested models of foreign policy belief structures outside the United States. However, it has also become clear that these frameworks need to be adapted to a country’s specific context to be meaningful.

Regarding the connection between public opinion and foreign policy, it remains disputed among scholars whether a causal relation exists, but granted that there is a link it is unclear in which direction the causal arrow runs. This is partly owed to the fact that there are far more descriptive studies on public opinion than investigations of the causal chain that connects it to foreign policy (Holsti, 1992: 453). As in other areas of politics, it is difficult to demonstrate with certainty that a specific factor had the hypothesized influence while accounting for the possibility that other factors could have equally affected the resulting policy outcome. While the issue is often portrayed, for simplicity’s sake, as a relation between citizens and decision-makers, there are a number of important confounders, such as legislatures, media coverage, and issue salience.
In lack of a comprehensive theory of public opinion and foreign policy, it might be worthwhile to revisit the theoretical frame suggested by Risse (1991). In essence, Risse argues in favor of a combined approach that regards public opinion in the context of a country's political system and its degree of centralization, its societal structure and the degree of state influence in coalition-building processes (1991: 486). In combination, these three domestic factors enable or constrain opportunities for public influence on foreign policy decisions. Risse argues that strong states with relatively close-knit policy networks offer few opportunities for public influence, while states that are less centralized and allow for a wider input into the political process should be more responsive to public opinion.

Security culture, national identity and role conceptions
Explanations of democratic foreign policy frequently refer to democratic “norms” and “culture”, but as far as predominant approaches to the democratic peace are concerned, these concepts themselves have long been neglected as objects of inquiry. However, in the wake of the “constructivist turn” in IR theory (Checkel, 1998), scholars have begun to unravel these terms and investigate how norms and culture are constituted and to which extent they shape national interests and identity, including states’ external security policies and their conflict behavior (Katzenstein, 1996). Others have focused on national role conceptions and role performance as concepts that are closely related to national identity, norms and culture but which have remained largely within the domain of foreign policy analysis (FPA) and outside the major currents of IR theory (Breuning, 2011: 20; McCourt, 2012: 370).

Constructivist studies show how shared ideas and beliefs shape states’ national identity, define national interests, and influence security policy. For instance, Elizabeth Kier (1997) explores the military’s organizational culture in France and Britain during the interwar period. Her work demonstrates how culture affects strategic orientation – contrary to the expectations derived from a functionalist logic or systemic imperatives. Thomas Berger (1996) traces the evolution of distinct political-military cultures in Germany and Japan following their collapse in World War II, which proved to have a lasting impact on these states’ policies and resulted in a marked reluctance to engage in the use of military force. Audie Klotz (1995) argues that the emergence of a universal norm of racial equality had a constitutive role in defining national identities and interests, which led international organizations and states to adopt sanctions against the Apartheid regime in South Africa, despite
countervailing economic and strategic interests. Martha Finnemore (1996) provides evidence from diverse issue areas that illustrates how international organizations socialize states to redefine their national interests, in contrast to the expectations of prevalent approaches that stress domestic pressures or external threats. Finally, a related literature builds on what Karl Deutsch termed “pluralistic security communities” (1957) to enlarge the scope of analysis beyond the level of the nation state and to include matters of regional integration and transnational community (Adler and Barnett, 1998).

Research on the democratic peace has also been propelled by constructivist approaches. Risse (1995b) argues prominently that democracies are “Janus-faced”: shared norms constitute the collective identity of democracies, which entails benevolent intrademocratic relations but also potentially fosters aggression vis-à-vis non-democratic regimes that are regarded as oppressive and unjust toward their own population. This theoretical argument resonates with empirical work that emphasizes the role of perceptions of “democraticness” (Owen, 1997). Harald Müller (2002; 2004) explores “antinomies” inherent in prevailing explanations of the democratic peace, which are defined as contradictions between implications of equally valid theoretical principles. Müller demonstrates convincingly how conflicting tendencies can be derived from monadic and dyadic propositions that can foster peaceful foreign relations as well as belligerent behavior (2002: 67–72).

To account for the apparent variance in democratic conflict behavior, Müller and Jonas Wolff (2006) suggest a theoretical explanation that rests on the essential ambiguity of liberal-democratic norms. Partly reflecting Risse’s argument, it is held that these norms can equally serve to justify democratic war as to prevent armed hostilities against another democracy (2006: 61). Müller and Wolff distinguish democracies by their predominant political culture on a continuum that ranges from a “militant” to a “pacifist” pole (2006: 62). While these traits can co-exist in many countries, it is argued that some countries have a political culture with deeply embedded militant or pacifist traits (2006: 64). With regard to the interaction between different regimes, it is further suggested that the probability of “democratic war” increases dramatically against an “outlaw regime”, or when democracies are faced with “genocidal-totalitarian” states, because even largely pacifist countries would consider such adversaries legitimate targets (Müller and Wolff, 2006: 65). An empirical study by Anna Geis and colleagues (2010; 2013) explores the reasons for democratic belligerence and peacefulness. The authors investigate parliamentary debates prior to the wars in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and Iraq and across seven
democracies. An extensive analysis of parliamentary speeches provides evidence of distinct foreign policy cultures in the observed countries, as reflected in the discursive structures of plenary debates.

Despite the affinity between constructivist approaches and role theory, the latter has mainly stayed under the purview of foreign policy analysis – notwithstanding current attempts at integration between the political science subfields of IR and FPA (Thies and Breuning, 2012).18 Yet role theory has an established pedigree in sociology, stretching back to the work of George Herbert Mead (1934), who influenced early contributions in foreign policy analysis (Holsti, 1970; Walker, 1987) and whose original studies‘ have received renewed attention in recent years (Harnisch, 2011a; McCourt, 2012).19

Roles can be defined as “social positions” that arise from “ego and alter expectations regarding the purpose of an actor in an organized group”. This definition entails the role conception of an actor and others’ role expectation of this actor. These concepts need to be kept analytically separate from role performance, or foreign policy behavior, which often serves as the dependent variable in role theory research (Harnisch, 2011b: 8–9). Role theory is essentially integrative as its framework combines ideational and material factors; it thus holds the potential to serve as a nexus for the agent–structure relationship that has been a central concern of constructivist scholarship (Breuning, 2011: 26).

Empirical work on role conceptions comprises, for the most part, single-country studies. Still, authors fruitfully apply role theoretical approaches to explain puzzles in foreign policy behavior, to expand the framework to the study of regional organizations, and to combine it with other theoretical lenses. For example, Sebastian Harnisch (2001) examines post-unification German foreign policy and the country’s role socialization as a “civilian power”, drawing on the conception Hanns Maull (1990) introduced for Germany and Japan and which was later expanded into a more general theoretical framework (Kirste and Maull, 1996). Harnisch shows how role theory helps to explain the peculiar continuity in German foreign policy after its unification. Rikard Bengtsson and Ole Elgström (2011) investigate the meta-role of the EU as a normative power and other, context-specific roles of the EU in its relations with external states. Trine Flockhart (2011) explores the processes of identity construction within NATO and the multiple roles adopted by the organization throughout its institutional evolution. Finally, Cameron Thies (2012) develops an innovative approach that combines role conceptions and game theory to understand socialization processes, which he applies to several episodes of Israeli history.
External constraints and inducements

The previous sections emphasized domestic factors as potential causes of democratic war involvement. But this should not be taken to imply that external factors are negligible. In contrast to work that stresses either domestic or systemic factors, I argue that the latter serve as external constraints and inducements that must be combined with domestic factors in order to explain particular governments’ chosen policies. This section explores arguments based on collective action, external threat and alliance dependence.

Collective action

Collective action theory has frequently been applied to questions of “burden sharing” within military alliances and coalitions. Debates about allied security provision reach back to the foundation of NATO on 24 August 1949, when the Cold War entered a new phase. Shortly after the North Atlantic Treaty came into force, President Truman publicly announced that US aircraft had detected a radioactive explosion – indicating that the Soviet Union had detonated its first atomic weapon. This was a demonstration of technological prowess that few experts had thought possible at the time. In response, Truman had the United States initiate a massive military build-up, as advocated in a then secret policy paper to the National Security Council (US-DoS, 1950). With regard to NATO, analysts were primarily concerned how alliance members, despite their asymmetries in economic and military capabilities, could provide for the common defense at adequate levels without exploiting the contributions of some members to the benefit of others.

In a seminal article, Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser (1966b) applied collective action theory to security alliances and NATO as an organization of member states allied for the purpose of common defense, which is understood as a collective good, since all members benefit from it and none can be excluded from its consumption, regardless of whether or not they contributed to the good’s provision. Olson and Zeckhauser argue that, due to the effects of group size and the distinct cost and benefit structures of their members, (1) alliances as a whole tend to provide only a suboptimal amount of the public good, and (2) larger members of alliances, who ‘place a higher absolute value on the public good’, tend ‘to bear a disproportionate share of the burden’, because small states are likely to exploit opportunities to ride free on the defense provisions of the larger member states (1966b: 268).
As Russell Hardin (1982) points out in a critique of Olson’s argument (1971) that specifically concerns the latter’s typology of groups, total group size is less important than the size of the smallest subgroup that “just barely stands to benefit” from mutual cooperation, even when other group members ride free. If the size of this subgroup, denoted by \( k \), is relatively small, then also larger groups can provide public goods (Hardin, 1982: 40–41). In a game-theoretic application of this logic to hegemonic stability theory, Duncan Snidal demonstrates the theoretical feasibility of collective action despite the presence of free riders, as long as an effective \( k \)-group coordinates its actions. Snidal suggests that cooperation between a few states in an asymmetric group can effectively replace hegemonic leadership by a single dominant actor (Snidal, 1985: 603–612). This reasoning is based on the premise that large states have both a stronger interest in and a greater capacity to provide the public good. Hence, asymmetry among states reduces the size of the \( k \)-group, which enhances the likelihood of successful provision of the public good (Hasenclever et al., 1997: 101).

Olson and Zeckhauser’s “exploitation of the great by the small” hypothesis (cf. Olson, 1971: 169) is further based on the premise of the provision of a pure public good. But scholars have pointed out that security alliances often provide multiple goods. Nuclear deterrence, for instance, comes close to being a pure public good, since the deterrent threat of a retaliatory strike can be extended to cover additional member states at little or no further cost. Conventional defense, however, is better characterized as an impure public good that is rival in consumption because it is tied to a specific territory, creating vulnerabilities elsewhere. Because of the different functions that defense provisions can serve, it is therefore useful to conceive of their output as “joint products”, as Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley have suggested (1999: 34).

**External threat**

Questions of alliance formation and behavior have long been a central concern of realism. Realists argue that states form alliances in reaction to power imbalances or external threats. As a school of thought, political realism shares three basic assumptions: (1) nation states are the central actors in international politics, (2) anarchy, or the absence of government, is the defining characteristic of the relations between states, and (3) states calculate their goals rationally, based on narrow conceptions of self-interest. Based on these premises, realists derive a conception of international politics as a zero-sum struggle for power in a self-help environment. But despite these shared assumptions, variants of realism offer a range of different theoretical arguments regarding alliance behavior.
For structural realists (or neorealists) like Kenneth Waltz, it is the distribution of material capabilities across the international system that plays a crucial role in constraining states and inducing certain patterns of behavior. Under conditions of bipolarity with only two great powers (or superpowers) in the system this is expected to foster balancing behavior, because states seek to maintain the status quo and thus “prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions” to form a counterweight against a rising power (Waltz, 1979: 126).

Yet it is difficult to derive testable implications from structural realism for the behavior of individual states, much less for contemporary democracies in a multipolar or unipolar world. Due to its parsimony and high level of generality, Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* (1979) remains underspecified and fraught with inherent ambiguity. Hence, even realists have concluded that, “for a particular state in particular circumstances, any foreign policy and its opposite can sometimes be deduced from Waltz’s theory” (Christensen and Snyder, 1990: 138). However, Waltz has repeatedly told critics who bemoaned the poor explanatory power of neorealism that his theory was not intended to explain foreign policy outcomes as it rests on a higher level of generality (1979: 121).

By contrast, Stephen Walt (1987) evidently seeks to explain foreign policy outcomes. Walt understands his balance-of-threat theory as a “refinement of traditional balance of power theory” and argues that states primarily balance against perceived threats, rather than what Waltz conceived as balancing against aggregate material capabilities (1987: 263). The level of threat, according to Walt, is a function of material resources, offensive power, geographic proximity, and perceptions of aggressive intent (1987: 22–28). In general terms, Walt, like Waltz before him, expects balancing to be the predominant behavior in international politics. He presumes that this tendency is stronger among powerful states, whereas weaker states might bandwagon when threatened. With regard to defective behavior Walt further notes, “When adequate allied support is certain, however, the tendency for free-riding or buck-passing increases” (1987: 33).

How can the external threat argument be applied to democratic war involvement? Realists regard alliance formation as a manifestation of external balancing behavior. In order to apply their arguments to the foreign policies of contemporary democracies in an existing alliance such as NATO, however, some assumptions are necessary. First, we have to assume that alliance coordination is equivalent to balancing behavior. Hence it is supposed that states that perceive a threat will make a military contribution to a planned intervention. Regarding the opposite behavior, bandwagoning, there is no proper equivalent in contemporary alliance
politics. Arguably, a refusal to cooperate or a threatened veto against an impending alliance decision would come closest to bandwagoning, but it stops short of joining forces with the adversary and is usually not an expression of support for the target of allied military intervention but an expression of disagreement over specific alliance policies. Finally, expectations on the causes of free riding or buck-passing are nearly identical to those found in the collective action literature.

Alliance dependence

The familiar logic of the “security dilemma” can be extended to coordination problems between member states of security alliances.  In his classic statement on the subject, John Herz described the security dilemma as a result of the perennial problem that actors acquire power to feel more secure, whereby other actors are left less secure and consequently, due to mutual uncertainty about the intent of the other, a “vicious circle of security and power accumulation” evolves (1950: 157).

Members of an alliance have to reconcile two essential but crosscutting foreign policy goals: (1) the strive for security and (2) the pursuit of political autonomy vis-à-vis other states. While a firm alliance commitment increases security through a mutual defense guarantee, it entails the risk of becoming drawn into other states’ conflicts and having to fight over an ally’s interests, thereby reducing autonomy. Defection or non-cooperation, on the other hand, increases autonomy but also raises the risk of being deserted by the ally in future conflicts. These dynamics constitute the ‘alliance security dilemma’ as states face inversely related fears of ‘entrapment’ and ‘abandonment’, where reducing one leads to an increase in the other (Snyder, 1984: 466–468). The severity of the alliance security dilemma is contingent on several factors, but the most important one, according to Glenn Snyder, is a state’s “relative dependence” on the alliance, which is a function of military capability in relation to other alliance members, the presence of external threats and potential alliance alternatives (1984: 471).

What are the theoretical implications of the alliance dependence argument? In general terms, it can be expected that a state will provide support for an alliance operation whenever the fear of abandonment outweighs the fear of entrapment. Small powers, in particular, are more likely to be dependent on their more powerful allies because they cannot sufficiently provide for their own security. In highly asymmetric alliances, such as NATO, the dependence of each ally on the most powerful state will determine its contribution. Similar to the collective action argument, however, the hypothesis is agnostic about the kind of contribution made. Hence support could be given in political, economic, or military terms.
3
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Based on the preceding discussion of democracy and war involvement, this chapter develops the theoretical framework and hypotheses to be tested in the comparative case studies of Chapters 5–7. The following sections elaborate on the theoretical expectations, whereas Table 3.1 provides a summary of the hypotheses advanced in each section.

While the individual hypotheses developed here are broadly informed by liberal-institutionalism, realism, and constructivism, as the major perspectives in IR theory, my approach is consciously eclectic in its aim for an integrative theoretical explanation of democratic war involvement. This resonates with scholars’ recent efforts to dissolve paradigmatic boundaries and to focus on problem-driven research that takes into account “complex causal stories” and that restricts itself to modest generalization (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010: 208). My approach thus diverges from studies that test competing hypotheses from different IR paradigms in order to assess their relative explanatory strength – a practice that still predominates in empirical research.¹ I argue that work of this kind can only be fertile where contradictory claims are clearly identifiable and different theories each offer comprehensive explanations of empirical phenomena. Yet it is apparent that different theoretical paradigms ask different analytical questions. Hence, the thrust of a research question frequently affects the results in favor of one paradigm over its competitors. Likewise, paradigmatic research tends to emphasize discrete elements of an explanation – whether this entails the role of power, institutions, preferences, or norms in affecting certain processes or bringing about specific outcomes.

The research problem of varying war participation among democracies primarily concerns countries’ domestic sources of foreign policy, an area that is commonly understood as the domain of liberal and
constructivist approaches, though neoclassical realism has begun to challenge this conception as of late. However, rather than focusing on differences between schools of thought, I develop an integrative comparative approach that combines the analysis of domestic factors, including different forms of institutional constraints, political ideology, and public opinion, as well as structural factors, such as countries’ relative power position, to explore the conditions under which democracies participate in military operations. The approach conjoins factors that previous studies have identified as important in explaining military participation but whose interaction has gone largely unobserved. Hence, the framework developed here reflects recent efforts to move away from studies that investigate purely institutional effects and instead combine the analysis of institutions and preferences (Clare, 2010; Elman, 2000; Kaarbo and Beasley, 2008; Müller, 2004).

Parliamentary veto rights

Democracies display notable differences concerning the degree of involvement of their national legislatures in decision-making processes on the use of force. Likewise, considerable variation exists at the constitutional level regarding the scope of military operations that democracies are legally permitted to engage in. In recent years, a literature has emerged that focuses on parliamentary veto power and constitutional constraints in the context of democratic accountability and as institutional explanations for democratic participation and non-participation in various kinds of military operations – essential issues that have long been ignored in research on democracy and the use of force (Born and Hänggi, 2005; Dieterich, et al., 2009; 2010; Kesgin and Kaarbo, 2010; Kolanoski, 2010; Ku and Jacobson, 2003a; Wagner, 2011; Wagner et al., 2010).

Concerning parliamentary involvement, it is apparent that some executives face no legislative constraints in sending the military abroad, whereas others are constitutionally bound to seek parliamentary approval before authorizing troop deployments. In contrast to abstract notions of executive–legislative relations as an “institutional constraint” to democratic governments, the concept of “parliamentary war powers” refers to the concrete authority of the legislature in the field of military deployment policy (cf. Peters and Wagner, 2011).

Recent work on parliamentary war powers provides an important specification of democratic foreign policy processes, identifying sources of variation among democracies that have not been addressed by previous studies on the democratic peace. Parliamentary war powers are
analytically closer and thus, arguably, of more immediate relevance to decisions on the use of force than remote measures of institutional constraints that merely differentiate between constitutional systems. These are also distinct from the constitutional right to declare war, which is obsolete at best in an age where armed conflict is prevalent but formal declarations of war are virtually extinct. Hence, surveys that examine the formal constitutional right to declare war are inadequate as a measure of parliamentary influence on foreign and security policy (e.g., Fish and Kroenig, 2009).

Furthermore, while numerous studies have examined differences between parliamentary and presidential systems regarding conflict behavior, few have investigated the concrete involvement of legislatures in decision-making on the use of force. Studies suggest, however, that significant variation exists that eludes the common parliamentary–presidential distinction. According to this view, it is rather the degree of legislative involvement in military deployment decisions that can, under certain preconditions, reduce war participation (Dieterich et al., 2009; Kesgin and Kaarbo, 2010). In a study of European governments’ involvement in the Iraq War, Sandra Dieterich, Hartwig Hummel, and Stefan Marschall (2009) find that countries that were involved militarily had “basic” or “deficient” war powers, while countries with “comprehensive” war powers made no contribution beyond logistical support. According to Dieterich et al. this can be interpreted as confirming evidence for the “parliamentary peace” hypothesis, which holds that, given the presence of a war-averse public, countries with wide-ranging parliamentary war powers abstain from military participation (2009: 34).

Parliamentary war powers foremost concern the question of whether the legislature holds a veto right over executive decisions on military deployments. In its strongest expression this right grants an *ex ante* veto over all types of military operations. In contrast, an *ex post* veto grants parliament a vote on operations that have already been initiated (Dieterich et al., 2010; Wagner et al., 2010). Arguably, the latter is a much weaker form of influence, since the material and reputational costs for revoking a decision are substantial and make it unlikely that parliamentarians are willing to use this power except under severe circumstances. This is akin to “audience costs” that leaders need to take into account before backing down on a public commitment (Fearon, 1994). At the low end of war powers are informational rights that give parliament no binding veto of any sort but a right to be informed regularly by the executive and to initiate hearings and parliamentary debate (Dieterich, et al., 2010; Wagner, et al., 2010).
In terms of institutional factors, I follow recent work on parliamentary war powers, as an important specification of democratic foreign policy processes. However, my approach departs from prior studies as I make an analytical distinction between parliamentary veto rights and constitutional restrictions on the premise that, while these two concepts are interrelated, they are governed by different causal mechanisms. Whether parliament constitutes a veto point to executive decisions on military deployments, as in a political arena where government proposals can be blocked, depends foremost upon the presence of a formal constitutional right that enables legislators to overturn executive decisions but also on party discipline and the preference distribution in parliament (Immergut, 1990). Equally important for a parliamentary veto point, however, is the extent of public support for a planned military deployment. By contrast, constitutional restrictions establish a structural veto point against military deployments irrespective of the preference distribution in parliament or public support for military participation.

Therefore, I do not expect parliamentary veto rights to be individually necessary nor sufficient but part of a combination of conditions that is sufficient for military non-participation. This implies that parliamentary veto rights are an INUS condition for military non-participation, that is, “an insufficient but necessary part of a condition, which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result” (Mackie, 1965: 245; original emphasis). Specifically, I expect the combination of parliamentary veto rights and public opposition to constitute a parliamentary veto point that is sufficient for military non-participation. This leads to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1a: Parliamentary veto rights are an INUS condition for military non-participation.

Hypothesis 1b: Parliamentary veto rights combined with public opposition are a sufficient condition for military non-participation.

Constitutional restrictions

While democracies show substantial differences with regard to parliamentary involvement in decisions on the deployment of the armed forces, similar variation exists in terms of constitutional law, and the range of military operations democracies are legally permitted to engage in. Though constitutional provisions are subject to historically contingent legal interpretations and are regularly challenged from within and outside of government, constitutional restrictions present the most rigid
form of institutional constraint to executive decisions on the use of force. While the outcome of parliamentary involvement in troop deployment decisions ultimately depends on the preference distribution and political majority inside parliament and policy attitudes among the electorate, constitutional boundaries – where they are defined – present a structural veto to military deployments, irrespective of political preferences.

Constitutional restrictions are sometimes based on a legal status of permanent neutrality, as in Austria and Switzerland. Both countries attained neutrality through unilateral declarations; in the case of Switzerland this occurred in the context of the Vienna Congress of 1815 where the declared neutrality of Switzerland was recognized by the relevant European powers, whereas Austria declared its neutrality in the Bundesverfassungsgesetz (Federal Constitution Act) of 26 October 1955. For other countries, permanent neutrality is rooted in a policy tradition rather than a legal act, as in Sweden, Finland, and Ireland (Bothe, 2008: 577). In the case of Finland, neutrality also had a legal dimension since it was institutionalized in 1948 through the “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” that was imposed upon the country by the Soviet Union and ended with its dissolution in 1992. Since the Soviet Union also insisted upon Austria becoming neutral as a precondition for its continued independence during the Cold War, these two countries could be considered neutral by “coercion”, in contrast to Ireland and Sweden, which established a policy of neutrality on their own initiative (Beyer and Hofmann, 2011: 288, 294–295).

In other democracies significant constitutional restrictions on the use of force emerged against the backdrop of an authoritarian past and the historical experience of militarism, as in Germany and Japan, where post-war constitutions placed substantial limitations on the armed forces and their potential participation in military operations (Damrosch, 2003: 56–58). Still other countries, while neither traditionally neutral nor post-authoritarian, have also placed considerable restrictions on the use of force. For instance, Danish constitutional practice in the 1990s still required a UN mandate, which posed a considerable constraint on participation in NATO’s Kosovo campaign (Jakobsen, 2006: 90–91). In Norway a long-standing consensus existed regarding the primacy of the United Nations and, consequently, the requirement of a UN mandate before considering participation in military operations (Nustad and Thune, 2003: 158–162). In both countries, however, processes of loosening restrictions emerged from the mid-1990s onward, to allow participation in a wider range of military operations, even without explicit authorization from the Security Council. Similar
processes took place in several of the neutral countries, some of which have hence been termed “post-neutral” as their cooperation with alliances and participation in military operations increased substantively (Möller and Bjereld, 2010).

Drawing on established categories in the literature (Jakobsen, 2006; Ku and Jacobson, 2003a; Nolte, 2003), I distinguish three sets of constitutional restrictions on the basis of provisions that prohibit or limit military participation, either (a) on the grounds of international law, (b) outside certain organizational frameworks, or (c) beyond a set of permissible tasks. Provisions in the first set can range from a firm requirement of authorization through the UN Security Council to instructions that bind the armed forces to act in agreement with international law broadly conceived. The second set relates to regulations that demand the involvement of specific multilateral organizational frameworks, as within the UN or through regional security organizations such as NATO or the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Lastly, some democracies specify a limited range of permissible tasks for military deployments to prohibit, for instance, offensive military operations.

How do these sets of constitutional restrictions influence government use of force? Depending on the historical circumstances of each case examined in this study, any set of restrictions can be a sufficient condition for military non-participation. The wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq display dissimilar characteristics in terms of their legality, legitimacy, and organizational frameworks. While NATO’s Kosovo campaign was highly controversial and had no UN authorization, it was also widely considered a legitimate use of force. By contrast, the Iraq War, conducted by an ad hoc coalition of states without a Security Council mandate, violated international law and lacked any legitimacy in world opinion. Finally, the invasion of Afghanistan was based on the legal principle of collective self-defense but had no explicit UN authorization and took place with NATO endorsement but no formal involvement of the alliance during its initial stages. Against this backdrop, each case study chapter initially examines the political and legal background for its respective conflict. Furthermore, the specific meaning of “constitutional restrictions” is specified within each chapter. With regard to general expectations, the following hypotheses can be derived:

*Hypothesis 2a:* Constitutional restrictions are a sufficient condition for military non-participation.
Hypothesis 2b: The absence of constitutional restrictions is a necessary condition for military participation.

Partisanship

Based on the premise that an essential part of domestic politics in mature democracies is party politics, a sizable literature has emerged on the link between political partisanship and public policy (Allan and Scruggs, 2004; Schmidt, 1996). Partisan arguments rest on the notion that parties are “policy-seekers” that aim to implement policy based on their ideological preferences, whereas the “office-seeking” conception regards political parties as policy-blind. In contrast to the former, office-seeking parties’ primary aim is not to implement their preferred policies but to maximize control over office (Strøm, 1990). Findings in Comparative Politics provide empirical evidence that supports the policy-seeking model, indicating that parties tend to articulate policy preferences in line with their political ideology, submit these to the constituency through party manifestos, and aim to enact policy that matches their expressed policy preferences (Klingemann et al., 1994). It has further been shown that policy positions are linked across issue areas, including foreign and security policy, and that these can be meaningfully placed under the categories of “left” and “right” on a one-dimensional scale (Laver and Budge, 1992). Left parties tend to emphasize economic regulation, an expansion of the welfare state, and a negative view of the military, whereas right parties typically stress free enterprise, a limitation of the welfare state, as in a reduction of social services, and a positive view of the military (Budge and Klingemann, 2001).

The question remains, however, whether political partisanship also translates into foreign policy and, specifically, decisions on the use of force. Do left and right parties differ on the issue of war involvement? If so, do these differences also turn into observable outcomes? Several recent studies have enlarged the scope of partisan influence analysis to the field of security studies, reporting systematic differences between left and right parties on substantive questions regarding the use of force. For example, based on an analysis of the conflict involvement of parliamentary democracies during the Cold War period, Glenn Palmer, Patrick Regan, and Tamar London (2004: 16) find right governments more likely to become engaged in interstate conflict than their left counterparts, a finding that is strengthened by the results of a separate study by Philip Arena and Palmer, who report “strong support” for the
hypothesis that right governments are more likely to initiate international disputes (2009: 973). In a study of European countries’ political responses to the Iraq crisis, Jürgen Schuster and Herbert Maier find discernible partisan patterns for Western Europe, where right governments generally supported the war and left executives tended to oppose it, while the partisan hypothesis is not confirmed for Central and Eastern European countries (Schuster and Maier, 2006: 233–235). Finally, Stephanie Hofmann (2013) demonstrates in her study of the creation of European security institutions that partisanship shapes government preferences in security policy and that ideological congruence across governments fosters institution building.

These findings resonate with research conducted by Rathbun (2004, 2007), who reports significant differences between left and right parties in their conception of the national interest and particularly their support for military intervention, an observation that challenges realist conceptions that discount the influence of political ideology on foreign policy and which conceive of hierarchically ordered policy goals regardless of who is in power (Rathbun, 2007: 403). Rathbun associates left and right partisanship with core values such as “community” and “hierarchy”, respectively. He finds confirming empirical evidence for the hypotheses that “community” relates to increased support for humanitarian military intervention, while “hierarchy” is associated with strategic uses of force to defend military or economic assets (Rathbun, 2007: 397–403). In addition, based on a comparative study of French, German, and British governments during the Balkan wars, Rathbun demonstrates, for instance, that left parties in all three countries eventually supported the use of force for humanitarian reasons, while right parties viewed humanitarian intervention as outside their conception of the national interest (Rathbun, 2004: 81).

The argument made by Rathbun rightly emphasizes that in order to explain government positions on the use of force, the qualitative characteristics of military operations need to be taken into account. Despite substantive foreign policy differences between political parties, it is apparent that political conflict does not arise equally over all types of military operations. While some deployments are relatively uncontroversial across the political spectrum, others spark fierce partisan debates. All else being equal, I expect increased partisan dispute, and thus partisan effects, over wars that are matters of political choice, in contrast to conflicts where no viable alternative to the use of force exists and therefore a broad partisan consensus would be expected. This resonates with the concepts introduced by the diplomat and political
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...explains the role of democratic participation in armed conflict, distinguishing between “wars of necessity” that are “essentially unavoidable” and which are most often cases of self-defense, whereas “wars of choice” reflect a conscious decision to use force despite the availability of “other reasonable policies” (Haass, 2009: 9), such as negotiations, diplomatic initiatives, or economic sanctions. Clear cases of self-defense are rare, however, and most wars and military interventions are characterized by some degree of choice on the part of political decision-makers.

This study’s conception of partisanship in security policy is based on general notions of party differences (Budge and Klingemann, 2001) and, specifically, follows the approach suggested by Rathbun (2004), who distinguishes three substantive areas of divergence among ideal-typical parties of the left and the right. Accordingly, parties differ in their definitions and evaluations of (a) the national interest, (b) the appropriateness of military force, and (c) the role of multilateralism in international politics. Left parties typically follow an inclusive conception of the national interest that comprises the promotion of human rights and the welfare of other countries. They are committed to multilateral solutions and reluctant to use military force, emphasizing civilian modes of conflict resolution instead. Right parties, by contrast, typically have a narrower conception of the national interest, focusing on issues that directly affect the well-being of their own country, as opposed to inclusivist humanitarian concerns the left would raise. They prefer unilateral approaches to multilateral alliance operations and regard the use of military force as a necessary instrument of deterrence (Rathbun, 2004: 18–21).

Against this backdrop, I do not expect right or left partisanship to be individually necessary or sufficient for an outcome. Rather, I anticipate these to be parts of combinations of conditions that are sufficient for military participation and non-participation, respectively. In general, it is assumed that left parties are reluctant to use force and that these prefer alternative ways of conflict resolution, whereas right parties consider the military an essential instrument of power that is to be used strategically when economic or military assets are at risk. However, these general assumptions do not preclude right governments from abstaining to use force when a narrowly defined national interest is not at stake, nor does it presume that left governments will not opt for military operations when humanitarian concerns are present and multilateral frameworks available. This means that the partisan hypotheses need to be specified for each of the subsequent comparative case studies. All else being equal, left and right partisanship are conceived...
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as INUS conditions (Mackie, 1965) for military participation and non-participation, respectively. This leads to the following hypotheses:

\textbf{Hypothesis 3a}: Right partisanship is an INUS condition for military participation.
\textbf{Hypothesis 3b}: Left partisanship is an INUS condition for military non-participation.

Public support

The notion that ordinary citizens can act as a constraint on governments with war ambitions is a prominent feature of democratic theory and has frequently been employed in explanations of the democratic peace. Kant’s famous proposition that if citizens would have to approve war, a weighting of costs and benefits would lead them to decide against it (2007: 100), has served as the backdrop for a range of arguments on participatory or public constraints. Rational choice studies, particularly those that rely on formal models, have operationalized Kant’s proposition as a fixed cost that democratic leaders face when contemplating the use of force (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992). Other authors also address public constraint, but emphasize that public opinion does not equate to a constant, fixed cost but that it should rather be treated as a variable that can influence government decisions if support or opposition becomes particularly pronounced. According to the liberal view, democratic governments are constrained by a requirement “to consider the will of the people” (Russett and Oneal, 2001: 274) and to gather citizens’ support for decisions on war and peace, because democracies will only fight wars for “popular, liberal purposes” (Doyle, 1983a: 230). These and related arguments in the democratic peace literature assume a citizen-policy link that, whether directly or indirectly, constrains democratic leaders. By implication, this means that public support is conceived as a necessary condition for military participation. Vice versa, the absence of public support is assumed to be a sufficient condition for military non-participation.

However, it has also been pointed out by scholars that public opinion, on its own, rarely alters a decision in favor or against using force and might sometimes even be ignored by policymakers. For example, Barry Buzan refers to the British government’s involvement in the Suez invasion of 1956, which took place despite the fact that “a significant plurality of the British people did not favour using force” (1974: 184). Hence, based on the Suez crisis and similar historical episodes where public opinion
was effectively ignored by democratic governments, Buzan argues in favor of considering the interplay with additional influences: “public opposition to a state’s use of force […] generally produces a restraint only in conjunction with other favorable factors” (1974: 192; emphasis added).

Others question the logic of the public constraint hypothesis or argue that its effect is weaker than usually assumed. Since few people are directly affected by war, citizens’ cost-benefit calculations, on average, should not result in substantial opposition to military operations (Rosato, 2003: 596). This could be one of the reasons why there has long been evidence of a “permissive mood toward international involvements” among the general public (Caspary, 1970: 546). Also, while the public is found to do “a good job of forming and changing its collective policy preferences”, the quality of public opinion ultimately depends on the availability of unbiased and correct information (Shapiro and Page, 1988: 244).

Against this backdrop, I argue that one potential factor that influences outcomes in conjunction with public opinion are parliamentary veto rights, as outlined above, which combine with public opposition to constitute a parliamentary veto point, as stated in Hypothesis 1b. Apart from this specific combination of conditions, I expect public opinion to be an INUS condition for military participation and non-participation, respectively. However, if public opinion is found to be necessary or sufficient for an outcome, this would count as evidence in favor of the public constraint argument. By contrast, if those who question the influence of public opinion are right, then we should not find consistent pathways where public support or opposition is an element. This leads to the following hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 4a:* Public opposition is an INUS condition for military non-participation.

*Hypothesis 4b:* Public support is an INUS condition for military participation

**Military power**

With regard to alliance formation and alliance behavior three related sets of arguments have been suggested in the literature and seen wide application in empirical studies. These arguments are based on theories of collective action, external threat and alliance dependence. However, while all three approaches take into account the relative distribution of material capabilities across the international system, they arrive at conflicting theoretical claims about concrete alliance behavior.
The collective action hypothesis asserts that economically and militarily more powerful alliance members contribute a disproportionately large share toward the provision of common defense measures, while weaker members of an alliance have strong incentives to free ride on the contributions of their more powerful allies. In its original formulation, the argument draws primarily on the effects of group size and the distinct cost and benefit structures of alliance members with sizable power disparities, resulting in an “exploitation of the great by the small” (Olson, 1971: 169; Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966a). Hence the powerful provide for the public good because it is in their own interest to see it being provided, while the contributions of smaller states hardly alter the overall balance, which encourages them to engage in free riding.

The external threat hypothesis holds that states engage in balancing behavior against perceived threats to their security. While internal balancing against an aggressor can mean an increase in military expenditure and technology, external balancing comprises the formation of new alliances or the strengthening of existing alliance commitments. In its formulation by Walt (1987), the external threat argument emphasizes the perception of aggressive intent as a main driver of balancing behavior in conjunction with military power, technology, and geographic proximity, whereas earlier balance-of-power considerations expected balancing against aggregate material capabilities, irrespective of threat perceptions (Waltz, 1979). With regard to intra-alliance behavior, this implies that the perception of an external threat should encourage balancing directed against that threat and thus increased allied cooperation and participation in military operations (Kupchan, 1988).

The alliance dependence hypothesis proposes that the more dependent a state is on external security provision through its allies, the more likely it is to cooperate and contribute to alliance goals. Based on the notion of an “alliance security dilemma” where states are trapped between adverse fears of “abandonment” and “entrapment” that reflect the crosscutting state interests of security and autonomy, it is assumed that alliance commitment is a function of the balance of these two fears (Snyder, 1984). In particular, for highly asymmetric alliances, such as NATO, the dependence of each ally on the United States, as the most powerful state within the organization, will determine its level of commitment. Small states are especially prone to be dependent, because as militarily weaker powers they cannot adequately provide for their own security. Hence the alliance dependence argument provides an explanation for contributions from small states despite the presence of freeriding incentives (cf. Bennett et al., 1994, 1997: 12–14).
As indicated above, the theories underlying the collective action, external threat, and alliance dependence hypotheses yield several competing implications in terms of expected alliance behavior. First, whereas proponents of the collective action argument anticipate an “exploitation of the great by the small” that boils down to weak states’ free riding on the contributions of larger alliance members (Olson, 1971: 169; Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966b), the alliance dependence hypothesis asserts that, as states that are dependent upon more powerful alliance members for their security, “small powers cooperate when they are forced to do so” (Kupchan, 1988: 325). The latter implies that security concerns would normally prevail over free-riding incentives for small states, especially when intra-alliance pressure is exerted upon potential free-riders.

Second, the external threat hypothesis presumes states to balance against emerging threats by increasing their alliance commitment (Walt, 1987: 263), an expectation that squares with arguments by defensive realists who emphasize security-seeking and prudence in responding to emerging threats (Rose, 1998: 149–150). Hence, according to these views, increased alliance cooperation should outweigh free-riding incentives. However, conflicting expectations can be found in balance-of-threat theory, where Walt also argues that under conditions “when adequate allied support is certain”, weak states are more likely to free ride (1987: 33). This assumption resonates with the offensive realism of John Mearsheimer, who detects “a strong tendency to buck-pass or ‘free-ride’ inside balancing coalitions” (2001: 159).

Third, the expectation of free riding in collective action theory derives from the assumption of a pure public good. Yet this premise could be misguided and alliance security more properly characterized as an excludable or private good (Goldstein, 1995). If this were the case, however, free riding would not be the expected behavior since the alliance leader could easily sanction non-contributors for their defection.

Finally, realists disagree about the causes for small states’ balancing behavior. Whereas Walt (1987) primarily argues that it is the perception of an external threat that encourages balancing, Jens Ringsmose (2009) suggests that small states are rather inward-looking. For them, intra-alliance pressure outweighs considerations of external threat. Though the argument by Ringsmose effectively rests on a similar logic than the alliance dependence hypothesis suggested by Snyder (1984), it shifts the analytical focus to intra-alliance dynamics rather than exogenous dangers.

What is one to make of these conflicting theoretical claims? And what are the empirical implications of these arguments for the war participation of democracies? Despite their differences, most arguments expect
powerful states, understood in terms of military strength, to make disproportionately large contributions. Disagreements persist, however, with regard to small state behavior. While most theories presume free-riding incentives for small states, these can be negated if the alliance leader exerts pressure or withholds access to private goods. Therefore, the security goods at stake need to be carefully specified for each conflict, including the questions of whether excludable benefits existed and whether intra-alliance pressure was applied – two factors that could override the incentives for free-riding among smaller states. In general terms, however, it is expected that military power is part of combinations of conditions that are sufficient for military participation, while military weakness is presumed to be present in combinations of conditions sufficient for military non-participation. This leads to the following hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 5a:* Military power is an INUS condition for military participation.

*Hypothesis 5b:* Military weakness is an INUS condition for military non-participation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary veto rights</td>
<td>$H_{1a}$ Parliamentary veto rights are an INUS condition for military non-participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$H_{1b}$ Parliamentary veto rights combined with public opposition are a sufficient condition for military non-participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional restrictions</td>
<td>$H_{2a}$ Constitutional restrictions are a sufficient condition for military non-participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$H_{2b}$ The absence of constitutional restrictions is a necessary condition for military participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>$H_{3a}$ Right partisanship is an INUS condition for military participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$H_{3b}$ Left partisanship is an INUS condition for military non-participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion</td>
<td>$H_{4a}$ Public support is an INUS condition for military participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$H_{4b}$ Public opposition is an INUS condition for military non-participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military power</td>
<td>$H_{5a}$ Military power is an INUS condition for military participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$H_{5b}$ Military weakness is an INUS condition for military non-participation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One might object that “military power” introduces another domestic-level factor rather than a systemic one. However, as the discussion in this section and the previous chapter has shown, the analysis of military capabilities is firmly grounded in the burden sharing and alliance literature – which arrives at conflicting claims. Hence, it is of theoretical and empirical interest to include this factor and to submit it to a systematic test. In addition, the applied measure of military power incorporates a systemic component as it draws on the relative distribution of power among allied states and partner countries. A detailed explanation of the calculation of military power is given in the case study chapters. Table 3.1 summarizes the theoretical expectations formulated throughout this chapter.
Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

The empirical analysis of subsequent chapters in this book is based on fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). This chapter introduces the methodological approach of fsQCA, placing emphasis on its core principles, specific terminology, and analytical procedures. In the first two sections, I justify the methodological choice of a set-theoretic approach against the backdrop of prevalent methods in democratic peace research. This is followed by a detailed introduction to the principles and terminology of QCA and fuzzy-set analysis, including a guide through the analytical procedure as conducted in the ensuing chapters. The final section concludes by addressing comparative strengths and limitations of the chosen approach.

Methodological approaches in democratic peace research

Albeit a few exceptions, prior studies in democratic peace research can be broadly subdivided into works that conduct statistical analyses and those that apply a case-study approach. The former constitute a large body of important research on the democratic peace that has provided ample evidence in support of generalizations about democratic conflict behavior. The statistical approach is exemplified in works such as the first thorough examination of the relationship between democracy and war involvement by Melvin Small and David Singer (1976), which initiated a flurry of subsequent statistical research and methodological refinement, some of which is documented in an edited volume by John Vasquez (2000), or the encompassing statistical assessments and re-assessments of the democratic peace by Russett and Oneal (2001) and Paul Huth and Todd Allee (2002), to name just a few seminal works in this tradition. Quantitative studies have successfully established
a (near) consensus on two empirical propositions with regard to the democratic peace, namely that (1) democracies rarely, if ever, use force against other democracies and that (2) democracies are (almost) as war-prone as non-democracies.

Despite these important contributions to research on democracy and war, statistical methods encountered difficulties in establishing convincing theoretical explanations for the observed patterns in democratic conflict behavior. How, exactly, does “democracy” influence decisions on the use of force? Do norm-based or institutional arguments reflect the actual considerations of political decision-makers in crisis situations? And to which extent are vast generalizations across time periods and democratic regimes reconcilable with the scientific goals of theoretical “concreteness” and a proper specification of a theories’ “bounds of applicability” (King et al., 1994: 103, 109)?

In their review of three decades of democratic peace research, Alexander George and Andrew Bennett note that with regard to the first generation of scholarship, which contained almost exclusively quantitative work, “posited causal mechanisms were often contradictory, and no consensus existed on which of these variables caused an interdemocratic peace” (2005: 42). Hence, George and Bennett conclude that, “statistical methods proved inadequate to test these mechanisms” – notwithstanding the merits of quantitative approaches in the initial identification of the democratic peace (2005: 42).

Given this background, two additional reasons exist why I consider the use of statistical methods not appropriate for the research aim of the present study. First, statistical aggregation tends to conceal substantial variance in conflict involvement, when recent studies have demonstrated that participation in military interventions is distributed very unevenly among democracies (Chojnacki, 2006; Gleditsch et al., 2007). While this does not in itself speak against the use of quantitative methods, the particular intra-democratic variance is frequently lost when studies conduct large-n comparisons between democracies and non-democracies and even when democratic subtypes, forms of government, or electoral rules are investigated with large samples. This might partly explain why different studies have been found to yield conflicting findings on the relationship between regime type and conflict behavior (Mintz, 2005: 5).

Second, conventional quantitative measures of conflict involvement contain assumptions that are often not suitable for an investigation of the conditions under which democracies use force. Most statistical analyses on this subject are based on concepts and data from the Correlates of War project (Sarkees et al., 2003; Singer and Small, 1972; Small and
Singer, 1982) and employ Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) as their dependent variable (Ghosn et al., 2004). However, for the purpose of analyzing political decisions on the use of force this is an imprecise and misleading indicator, as Benjamin Fordham and Christopher Sarver point out (2001: 457), since the MID data includes disputes that are not linked to the political authorization of force, for instance military border clashes between individual units irrespective of political directives, and it further excludes disputes that are highly relevant for democratic conflict involvement, such as the use of force against terrorist groups and other non-state actors.

Partly as a response to the prevalence of statistical methods among earlier work on the democratic peace, later scholarship saw an increase in qualitative methods and case studies (George and Bennett, 2005: 45–54; Hayes, 2012: 11–16). Work in this tradition emphasized the historical circumstances and decision-making processes in specific countries – which were sometimes found to be at odds with the generalizations suggested by quantitative researchers. In a formative edited volume, Miriam Elman (1997b) lays out a persuasive argument for case-study research on the democratic peace. It is suggested that a particular strength of case studies is their capacity for context-sensitive analysis – or, as Elman argues, “[c]ase studies can specify the antecedent conditions and particular circumstances under which the theory is likely to predict successfully – and the conditions under which it will be less likely to hold” (1997a: 43, emphasis added). Elman and her contributors provide eight case studies on the democratic peace, in addition to three studies of non-democratic regimes. Other research that employs the case-study method includes, for example, Risse’s (1995a) work on small state influence within security alliances, which examines allied influence in historical cases from the Korean War to changes in NATO’s nuclear strategy during the 1970s, or the study of liberal ideology by John Owen (1997), who investigates the process and outcome of ten historical cases of diplomatic crises between the United States and other liberal or non-liberal states. More recently, Elizabeth Saunders (2011) applied a case-study approach to trace the influence of individual leaders on foreign policy, namely the decisions of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson whether or not to intervene militarily in several historical episodes throughout the 1950s and 1960s.3

While these and other examples of case-oriented work demonstrate the importance and unique contribution of qualitative research, some criticism of case-study approaches persists. As such, the “many variables, small number of cases” problem is held to be particularly pronounced
in small-n studies, although it is recognized that this problem applies to all social science research (Lijphart, 1971: 685). Other potential difficulties include case selection bias and indeterminacy, where the latter is understood as the “inability to exclude all but one explanation of a case” (Bennett, 2004: 39–41). The allegation of indeterminacy is a point frequently made by quantitative scholars, who hold that case-study research often contains too few observations to conduct adequate tests of alternative explanations, which dovetails with Lijphart’s critique of small-n approaches (King et al., 1994: 210). Finally, researchers assert that case-based research cannot sufficiently account for probabilistic processes and measurement error as two central concerns of statistical research (Lieberson, 1991: 309–312).

**Fuzzy-set analysis as an alternative to prevalent methods**

Why use fsQCA to study democratic war involvement? As discussed in the previous section, the majority of existing studies on democratic conflict behavior either conducts statistical analyses or investigates one or a few cases in-depth. Given this study’s research aim, I hold that QCA possesses several comparative strengths that allow it to fill a void between case studies and statistical analyses. First, focusing on specific wars in separate fuzzy-set analyses allows for a fine-grained qualitative assessment of democratic war participation that takes into account the historical context of a given conflict. This contrasts with aggregate datasets on conflict involvement that usually comprise a range of phenomena, from interstate wars to military interventions and temporary fire exchanges at a contested borderline. Second, since the approach attends to configurations of conditions rather than net effects of individual variables, it is particularly amenable to the study of foreign policy, where it is rare that an outcome can be attributed to a single cause. For instance, parliamentary veto rights alone are not expected to be sufficient for military non-participation but only when combined with other factors, such as public opposition (see Table 3.1). Third, as a rigorous comparative method, QCA is ideally suited to examine intra-democratic variance in conflict behavior, an empirical fact that prior studies noted, but which few have explored much further. The QCA framework demands a conscious and theoretically informed comparative research design that forces the investigator to be explicit about criteria regarding case selection, coding decisions, and analytical steps. Hence, this comparative dimension presents a distinct advantage over small-n studies of one or several cases.
Throughout the past decade, researchers have increasingly turned to QCA and fuzzy sets as analytical tools for social scientific inquiry, which were developed by Charles Ragin in a series of publications (1987, 2000, 2008). As recent textbooks indicate, QCA has gained awareness among social scientists as a methodological approach with specific benefits for comparative studies (Blatter and Haverland, 2012; Gerring, 2012; Rihoux and Ragin, 2009; Rohlfing, 2012; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). From its inception, QCA was aimed at the “middle ground” between quantitative and qualitative methodologies (Ragin, 2000: 22). Contrary to regression-based methods, QCA is based on set theory and investigates the specific conditions under which an outcome occurs, rather than estimating the “average effects of independent variables” (Mahoney, 2010: 132). Hence causal relations are expressed in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, a “substantively important” view of causation that has gained increased attention in the social sciences (Collier et al., 2010: 147). A particular strength of QCA is the ability to account for equifinality and conjunctural causation. The first concept relates to the potential presence of alternate pathways toward an outcome, while the second concerns the idea that configurations of conditions can be jointly necessary and/or sufficient, whereas their constituent parts might be neither necessary nor sufficient for an outcome. Finally, fuzzy sets complement QCA as a methodological tool to translate categorical concepts into measurable conditions, drawing on the notion that cases can hold degrees of membership in a given set (Ragin, 2008).

**Boolean algebra and fuzzy-set theory**

Fuzzy-set QCA is grounded in Boolean algebra and fuzzy-set theory. The former originates from the work of George Boole, a 19th century British mathematician and logician, who developed an algebra for variables that occur in only two possible values: true (present) or false (absent). Boolean algorithms have been central in electrical engineering, particularly in the development of electronic switching circuits, which are based on binary language and have seen wide application in the experimental and applied sciences (Ragin, 1987: 85–86; Rihoux and Meur, 2009: 34). Fuzzy-set theory is an extension of traditional set theory and was originated by Lofti Zadeh (1965) to account for categories with gradations of set membership and to enable mathematical operations on these sets. Based on the work of Zadeh, fuzzy categories have been widely used in linguistics (e.g., Lakoff, 1973) and also seen increased application in the social sciences (cf. Smithson and Verkuilen, 2006: 1–3).
By convention, QCA solution terms are expressed in Boolean notation, which comprises several basic operators. Explanatory and outcome conditions are stated in capital letters, whereas a tilde [~] refers to a logical NOT, as in the negation or absence of a condition. Multiplication [*] refers to a logical AND, or the combination of conditions, whereas addition [+] indicates a logical OR, as in alternative pathways. Finally, arrows express the relationship between one or several explanatory conditions and the outcome. Accordingly, a right-hand arrow [→] refers to a sufficient condition, while a left-hand arrow indicates a [←] necessary condition.

To illustrate this with a simple example, we can consider a pair of consolidated democracies [D] a sufficient condition for peace [P] between these states. In Boolean notation this would be expressed as: D → P. To make matters more complex, we could further assume that alternative pathways are each individually sufficient for the democratic peace to occur. An institutionalist path could refer to the combination of a war-averse citizenry [C] with democratic institutions that ensure political accountability [A] as a cause for interdemocratic peace. By contrast, a constructivist path could emphasize domestically embedded democratic norms [N], which are sufficient for peaceful interdemocratic relations when combined with the notion of a shared identity across liberal democracies [L]. Hence, in Boolean notation this relationship would be written as: (C*A) + (N*L) → P.

While Boolean logic rests on “crisp sets” with binary values, “fuzzy sets” can take on a range of values between 0 and 1. Yet for operations on fuzzy sets similar principles apply as for crisp sets. The negation of fuzzy-set values is calculated by subtracting a case’s membership value in a given set from 1. Hence, if case A holds a membership of 0.7 in set X, its value for ~X is 0.3. A logical AND, or combination of conditions, refers to the minimum membership value in the respective conditions. For example, the theoretical framework introduced in the previous chapter proposes that a “parliamentary veto point” arises only when parliamentary veto rights [V] are combined with public opposition, as in the absence of public support [~S]. If country B’s membership in the set parliamentary veto rights is 1.0 (fully in the set), but its set-membership in public opposition is 0.2 (mostly outside the set), then membership in the combination of these conditions [V*~S] is the lower of the two values (0.2) and thus a parliamentary veto point is (rather) not present. This set-theoretic principle contrasts with most quantitative approaches that would calculate the average value between the two conditions in question. However, with regard to their membership
in a given combination of conditions, such as the parliamentary veto point mechanism \([V^* - S]\), no difference exists between countries whose membership scores are outside one or both sets of that combination. Finally, a \textit{logical OR} indicates alternative conditions and refers to the maximum of the respective membership values. This could be the case when two conditions \([A]\) and \([B]\) individually lead toward an outcome or if they combine with a third condition to bring about the outcome. Thus, a case’s fuzzy-set membership in the term \([A+B]\) refers to its highest membership score across the two conditions.

\textbf{Complex causation}

As a research approach QCA entails three key methodological assumptions: equifinality, conjunctural causation, and causal asymmetry. Together, these assumptions constitute what is described alternatively as “multiple conjunctural causation,” “causal complexity” or, as the term used in this book, \textit{complex causation} (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009: 6–11; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 76–83). What do these assumptions imply? In plain words, QCA accounts for the possibility that alternate pathways toward an outcome exist (\textit{equifinality}), that combinations of conditions can jointly cause an outcome to occur (\textit{conjunctural causation}), and the notion that an identified relationship between a condition or combination of conditions and the outcome does not mean that the inverse relationship must also be true (\textit{causal asymmetry}).

While scholars frequently point to the assumption of complex causation as a particular strength of the QCA approach, this remains infrequently incorporated on a theoretical level. Yet conditions are rarely individually necessary – much less sufficient – for an outcome. By contrast, INUS and SUIN causes occur commonly in social research, though causal explanations are rarely framed in these terms (Mahoney et al., 2009). INUS refers to “an \textit{insufficient} but \textit{necessary} part of a condition, which is itself \textit{unnecessary} but sufficient for the result” (Mackie, 1965: 245, original emphasis). SUIN is “a \textit{sufficient} but \textit{unnecessary} part of a factor that is \textit{insufficient} but \textit{necessary} for an outcome” (Mahoney et al., 2009: 126, original emphasis).

In brief, INUS causes are present whenever equifinality and conjunctural causation combine. This implies that at least two pathways toward an outcome exist and that at least one of these contains more than a single condition. In Boolean notation this can be expressed as: \(A + BC \rightarrow O\), where the conditions \(B\) and \(C\) are INUS causes for the outcome \(O\). SUIN causes, on the other hand, are located at the level of indicators or attributes that constitute a necessary condition, where each individual element is unnecessary but sufficient for the necessary condition. In formal
terms this can be stated as: $A + B \rightarrow C$, where $C$ is a necessary condition for the outcome: $C \leftarrow O$.

With regard to causal asymmetry, as the third methodological assumption specific to QCA, it is presumed that the solution for the non-outcome cannot with certainty be derived from the solution for the outcome. It is therefore considered “good practice” to conduct separate analyses for the outcome and its negation, as Carsten Schneider and Claudius Wagemann recommend (2010: 408–409, 2012: 279). This procedure can further serve as a validation of a researcher’s theoretical argument – if a specific combination of conditions leads consistently toward the outcome but also leads toward the non-outcome, serious doubts arise about the explanatory strength of the conditions employed. Likewise, a meaningful analysis of the non-outcome necessitates the inclusion of negative cases, which can strengthen the confidence in the fsQCA results for both analyses.

Fuzzy-set coding procedures

Fuzzy sets complement QCA by providing an intuitive tool to translate categorical concepts into measurable conditions, drawing on the notion that cases can hold degrees of membership in a given set. Thus, fsQCA allows for qualitative differentiation: based on substantive and theoretical knowledge the researcher sets “qualitative anchors” to determine when a case is “fully in” a given set (fuzzy score 1), when it is “neither in nor out” (fuzzy score 0.5), and at which point a case is “fully out” of a set (fuzzy score 0). This set-theoretic conception and coding procedure challenges an assumption often made in statistical research, where all variation is held to be equally meaningful (Ragin, 2000: 163). With regard to the outcome military participation, for example, criteria are defined for each historical case in order to determine when a country is considered fully in the set of those that participated militarily. This does not imply that countries that receive the same coding will also have deployed an identical number of troops or similar force levels. In contrast, it is rather likely that substantial quantitative differences will be observed across military contributions by countries in the same coding category. In qualitative terms, however, their contributions justify an identical fuzzy-set coding.

In essence, three different procedures exist for coding fuzzy sets. The straightforward approach is to assign fuzzy scores to cases on the basis of substantive and theoretical knowledge. Using this approach a researcher would first conceptualize different degrees of membership in a given set and then qualitatively assess each case’s fuzzy score for that
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set. Other coding procedures are the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ methods of calibration (Ragin, 2008: 85–105), which become relevant only when quantitative data is to be used in a fuzzy-set analysis. Both the direct and indirect methods use statistical estimation techniques to transform interval-scale variables into fuzzy-set scores. The direct method of calibration applies a logistic function to transform raw data into fuzzy-set values, based on three qualitative break-points specified by the researcher (Ragin, 2008: 89–94). As the name implies, the indirect method of calibration includes an additional step that necessitates a preliminary qualitative grouping of cases by their degree of membership. In turn, a fractional logit model is used to estimate fuzzy-set values based on the raw data and the initial qualitative coding of cases (Ragin, 2008: 94–97). It is apparent from these procedures that despite their dissimilarities all three coding procedures require a careful conceptualization of qualitative anchors. Hence, even for “semi-automated calibration techniques” substantive knowledge is a prerequisite for the coding of fuzzy sets (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 41).

Set-theoretic consistency and coverage as measures of fit

Fuzzy-set analysis introduces “consistency” and “coverage” as two measures of fit to assess whether a single condition or a conjunction of several conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for an outcome (Ragin, 2006). In brief, consistency reflects the fit of the empirical evidence with an assumed set-theoretic relationship, whereas coverage indicates the relevancy of a condition in empirical terms.

For the analysis of sufficiency, set-theoretic consistency indicates the extent to which instances of a combination of conditions are a subset of instances of the outcome. To stick with the example from democratic peace theory, if the outcome is “peaceful interstate relations” then the condition “mutual democracy” would be a (near) perfect subset and thus a sufficient condition for peace. Likewise, for the analysis of necessity, set-theoretic consistency reflects the degree to which an outcome is a subset of a single condition or combination of conditions. For instance, if the outcome were “consolidated democracy”, then this would be a subset of “regular elections,” which are a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratic regimes.

In formal terms, consistency is calculated as the degree to which a subset relation exists between instances of a condition X and the outcome Y. If all values for Y are equal to or less than their corresponding values for X, then Y is a subset of X and thus X is a necessary condition for the outcome. In turn, if all values for X are equal to or less than
their equivalent values for $Y$, then $X$ resembles a subset of $Y$ and thus a sufficient condition for that outcome. These relations are expressed in the following formulae (Ragin, 2006):

$$\text{Consistency}_{\text{Necessary Conditions}}(Y_i \leq X_i) = \frac{\sum \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum Y_i}$$

$$\text{Consistency}_{\text{Sufficient Conditions}}(X_i \leq Y_i) = \frac{\sum \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum X_i}$$

The calculation of set-theoretic coverage is inversely related to the consistency measure. This implies that the coverage of a sufficient combination of conditions indicates the size of the empirical overlap or to the proportion of instances of the outcome that are explained by that combination. While conjunctions with several conditions are likely to show higher consistency scores, their empirical relevance will tend to decrease, as there will be fewer empirical cases that fit the described causal path. In turn, for a necessary condition the coverage value reflects the fit between instances of that condition and the outcome. While a condition could be a perfectly consistent superset and thus in formal terms a necessary condition, it might be irrelevant in theoretical terms if the condition is present across cases that show the outcome as well as among those that do not show the outcome. Accordingly, these relations can be expressed in the following formulae (Ragin, 2006):

$$\text{Coverage}_{\text{Necessary Conditions}}(X_i \leq Y_i) = \frac{\sum \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum X_i}$$

$$\text{Coverage}_{\text{Sufficient Conditions}}(Y_i \leq X_i) = \frac{\sum \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum Y_i}$$

Though consistency and coverage measures are obviously closely related, it is important to underline that the calculation of consistency must precede the measure of coverage and that the latter only makes sense once a consistent necessary or sufficient condition or combination of conditions is revealed. As Ragin argues, it is “pointless” to calculate coverage for a condition that is not found to be a consistent subset or superset of an outcome (Ragin, 2008: 55). However, where consistency is discovered, the computation of coverage helps the researcher to evaluate the empirical weight of the identified relationship.
Analysis of necessary conditions

While the core of fsQCA comprises the analysis of sufficient conditions during the truth table procedure described below, this should always be preceded by an identification of potential necessary conditions (Ragin, 2009: 110; Schneider and Wagemann, 2010: 404). In set-theoretic terms a necessary condition is indicated when instances of the outcome are a subset of instances of a condition. In order to test for necessary conditions, the formulae for consistency and coverage are applied, as described in the previous section. By convention, the consistency threshold for potential necessary conditions is set to 0.90 (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 143).

How should the analysis proceed in the event that a necessary condition is identified? Because textbooks give dissimilar advice on the treatment of necessary conditions, a brief discussion of this issue is warranted. In his textbook chapter on fuzzy-set analysis, Ragin advises to exclude necessary conditions from the subsequent truth table analysis:11

It is often useful to check for necessary conditions before conducting the fuzzy truth table procedure. Any condition that passes the test and that ‘makes sense’ as a necessary condition can be dropped from the truth table procedure, which, after all, is essentially an analysis of sufficiency. [...] Of course, the condition identified in this way would be retained for discussion as a necessary condition and should be considered relevant to any sufficient combination of conditions identified through the truth table analysis. (Ragin, 2009: 110, emphasis added)

Contrary to this recommendation, which is repeated in the “good practices” section of the textbook (Ragin, 2009: 118), I argue that identified necessary conditions should be included in the truth table procedure for analytical reasons. Most importantly, causal conditions can be both necessary and sufficient, either on their own, which is quite rare in social research, or as an element in a conjunction of conditions, which occurs more frequently. If one excludes necessary conditions from the truth table procedure, however, one could not identify these configurations and would lose analytical leverage as a result. While it is possible to manually “add” a previously identified necessary condition to the results of the fsQCA procedure, considering it as a precondition for any sufficient combination of conditions, this could also result in a loss of analytical leverage. For instance, if a researcher identifies a necessary condition that is probabilistically consistent but not a perfect
necessary condition, say with a consistency of 0.90 and a coverage of 0.70, it is likely that one or a few cases of the population show the outcome despite the absence of the necessary condition. However, if the recommendation to drop this necessary condition from the truth table procedure were followed, this kind of information would be lost during the analysis.12

While the exclusion or inclusion of necessary conditions in the fsQCA procedure may appear trivial at first glance, either decision can have a tangible effect on the results of a study. This is best illustrated with an empirical example. In her study on the introduction of women’s suffrage among Western European countries, Trineke Palm (2013) identifies the “absence of ethnic fragmentation” as an almost necessary condition for the early introduction of voting rights (consistency of 0.90 and a coverage of 0.80). Following “good practice” guidelines, she explicitly decides to exclude this condition from the fsQCA procedure (2013: 14), which yields highly consistent truth table rows and two sufficient conjunctions. However, the truth table hides the fact that Finland is found to be a deviant case in this analysis, since the country shows the outcome despite ethnic fragmentation. Because the analysis is restricted to three conditions, excluding ethnic fragmentation, case-based information is lost, and Finland, Norway, and Sweden end up in the same truth table row, although there is an essential difference between these three countries with respect to the preconditions for women’s suffrage. To her merit, Palm is highly transparent in her documentation and also mentions that Finland is an exemption, which the study illustrates with an x-y plot that traces the empirical fit of the necessary condition (Palm, 2013: 13).

Truth table analysis

How do these concepts and principles translate into the analytical process? The analytical procedure in QCA contains two steps. First, a truth table is constructed that contains rows for each logical combination of conditions and that indicates which cases belong to which configuration and how these relate to the outcome of interest. The fuzzy-set truth table represents a multidimensional vector space with $2^k$ corners, where $k$ relates to the number of conditions, and each corner of the resulting property space signifies a distinct combination of conditions, represented by a separate row in the truth table. For example, if four conditions are part of the analysis, the truth table comprises $2^4 = 16$ rows. Based on their fuzzy-set membership scores for each condition in a respective combination, cases can be assigned to distinct corners of the
property space (Ragin, 2008: 124–135). The consistency column of the truth table indicates the extent to which the fuzzy-set values of all cases in a given row, indicating a certain combination of conditions, are sufficient for the outcome. Based on the consistency scores a cut-off point is determined to separate rows above a certain consistency, which are kept for the remainder of the truth table procedure, from those with a lower consistency that are excluded from the procedure (Ragin, 2008: 135).

While the construction of the truth table helps to identify patterns in the empirical data, its logical minimization is required to identify sufficient conditions. This happens during the second step of the analysis, where Boolean algebra is applied to minimize the truth table and identify combinations of conditions that are sufficient for the outcome (Ragin, 1987: 93–97). In QCA this is done via the Quine-McCluskey algorithm, also known as truth table algorithm. It requires the researcher to set a consistency threshold that determines which truth table rows are included in the ensuing minimization procedure. By convention, this threshold should be set to a consistency of 0.75 or greater.

To illustrate the construction of truth tables with a simple example using crisp-sets, let us assume that we have three conditions that are expected to lead toward the outcome, either in combination with other conditions or individually. Table 4.1 shows all logical combinations of conditions A, B, C and their empirical relation to the outcome Y, based on 15 cases across the nine possible configurations.

It is evident from the table that only the first two rows lead toward the outcome. In Boolean algebra this is expressed as $(A*B*C) + (A*B*\neg C) \rightarrow Y$. Based on logical minimization, the expression can be reduced to $(A*B) \rightarrow Y$, because the condition C is irrelevant for the outcome, while A and B are necessary elements of a conjunction that is sufficient for Y. This simple

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example serves to illustrate the basic principle of comparison that is embedded in QCA. As further conditions and measures of consistency are added, the analysis gets increasingly complex so that it justifies a systematic treatment that can be conducted with the fsQCA software on the basis of the Quine-McCluskey algorithm.\(^\text{13}\)

The comparative procedure of QCA bears resemblance, of course, with John Stuart Mill's four methods of scientific inquiry. In his seminal philosophical work *System of Logic* of 1872 (2006, Book 3, Chapter 8), Mill distinguishes the "method of agreement," "method of difference," "method of residues," and the "method of concomitant variations" (2006: 388–406). Mill further discusses a "joint method of agreement and difference" (2006: 394–396). In some aspects QCA could be regarded as a *systematic application* of the latter method. Yet there are at least two ways in which QCA surpasses Mill's methods. First, the truth table procedure identifies and addresses *limited diversity* in the empirical data – something that Mill's methods cannot account for and which frequently undermines their results. Second, with the introduction of its fuzzy-set variant and separate measures of fit, QCA incorporates features that allow for *differentiation* in the estimated effects and *robustness tests* that Mill's methodology does not entail.\(^\text{14}\) Therefore, it is misguided when QCA is being criticized for its supposed reliance on Mill's methods and their (acknowledged) limitations as tools for comparative research, which do not apply to QCA (cf. Hug, 2013: 253–254).

**Solution terms**

Based on the truth table algorithm and a consistency cut-off specified by the researcher, the fsQCA software derives three solution terms, which differ in their treatment of 'logical remainders' (Ragin, 2009: 118). Logical remainders are closely related to the problem of *limited diversity*, which refers to a discrepancy between logically possible combinations of conditions and actual empirical cases for a given conjunction. Hence, logical remainders indicate truth table rows without cases in them that hold set-membership higher than 0.50 in the respective configuration.

Why are logical remainders important? Even though no empirical cases might exist for a certain truth table row, that configuration can still be interesting from a theoretical point of view (and for possible future cases). By contrast, another configuration might be theoretically implausible, or even impossible in empirical terms. QCA thus offers three approaches to deal with logical remainders. The *complex solution* provides the most conservative estimate since it does not make any assumptions beyond the empirical cases. As the name implies, this
approach also tends to yield the lengthiest solution terms. By contrast, the *parsimonious solution* does incorporate logical remainders but it does not assess their plausibility. While this procedure leads to solution terms that are easier to interpret, the parsimonious solution should be treated with care and always contrasted with other solutions because it could entail implausible assumptions. Finally, the *intermediate solution* allows the researcher to specify how logical remainders are to be treated, based on explicit expectations about the causal relationship. It is thus positioned in between the complex and parsimonious solutions.

**Graphical representation and documentation of fsQCA results**

As a case-based approach QCA has a comparative advantage over statistical methods because it identifies sufficient combinations of conditions toward an outcome for *specific* cases. It is thus particular amenable to historical explanation. To utilize this potential, however, researchers are well advised to not focus exclusively on solution formulae and their consistency and coverage values but to examine individual case membership for each solution “path,” that is, a combination of conditions that is found to be sufficient for an outcome. Which cases are covered by a solution path and to which extent? Is there an empirical overlap between sufficient configurations or are there distinct pathways? Do any deviant cases exist? These questions can be answered only on the basis of case membership in solution paths, which is thus considered a crucial element of “good practice” QCA (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009: 168; Schneider and Wagemann, 2010: 410, 2012: 280–281). On their own, the solution terms are rather abstract and do not provide detail on the distribution of cases and the overall fit of the model. In order to address this shortcoming, subsequent analyses in this book entail x-y plots that display the position of each country by tracing membership in the solution term against membership in the outcome.¹⁵

**Strengths and limitations of the chosen approach**

Though QCA has gained widespread recognition as a research approach that holds distinct advantages for systematic comparative studies, it has also raised criticism with regard to the underlying assumptions of the method and its treatment of more general methodological problems. In this context, some quantitative researchers have criticized QCA for not taking into account probabilistic processes (Lieberson, 2004), potential confounders (Seawright, 2005), or measurement error (Hug, 2013). Other authors have challenged the method on ontological grounds – a
critique that is not limited to QCA but extends to all approaches of “neopositivist case comparison” (Jackson, 2011: 69). While this section cannot provide an exhaustive discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of QCA vis-à-vis other methods nor engage in an ontological debate, I will briefly address some of the critical points raised and draw out conclusions for the present study.

In a recent article, Simon Hug (2013) cites several prominent QCA studies and criticizes that these reflect a widespread practice where “scholars implicitly or explicitly employ [QCA] as a tool for inductive theory generation,” which represents an approach that “contradicts its original purpose” (2013: 252, 255). Hug further bemoans that the QCA approach “does not allow us to directly take measurement error into account,” despite the well-known fact that all measurement in the social sciences is prone to errors (2013: 254). Both the inductive use of QCA and its neglect of measurement error are perceived as serious shortcomings that can lead to problematic inferences.

I agree with Hug as far as the purely inductive application of QCA is concerned. As I argue elsewhere in detail, recent fsQCA applications indicate a proliferation of “exploratory models” of conditions—an inductive use of variables that lacks theoretical grounding and often generates methodological problems (Mello, 2012a). With regard to measurement error, however, I contend that Hug does not sufficiently acknowledge differences between statistical and qualitative methodologies. It is a well-acknowledged and good research practice to justify any coding decision. This applies to QCA as much as any other empirical research method. Furthermore, whenever the coding of a case is deemed controversial, it is prudent to run separate fsQCA procedures with different codings, as one way to conduct a robustness check and increase the confidence in one’s fsQCA results (cf. Skaaning, 2011). Partly for this reason, I provide detailed information on my coding decisions, including a discussion of contentious cases, and present documentation of alternative analyses in the Appendix.

Some of the criticism articulated by statistical researchers conveys a conception of QCA as a methodological challenger to regression analysis and other quantitative approaches. Not surprisingly, many proponents of statistical methods are not keen to accept what they seem to perceive as a newcomer on their home turf. This becomes apparent when Jason Seawright considers regression analysis a “major practical competitor as a tool for cross-case analysis”, alongside QCA (2005: 4). Against the backdrop of a comparison of these two approaches in terms of “assumptions required to make causal inferences,” Seawright concludes that, “given
the centrality of untested assumptions [...] QCA is not an improvement over regression analysis” (2005: 24). It stands to question, though, whether QCA is properly conceived as a competitor to regression analysis or whether it is more beneficial to see it as an addition to a diverse toolbox of methods in the social sciences, which includes case-based and statistical approaches and where each method has distinct advantages for a limited range of research aims.19

As argued in the review of methods applied in democratic peace research outlined above, statistical methods are not deemed appropriate for the research aim of this study. Fuzzy-set analysis, by contrast, allows for a fine-grained qualitative assessment of democratic war participation and for taking into account configurations of conditions, rather than the net effect of single variables. Additionally, part of the discussion over the viability of QCA seems to be grounded in a lack of differentiation between its potential as a method and its actual application in specific research contexts (Gerring, 2012: 350). In this sense, much of the criticism appears to be concerned with flawed research practice, but it does not concern the method and approach of QCA per se.

This chapter started out with a concise review of prevalent methods in democratic peace research. Despite their respective merits, it was noted that both statistical methods and case-study approaches entail limitations for the research aim of this study. While the comparative advantage of fsQCA has been acknowledged in social science research, to this date there have been few empirical applications of this method in the subfield of International Relations. Hence, in its extension of fuzzy-set analysis to a new empirical area and the study of democratic war involvement in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, this book seeks to make a contribution to the toolbox of existing methods in democratic peace research.
Kosovo: Forced Allies or Willing Contributors?

On March 24, 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) initiated air strikes against targets in the Kosovo province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). This military operation was preceded by a long political crisis between Western governments and the Serbian political leadership under Slobodan Milošević – a conflict that had escalated over grave human rights violations committed by Serbian armed forces against the Kosovar Albanians throughout the months preceding the bombing campaign. The humanitarian situation in Kosovo sparked intense debates among decision-makers across Western governments about how to react to this security challenge. Had all diplomatic options been tried? At which point would the use of military force be an appropriate response? And what were the legal requirements of military action in the case that alternative approaches failed?

The political situation was further complicated by an evident deadlock in the UN Security Council as the Russian Federation conveyed that it would veto any resolution that aimed to sanction the use of force against Serbia. While the Council had passed two Chapter VII resolutions of increased severity on Kosovo in March and September of 1998, legal scholars agree that neither of these amounted to an authorization to use force against Serbia (Chesterman, 2001: 208–209; Simma, 1999: 6–7).

In this context, several Western governments endeavored to build a consensus for an authorizing Security Council resolution and to engage Russia in the process, while others saw this as an effort that was doomed to fail in the face of imminent Russian opposition against any measures to use force in Kosovo. Among NATO allies, Germany and Italy where amid those that emphasized diplomatic approaches and the importance of a UN mandate, whereas the United Kingdom and the United States pressed for a credible threat that force would be used even in the
absence of authorization for such action. In this context, the memoir of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright is revealing, as it underlines that leaders were aware that NATO action without UN authorization would be incommensurable with the UN Charter but that it was decided to proceed regardless of legal concerns:

I called [British Foreign Secretary] Robin Cook, who said his lawyers had told him a council mandate would be needed if NATO were to act. I told him he should get himself new lawyers. If a UN resolution passed, we would have set a precedent that NATO required Security Council authorization before it could act. This would give Russia, not to mention China, a veto over NATO. (Albright, 2003: 489)

Eventually, on October 13, 1998, the North Atlantic Council, as NATO's executive organ, announced its decision to issue “activation orders,” which constituted a step toward air strikes in order coerce Milošević into submission.3 NATO Secretary General Javier Solana underscored that, given the situation in Kosovo as detailed in SC Resolution 1199, NATO saw “legitimate grounds for the Alliance to threaten, and if necessary, to use force.”4 This declaration marked a turnaround from earlier statements throughout the crisis, as several European governments and alliance members had argued that UN authorization would be strictly required before NATO air strikes could be conceived. However, by October 1998 it was evident that a consensus had formed around the position that “legitimate grounds” existed for a humanitarian military intervention.

Changing standpoints became most apparent in the case of the German government. In early 1998, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel held that he regarded Security Council authorization a necessary condition for NATO to consider air strikes against Serbian forces in Kosovo (Rudolf, 2000: 132–133). Yet by October, in its final parliamentary debate on the issue, the outgoing German government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl had embraced the NATO position that an intervention was legitimate, despite the absence of a UN mandate, in order to prevent a “humanitarian catastrophe” in Kosovo (DE-BT, 1998a; 1998b). However, in an attempt to defend the conservative-liberal coalition’s shift in position, Kinkel stressed that Kosovo ought not to set a precedent, since that could lead the alliance onto a “slippery slope” with regard to the use of force outside UN authorization.5

The announcement of activation orders ran parallel to renewed diplomatic initiatives, headed by the American Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke, who negotiated a ceasefire with Milošević and set the stage...
for an agreement between the FRY and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) regarding the establishment of an unarmed verification mission in Kosovo and a supplementary air verification mission conducted by NATO. A subsequent resolution acknowledged these diplomatic initiatives and demanded “full and prompt implementation” of the negotiated agreements, while affirming that the situation on the ground continued to constitute a “threat to peace and security in the region” (UN-SC, 1998c). Still, only a few months into the ceasefire, hostilities flared up again between Serbian forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army. In its subsequent investigation, the International Independent Commission on Kosovo documents a series of atrocities and violent exchanges from December 1998 onward, events that temporarily culminated in what became known as the “massacre of Racak,” a Kosovar village where Serbian forces reportedly executed 45 ethnic Albanians on January 15, 1999 (IICK, 2000: 80–81).

As a last-ditch diplomatic effort, negotiations were held in Rambouillet near Paris, starting February 6, 1999, where an “Interim Agreement on Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo” was suggested to the two conflict parties but which the Serbian leadership eventually refused to sign. It must be noted, though, that by the time of the Rambouillet negotiations, the deck was already stacked against a diplomatic solution. This was partly because the terms of the prepared agreement “were highly favourable to the Kosovar Albanians” (Seybolt, 2007: 81) but also because the US-approach to the negotiations left little room for compromise (Chesterman, 2001: 210–211). Finally, it appeared that the Serbian leadership was more intent on buying time than to reach a genuine agreement – an impression that was strengthened by the fact that Milošević initially sent a low-level delegation to France, a group of representatives that effectively refused to engage in constructive negotiations (Clark, 2001: 79). However, it is also acknowledged that some officials in the Clinton administration saw Rambouillet as a pragmatic way “to help European NATO members justify an armed intervention to their domestic constituencies, and thus build a tighter coalition in favor of what was by then viewed as an almost certain recourse to force” (IICK, 2000: 153).

Against the backdrop of these developments, on March 24, 1999, NATO initiated the bombing campaign “Operation Allied Force” against Serbian military targets in Kosovo, later extended across Serbia, which lasted for roughly three months and ended officially on June 20, 1999. One month into the bombing campaign, NATO conducted its fiftieth anniversary summit in Washington, a meeting that is widely regarded as a critical juncture in the conduct of the military operation.
European and North American leaders had publicly disagreed about the policy objectives underlying the air strikes against Serbia during the weeks before the summit, alliance members displayed greater political cohesion afterwards. In addition, the military campaign was severely intensified after April 25 (Clark, 2001: 268–274; Daalder and O’Hanlon, 2000: 137–155).

This chapter seeks to explain democracies’ military participation in the Kosovo War. Who contributed to NATO air strikes during Operation Allied Force? Are there observable differences between country’s military contributions? If so, how can these be explained? And specifically, to which extent can domestic factors, such as constitutional restrictions, legislative involvement in security affairs, the partisan composition of government, or public support for intervention account for the observed outcomes when compared to structural factors such as a country’s relative power position? The chapter proceeds with a concise review of prevalent explanations for democracies’ involvement in Kosovo. This serves a three-fold aim, identifying empirical gaps in existing research, pointing out disagreements over explanatory factors suggested in prior studies and showing on which points consensus exists. Following the review, I adapt the theoretical expectations formulated in Chapter 3 to the specific case of NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo. The main part of this chapter then provides a specification of the research design, including criteria for the inclusion of governments and the conceptualization and coding of the outcome and the five explanatory conditions. The subsequent section presents the fuzzy-set analysis, followed by a discussion of analytical findings and theoretical implications. The concluding section summarizes the chapter.

**Prevalent accounts of the Kosovo War**

The Kosovo War brought to the forefront an inherent tension between, on the one hand, state sovereignty and the norm of non-interference and, on the other hand, states’ obligation to protect the individual human rights of the population living in its borders. Despite politicians’ claims to the contrary, Kosovo set a precedent that the international community was, in principle, willing to disregard the norm of state sovereignty in order to protect people from human rights violations. For this reason alone, the Kosovo conflict “will surely be regarded as the quintessential liberal war of our time,” as Vasquez attests (2005: 311).

Kosovo emerged against the historical context of the failure of the international community to respond to the genocide that took place in
Rwanda in 1994 and to prevent the atrocities that occurred during the Bosnian War, most visibly in Sarajevo in 1992, when UN peacekeepers left the city to its fate, and in Srebrenica in 1995, when declared UN safe areas were attacked and overrun by Serbian forces. Evidently, these disastrous events and precursors to the Kosovo conflict were reference points when European political leaders sought to make the case for a firm stand against the Serbian leadership under Milošević. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair explicitly draws the connection between earlier non-action in the Balkans and the situation in Kosovo, when he argues in his memoir that, “[n]on-intervention in Bosnia in the early 1990s might have seemed sensible at the time, but not in retrospect. And, of course, it led directly to Milošević believing that he could get away with the operation in Kosovo” (2011: 229). While Blair’s comment offers a glimpse at the conceivable rationale of the Serbian leadership, which turned out a severe miscalculation, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer holds that with regard to the international community of states, a “right and duty to humanitarian intervention” materialized after the disillusioning experience of international inaction in Rwanda and Bosnia (2008: 117).

This setting prods the question why some governments decided to push for military intervention in Kosovo and to participate with their own forces, whereas others were reluctant to engage in the use of force and ended up not providing military assistance. Though there is no shortage of studies on the Kosovo conflict, previous work tends to focus on the legal implications of NATO’s military intervention without UN authorization (Bothe, 2001; Simma, 1999) or to investigate broader questions relating to an emergent norm of humanitarian intervention beyond the Kosovo case (Finnemore, 2003: 52–84). Others examine strategic aspects of the military operation, specifically the efficacy of air power as an instrument of coercive bargaining (Allen and Vincent, 2011). The following section concentrates on several comparative studies to evaluate alternative explanations for democratic war involvement in Kosovo. These studies offer contending accounts for the observed variance that emphasize security interests, normative concerns, constraining institutions, or domestic public opinion as explanations that broadly resonate with realist, constructivist, and liberal-institutionalist approaches in IR theory.

Based on the contributions to an edited volume on NATO’s war in Kosovo, Mark Brawley and Pierre Martin (2000) draw out some general conclusions to explain the observed cross-national variance. Their argument concentrates on alliance members’ security concerns, their level of domestic support for the use of force, and normative considerations in
order to account for government decisions during the Kosovo conflict. Turning against the “forced allies” conjecture, which posits that several NATO member states had been pressured “into responding to the Kosovo crisis” by the alliance leader and other powerful member states, as observers have suggested (Haglund, 2000: 92), Brawley and Martin argue that, to the contrary, alliance members participated in Kosovo out of their own interests:

NATO members did not need to be coerced into responding to the Kosovo crisis, because those who lacked domestic support had strong security rationales to join the effort, while those who had little direct security incentives to participate were able to count on solid support for the normative principles underpinning the intervention. (Brawley and Martin, 2000: 229)

Hence, the argument by Brawley and Martin implies the presence of alternate pathways toward military participation: a realist route based on national security interests despite public opposition and a liberal-constructivist route that emerges out of inclusive normative considerations backed by public support.

These perspectives diverge from the institutionalist argument suggested by David Auerswald (1999), who holds that government support for military action is, to a large extent, dependent on the relative strength of the executive vis-à-vis the legislature. Auerswald proposes that coalition governments in parliamentary democracies are most constrained among democratic subtypes, because premiers in coalition cabinets fear the “very real chance of parliamentary interference” and will thus be reluctant to use force (1999: 477–478). In his study of the Kosovo conflict (2004), Auerswald examines political and military support for OAF across the major powers in NATO. In line with his institutionalist argument, he presumes coalition governments in Germany and Italy “to be extremely gun shy,” while strong presidential systems and majoritarian parliamentary systems, as in France and Great Britain, are expected to offer robust support due to greater autonomy over foreign affairs (2004: 642). Though government type is central to Auerswald’s argument, his integrated model further considers public opinion and collective action. Yet these factors do not alter the general premise that coalition governments are expected to provide “weak support,” while majoritarian governments are anticipated to contribute moderate to strong support, depending on their respective valuation of the public good (Auerswald, 2004: 643–645).
By contrast, Rathbun (2004) suggests a constructivist explanation for the behavior of French, German, and British governments during the Kosovo War. For Rathbun the ideological orientation of government parties, in combination with distinct historical experiences, goes a long way toward explaining their positions on military intervention as the conflict evolved. For instance, Rathbun contrasts the British approach to Kosovo under Labour with the policies the Conservative government had taken a few years earlier during the war in Bosnia. According to Rathbun, Labour under Blair “was the most vehement advocate of the use of force in Kosovo,” while the Conservatives under Prime Minister John Major were “the least willing to strengthen the UN and NATO mandate in Bosnia” (2004: 46). For Rathbun, this variation is best explained on the grounds of different conceptions of the national interest:

A leftist Labour Party that considered upholding human rights as part of the national interest replaced a rightist Conservative Party that questioned the extent to which British interests were at stake in the Balkans. Labour had a more inclusive ideology because of its egalitarianism, and this led to a more robust approach to humanitarian intervention. (Rathbun, 2004: 46–47)

While Rathbun acknowledges national differences in the way left parties approached the conflict, he finds that left parties in all three countries eventually supported the use of force for humanitarian reasons, while right parties viewed humanitarian intervention as outside their conception of the national interest. To Rathbun this is evidence against the culturalist argument that would rather expect policy convergence within a country and more pronounced cross-national differences (2004: 81).

Finally, Jason Davidson (2011) contends that neoclassical realism provides a better explanation of countries’ political and military support for NATO air strikes in Kosovo than constructivist accounts. Davidson holds that government decisions in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom were driven primarily by concerns about regional instability in the Balkans, NATO’s credibility following the non-interventions in the early 1990s and its’ eroding sense of purpose after the Cold War, and their own country’s prestige vis-à-vis the United States and within the alliance. Humanitarian concerns, by contrast, were, for the most part, mere rhetoric used “to appeal to left-wing critics of the air war,” as Davidson suggests (2011: 103). While he acknowledges that the empirical evidence is not as clear-cut as to allow a refutation of alternative
accounts, Davidson finds that, on balance, neoclassical propositions receive stronger support than the constructivist alternative.

Though this review necessarily abridges some of the arguments made, it reflects prevalent positions with regard to explaining states’ participation in the Kosovo War, based on realist, constructivist, and liberal-institutionalist perspectives. As the review shows, prior studies offer contending explanations for democracies’ varying war involvement, which prompts several questions and opens up avenues of inquiry for the present study.

Brawley and Martin suggest that security interests alone can explain why some governments decided to participate militarily, even in the absence of public support for such action. At the same time, their argument implies that for countries where security interests were not immediately concerned, the combination of a humanitarian motivation on the governments’ side and public support for intervention had been sufficient for military participation. In essence, both of these routes toward war involvement should be discernible in the fuzzy-set analysis, if the argument is correct. The realist route should apply primarily to countries in close proximity to the Kosovo conflict, some of which are new or aspiring NATO members. While many Western European democracies were not immediately affected by the wars in former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, the CEE countries felt security needs in an uncertain geopolitical environment, giving them incentives to bind themselves closer to NATO. In turn, the liberal-constructivist route should apply mainly to countries with public support and left governments, due to their inclusive conception of the national interest that comprises the protection of human rights of other countries’ citizens.

Auerswald argues that coalition governments, fearing domestic repercussions in response to possible policy failure, are severely constrained in their foreign policy options. Hence executives with two or more parties are expected to provide, at most, weak support for military intervention, irrespective of other factors. Though the fuzzy-set analysis in this chapter does not entail coalition type, I provide descriptive information on the 23 governments included in this study and compare this to the analytical results in order to assess the plausibility of Auerswald’s argument.

According to Rathbun left governments are expected to be supporters of humanitarian military intervention, since that policy resonates with their ideological value of egalitarianism that expresses itself in the global protection of human rights where these are endangered. While Rathbun also acknowledges that left parties often comprise pacifist factions, his case studies demonstrate that during the Kosovo conflict and due to the specific historical context, the interventionist left was predominant in
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. This prompts the question for the present study to which extent a similar pattern can be found for other democracies, beyond the cases examined by Rathbun.

Concerning realist arguments that emphasize power status, threat perception, and prestige as the main drivers of government decision-making in foreign and security policy, as suggested by Davidson and some of the contributors in Martin and Brawley (2000), it is difficult to disentangle these from other concerns, since I would contend that normative and domestic considerations are part of complex decision-making procedures and thus should not be dismissed as “mere rhetoric,” as Davidson depicts them (2011: 103). Yet what can be expected from a realist perspective is that powerful states contribute militarily out of self-interest due to greater spheres of influence, while weaker states have strong incentives to free-ride on others’ contributions, except when they are immediately affected by the conflict.

Finally, it is apparent that previous work has focused almost entirely on the United States and the large European allies. But to which extent do the suggested explanations account for small state behavior? In the ensuing analysis I will assess the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3 and the specific expectations discussed in this section on a sample of 23 democracies.

**Explaining military participation in Kosovo**

This chapter investigates democracies’ participation in OAF, which lasted for roughly three months, beginning on 24 March 1999 and ending officially on 20 June, though air strikes had been suspended since 10 June. The empirical analysis is based on the approach and method of fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, as introduced in the previous chapter. This section presents the conceptualization of the coding procedure for the outcome condition military participation and the five explanatory conditions: parliamentary veto rights, constitutional restrictions, executive partisanship, public support, and military power. Before moving to these conditions, however, I will provide the criteria that informed the case selection and specify executives, parties, and government types across the selected democracies.

**Country and cabinet selection**

Countries were selected based on two criteria: (1) the presence of uncontested democratic political institutions and (2) institutionalized security cooperation with other democracies. As a threshold for the first criterion I employed the Polity IV data to exclude countries with a
score of seven and below on the combined autocracy–democracy scale. Institutionalized security cooperation in the context of the Kosovo War refers to countries with EU or NATO membership, or cooperation agreements with either organization. To enhance cross-case comparability, I further applied a scope condition, excluding countries with a population below one million inhabitants.

These criteria resulted in the selection of 23 democracies from Europe and North America (see Table 1.2). When NATO air strikes were initiated, 16 of these countries were alliance members, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, which had joined NATO a few weeks earlier. In turn, the governments of Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia had already expressed their desire to join the alliance. I further include Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden – four countries that preserve a legal status of permanent neutrality or follow a traditional policy of non-alignment but which have formalized their cooperation with NATO. Table 5.1 lists the selected countries, their executives, partisan composition, and government type in the spring of 1999. The units of analysis are the relevant cabinets at the time of OAF. This was unambiguous except for Finland, where parliamentary elections were held on 21 March 1999 and the reigning five-party coalition under Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen was re-elected. Here, the analysis refers to the first Lipponen cabinet that was in office between 1995 and 1999.

The selection includes a large group of parliamentary democracies, but these are further divided into countries with coalition governments and single-party executives. In addition, five minority governments were in office during the Kosovo conflict and the two presidential systems, France and the United States, both experienced divided government during this time. While government type is not included in the fuzzy-set analysis proper, I will discuss its implications with regard to arguments on the effects of coalition government as opposed to single-party government during the interpretation of the results.

**Military participation in Operation Allied Force**

The primary criterion for the measurement of the outcome military participation is whether or not a country participated with its own military in NATO air strikes. This criterion is used to differentiate between, on the one hand, countries that provided aircraft and personnel and, on the other hand, those that provided logistical support or that decided not to participate in the operation. In order to qualify for membership in the fuzzy-set military participation (receive a fuzzy score greater than 0.5) a deployment had to include combat aircraft with participation in strike missions.
Table 5.1 Kosovo: Executives, government types and partisanship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Executive leader</th>
<th>Since</th>
<th>Executive party / Coalition</th>
<th>Government type</th>
<th>Executive L-R</th>
<th>Right executive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>AUT</td>
<td>Viktor Klima</td>
<td>11/1997</td>
<td>SPÖ, ÖVP</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>51.76</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>BEL</td>
<td>Jean-Luc Dehaene</td>
<td>06/1995</td>
<td>CVP/PSC, SP/PS</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>-22.40</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>BGR</td>
<td>Ivan Kostov</td>
<td>05/1997</td>
<td>ODS</td>
<td>Single-party majority</td>
<td>44.48</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>John Chrétien</td>
<td>09/1997</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Single-party majority</td>
<td>13.43</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>CZE</td>
<td>Miloš Zeman</td>
<td>07/1998</td>
<td>ČSSD</td>
<td>Single-party minority</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>DNK</td>
<td>Paul N. Rasmussen</td>
<td>03/1998</td>
<td>SD, RV</td>
<td>Minority coalition</td>
<td>6.63</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>Paavo Lipponen</td>
<td>04/1995</td>
<td>SDP, KOK,VAS, SFP,VIHR</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>-11.95</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>Jacques Chiracb</td>
<td>05/1995</td>
<td>RPR, UDF</td>
<td>Divided governmentc</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>DEU</td>
<td>Gerhard Schröder</td>
<td>10/1998</td>
<td>SPD, Greens</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>-3.72</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>Kostas Simitis</td>
<td>09/1996</td>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>Single-party majority</td>
<td>-37.30</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>HUN</td>
<td>Viktor Orbán</td>
<td>07/1998</td>
<td>Fidesz, FKGP, MDF</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>17.15</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>IRL</td>
<td>Bertie Ahern</td>
<td>06/1997</td>
<td>FE, PD</td>
<td>Minority coalition</td>
<td>11.07</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>Massimo D’Alema</td>
<td>10/1998</td>
<td>DS, PPI, PRC, RI, UDR, FdV</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>21.05</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>NLD</td>
<td>Wim Kok</td>
<td>08/1998</td>
<td>PvdA, VVD, D66</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>-21.21</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>NOR</td>
<td>Kjell M. Bondevik</td>
<td>10/1997</td>
<td>Kr, Sp, V</td>
<td>Minority coalition</td>
<td>-13.54</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>POL</td>
<td>Jerzy Buzek</td>
<td>10/1997</td>
<td>AWS, UW</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>20.49</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>António Guterres</td>
<td>10/1995</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Single-party minority</td>
<td>-39.75</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>ROU</td>
<td>Radu Vasile</td>
<td>04/1998</td>
<td>CDR, USD, UDMR</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>-43.81</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>SVK</td>
<td>Mikuláš Dzurinda</td>
<td>10/1998</td>
<td>SDK, SDL, SMK-MKP, SOP</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>-4.03</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>José M. Aznar</td>
<td>05/1996</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Single-party minority</td>
<td>24.83</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
Table 5.1  Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Executive leader</th>
<th>Since</th>
<th>Executive party / Coalition</th>
<th>Government type</th>
<th>Executive L-R</th>
<th>Right executive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>SWE</td>
<td>Göran Persson</td>
<td>09/1998</td>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Single-party minority</td>
<td>−6.67</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>Tony Blair</td>
<td>05/1997</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Single-party majority</td>
<td>14.47</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>William J. Clinton</td>
<td>01/1997</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Divided government</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Country codes refer to the ISO format. Dates indicate the beginning of term or a cabinet change. Negative L-R values indicate left partisanship.

a The five-party coalition government under Prime Minister Lipponen was re-elected on March 21, 1999.
b President Chirac shared executive power with Prime Minister Jospin, who headed a coalition between the PS, PCF, and Greens.
c President with a legislative minority.

This coding is based on the rationale that combat forces, including strike aircraft, are exposed to higher levels of risk in getting wounded or killed than rear support units like engineers at flight bases or pilots of support aircraft. Decision-makers are sensitive to these risks because they fear political losses and electoral punishment by a casualty-averse public. Studies have shown repeatedly that the fear of casualty-aversion, whether justified or not, influences decision-making in foreign and security policy (Baum and Potter, 2008; Schörnig, 2007; Smith, 2005). Consequently, political leaders distinguish strictly between combat operations and non-combat and humanitarian tasks. When justifying the use of force to the general public, they further tend to emphasize the nature of military deployments, especially where restrictions or caveats are placed on mandates. However, this also implies that governments can have incentives to misrepresent their country’s military involvement. Hence the coding used here takes into account contributions as declared by government representatives and in ministerial reports, as well as foreign sources and external reports in order to verify a countries’ extent of military participation.

Based on the designated criteria countries are coded from 1 to 0 on a fuzzy scale, indicating a range from full membership in the set of countries that participated militarily to full non-membership. At the high end of the scale are states that fully participated in the air strikes, as indicated by their sorties numbers and the number of aircraft deployed. These comprise the United States, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada. While the extent of contributions varied across these countries, all of them provided sizable deployments in relation to their capabilities and their aircraft were equipped to strike targets on the ground. The next group contains countries that also participated with combat aircraft equipped for strike missions but whose deployments were of a limited scale when compared to countries in the previous group. Accordingly, Belgium, Denmark, and Spain receive a lower coding (fuzzy score 0.8). Finally, another group of countries contributed aircraft to OAF, but these took on a support role and did not engage in strike missions (fuzzy score 0.6). This group includes Germany, Portugal, and Norway, all of which deployed aircraft to support NATO air strikes but whose planes were not equipped to strike targets. The German Tornado aircraft were equipped with anti-radiation missiles used to suppress enemy air defenses (Rudolf, 2000: 138). Norway deployed F-16 fighter planes, but these were not equipped to strike targets on the ground (Jakobsen, 2006: 170). Due to a lack of political consensus over the Kosovo War, the Portuguese government explicitly restricted the country’s F-16 to escort and patrol missions (Carvalho Narciso, 2009).
In contrast, three groups of countries did not participate in the air strikes but still supported the military operation to varying extents. Hungary had several aircraft patrolling its border to Serbia, resulting in a coding that reflects this material contribution. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia all provided logistical support, but did not contribute beyond that (Vachudová, 2000; US-CRS, 1999). Finally, Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden did not participate to any extent in OAF. Table 5.2 summarizes the data that informed the coding of military participation, including the type of contribution, number of aircraft, sorties flown, and the resulting fuzzy-set value. As a means to place contributions in context, the table further lists national arsenals in combat aircraft and the share of deployed aircraft. These indicators, however, did not influence the fuzzy-set coding since this was based on the qualitative kind of military participation and not the numerical size of each country’s deployment.

**Parliamentary veto rights**

The analysis includes two institutional conditions: parliamentary veto rights and constitutional restrictions. I treat these separately because I regard them as governed by different causal mechanisms: while the former is expected to constitute a parliamentary veto point in combination with public opposition, constitutional restrictions are conceived as a structural veto to military deployments irrespective of the preference distribution among the public or in parliament.

I operationalize the fuzzy-set parliamentary veto rights on a dimension that ranges from mandatory parliamentary approval in advance of all military deployments (fuzzy score 1.0) to the complete absence of parliamentary involvement in troop deployment decisions (fuzzy score 0). The central criterion to distinguish whether a country is rather in the fuzzy set (receive a fuzzy score above 0.5), or whether it is situated rather outside that set (receive a fuzzy score below 0.5) is the presence or absence of a basic parliamentary veto right. Depending on the comprehensiveness of this institutional practice, fuzzy scores in the first group can take values between 1.0 for a full *ex ante* veto, 0.8 indicating a limited *ex ante* veto, and 0.6 for an *ex post* veto. In turn, countries without parliamentary veto rights but other forms of legislative influence are coded 0.4 when parliament is informed in advance of a military operation, 0.2 indicating *ex post* information of parliament, and 0 in cases where there is no relevant involvement of the legislature in the decision-making process.

My coding of parliamentary veto rights draws primarily on the ParlCon dataset compiled by Wolfgang Wagner, Dirk Peters, and Cosima
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MP</th>
<th>Military Participation</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Strike</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>full participation</td>
<td>23,208</td>
<td>5,035</td>
<td>338</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>338</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>2,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.414</td>
<td>in air strikes</td>
<td>2,414</td>
<td>1,675</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1,081</td>
<td>participation</td>
<td>1,081</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>participation</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>1,249</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,252</td>
<td>participation</td>
<td>1,252</td>
<td>1,085</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>participation</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>limited participation</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>participation</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>in air strikes</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>participation</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>in support role</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>in support role</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>indirect support</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>logistical support</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>458</td>
<td>297</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>367</td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>253</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>85</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>no participation</td>
<td></td>
<td>227</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>458</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>297</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Note: MP is the fuzzy set military participation. Share indicates the percentage of deployed combat aircraft in relation to combat aircraft in arsenal. Sorties data were not available for some contributors. Sources: Bowman (2002); IISS (1998); Peters et al. (2002); UK-HoC (1999); US-DoD (2000).
Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict

Glahn (2010). ParlCon classifies the parliamentary control level of countries in terms of the presence or absence of an *ex ante* veto right, which, in case of the former, translates into high values on the scale for the fuzzy-set parliamentary veto rights. In addition to its binary coding of veto rights, ParlCon provides brief country studies that focus on the institutional role and political practice of parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions. I used these country briefs for the fuzzy-set coding in order to distinguish *degrees* in parliamentary veto rights. In some cases, however, the characterization of institutional provisions did not suffice to make an informed coding decision. Hence, I have drawn on further country studies and two additional surveys of parliamentary war powers (Born and Hänggi, 2005; Dieterich et al., 2010).14

Of the observed countries 11 had parliaments with an *ex ante* veto on all military deployments (fuzzy score 1.0). These comprise Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden.15 In Italy, constitutional interpretations that regard parliamentary involvement in decision-making as mandatory remain controversial. While most analysts agree that a basic parliamentary veto right exists, there is no consensus on its reach. Hence, the coding reflects the presence of a weak parliamentary veto right (fuzzy score 0.6).16 In the Netherlands no formal veto right is given, but there is a policy tradition of parliamentary involvement and information prior to military deployments (fuzzy score 0.4). In Belgium, Canada, Norway, Poland, Portugal, and the United States military deployments are primarily a matter of the executive, but parliament has to be informed within a certain timeframe (fuzzy score 0.2).17 Finally, countries with an executive prerogative over foreign policy and thus no mandatory parliamentary involvement comprise France, Greece, Spain, and the United Kingdom (fuzzy score 0).18

**Constitutional restrictions**

As the second institutional condition, constitutional restrictions are assumed to constitute a structural veto point against military deployment irrespective of the preference distribution in parliament. While regulations vary across countries, I distinguish three sets of constraints on the basis of provisions that prohibit or restrict military participation either (a) on the grounds of international law, (b) outside certain organizational frameworks, or (c) beyond a set of permissible tasks. Restrictions in the first area can range from an explicit requirement of UN authorization to the use of the armed forces in accordance with international law broadly conceived. The second area relates to
requirements regarding multilateral organizational frameworks. Finally, some democracies specify a limited range of permissible operations for military deployments, thereby prohibiting offensive military action.

My operationalization of constitutional restrictions ranges from comprehensive restrictions (fuzzy score 1.0) to the absence of any relevant limitations (fuzzy score 0). Hence, the central criterion to distinguish whether a country is rather in the fuzzy-set constitutional restrictions (receive a fuzzy score above 0.5) or whether it is situated rather outside that set (receive a fuzzy score below 0.5) is the presence or absence of relevant restrictions. In the case of Kosovo, a strict requirement of a UN mandate and restrictions that prohibit the offensive use of force are expected to sufficiently constrain a country to prevent military participation in OAF. Were these restrictions are partially present or less explicitly laid out, countries receive a lower coding, depending on the rigidity of the specific restrictions (fuzzy scores 0.8 and 0.6). Provisions regarding organizational frameworks, on the other hand, are not seen as a sufficient constraint, since the intervention was conducted under NATO auspices and all of the observed countries were either alliance members or in formal cooperation with the organization. In turn, countries that are rather outside the set constitutional restrictions are distinguished by the degree to which the primacy of the United Nations and international law is acknowledged in constitutional documents and political practice. While none of the countries with values below 0.5 demands a UN mandate, some require that military operations be conducted in accordance with international law, broadly conceived (fuzzy score 0.2). Finally, countries without any relevant restrictions are coded accordingly (fuzzy score 0). The coding of constitutional restrictions is based on an analysis of primary sources, such as constitutional documents or legislative bills regarding the use of the armed forces, and on secondary sources, which proved particularly helpful in interpreting regulations in the context of specific countries.

Countries with comprehensive constitutional restrictions (fuzzy score 1.0) preceding OAF comprise Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden. All of these countries require multilateral organizational frameworks and restrict the scope of permissible tasks to peace support operations, meaning that they cannot participate in offensive operations. Finland and Ireland further prohibit operations without UN authorization, while Austria is constitutionally allowed to participate only in operations under UN, OSCE, or EU auspices. Sweden adapted its legal framework in the 1990s to allow participation in a greater range of peace support operations, but the general requirement of a UN mandate retained at the time of the Kosovo crisis (Jakobsen, 2006: 183–185; Wunderlich, 2013).
In turn, Denmark, Germany, and Norway all have constitutional restrictions, yet their extent varies. Denmark is a country with considerable constraints (fuzzy score 0.8). While Danish constitutional practice does not require a specific organizational framework nor restricts the scope of permissible operations (Jensen, 2003: 238), it was still considered to require a UN mandate in 1998–1999, which posed a sizeable obstacle on its participation in OAF (Jakobsen, 2006: 90–91). Like other Scandinavian countries, Norway had witnessed a long-standing consensus regarding the primacy of the UN and, consequently, the requirement of a UN mandate before considering participation in military operations (Nustad and Thune, 2003: 158–162). In the 1990s, however, this consensus slowly eroded until in 1994 a parliamentary majority passed an act to allow Norwegian participation in humanitarian or peace operations without an explicit UN mandate but in agreement with the principles of the UN Charter (Jakobsen, 2006: 151). Hence, by the time of NATO’s activation orders in October 1998, Norway was already in the process of changing its long-standing policy and loosen the legal requirement of a UN mandate, which justifies a lower coding that indicates the presence of partial constraints (fuzzy score 0.6). German constitutional law restricts military participation to “defense purposes” and operations within the institutional framework of “systems of mutual collective security”. The Grundgesetz further prescribes a firm commitment to international law (Nolte, 2003: 350–351). Hence, the lack of Security Council authorization led to intense debates in the German Bundestag about whether the country could participate in NATO air strikes without violating principles of international law. Based on the inherent tension between German constitutional law and the “legal flaw” that marked the Kosovo intervention, I code the country as having partial restrictions (fuzzy score 0.6).

In contrast to the previous countries, the majority of the observed democracies have minor or no constitutional restrictions. These relate either to a requirement of military operations to conform to international law broadly conceived or some limitation on the purposes for which the armed forces can be sent abroad. Countries with minor restrictions (fuzzy score 0.2) include Belgium, Canada, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Romania. The remaining 10 countries have no relevant constitutional restrictions and are coded accordingly (Ku and Jacobson, 2003a; Nolte, 2003; Wagner et al., 2010). These comprise Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Executive partisanship

This condition refers to the position of a country’s executive on a left-right scale in political space. My estimate of partisan positions draws on the extensive research of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP, Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006). The CMP data is based on a qualitative coding of statements in party election programs along 56 policy categories and seven policy domains that range from domestic issues to external relations. Of these policy categories, 13 are associated with positions traditionally emphasized by left parties, such as peaceful international cooperation, welfare state expansion, and economic regulation, while another 13 categories indicate policy positions that are commonly highlighted by right parties as, for instance, strong defense, free enterprise, and traditional moral values (Budge and Klingemann, 2001).

A particular strength of the CMP is the provision of meaningful indicators of cross-national variation, whereas estimates that are based on party-family affiliation or expert judgment of particular countries can be misleading when used for comparative purposes. In terms of its political program, for instance, Norway’s Arbeiderparti (Labour Party) is considerably more left than Australia’s Labour Party, yet both belong to the social democratic party family. This difference is due in part to Norway’s political space, which is located further to the left than most countries’ party systems. In contrast to some alternative measures of partisanship, the CMP approach is sensitive to this kind of cross-national variation (Klingemann et al., 2006: 63–85). Hence the resulting left-right values do not necessarily reflect popular perceptions of party positions. For instance, Britain’s New Labour under Blair made a decisive turn toward the right, which is reflected in a CMP value that characterizes Labour as a center or center-right party, in contrast to its familiar classification as a social democratic party.

The calculation of CMP left-right values results from subtracting the sum of left statements from the sum of right statements for each party and each election. For the estimate of partisan positions I follow the approach suggested by Michael Laver and John Garry (2000: 628) and calculate the “substantive” policy position for each party. This technique is an adaptation of the original CMP calculation. In essence, it discounts the salience a party places on a category in favor of its “pure” policy position, dividing the CMP left-right values by the sum of left-right references. A party’s left-right position, $P_{LR}$, is thus defined as:

$$P_{LR} = \frac{P_R - P_L}{P_R + P_L}$$
While this calculation is straightforward for single-party governments and presidential systems, the majority of parliamentary democracies typically feature coalition government (Müller and Strøm, 2000). Hence for multi-party governments in parliamentary democracies I calculate a weighted score where each coalition partner’s left-right value is set in relation to its parliamentary seat shares and the overall number of seats of the governing coalition.\textsuperscript{23} This calculation is based on the assumption that coalition partners distribute cabinet posts in accordance with their relative seat shares, a conjecture that is well supported by empirical studies (Powell, 2000: 173). Thus, if $S_a$ indicates the parliamentary seat share of government party $GP_{ar}$, the executive’s partisan position on a left-right scale, $E_{LR}$, is defined as:

$$E_{LR} = \frac{(GP_{LR_a} \cdot S_a) + \ldots + (GP_{LR_n} \cdot S_n)}{\sum S_i}$$

In order to transform the resultant CMP values into fuzzy sets, I employ the “direct method” of calibration (Ragin, 2008: 85–94). This approach requires the researcher to define three qualitative breakpoints that indicate full set membership, a point of maximum ambiguity, and full set non-membership. Based on a scale of substantive CMP values that ranges from −100 (all left statements) to 100 (all right statements), I define full membership in the fuzzy set right executive as any CMP value equal to or above 50. Likewise, values below −50 or equal to it are defined as indicating full non-membership, while 0 marks a natural crossover point. Table 5.1 displays the executive parties, resultant substantive CMP values for each party or coalition, and the calibrated fuzzy values. As the fuzzy values show, 13 out of 24 cabinets are considered right executives to varying extents (fuzzy values above 0.50), whereas six of these are almost fully in the respective set (fuzzy values greater than 0.70). Likewise, five cabinets are almost fully in the set left executive (fuzzy value below 0.30).

**Public support**

This condition is based on the citizen–policy link postulated by proponents of the democratic peace. If scholars are correct in their assumption that democratic leaders are constrained by a requirement to gather citizens’ support for decisions on war and peace, then public opinion should be a critical factor in assessing whether or not a country engages in military conflict. Hence, according to this logic, public support should be a necessary condition for military participation. Vice versa, the absence of public support should be sufficient for military non-participation. By contrast, if those who question the influence of public opinion are right,
then we should not find consistent pathways where public support or public opposition is an element. In contrast to these absolute positions, plausible arguments suggest that the interplay between public opinion and other factors should be examined, as outlined in Chapter 3. I argue that one potential factor that influences outcomes in conjunction with public opinion are parliamentary veto rights. Apart from this specific combination of conditions, I expect public opinion to be an INUS condition for military participation and non-participation, respectively.

My estimate of public support for the Kosovo War is based on a secondary analysis of opinion polls conducted across the 23 countries included in this study. In terms of data, I draw on a variety of international surveys collected and documented by Philip Everts (2002).24 Not surprisingly, the range of available data varies greatly by country. While most surveys focus on the United States and the larger European countries, there are few reports on public opinion from smaller and Eastern European states. Hence, to attain the largest possible pool of surveys and to increase cross-country comparability, I chose opinion polls asking respondents about their general support for NATO air strikes rather than polls with more specific questions, as these are difficult to compare across countries, if at all available.25 I selected polls with similarly worded questions and restricted the timeframe to include only polls conducted during the first month of OAF, between March 24 and April 22, 1999, as the timeframe from the initiation of combat, up until NATO’s Washington summit, which is widely perceived as the critical juncture in the conduct of military operations.26 For this timeframe comparable cross-country data exists, including some larger international surveys conducted for the Economist and The Guardian (by the Angus Reid Group and ICM, respectively). Furthermore, since levels of public support vary to some extent depending on who conducted the survey, I chose to base my estimate on average levels of support across available surveys. This way a larger number of opinion polls are included and extreme values are evened out, as these could have been the result of particular circumstances on the day a respective poll was conducted or a specific bias of the polling agency.

On the basis of countries’ average values, I construct the fuzzy-set public support to reflect where support for NATO air strikes is present and where it is absent. Fuzzy-set membership values are calculated using the direct method of calibration. For the opinion polls that my estimate is based on, the average share of respondents who gave no answer or were undecided is at about 10 per cent. Hence, the point of maximum ambiguity would be at 45 per cent public support – a point at which it is likely that an equal share of respondents opposes NATO air strikes.
Accordingly, I define three qualitative breakpoints: countries with 75 per cent of supporters are considered fully in the fuzzy set public support (fuzzy score 1.0), the cut-off point of maximum ambiguity is set at 45 per cent public support (fuzzy score 0.50), and countries with less than 15 per cent of supporters are considered fully outside the set (fuzzy score 0). The resulting fuzzy values are given in Table 5.3. Countries on the left-hand side are rather in the set public support (fuzzy score above 0.50), while countries on the right-hand side are rather outside the set (fuzzy scores below 0.50).

Several countries are close to being fully in the set public support, led by the Netherlands, Denmark, and to a lesser extent Norway. These are followed by a group of countries that are almost fully in the set public support, which comprises the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France, Belgium, and the United States. Hungary takes an intermediate position, while Poland, Finland, and Ireland are rather in the set, but have low membership scores, reflecting some ambiguity in their degree of public support. In turn, Spain, Italy, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Portugal are rather outside the set public support, but show traces of set membership. In Sweden the lack of public support is more pronounced, while Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece are almost fully outside the set public support, indicating substantial opposition to NATO air strikes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Public support</th>
<th>Polls</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Public support</th>
<th>Polls</th>
<th>S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: S is the fuzzy set public support for NATO air strikes. Estimates draw on average values across polls between March 22 and April 24, 1999. The Portuguese poll was conducted by Canal IPSOS on June 2, 1999.

Military power
The condition military power is based in the general expectation derived from collective action theory that powerful states make disproportionately large contributions, whereas weak states have strong incentives to ride free or limit their participation to nominal contributions. Hence, it is expected that military power is part of combinations of conditions that are sufficient for military participation, while military weakness is presumed to be present in combinations of conditions sufficient for military non-participation. In order to apply this general hypotheses to the Kosovo conflict, however, first the respective collective good and the relative material strength of the countries involved need to be specified.

With regard to the military intervention in Kosovo, one could argue that the collective good had several dimensions, or that it was characterized by “content asymmetry” to use Hardin’s term (1982: 76). First, reports about widespread human rights violations in Kosovo spurred Western leaders to make their primary goal “stopping another round of ethnic cleansing”, as US President Bill Clinton put it in his memoirs, referring to previous atrocities committed by Serb forces in Bosnia and Croatia (2005: 512). Second and related to human rights abuses and violations of humanitarian law was the attempt to stop refugee flows that destabilized the region with immediate repercussions for neighboring countries. While this concern was shared by many governments, it directly affected larger NATO members like Italy and, albeit to a lesser extent due to its geographical distance, Germany, as countries where a majority of refugees would likely seek shelter. Finally, as NATO became increasingly involved in the Kosovo conflict throughout 1998, awareness grew that the conflict threatened to undermine its credibility as an alliance. In the 1990s the organization had expanded its strategic doctrine and could thus, arguably, not afford to bypass military involvement in Kosovo. As Walt holds, “the new strategic concept makes it impossible for NATO to ignore events in neighboring areas – such as the former Yugoslavia – without casting doubt on its claim to be the main guarantor of regional stability” (2000a: 16).

It is thus argued that for the countries involved, solving the Kosovo conflict presented a collective good with three dimensions: (1) stepping in against human rights violations, (2) preserving regional stability, and (3) maintaining NATO’s credibility as a security organization. The reasoning that informs the collective action argument is based on the assumption that more powerful states stand to gain larger absolute benefits from the collective good than their weaker counterparts. Hence, powerful states will bear a disproportionate share in the provision of
the collective good, while weak states – whose relative contribution has little influence on the provision of the public good – will exploit the opportunity to ride free on the provisions of the more powerful or to ride easy, as in limiting their participation to a nominal contribution.

How can we determine what constitutes a powerful state? Certainly, there are many ways to conceptualize power. However, as the theoretical argument on collective action problems in alliance contexts is based on material conceptions of power, I will restrict my conceptualization of power to countries’ relative material capabilities as indicators of military power.29 Hence, I base my estimate of military power on country’s relative military expenditure, as a standard neorealist indicator for material capabilities.30

As an aside, I contemplated the construction of an index that comprised military expenditure and the available number of combat aircraft to estimate operational military power. The respective figures are displayed in Table 5.2, which lists each country’s arsenal in combat aircraft in relation to the deployed number of aircraft. However, I decided against such an index value for two related reasons. First, since the sheer number of aircraft cannot reflect technological differences, it appears misleading as an indicator. Second, using an estimate based on military hardware further entails the problem of maintenance status, on which cross-country data is scarce. For example, based on the figures in Table 5.2, many of the former communist countries hold large arsenals in combat aircraft, but their maintenance status might not allow for actual deployment.

The fuzzy-set military power is constructed on the basis of absolute values for military expenditure for 1998, as listed in the widely used reference The Military Balance (IISS, 1999). These values are standardized and transformed into a fuzzy set using the direct method of calibration. I define full membership in the set military power as any z-score equal to or above 0.5 standard deviations. In turn, full non-membership relates to z-scores equal to or below -0.5 standard deviations, while 0 marks a natural crossover point.

Table A.5 in the Appendix shows absolute military expenditures, standardized scores, and the resultant fuzzy set military power. The table demonstrates that the observed countries are characterized by a highly asymmetrical distribution of military power, which relates to their economic size. In 1998 the United States spent about 80 billion USD more on defense than the other 22 democracies combined. Among the large European states, France has the largest amount of military expenditures, followed by the United Kingdom and Germany, while Italy is a distant fourth and thus barely in the group of militarily powerful states.
Fuzzy-set analysis

The fuzzy-set analysis comprises separate fsQCA procedures, one for the analysis of the outcome and another for its negation. It is good practice to conduct both of these, because the results for one cannot be inferred from the other. Furthermore, since Chapter 3 and the theoretical section of this chapter yielded asymmetric hypotheses, a test of these arguments requires separate analyses. Before proceeding with the analysis of sufficient conditions, it is prudent to test for necessary conditions. In fuzzy-set analysis a potential necessary condition is indicated when instances of the outcome are a subset of instances of a condition. In formal terms, necessary conditions are calculated on the basis of separate measures for consistency and coverage, as described in Chapter 4. Accordingly, each condition and its negation are tested separately for both outcomes, while conditions with a consistency value equal to or above 0.85 are further tested for coverage.

This procedure reveals that the absence of military power (~M) can be considered a necessary condition for military non-participation (~MP), at 0.93 consistency and 0.64 coverage. In addition, the absence of constitutional restrictions (~C) shows a consistency score of 0.86 and a coverage score of 0.65 and could thus be considered “almost necessary” for military participation. However, because the consistency is below the conventional threshold of 0.90 it should not be treated as a necessary condition in a strict sense. All other conditions are substantially below the threshold for necessary conditions.

If a condition is necessary for an outcome, it follows that its negation must be sufficient for the negation of the outcome. This logic implies that, since (~M) is a necessary condition for (~MP), military power (M) must be sufficient for military participation (MP). Likewise, as the absence of constitutional restrictions (~C) could be considered almost necessary for military participation (MP), it can be expected that (C) is almost sufficient for (~MP). Though these implications make intuitive sense in the light of theoretical expectations about free-riding incentives for small states and the constraining effects of constitutional restrictions, as statements about sufficient conditions they still need to be confirmed in the fsQCA procedure.

Military participation in Operation Allied Force

Which conditions led democracies to participate in NATO air strikes against Serbia? Can pathways be identified that resonate with the
outlined theoretical expectations? To address these questions, the fuzzy-set analysis proceeds through a sequence of steps, the core of which can be carried out with the QCA software.

In a first step a truth table is constructed on the basis of countries’ fuzzy-set membership scores for each condition and the outcome. Table 5.4 displays the truth table for the outcome military participation and the five conditions military power (M), parliamentary veto rights (V), constitutional restrictions (C), public support (S), and right executive (E). Because the model contains five conditions, the truth table comprises \(2^5 = 32\) rows. For reasons of space the table displays only those rows that are filled with empirical cases. Rows 16 through 32 contain logical remainders, which represent combinations of conditions not filled with empirical cases. These can be included in an intermediate solution if one can make plausible assumptions about their potential outcomes.

Each country’s membership in the respective conjunction of conditions is given in brackets. Sweden, for instance, holds a membership of 0.60 in the conjunction given in Row 14, which comprises the absence of both military power and public support with a left executive, parliamentary veto rights, and constitutional restrictions. The consistency column indicates the extent to which the fuzzy-set values of all cases in a conjunction are sufficient for the outcome military participation (0.50 in Row 14). Based on the consistency scores a cut-off point is determined to separate combinations that pass fuzzy-set sufficiency from those that do not (Ragin, 2008, 135). To proceed with the analysis, I decide for a consistency threshold of 0.87. Hence all configurations below Row 6 are excluded from the ensuing minimization procedure.

In a second step, Boolean algebra is used to minimize the truth table and to identify combinations of conditions that are sufficient for the outcome (Ragin 1987, 93–97). In fsQCA this is done via the Quine-McCluskey algorithm, also known as truth table algorithm. On this basis three solution terms are derived, which differ in their treatment of logical remainders. The complex solution provides a conservative estimate that makes no assumptions beyond the empirical cases. The parsimonious solution incorporates logical remainders but does not assess their plausibility. While this procedure yields solution terms that are easier to interpret, the results of the parsimonious solution should be treated with care and always contrasted with the other solutions. Finally, the intermediate solution allows the researcher to specify how logical remainders ought to be treated, based on explicit assumptions about the causal relationship. It is thus positioned in between the complex and parsimonious solutions.
Table 5.5 displays the three solution terms and their constituent conjunctions of conditions that are sufficient for military participation. In addition, at the top of the table the previously identified almost necessary condition (~C) is displayed. The results for military non-participation, shown at the bottom of the table, are discussed below.

The numbered paths present alternate routes within a solution for an outcome. On the right-hand side, consistency and coverage scores are given by solution and for each path within it. While raw coverage refers to how much of the outcome a path can account for, unique coverage discounts empirical overlap between paths to indicate only the specific explanatory contribution of the respective path.

The solution terms differ greatly in their level of detail. As the most general, the parsimonious solution covers more cases than the other solution terms. By contrast, the intermediate and complex solutions are more detailed than the parsimonious solution, indicated by the complexity of their conjunctions and the number of alternate pathways.

I focus on the parsimonious and intermediate solutions since these provide the best combination of consistency and coverage in relation to level of detail. While a theoretical interpretation of the results is

Table 5.4  Truth table for military participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>MP</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>United Kingdom (.70),</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United States (.68),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France (.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Italy (.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Norway (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.93</td>
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<td>Spain (.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Canada (.69), Poland (.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hungary (.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Greece (.83), Portugal (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bulgaria (.90), Czech Republic (.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Finland (.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sweden (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Austria (.60)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

provided in the ensuing section, a few observations are evident from the configurations that comprise these solution terms.

First, it is apparent that the absence of institutional constraints, which is understood here as a lack of parliamentary veto rights (~V) and/or constitutional restrictions (~C), are a necessary element in each of the paths toward military participation of either solution term. Path 6 even combines these institutional features. Second, we see that right executives decide on military participation either when there are none of the two forms of institutional constraints, or when a country is militarily powerful and contains no constitutional restrictions (Path 4 and Path 6). By contrast, while left executives also participate militarily, this occurs only in the presence of public support and the absence of a parliamentary veto (Path 5).

On their own, the solution terms are rather abstract; they further lack information on the distribution of cases and the empirical fit of

**Table 5.5 Kosovo: Analytical results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Conjunction</th>
<th>Relation</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Necessary condition</td>
<td>~C</td>
<td>← MP</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parsimonious solution</td>
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<td>M*~C</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>~V*S</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>~V*E</td>
<td>→ MP</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate solution</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>M<em>~C</em>E</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>~V<em>S</em>~E</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>~V<em>~C</em>E</td>
<td>→ MP</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex solution</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>M<em>V</em>~C<em>~S</em>E</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>~M<em>~V</em>S*~E</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>~V<em>~C</em>~S*E</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>~M<em>V</em>~C*E</td>
<td>→ MP</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessary condition</td>
<td>~M</td>
<td>← ~MP</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex solution</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>~M<em>V</em>~S</td>
<td>→ ~MP</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the model. In order to address this shortcoming, I construct an x-y plot that displays the position of each country by tracing membership in the solution term against membership in the outcome. Figure 5.1 demonstrates the fit of the parsimonious solution as a sufficient condition for military participation in the Kosovo War. The diagonal line demarcates points that hold equal membership in both sets. More importantly, it separates cases with a higher value in the outcome than in the solution (above the line) from those where membership in the solution exceeds that of the outcome (below the line). While the former can indicate a sufficient condition, the latter can signal a necessary condition. In set-theoretic terms, it is crucial to distinguish whether a case rather holds membership in a given set \((X_i > 0.50)\) or whether it is situated rather outside that set \((X_i < 0.50)\). This lets us divide the x-y plot into six distinct zones, which differ in their theoretical relevance, depending on the analytical aim of the research (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013: 21).

The x-y plot demonstrates visually that the parsimonious solution is almost sufficient for military participation, since the majority of countries, 20 out of 23, are placed on or above the main diagonal. The x-y plot further shows two main groups of cases. Countries in the lower left corner hold low membership values in both the outcome and the solution and can thus be considered largely irrelevant for the theoretical argument. By contrast, of the 12 democracies that participated militarily, nine also hold membership in the solution term (Zone 1 & 2), seven of which can be considered typical cases (Zone 1). Arguably, Spain could well be included in this group of countries, as its position is just barely below the main diagonal. In contrast, Poland in Zone 3 can be considered a deviant case, since the country holds membership in the solution but does not show the expected outcome. Norway in Zone 2 is a country that holds a higher membership in the solution term than in the outcome, so it could be considered uncharacteristic due to its comparably low outcome value; nevertheless it is not a deviant case because, unlike Poland, the country still shows the outcome, albeit to a lesser extent than others. Three countries also participated militarily, but are not explained by the solution: Denmark, Germany, and Portugal (Zone 6). However, although it lowers the overall coverage values of the solution term, the identification of cases in Zone 6 does not undermine the theoretical argument.

Taken as a whole, the solution term provides a consistent account for military participation, as visualized by the x-y plot and the large number of typical cases in the top right corner. But how are we to explain the deviant case of Poland? First, it is apparent from Table 5.4 that Poland shares a configuration with Canada, which comprises a right
executive, public support for air strikes, and the absence of institutional constraints and military power. Hence, based on these characteristics alone, we would have expected military participation. In fact, given the overwhelming political support for NATO actions expressed by the Polish government throughout the Kosovo crisis (Vachudová, 2000: 202), it is surprising to see that Poland did not play a larger military role in the air strikes. While this section cannot provide a comprehensive treatment of the Polish case, a possible explanation for the country’s military abstention could lie in the fact that Poland, together with Hungary and the Czech Republic, had joined NATO just weeks prior to OAF and was thus not in a position to operate in a complex mission of closely coordinated air strikes. Yet this argument cannot explain why Poland did not provide more than logistical support for the operation.

Figure 5.1 Kosovo: Military participation and solution term

**Military non-participation in Operation Allied Force**

Which conditions explain countries’ abstention from military participation in NATO air strikes against Serbia? Does the theoretical model
fit equally well for the non-outcome as it did for the outcome military participation? To address these questions, the fuzzy-set analysis follows the same procedure as applied above. Table 5.6 shows the truth table for the outcome military non-participation (¬MP). The conditions and countries’ membership values for each conjunction are identical to the previous analysis. However, since the analysis is now directed toward the non-outcome, the consistency values inevitably differ. What is evident at first glance is that overall consistency is lower than in Table 5.4 for military participation. Hence, I set the consistency threshold to 0.79 to include the first four rows in the ensuing minimization procedure.

In the second analytical step, the truth table is minimized on the basis of Boolean logic. In contrast to the previous analysis that provided three solutions terms at different degrees of complexity, the analysis for military non-participation results in identical terms for the parsimonious, intermediate, and complex solution. Table 5.5 displays the resultant sufficient path toward military non-participation and the respective consistency and coverage values. It further includes the absence of military power (¬M) as the previously identified necessary condition for military non-participation.

### Table 5.6 Truth table for military non-participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>¬MP</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Romania (.80), Slovakia (.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Austria (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sweden (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bulgaria (.90), Czech Republic (.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Finland (.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Denmark (.60), Ireland (.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hungary (.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Greece (.83), Portugal (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Germany (.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Italy (.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Norway (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Spain (.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Canada (.69), Poland (.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Belgium (.79), Netherlands (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>United Kingdom (.70), United States (.68), France (.61)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The solution path indicates that the combination of the absence of military power (~M), parliamentary veto rights (V), and the absence of public support (~S) are *jointly sufficient* for military non-participation. This demonstrates that a condition can be both individually necessary for an outcome and an element in a set of conditions that are jointly sufficient for that outcome, as the absence of military power (~M) shows. It is thus a necessary condition and a NESS condition, which describes a “necessary element of a sufficient set” of conditions, as Richard Wright has termed these (1988: 1019). NESS conditions differ from INUS conditions in the sense that the former can also be individually necessary, while the latter presumes constituents that are in themselves unnecessary (Mackie, 1965: 245). The identification of a NESS condition further supports my argument regarding the need to retain necessary conditions during the fsQCA procedure – despite contrary recommendations given in several textbooks, as discussed in Chapter 4.

Again, in order to visualize the fsQCA result for military non-participation, I construct an x-y plot by tracing membership in the solution term against membership in the outcome. Figure 5.2 shows the empirical fit of the complex solution as a sufficient condition for the non-outcome. With 17 out of 23 cases in Zone 1, 5, and 6, a majority of countries are placed above the main diagonal, indicating an almost sufficient condition. While there are no deviant cases that hold membership in the solution but not in the outcome (Zone 3), countries are divided among three groups. In the top right corner three typical cases are found, with another three just outside Zone 1 on the right and two more are close to Zone 1 on the left. Then there are cases in Zone 6 that show the outcome but which do not hold high enough membership in the solution term to be considered typical cases. Finally, countries in the bottom left corner hold low membership in both sets and are thus irrelevant for the theoretical argument.

The x-y plot demonstrates that the identified solution term is fairly consistent and that no deviant cases exist. Yet it also shows that a number of cases are not accounted for in the present model (Zone 6). In particular, how to explain that Finland and Ireland are not typical cases for military non-participation, as one would expect based on the institutional constraints present in these two countries? One reason lies in the fact that in both countries public support for NATO air strikes was comparably high. In contrast, public opinion in Austria and Sweden was more opposed to military action, as indicated by polls that yielded 5–13 per cent less public support than in Ireland and Finland (Table 5.3). Hence, an alternative coding procedure with a higher
threshold on the fuzzy set public support would yield a more typical result, because Ireland would then hold the same configuration as Austria, while Finland would end up in the same row as Sweden, which can be deduced from Table 5.6.

**Analytical findings**

In essence, four sets of findings with theoretical import can be derived from the fuzzy-set analyses. I will discuss these in turn before addressing limitations of the present study and prospects for future research. First, it is apparent from the analysis that all sufficient solution paths toward military participation feature a lack of institutional constraints, as indicated by the absence of parliamentary veto rights and/or constitutional restrictions (Table 5.5). The absence of constitutional restrictions was further identified as an almost necessary condition for military participation, which underlines the substantive importance of this type of institutional constraint and confirms theoretical expectations ($H_{2b}$). In turn, the absence of parliamentary veto rights is an element in all
but one sufficient pathway toward military participation. Moreover, the analysis identified a single consistent pathway toward military non-participation, which features the hypothesized parliamentary veto point (H$_{1b}$) that emerges when legislative involvement is combined with public opposition (Path 11). However, as indicated by the conjunction ($\neg M \vee \neg V \vee \neg S$), this veto point seems to arise only in the context of militarily non-powerful states.

Yet the Kosovo conflict also demonstrates the substantial strain that was placed on country’s constitutional restrictions. Denmark, Germany, and Norway were found to have considerable or partial legal constraints. Nevertheless, all three countries participated in NATO air strikes. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the controversies over the constitutionality of the Kosovo War and the requirement of proper UN authorization led several countries to loosen their constitutional restrictions to allow for broader participation in military operations.

Second, the analysis further demonstrates that the distinction between coalition and single-party government, or between majoritarian and non-majoritarian democracies does not suffice to explain democratic war involvement. While studies argue that coalition governments should be more constrained and thus reluctant to use force (Auerswald, 1999; 2004), the analysis in this chapter provides empirical evidence that contradicts this claim. If it is true that coalition cabinets fear the “very real chance of parliamentary interference” and are thus hesitant to use force (Auerswald, 1999: 477–478), why is it that fragmented multi-party coalitions as in the Netherlands under Prime Minister Wim Kok and in Belgium under the premier Jean-Luc Dehaene decided to participate in NATO air strikes? I argue that in order to explain these cases, we need to take into account more than just government type and instead examine these cases as configurations. As the analysis in this chapter shows, part of the explanation for their military involvement lies in the fact that both of these countries lack effective institutional constraints, while their publics were largely in favor of a military response (Table 6.4).

Third, as far as alliance behavior is concerned, the findings lend strong support to the previously discussed theoretical expectations. If the collective action argument were formulated in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, then one would expect military power to be sufficient for military participation, either on its own or as an INUS condition. Vice versa, the absence of military power would be necessary for military non-participation. This is precisely what the empirical evidence indicates. For one thing, the absence of military power was identified as a highly consistent necessary condition for non-participation.
Moreover, the analysis found military power to be a part of a sufficient conjunction of conditions with perfect consistency across solution terms, as displayed in the first path of each the solution terms (Path 1, 4, & 7). However, with regard to the free-rider hypothesis that expects militarily weak states to abstain from participation, some evidence to the contrary was found. This suggests that weak states engage militarily under certain conditions. As indicated in the complex solution term for military participation, weak states did indeed contribute when public support and a left executive were combined with the absence of veto rights (Path 8) and when a right executive was combined with the absence of both types of institutional constraints (Path 6).

Finally, for partisanship evidence suggests that right executives were more willing than their left counterparts to use military force in the absence of public support. This pattern resonates with one of the pathways suggested by Brawley and Martin (2000: 229) and can be identified in the complex solution term in Table 6.5. Path 7 is particularly interesting from a theoretical perspective, since it comprises the parliamentary veto mechanism but nevertheless yields military participation. Apparently the presence of parliamentary veto rights combined with the lack of public support was inadequate to stop a military powerful right executive from using force. This confirms a point made earlier, that the parliamentary veto mechanism does not work as hypothesized (H1b), but that it applies only to militarily weak states. With regard to left executives it was found that these used force only when public support was present, as indicated in Path 5 and Path 8. While this delimits an expectation formulated on the basis of Rathbun (2004), it lends support to the liberal-constructivist route toward war involvement suggested by Brawley and Martin (2000).

As for limitations of the present study, two aspects stand out. First, as the analysis of military non-participation revealed, some countries were not captured by the solution term due to a wide-ranging operationalization of public support, which included values equal to or above 45 per cent public approval of air strikes. Certainly, a more restrictive threshold would have yielded results that had been more in accordance with previously formulated theoretical expectations. Yet, as was argued in the respective section, there are valid reasons why the threshold was set this way. However, as an alternative to the present study one could replicate the analysis with a higher threshold on public support. Second, the analysis identified Poland as a deviant case with regard to the country's abstention from military participation when its characteristics pointed in the opposite direction. To explain this anomaly it was suggested that
because Poland had joined NATO just weeks before the military intervention, it might not have been in a position to operate in a mission of closely coordinated air strikes. By extension, this argument would also apply to the Czech Republic and Hungary, as the other former communist countries that joined NATO in 1999. However, the argument would not be able to explain why these countries did not participate more widely in support roles.

Conclusion

The Kosovo conflict has in many ways been characteristic for a liberal war fought for liberal purposes. Hence, it stands in sharp contrast to traditional conceptions of war, although observers have pointed out that the notion of a humanitarian military intervention is not an entirely new phenomenon. This chapter focused on the question of why and under which conditions democracies participated in NATO air strikes between March 24 and June 20, 1999. While some countries fully participated in the air strikes, others restricted their contribution to support functions and explicitly ruled out combat operations for their own forces. Still others did not participate at all, or provided mere logistical support to the operation. At the outset of this chapter, a brief account of the historical and legal context of the military intervention was provided. The ensuing review focused on prevailing explanations for the research problem of varying war involvement, as suggested in several comparative studies on the subject. Based on this review, it was concluded that despite numerous existing studies on the Kosovo conflict, few studies have included more than a handful of countries, most often focusing on the large European alliance members and the United States, and even fewer have investigated the extent of military involvement in detail.

Hence, the research design of this study sought to redress the identified limitations of previous studies by including 23 democracies and providing a detailed conceptualization of military participation. Based on explicit criteria, it was found that 12 out of 16 of the included NATO countries participated militarily at varying extent, while four alliance members abstained from participation. Some non-NATO members provided logistical support, while others were not involved in any function. The analytical framework comprised five conditions, including relative material power, government partisanship, two forms of institutional constraints and the extent of public support for military intervention in the given case. These conditions revealed substantial cross-case variance. Public support, for instance, varied from near-unanimous
public opposition to overwhelming support – a distribution that was
discernible also among NATO countries. With regard to institutional
constraints, it was shown that about half of the included countries fea-
tured mandatory parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions
and that seven countries had some form of constitutional restrictions
on the scope of permissible operations.

Based on the fsQCA procedure, four findings with theoretical import
were identified. First, the analysis found both types of institutional con-
straints to contribute toward non-participation, where constitutional
restrictions were identified as an almost necessary condition for absten-
tion and a parliamentary veto point to emerge in militarily weak states.
Yet it was also shown that several countries overstepped their consti-
tutional framework by joining a military operation that was clearly
out of bounds with the UN Charter, even when there was a legitimate
humanitarian concern on which the action was justified. Second, the
chapter provided empirical evidence against the claim that coalition
governments are somehow effectively constrained from using force. By
contrast, it was argued that in order to explain governments’ military
involvement, combinations of parliamentary veto rights, constitutional
restrictions, and public opinion are more informative indicators than
a mere examination of democratic subtypes. Third, empirical evidence
provided strong support for the hypothesis derived from collective
action theory, which holds that military power ought to be sufficient
for military participation, either on its own or as part of conjunction
of conditions. Specifically, it was shown that the absence of military power
is a necessary condition for non-participation and that military power is
a part of a sufficient conjunction of conditions for military participation.
However, concerning the related free-rider hypothesis, which expects
weak states to make nominal contributions at most, evidence to the
contrary was found. It was shown that two pathways exist under which
weak states do indeed participate militarily. Finally, concerning parti-
sanship evidence suggests that under conditions of public opposition
to the use of force, right executives were willing to participate militar-
ily regardless, whereas left governments used force only in combina-
tion with public support. While these partisan patterns resonate with
theoretical expectations, a confirmation would require a more detailed
analysis of partisan politics in the respective cases were this pattern
was found.
6
Afghanistan: Unconditional Support but Selective Engagement?

On December 5, 2011, international representatives returned to the Petersberg near Bonn to negotiate the terms of a continued commitment to Afghanistan. Ten years earlier, politicians, diplomats, and military leaders had convened in the same place to find a common ground for governance in Afghanistan after the ousting of the Taliban. As a result of the initial Petersberg conference, the UN Security Council had authorized the establishment of an “International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF), under the command of the United Kingdom as the first ISAF “lead nation” and with the participation of 18 other countries, to guarantee the “maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas” (UN-SC, 2001e). While the majority of contributors to ISAF were NATO member states, the operation was initially an *ad hoc* coalition, since NATO assumed authority for ISAF only two years into the conflict, on August 11, 2003, following a request from Germany and the Netherlands, which had jointly led ISAF from February 2003 onward. Likewise, ISAF’s mandate was not expanded to include the entire country of Afghanistan until October 13, 2003, two months after NATO assumed control (UN-SC, 2003f).

From its inception, ISAF ran parallel to the US-led “Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF) that marked the military response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11), and which operated in Afghanistan from October 7, 2001 onward with the declared aim of removing the Taliban regime and destroying Al-Qaeda capabilities. In terms of international law, OEF was justified on the principle of individual and collective self-defense, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. In domestic terms, OEF derived its lawfulness from a Joint Resolution passed near-unanimously by US Congress on September 14,
which granted the President wide-ranging authority to use military force against the perpetrators of 9/11:

That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons. (US-CO, 2001)

While this bill comprised far-reaching powers and substantial discretion in terms of targets and duration, it was still limited when compared to the draft legislation the White House had originally proposed to Congress. That draft would have authorized the President “to deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States,” thereby granting near unlimited authority to use force against any form of terrorism directed at the United States (US-CRS, 2007: 2). However, though Congress delimited the extent of authorization that the White House had initially asked for, it notably rejected a motion to recommit by Representative John Tierney of Massachusetts, which would have obligated the President to submit reports on the use of force against terrorists in regular 60-day intervals in order to “keep Congress informed and comply with the War Powers Act” (Burke, 2001; US-CRS, 2007: 3).

In contrast to the ISAF mission, the Security Council had not explicitly authorized OEF. Instead, Resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001, which had been passed unanimously, condemned the terrorist attacks in harsh terms, while acknowledging the right of individual and collective self-defense and the readiness of the Security Council “to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks [...] and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations” (UN-SC, 2001c). These principles were reaffirmed in Resolution 1373, a document that suggested detailed procedures to address the threat of terrorism through police investigations, freezing of financial assets, the international exchange of information, and similar measures (UN-SC, 2001d).

Though these resolutions did not authorize the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, they were almost universally perceived as an endorsement of the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack – a right that in the eyes of many extended to the
Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict

use of force against non-state actors, such as terrorist groups (Gray, 2008: 199; Heintschel Heinegg, 2005: 192). It has also been argued that the Taliban as de facto government in Afghanistan and though not directly involved in the 9/11 attacks, became in legal terms “accessories-after-the-fact” through their refusal to comply with Security Council resolutions on taking measures against the terrorist threat posed by Al-Qaeda. Hence, based on this reasoning, the United States were entitled to execute individual self-defense against Afghanistan while any other country could join it in reference to the right of collective self-defense (Dinstein, 2011: 261). Nevertheless, legal debates continued over whether terrorist actions could constitute an “armed attack” in the first place, and whether the military intervention in Afghanistan that was initiated on October 7, and which contained aggravated aerial bombardments, met the customary requirements of a “necessary and proportionate” response to the terrorist attacks in Washington and New York.6

The immediate reaction to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 as displayed by international organizations, governments, and individual leaders demonstrated an impressive unity in support and solidarity with the United States. On 12 September, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution that strongly condemned the “heinous acts of terrorism” and called for “international cooperation” to bring its perpetrators to justice and to “prevent and eradicate acts of terrorism” (UN-GA, 2001). On the same day, President Romano Prodi, on behalf of the European Commission, issued a statement intended “to send the strongest possible signal of European solidarity with the American people” (EU-EC, 2001b). Meanwhile the North Atlantic Council announced the activation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, affirming that the terrorist attacks constituted an “armed attack” against the United States and calling alliance members and partner countries for their support.7 Because it was the first time in the history of NATO that Article 5 was activated, and since the decision required unanimity across 19 capitals, negotiations turned out to be strenuous. But eventually all member states supported the proposal, which was considered the “ultimate act of solidarity with the people of the US,” as NATO Secretary General George Robertson recalls.8

Statements from national governments largely mirrored those of international organizations. Addressing the German Bundestag on September 12, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder expressed his governments’ “unconditional solidarity” with the United States and declared that he agreed with the French President Chirac and Prime Minister Jospin as well as British Prime Minister Blair, among other leaders, that the attacks
of 9/11 constituted a “declaration of war against the civilized world” (DE-BT, 2001b: 18293–18294). On September 14 the Australian government invoked the mutual defense clause of its security treaty with the United States (AU-PM, 2001). Prime Minister John Howard submitted a motion to the House of Representatives, declaring that the 9/11 terrorist acts “constitute an attack upon the United States of America within the meaning of Articles IV and V of the ANZUS Treaty,” and further proposed that parliament fully endorse “the commitment of the Australian Government to support within Australia’s capabilities United States-led action against those responsible for these tragic attacks,” which the House approved in its session on September 17 (AU-HoR, 2001: 30739). Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi publicly pledged support for US forces on September 19 stating that, “Japan will actively engage itself in the combat against terrorism, which it regards as Japan’s own security issue.” Specifically, Koizumi addressed several “immediate measures” his government would undertake, announcing that his government would “promptly take measures necessary for dispatching the Self-Defence Force (SDF) for providing support, including medical services, transportation and supply, to the US forces and others taking measures related to the terrorist attacks” (JP-PM, 2001).

Finally, on October 7, 2001, the US and UK governments informed the Security Council in separate letters that they had “clear and compelling information” regarding the responsibility of the Al-Qaeda terrorist group for the attacks on 9/11 and of the terrorists’ continued support by Afghanistan’s Taliban regime and that they had therefore “initiated actions designed to prevent and deter further attacks,” which marked the beginning of OEF, less than a month after 9/11 (UN-SC, 2001a, 2001b).

While the military operation was initially conducted almost entirely by American and British forces, other countries offered their military participation or affirmed their political support. As such, President Romano Prodi declared the “total solidarity” of the European Commission with the military operation in Afghanistan. Likewise, following a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council on October 8, the EU foreign ministers expressed their “wholehearted support for the action that is being taken in self-defence” (EU-EC, 2001a).

Among NATO member states and alliance partners, divisions over whether or not to participate militarily were, arguably, strongest in Germany under the coalition of social democrats and greens. In an attempt to rein in dissenters within the red-green government, Chancellor Schröder combined a parliamentary vote of confidence with the decision to deploy armed forces for participation in OEF,
where a total of 3,900 soldiers were planned for, including 1,800 in navy personnel.9 The parliamentary vote call on November 16, 2001 resulted in the closest vote on military deployments in the history of the Bundeswehr, since merely 336 out of 662 parliamentarians voted in favor of the government proposal. Yet, this decision set in motion Germany’s military involvement in OEF and prevented the red-green coalition from breaking apart over the issue. Forced by Schröder’s vote of confidence, the Green Party faced the dilemma of how to reconcile antimilitarist sentiments and substantial concerns regarding the US-led operation with its desire to remain in government. Eventually, the critics within the Greens decided on continued support for the Chancellor, but signaled their disagreement with the military deployment by splitting their votes, which resulted in four Greens voting against the proposal, including delegate Winfried Hermann who explained this reasoning in his parliamentary statement on behalf of the critics within the Green Party (DE-BT, 2001a, 2001c: 19903–19904).

This chapter aims to explain democracies’ military participation in Afghanistan. Why did some states decide to join OEF? How can apparent differences be explained when examining the military involvement of NATO allies and other democracies allied to the United States? To which extent did domestic factors, such as public support for intervention, legislative involvement in security affairs, or the partisan composition of government matter in deployment decisions?

Before addressing these questions, I will briefly review findings from studies on the Afghanistan conflict to draw out implications for the present study. The review equally serves to identify conflicting explanations and empirical gaps in prior studies, while also showing which areas have been attended to in detail and where scholars are in agreement. Based on this review, I adapt the general theoretical framework formulated in Chapter 3 to the particular case at hand. The subsequent section specifies the research design, including case selection criteria and the conceptualization of the outcome military participation in OEF and the included explanatory conditions. This is followed by an analytical section, which details the fsQCA procedure and discusses the results and their theoretical implications before the final section concludes the chapter.

**Prevalent accounts of the Afghanistan War**

Western governments’ decision to intervene militarily in Afghanistan cannot be understood outside the historical context of 9/11. In an unprecedented display of unity, political leaders, governments, and international
organizations expressed solidarity with the United States and agreed – in principle – that individual and collective self-defense against these attacks was justified under the given circumstances. As such, commentators as Lawrence Freedman have understood the military intervention in Afghanistan as “part of a campaign to prevent existential attacks on the Western way of life.” To Freedman, the Afghanistan conflict thus constitutes a “defensive liberal war,” to be distinguished from the humanitarian military intervention in Kosovo, which had an “offensive quality,” as it was fought “to extend liberal values” to a region where these had been absent, but were there had been no previous attack on the interveners’ territory (2006: 52).

However, given near-unanimous declarations of solidarity and support across the international community, Western governments’ selective military engagement during the initial military intervention in Afghanistan poses a puzzle. Constructivists have trouble explaining the discrepancy between norms of multilateralism and an intervention that comprised a small *ad hoc* coalition of states and largely unilateral US decision-making. Constructivists have argued prominently that contemporary military interventions demonstrate the “power of multilateral norms,” which are held to “pervade virtually all aspects of interstate politics” (Finnemore, 2003: 82). While realists hold that the US government preferred military effectiveness over normatively appropriate behavior in its response to 9/11 (Kreps, 2008), constructivist arguments imply that established norms of appropriateness should prevail even under those circumstances. As Finnemore posits, “One testament to the power of these multilateral norms is that states adhere to them even when they know that doing so compromises the effectiveness of the mission” (2003: 82). By contrast, the realist argument suggested by Sarah Kreps stresses rational cost-benefit calculation on part of the alliance leader, whose behavior is held to reflect a “logic of consequences” that emphasizes military effectiveness and an “aversion to the constraints of cooperation” that come with large coalitions and the involvement of international organizations (2008: 564).

Given the inherent complexity of the Afghanistan War, it is not surprising to find few academic studies that are based on a comparative research design and that seek to explain the conditions under which governments decided to deploy military force. First, it needs to be recognized that OEF and ISAF constitute separate but interrelated military operations, which are based on different mandates; while many countries contribute to both missions, the extent to which they are involved in each of these varies substantially. Second, as military operations are
ongoing in Afghanistan it is not possible to provide a conclusive assessment of the conflict. This also means that some information about the extent of military participation is not in the public domain and will require archival work in decades to come.

There are a number of non-comparative studies on the Afghanistan conflict, such as Kreps (2008), which investigates the US approach to multilateralism in forming a military coalition. As indicated earlier, Kreps’ argument gives priority to cost-benefit calculations over normative concerns, which helps explain why the US government did not favor a large-scale military operation with UN or NATO involvement at the outset of the Afghanistan War. Focusing on the political culture in Germany, Müller and Wolff (2011) analyze parliamentary debates in relation to the ISAF mandate and its renewal between 2001 and 2011. Their study indicates that political rhetoric on Afghanistan resonates broadly with the established role conception of Germany as a “civilian power” (Maull, 1990). By contrast, the following section focuses on several comparative studies and their implications for the research design of this chapter.

Davidson (2011) investigates decision-making in France, Italy and the United Kingdom with regard to participation in OEF. His neoclassical realist approach investigates threat perception, public opinion and alliance considerations, which are tested against alternative hypotheses that focus on norm compliance and state identity. Davidson asserts that “alliance value was very clearly on the line and it was a factor in each country’s decision – the evidence suggests it was the dominant factor in the British and Italian cases.” Regarding French involvement Davidson argues that, in addition to alliance value, “a desire to enhance France’s prestige drove the decision” (2011: 131). This lets Davidson conclude that only by taking into account alliance considerations can it be explained that countries made a contribution when the United States seemed fully committed to the Afghanistan conflict (2011: 131), which otherwise would have been a likely scenario for free-riding on part of the European allies.

Henrike Viehrig (2010) contrasts the military participation of six European countries in Afghanistan, seeking to investigate whether systemic or domestic factors provide a better explanation of deployment decisions. Based on an analysis of 14 military operations, her study finds that three indicators stand out: historical ties, alliance membership and relations toward the lead nation, all three of which are found to hold strong explanatory power (2010: 176). Yet, with regard to military participation in OEF, Viehrig finds no consistent pattern: only three countries were fully involved, while all have strong relations with the lead nation,
lack historical ties to Afghanistan, and are either members of NATO or, as in the case of Austria, a partner country of the alliance (Viehrig, 2010: 105–114).

Stephen Saideman and Auerswald (2012) focus on national “caveats” in multinational military operations. These are understood as political restrictions on the scope of operations that military forces are allowed to engage in as part of their mission (2012: 3). Examining ISAF contributions across 16 countries, Saideman and Auerswald find substantial variance, which they explain primarily on the basis of differences in political institutions. The authors suggest that Lijphart’s conceptualization of consensus and majoritarian democracies can be extended to explain the presence or absence of these caveats. Accordingly, Saideman and Auerswald argue that coalition governments tend to impose greater restrictions on the armed forces once deployed, while presidential or majoritarian parliamentary governments tend to give the military more discretion over operational decisions in the field (2012: 5).

In another study, Kreps (2010) takes issue with the participatory constraints argument, which holds that democratic governments ought to be responsive to public demands. However, as Kreps argues, this poses a puzzle when applied to the Afghanistan War, where public support has been in decline for years, while most of the involved governments further increased their military commitment. To account for the incongruity between foreign policy and public opinion, Kreps refers to what she describes as an “elite consensus” on the war, a tacit agreement among political actors that has effectively inoculated governments from public opinion and electoral backlash (2010: 192). However, Kreps asserts that this is “not the effect of collusion among political elites with an eye toward electoral immunity,” but rather the outcome of “systemic incentives associated with participation in a formal alliance” (2010: 201).

Whereas Kreps concludes that public opinion “hardly matters” for NATO operations in Afghanistan, Harald Schoen (2010) suggests that public opinion might well affect decision-making by way of anticipation. Based on an analysis of German public opinion on military operations in Afghanistan, Schoen argues that there were few incentives for the established parties to engage in political competition over the military involvement. Rather, parties attempted to de-emphasize the topic because there was little to gain in a climate that is, in general, very critical toward military operations (2010: 399).

Though this brief review makes no claim to be comprehensive, it shows that a number of aspects have not been sufficiently addressed in extant studies. First, as some of the above studies point out, alliance
considerations are an important factor in explaining the level of commitment and eventual military participation. Yet, while this should apply equally to all alliance members, we see substantial differences in the degree to which governments decided to become involved in Afghanistan. Davidson argues that alliance considerations were the “dominant factor in the British and Italian cases” (2011: 131). But how can it be explained that Italy deployed a few dozen engineers to OEF when the United Kingdom sent an infantry battle group of 1,700 soldiers? Viehrig holds that alliance membership is a “strong indicator” to explain military participation across the cases that she investigates (2010: 176). However, with regard to OEF and ISAF, Viehrig finds no consistent pattern involving alliance membership. In order to redress these problems, I suggest at least two differentiations in research design, including a detailed conceptualization of military participation that is specific to the case of Afghanistan, as well as an account of military power positions to further differentiate alliance members.

Second, authors have rightly pointed out the apparent disconnect between domestic public opinion in Western democracies and military involvement in Afghanistan, especially in recent years. To draw the conclusion that “public opinion hardly matters,” as Kreps asserts (2010), might be unwarranted however. How strong was public support for military intervention at the outset of OEF in 2001? To which extent did support levels vary across countries at that time? These questions need to be addressed before drawing conclusions about the timeframe that Kreps focuses on in her study.

Third, the prevalence of political restrictions in multinational military operations is an important phenomenon that has so far received too little attention. Saideman and Auerswald argue that coalition governments tend to impose tighter caveats on their military once deployed (2012: 5). Their study, however, does not distinguish within the group of parliamentary democracies with proportional electoral systems. Here, it seems warranted to take into account institutional differences regarding the involvement of parliament in security affairs. For instance, countries with mandatory legislative approval of military operations might be expected to impose more restrictions or to abstain from military participation altogether.

Explaining military participation in Afghanistan

This chapter investigates democracies’ participation in OEF, as part of the Afghanistan War. The empirical analysis is based on fsQCA, as
introduced in Chapter 3. This section discusses the conceptualization of the coding procedure for the outcome condition military participation and the five explanatory conditions: parliamentary veto rights, constitutional restrictions, executive partisanship, public support and military power. Before turning to these conditions, I will present the criteria that informed the case selection and provide details on executives, parties, and government types for the 30 democracies entailed in the analysis.

Country and cabinet selection

The selection of countries was based on two criteria: (1) the presence of uncontested democratic political institutions and (2) institutionalized security cooperation with other democracies. As a threshold for the first criterion, I used the Polity IV data to exclude countries with a score of seven and below on the combined autocracy-democracy scale. Institutionalized security cooperation in the context of OEF refers to countries that have bilateral security agreements with the United States, NATO membership or cooperation agreements, or countries in the process of accession negotiations with NATO. To enhance cross-case comparability, I applied a scope condition that excludes countries with a population below one million inhabitants.

Based on these criteria, 30 democracies from Europe, North America and the Pacific region were selected (see Table 1.2). At the time the military intervention in Afghanistan was announced, 16 of these countries were alliance members, while seven Central and Eastern European countries were in the process of accession. The selection further includes Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden – as countries that maintain a legal status of permanent neutrality or follow a traditional policy of non-alignment, but which have formalized their cooperation with NATO and enlarged their involvement in multilateral military operations. Finally, Australia, Japan and New Zealand are no alliance members but have engaged with NATO as formal partner countries. Australia and Japan also retain bilateral security agreements with the United States. Table 6.1 lists all selected countries, their executives, parties in power and government type for October 2001, as the time when military operations were initiated. Besides two exceptions, there is no ambiguity which government was responsible for a deployment decision (or the decision to abstain). In Denmark, Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen lost the general election in November 2001. The new government under Anders Fogh Rasmussen, later NATO Secretary General, submitted a proposal for military participation that was approved in the Folketing on December 14, 2001. The Estonian deployment decision was
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Executive leader</th>
<th>Since</th>
<th>Executive party/Coalition</th>
<th>Government type</th>
<th>Executive L-R</th>
<th>Right executive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>John W. Howard</td>
<td>10/1998</td>
<td>Liberal, National</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>63.95</td>
<td>0.98</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>AUT</td>
<td>Wolfgang Schüssel</td>
<td>02/2000</td>
<td>OVP, FPO, PRL, SP</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>34.52</td>
<td>0.89</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>BEL</td>
<td>Guy Verhofstadt</td>
<td>07/1999</td>
<td>VLD, PS, PRL, SP, Eco., Aga.</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>–15.04</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>BGR</td>
<td>S. Sakskoburggotski</td>
<td>07/2001</td>
<td>NDSV, DPS</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>–15.33</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>John Chrétien</td>
<td>11/2000</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Single-party majority</td>
<td>–23.14</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>CZE</td>
<td>Miloš Zeman</td>
<td>07/1998</td>
<td>CSSD</td>
<td>Single-party minority</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>DNK</td>
<td>Anders F. Rasmussen</td>
<td>11/2001</td>
<td>Venstre, KF</td>
<td>Minority coalition</td>
<td>51.10</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>EST</td>
<td>Siim Kallas</td>
<td>01/2002</td>
<td>Center, Reform</td>
<td>Minority coalition</td>
<td>–2.88</td>
<td>0.46</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>Paavo Lipponen</td>
<td>03/1999</td>
<td>SDP, KOK, VAS, SFP, VIHR</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>6.87</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
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<td>France</td>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>Jacques Chirac</td>
<td>05/1995</td>
<td>RPR, UDF</td>
<td>Divided government</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>0.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>DEU</td>
<td>Gerhard Schröder</td>
<td>10/1998</td>
<td>SPD, Greens</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>–3.72</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>Kostas Simitis</td>
<td>04/2000</td>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>Single-party majority</td>
<td>–42.76</td>
<td>0.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>HUN</td>
<td>Viktor Orbán</td>
<td>07/1998</td>
<td>Fidesz, FKGP, MDF</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>17.15</td>
<td>0.74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>IRL</td>
<td>Bertie Ahern</td>
<td>06/1997</td>
<td>FF, PD</td>
<td>Minority coalition</td>
<td>11.07</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>Silvio Berlusconi</td>
<td>06/2001</td>
<td>FI, AN, CCD-CDO, LN, NPSI</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>53.83</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>JPN</td>
<td>Junichiro Koizumi</td>
<td>04/2001</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Single-party minority</td>
<td>11.12</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>LVA</td>
<td>Andris Berzins</td>
<td>05/2000</td>
<td>TP, LC, TB/LNNK</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>8.44</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>LTU</td>
<td>Algirdas Brazauskas</td>
<td>04/2001</td>
<td>SDC, NS/SL</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>–16.58</td>
<td>0.27</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>NLD</td>
<td>Wim Kok</td>
<td>08/1998</td>
<td>PvdA, VVD, D66</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>–21.21</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>NZL</td>
<td>Helen Clark</td>
<td>11/1999</td>
<td>Labour, Alliance</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>–33.73</td>
<td>0.12</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>NOR</td>
<td>Kjell M. Bondevik</td>
<td>10/2001</td>
<td>Hoyre, KrF, V</td>
<td>Minority coalition</td>
<td>–3.10</td>
<td>0.45</td>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>L-R Value</td>
<td>Effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Poland</td>
<td>POL</td>
<td>Leszek Miller</td>
<td>10/2001</td>
<td>SLD, PSL</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.52</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>António Guterres</td>
<td>10/1999</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Single-party minority</td>
<td>-39.63</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>ROU</td>
<td>Adrian Nastase</td>
<td>12/2000</td>
<td>PDSR</td>
<td>Single-party minority</td>
<td>-15.74</td>
<td>0.28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>SVK</td>
<td>Mikulás Dzurinda</td>
<td>10/1998</td>
<td>SDK, SDL, SMK-MKP, SOP</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>-4.03</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>SVN</td>
<td>Janez Drnovsek</td>
<td>11/2000</td>
<td>LDS2, ZLSD, SLS+SKD</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>0.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>José M. Aznar</td>
<td>03/2000</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Single-party majority</td>
<td>11.42</td>
<td>0.66</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>SWE</td>
<td>Göran Persson</td>
<td>09/1998</td>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Single-party minority</td>
<td>-6.67</td>
<td>0.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>Tony Blair</td>
<td>06/2001</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Single-party majority</td>
<td>10.26</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>01/2001</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Unified government</td>
<td>52.09</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Country codes refer to the ISO format. Dates indicate the beginning of term or a cabinet change. Negative L-R values indicate left partisanship.

* The coalition was re-elected on November 10, 2001 while military deployments had been initiated in October.
* Estonia deployed an airport security team to OEF in June 2002.
* President Chirac shared executive power with Prime Minister Jospin, who headed a coalition between the PS, PCF and Greens.
* Prime Minister Guterres’ resignation led to early elections in March 2002.
* President with a legislative majority.

made in 2002, under the newly elected Siim Kallas who preceded Mart Laar as Prime Minister.

As indicated, almost all of the included countries are parliamentary democracies, albeit two exceptions in the presidential systems in France and the US. The parliamentary democracies can be further divided into coalition and single-party governments. At the time when OEF was initiated, nine of the included democracies saw minority governments in office, while the US experienced unified government under the Republican President Bush and a Republican legislative majority, whereas the conservative French President Chirac shared executive power with the socialist Prime Minister Jospin, who headed a three-party coalition. Though government type is not included in the fuzzy-set analysis itself, I will assess some of its implications in the final section, particularly with regard to prevalent arguments on the effects of majoritarian as opposed to consensus democracies.

Military participation in Operation Enduring Freedom

The measure of military participation applied here focuses on national military deployments to Afghanistan in the context of OEF, begun on October 7, 2001. I include deployments made throughout the first year of the operation. This restriction helps to separate political decisions pertaining to Afghanistan from the evolving political controversy over the US government’s war plans for Iraq that had been circulating within the administration not long after 9/11, but which had not been exposed in public statements until the fall of 2002.

I focus on OEF because it explicitly included offensive operations, aimed at the Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan, whereas the UN-endorsed ISAF operation was initially conceived as a peace support mission limited to the Kabul area. Admittedly, this distinction between the two missions became increasingly blurred when ISAF turned into a NATO operation and was subsequently expanded across Afghanistan. However, if public statements by political leaders are an indication, then it can be assumed that many governments were sensitive to these differences and consciously decided whether and to which extent they would contribute to the military fight against terrorism on the one hand, and the provision of security and reconstruction in Afghanistan on the other. In Italy, for instance, Defense Minister Antonio Martino stated that his country would only participate in peacekeeping operations, but would not “go through the mountains of Afghanistan to impose peace by force” (Nese, 2001). The German government, while providing Special Forces, held that political and military
risks prohibited the deployment of regular ground forces to OEF, as Foreign Minister Fischer recounts (2011: 42–43).

In terms of sources, my coding rests on unclassified and recently declassified government documents, newspaper articles, secondary sources, and other forms of publicly available information. I have sought to cross-validate the evidence by using at least two independent sources for each country’s contribution. Yet throughout the observed timeframe a large part of military operations in Afghanistan were conducted by Special Forces, which are considered classified information by most countries. The strategy of using these forces is documented in a partly declassified internal memorandum from US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, dated October 30, 2001. In this document Rumsfeld urges his planners to “insert many more CIA teams and Special Forces,” including troops from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and other countries. In addition to information from recently declassified documents, several governments openly shared information about their involvement in special operations. Furthermore, and partly due to the multinational character of the mission, a lot of information has subsequently entered the public domain, forcing governments to comment on press coverage regarding the involvement of their Special Forces in Afghanistan. Hence, from the perspective of the general public, these covert operations became almost equivalent to regular combat operations.

I therefore decided to include Special Forces in my measure of military participation. From a legal perspective it is important to further note that there is no distinction between regular armed forces and Special Forces. As Blaise Cathcart points out, “[t]here is no special law for special operations forces. SOF, like conventional forces, must fully comply with international law, and, where applicable, domestic law, in all their operations” (2010: 395).

The fuzzy-set coding is based on the type of contribution authorized for deployment. On a primary level, I differentiate between combat forces, non-combat support units, logistical support and non-participation. To qualify for membership in the set military participation (receive a fuzzy score greater than 0.5) a deployment has to comprise *combat forces* with respective tasks. This is based on the rationale that combat forces are exposed to a higher level of risk in getting wounded or killed than, for instance, rear support units like medical staff working in field hospitals or liaison officers deployed to headquarters. Studies on casualty aversion have shown that democratic leaders are aware of these risks and thus emphasize the nature of military deployments, caveats
placed on mandates, and the distinction between combat operations and non-combat and humanitarian tasks. On a secondary level, I make more fine-grained distinctions between contributions, based on the overall scope and level of risk associated with a deployment. As such, the provision of ground combat forces is coded higher than the deployment of fighter aircraft, which is in turn a more substantial and risk-inherent contribution than a small contingent of Special Forces, while all three are rather in the set military participation (fuzzy score above 0.5). Accordingly, for non-combat contributions I distinguish between military support units such as engineers and medical teams, which are not involved in combat operations, but still more exposed than, for instance, officers at headquarters. At the low end of the scale are forms of logistical support and non-participation in military operations.

Based on these criteria countries are coded from 1 to 0 on a fuzzy scale, indicating a range from full membership in the set to full non-membership. At the high end are states that participated in the entire spectrum of offensive operations. These comprise the United States, United Kingdom, Canada (fuzzy score 1.0), and, to a lesser extent, Romania and France (fuzzy-set score 0.9). The latter two did not participate with Special Forces, but Romania provided a sizable infantry battalion to Kandahar whereas France had an infantry contingent in Mazar-e-Sharif and took part in bombing missions from Kyrgyzstan. These are followed by countries that did not participate with regular ground forces, but which provided aircraft to fly combat missions, while some of these also deployed Special Forces. Accordingly, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands receive a lower coding than the previous group but remain well inside the set military participation (fuzzy score 0.8). Finally, another group of countries contributed Special Forces and some support elements, but did not send regular ground forces or fighter aircraft for operations in Afghanistan. This group comprises Australia, Germany, New Zealand, and Lithuania (fuzzy score 0.7).

In contrast to the aforementioned, six countries provided non-combat support with ground units. Spain deployed a military field hospital and support aircraft, while Italy, Poland, and Slovakia contributed engineers (fuzzy score 0.4). Two countries contributed to OEF, but did not deploy any units to Afghanistan. Greece sent a frigate to the Arabian Sea with the ability to conduct a variety of missions. Japan also sent vessels to the region, providing fuel support to coalition forces. The Japanese deployment was made possible after the legislature passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, which was approved by the
Diet on October 29, 2001 and allowed the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to conduct support operations in the context of OEF.24

Two countries provided local logistical support (fuzzy score 0.2). Latvia sent a team of cargo handlers, while Estonia deployed an explosives detection dog team to enhance security at Bagram airport.25 Other forms of logistical support include the detachment of liaison officers to the US Central Command in Tampa, Florida (fuzzy score 0.1). The Czech Republic, Finland, Belgium, Portugal, and Sweden contributed in this way, whereas Bulgaria hosted transport aircraft on its territory.26 Finally, four countries did not participate militarily in OEF during the observed timeframe (fuzzy score 0): Austria, Hungary, Ireland, and Slovenia. Table 6.2 summarizes the data that informed the coding of military participation across countries, including details on contributions, classification by type, troop numbers during the observed timeframe, and the resulting fuzzy-set coding.

**Parliamentary veto rights**

Parliamentary veto rights and constitutional restrictions are kept analytically separate because they are governed by different causal mechanisms: while the former constitutes a veto point under specific preference distributions, constitutional restrictions are considered a structural veto point to military deployments irrespective of the preference distribution in parliament or among the public.

Parliamentary veto rights are operationalized on a dimension from mandatory parliamentary approval prior to any military deployment (fuzzy score 1.0), to the complete absence of legislative involvement in military deployment decisions (fuzzy score 0). Here, the central criterion to determine whether a country is rather in the fuzzy set of "parliamentary veto rights" (receive a fuzzy score above 0.5), or whether it is situated rather outside that set (receive a fuzzy score below 0.5) is the presence or absence of a basic parliamentary veto right. Based on the extent of this institutional practice, fuzzy scores in the first group can take values between 1.0 for a full *ex ante* veto, 0.8 indicating an *ex ante* veto with restrictions, and 0.6 for an *ex post* veto. Countries that comprise other forms of legislative influence but no parliamentary veto rights are coded 0.4 when parliament is informed in advance of a military operation, 0.2 when parliament is informed *ex post*, and 0 in case there is no significant participation of the legislature in the decision-making process.

In terms of data, the coding draws primarily on the ParlCon dataset (Wagner et al., 2010). ParlCon specifies countries' level of parliamentary
### Table 6.2  Military participation in Operation Enduring Freedom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MP</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Full spectrum</td>
<td>Combat Ground and special forces, bomber aircraft</td>
<td>8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ground and special forces, support aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ground and special forces, support aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>Ground forces</td>
<td>Ground forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ground forces, fighter and support aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>Special forces, fighter aircraft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
<td>Special forces, fighter and support aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fighter and support aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Special forces</td>
<td>Special forces, support aircraft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td>Special forces, support aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td></td>
<td>Special forces, support aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td></td>
<td>Special forces, logistical support</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Ground units</td>
<td>Military field hospital, support aircraft</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Engineers, support aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td></td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>Naval support, liaison officers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Naval support, fleet refueling</td>
<td></td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Cargo handlers, overflight, facilities</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Airport security, overflight</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Liaison officers, overflight</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
<td>Liaison officers</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td>Liaison officers</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Liaison officers</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td>Liaison officers</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hosting transport aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>No participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** MP is the fuzzy set military participation. Troop numbers indicate military personnel related to OEF operations in Afghanistan. **Sources:** See notes for a detailed documentation of sources.
control in terms of the presence or absence of an *ex ante* veto right, which, in case of the former, translates into high values on the fuzzy scale. ParlCon further provides brief country studies that focus on the institutional practice of parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions. I employed these country briefs for the fuzzy-set coding in order to distinguish *degrees* in parliamentary veto rights. Yet in some cases the characterization of institutional provisions was not sufficient to make an informed coding decision, which is why additional country studies and two surveys of parliamentary war powers were used for the coding (Born and Hänggi, 2005; Dieterich et al., 2010).

In the observed timeframe, 12 countries have parliaments with an *ex ante* veto on all military deployments (fuzzy score 1.0). Among EU-15 member states, this includes Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, and Sweden. CEE countries with full parliamentary veto rights comprise Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania. In Slovenia, parliamentary veto rights are restricted to operations outside treaty obligations (fuzzy score 0.8). Three countries feature *ex post* veto rights or equivalent regulations (fuzzy score 0.6). The Czech Constitution restricts parliamentary involvement to retrospective approval for multinational operations in “common defence against aggression.” In the wake of 9/11, the Japanese government introduced legislation to allow for the participation of its armed forces in support of US military operations against terrorism. While the scope of permitted operations remains restricted, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law authorized government to deploy military forces for anti-terrorism purposes; whereas the involvement of the *Diet* is limited an *ex post* veto on such deployments (Wagner et al., 2010: 67). In Italy, constitutional interpretations that regard parliamentary involvement in decision-making as mandatory remain controversial. While most analysts agree that a basic parliamentary veto right exists, there is no consensus on its reach. Hence, the coding reflects the presence of a weak parliamentary veto right.

In the Netherlands the *Staten-Generaal* is informed prior to military deployments, a practice that became policy tradition and was formalized in 2000 with the introduction of Article 100 to the Dutch Constitution (fuzzy score 0.4). In Belgium, Canada, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and the United States military deployments are primarily a matter of the executive, but parliament has to be informed within a certain timeframe after deployments have been made (fuzzy score 0.2). Lastly, countries with an executive prerogative over foreign policy and thus no mandatory parliamentary involvement comprise...
Constitutional restrictions

Three sets of constitutional restrictions are distinguished. These relate to legislation that prohibits or restricts military participation either (a) on the grounds of international law, (b) outside certain organizational frameworks, or (c) beyond a set of permissible tasks. Provisions in the first area can range from a strict requirement of UN authorization to instructions binding the armed forces to act in accordance with international law broadly conceived. The second area relates to requirements regarding the involvement of multilateral organizational frameworks. Finally, some democracies specify a limited range of permissible tasks for military deployments to prohibit, for instance, offensive military operations.

Constitutional restrictions are operationalized along a dimension that ranges from comprehensive restrictions on military deployments (fuzzy score 1.0) to the absence of any relevant constraints (fuzzy score 0). The central criterion to distinguish whether a country is rather in the fuzzy set of constitutional restrictions (receive a fuzzy score above 0.5), or whether it is situated rather outside that set (receive a fuzzy score below 0.5) is the presence or absence of constitutional provisions that prohibit or severely restrict military participation. In the case of OEF three types of constraints are expected to be individually sufficient to avert military participation. First, while the military operation of OEF had been justified on the grounds of individual and collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, it did not receive explicit Security Council authorization. Hence, governments from countries with a strict requirement of UN authorization of the use of force were constrained in their decision on whether or not to participate militarily. Second, as the military operation was explicitly aimed to combat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, countries with restrictions on the scope of permissible operations are expected to refrain from military participation. Finally, being an ad hoc coalition, OEF by definition excludes countries that are constitutionally bound to participate only in specific multilateral organizational frameworks, such as operations under the auspices of the UN or NATO. The coding of constitutional restrictions is based on an analysis of primary sources, such as constitutional documents and legislative bills that delimit the use of the armed forces, and on secondary sources, which proved helpful in interpreting regulations against the background of specific national contexts.
Countries with comprehensive constitutional restrictions (fuzzy score 1.0) comprise Austria, Finland, Ireland, Japan, and Sweden. All of these countries require explicit UN authorization and restrict the scope of permissible tasks to peace support missions, meaning that they cannot participate in offensive operations. Austria is further restricted by its constitution to participate only in operations under UN, OSCE, or EU auspices.

By contrast, 11 of the observed democracies have only minor restrictions in the sense that foreign military deployments are required to be in accordance with international law. These provisions, however, are usually stated in broad and general terms and can thus not be regarded as a sufficient constraint on military participation (fuzzy score 0.2). Countries in this group comprise Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, and Romania.

Whereas Denmark had previously required a UN or OSCE mandate, this legal provision was removed when the “Act on the Aims, Tasks, and Organization of the Armed Forces” became effective on March 1, 2001. This legislation asserted the right to partake in military operations even in cases where the Security Council had not authorized the use of force and was thus a reaction to public debates over the controversial Danish participation in the Kosovo War (Jakobsen, 2006: 90; Jensen, 2003: 241).

While German participation in military operations is subject to several restrictions, legal scholars widely agree that the Bundeswehr is permitted to participate in operations within the context of individual and collective self-defense, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter (Geiger, 2010: 318–322; Tomuschat, 2001: 22; Wiefelspütz, 2008: 29). Hence, based on the premise that the conditions of Article 51 were met, there were no provisions that prohibit German participation in OEF.

Preceding the legislation passed by the Danish Folketing, Norway implemented a similar law on June 4, 1999, in the immediate aftermath of NATO’s Operation Allied Force. While the adopted bill stresses the importance of international law and specifically the authority of the Security Council, it preserves a right to deploy military forces without a UN mandate if circumstances require such an action. Finally, 13 of the countries included in this study show no relevant constitutional restrictions on military deployments (fuzzy score 0). These include Australia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States.
Executive partisanship

Partisanship is measured as the position of a country’s executive on a left-right scale in political space. The estimate used here draws on research from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP, Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006). The CMP data is based on a qualitative coding of statements in party election programs along policy categories associated with left parties, such as peaceful international cooperation, welfare state expansion, and economic regulation, or with right parties, such as, strong defense, free enterprise, and traditional moral values (Budge and Klingemann, 2001). An advantage of the CMP is that it provides meaningful indicators of cross-national variation, while alternative measures based on party-family affiliation or expert judgment can be misleading when used for comparative purposes.

For the calculation of partisan positions I follow the approach suggested by Laver and Garry (2000: 628) to determine the “substantive” policy position for each party, which is an adaptation of the original CMP calculation that discounts the salience a party places on a category in favor of its “pure” policy position, dividing the CMP left-right values by the sum of left-right references. To transform the resultant CMP values into fuzzy sets, I employ the direct method of calibration. This approach requires three qualitative breakpoints that indicate full set membership, a point of maximum ambiguity, and full set non-membership. Based on a scale of substantive CMP values that ranges from –100 (all left statements) to 100 (all right statements), I define full membership in the fuzzy set right executive as any CMP value equal to or above 50. Likewise, values equal to or below –50 are defined as indicating full non-membership, while 0 marks a natural crossover point. Table 6.1 displays government parties, the resultant substantive CMP values for each party or coalition, and the calibrated fuzzy values. As the fuzzy values show, 16 out of 30 cabinets are considered right executives to varying extents (fuzzy values above 0.50), whereas six of these are almost fully in the respective set (fuzzy values greater than 0.70). Likewise, nine cabinets are almost fully in the set left executive (fuzzy value below 0.30).

Public support

This condition rests on the liberal premise that democratic governments are constrained in their foreign policy by a requirement for public support, especially when it comes to decisions on war involvement. Hence, public support should be a necessary condition for military participation, whereas the absence of public support should be sufficient for military non-participation. However, if those who doubt the
influence of public opinion are correct, then there should be no consistent pathways of public support or public opposition. Yet, contrary to these absolute positions, evidence suggests that public opinion should be examined in combination with additional factors, as discussed in Chapter 3. Specifically, I argue that one factor that should alter outcomes in combination with public opinion is legislative veto power. In more general terms, I conceive of public opinion as an INUS condition for military participation and non-participation, respectively.

My estimate of public support for military involvement in Afghanistan is based on selected opinion polls across the 30 democracies included in this study. Since governments considered deployments to OEF from October 2001 onward, I focus on opinion polls from this time period, beginning with the initial phase of military operations that started on October 7 up until December 20 as the date when the UN Security Council formally authorized the ISAF operation. Regarding data, I draw mainly on two cross-national surveys with similar question wording and coverage of a large range of countries. The Flash Eurobarometer 114 “International Crisis” survey covers the EU-15 member states (Eurobarometer, 2001). More encompassing is the “End of Year Terrorism Poll 2001” by Gallup International, which comprises 25 of the 30 countries included in this study (Gallup, 2001). For the remaining five countries I complemented the data with similar polls.

Before proceeding, some caveats are in order because a comparative study using public opinion data from up to 30 countries faces several challenges. First, because there is no survey that covers all of the included countries, my estimate of public support is required to draw on a range of polls, with differences regarding question wording, polling technique, sample size and the time during which the fieldwork was conducted. I sought to rein in these difficulties by restricting the timeframe and drawing on large cross-national surveys. Some limitations remain, however, and these need to be kept in mind. First, while question wording is similar across polls, each contains specific connotations that could have influenced respondents. The Gallup International survey states as a fact that NATO members “have agreed to participate in the military action in Afghanistan.” This has to be seen against the background of NATO’s activation of the mutual defense clause in the wake of 9/11. However, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty does not irrevocably lead toward military involvement – rather, each member state is to decide how to assist the others with “action as it deems necessary, including the use of force.” In that regard, the Eurobarometer survey is more sensitive, since it leaves the question open on which
policies should be pursued. However, the question shifts the focus on fighting “with the US forces,” rather than on Afghanistan or the aim of removing the Taliban regime in that country. With these limitations in mind, the fuzzy set “public support” is constructed to reflect in which countries support for military involvement was rather strong and where it was largely absent. I calculate fuzzy-set membership values using the direct method of calibration. Across the opinion polls that inform my estimate, on average 10 per cent of the respondents gave no answer or were undecided. Therefore, the point of maximum ambiguity would be at 45 per cent public support – a point at which it is likely that an equal share of respondents were opposed to military involvement. Accordingly, I define three qualitative breakpoints: countries with 75 per cent supporters are considered fully in the set public support (fuzzy score 1.0), the cut-off point of maximum ambiguity is set at 45 per cent public support (fuzzy score 0.5), and countries with less than 15 per cent supporters are considered fully outside of the set (fuzzy score 0). Table 6.3 displays the resultant fuzzy values as well as the average share of public support and the opinion polls that informed the estimate.

Not surprisingly, public support for the use of military force in Afghanistan was greatest in the United States (fuzzy score 0.99). Likewise, the included Commonwealth states of New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada all showed high levels of public support for using force, followed by the Netherlands and France (fuzzy scores ranging from 0.90 and 0.82). Intermediate positions were taken by Germany, Italy, Denmark, and Norway (fuzzy scores between 0.76 and 0.69). Still within the set of public support, but not as pronounced were the levels of support in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Belgium. Lower levels of public support for using force were found in Romania, Portugal, Spain, and Slovakia (fuzzy scores ranging from 0.35 to 0.21). Finally, a group of ten countries indicates substantial public opposition, including Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Sweden, Japan, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Austria, Greece, and Finland (fuzzy scores between 0.14 and 0.02). For Hungary and Slovenia no comparable polls were available for the given timeframe. Hence, rather than using data from a later time period or pertaining to the ISAF mission, I set these countries’ level of public support to 45 per cent, yielding a fuzzy score of 0.5 to indicate that these are “neither in nor out” of the fuzzy set of public support (Ragin, 2008: 30).

Military power

This condition draws on collective action theory’s general expectation that powerful states tend to make disproportionately large contributions,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Polls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>Gallup, 7 Oct, 90% support ((A=660)); 19-21 Oct, 88% support, ((N=1006))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>DigiPoll/New Zealand Herald, 28-30 Sep, 67% support ((N=552))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>Newspoll/The Australian, 26-28 Oct, 66% support ((N=1200))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>a NOP, 13-22 Nov, 65.5% support ((N=1006)); b TNS, 23-27 Nov, 66% support ((N=1057))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>EKOS, 12-14 Nov, 62% support ((N=300)); 10-12 Dec, 66% support ((N=300))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>a NIPO, 15-22 Nov, 61.1% support ((N=1002)); b 8-11 Dec, 66% support ((N=966))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>a TNS Sofres, 14-17 Nov, 54% support ((N=1007)); b 14-15 Dec, 67% support ((N=1000))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>a TNS Emnid, 14-17 Nov, 54.6% support ((N=1001)); b 14 Dec, 58% support ((N=500))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>a DOXA, 15-18 Nov, 57% support ((N=978)); b 15-19 Nov, 51.3% support ((N=1001))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>a TNS Gallup, 14-19 Nov, 64% support ((N=1000)); b 8-15 Dec, 43.2% support ((N=602))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>b Norsk Gallup, 2-9 Dec, 53% support ((N=1015))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>b Mareco Praha, 28 Nov–17 Dec, 48% support ((N=1000))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>b Mareco Polska, 26-30 Nov, 48% support ((N=1252))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>a TNS Dimarso, 13-21 Nov, 42.9% support ((N=959)); b 3-8 Dec, 50% support ((N=1019))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>b CSOP, 30 Nov–6 Dec, 39% support ((N=1204))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>a Metris, 13-20 Nov, 26.5% support ((N=1002)); b TNS Eurot., 14-20 Dec, 45% support ((N=1000))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>a Demos., 16-20 Nov, 31.7% support ((N=1007)); b Sigma Dos, 17-18 Dec, 33% support ((N=500))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>b Mareco Praha, 28 Nov–17 Dec, 32% support ((N=1000))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>b EMOR, 28 Nov–5 Dec, 27% support ((N=503))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>a Marketing Surveys, 13-20 Nov, 26% support ((N=1000)); b 16 Nov–6 Dec, 22% support ((N=n.a.))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>b Baltic Data House, 20 Nov–4 Dec, 24% support ((N=504))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>a Svenska Gallup, 14–19 Nov, 19.9% support ((N=1000)); b 19-29 Nov, 26% support ((N=1000))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>b Nippon Research Center, 28 Nov–6 Dec, 21% support ((N=1385))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>b Sic Rinkos Tyrimai, 28 Nov–2 Dec, 16% support ((N=503))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>b BBSS, 1-10 Dec, 14% support ((N=1119))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>a Österr. Gallup, 20-26 Nov, 6% support ((N=500)); b 16–20 Nov, 8.4% support ((N=1000))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>a ICAP Hellas, 13–27 Nov, 7% support ((N=1000)); b 14–22 Nov, 5.2% support ((N=1000))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>a Suomen Gallup, 14–16 Nov, 5% support ((N=1001)); b 7–11 Dec, 7% support ((N=802))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** S is the fuzzy set public support for military participation in Afghanistan. Membership values are based on average support across polls. For Hungary and Slovenia no comparable data exists, hence these countries received a fuzzy value of 0.50 to indicate ‘maximum ambiguity’.

**Sources:** a Flash Eurobarometer 114. b Gallup International End of Year Terrorism Poll 2001. Other polls as indicated.
whereas weak states have strong incentives to ride free or limit their participation to nominal contributions. Before applying this hypothesis to Afghanistan, however, first the collective good and the relative material strength of the countries involved need to be specified.

Since the military intervention in Afghanistan was justified in reference to the right of individual and collective self-defense based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, it can be said that the primary collective good at stake was the defense against terrorist acts that posed a “threat to international peace and security” as the Security Council termed the attacks of 9/11 (UN-SC, 2001c). While it remains debatable whether the military response to these terrorist attacks actually helped to restore international peace and security, it is evident that in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 the international reaction was one of almost unanimous solidarity with the US. In line with the resolution passed by the Security Council on the same day, the UN General Assembly condemned the terrorist acts and expressed its solidarity with the United States, while calling for “international cooperation to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the outrages of 11 September 2001” (UN-GA, 2001). On October 2, NATO formally declared the activation of Article 5, affirming that the terrorist attacks constituted an “armed attack” against the United States and calling allied states for their support. When the military intervention of Afghanistan was announced on October 7, the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, extended the Commission’s “total solidarity with the action,” while a day later the foreign ministers of the EU expressed their “wholehearted support for the action that is being taken in self-defence” (EU-EC, 2001a).

Thus it can be concluded that the common response to the threat of international terrorism presented a collective good to the countries involved. However, this is not to imply that governments agreed on all aspects of what constituted a proper response and the concrete aims of a military intervention in Afghanistan. In fact, government declarations and policy statements were characterized by a fair amount of ambiguity; one could argue whether this was intentional or due to a lack of policy coordination, but that should not matter for the collective action hypothesis at hand.

The reasoning behind the collective action argument builds on the assumption that more powerful states stand to gain larger absolute benefits from the collective good than their weaker counterparts. Hence, powerful states will bear a disproportionate share in the provision of the collective good, while weak states – whose relative contribution has
little influence on the provision of the public good – will exploit the opportunity to free ride on the provisions of the more powerful or to limit their participation to a nominal contribution.

What constitutes a powerful state? While there are plenty of ways to conceptualize power, the theoretical argument on collective action problems in alliance contexts is based on material conceptions of power. I therefore restrict my conceptualization of power to countries’ relative material capabilities as indicators of military power. In the context of OEF my estimate of military power is based on a country’s relative military expenditure as a standard indicator for material capabilities.

The fuzzy set “military power” is constructed on the basis of absolute military expenditure values for 2001, as listed in the widely-used reference *The Military Balance* (IISS, 2002). These values were standardized and transformed into a fuzzy set using the direct method of calibration. I define full membership in the set military power as any z-score equal to or above 0.5 standard deviations. In turn, full non-membership relates to z-scores equal to or below –0.5 standard deviations, while 0 marks a natural crossover point. Table A.4 in the Appendix shows absolute military expenditures, standardized scores, and the resultant fuzzy-set military power.

**Fuzzy-set analysis**

The fuzzy-set analysis consists of separate fsQCA procedures, one for the outcome and another for its negation. Because no comparable public opinion data exists for Hungary and Slovenia, the analysis is restricted to 28 democracies. As a potential solution to this lack of data, one could assign the fuzzy score 0.50 to indicate “maximum ambiguity” in terms of set membership (Ragin, 2000: 158). However, this means that both countries would indicate membership in neither of the two configurations (the presence and absence of public support). By contrast, the results presented here are based on a conservative estimate that excludes these countries. The results of alternative analyses that include both countries are documented in the Appendix (Table A.3). In brief, the recalculation yields results that correspond closely to the findings discussed here.

The fsQCA procedure should be preceded by a test for necessary conditions. These are indicated when instances of the outcome are a subset of instances of a condition. In formal terms, necessary conditions are calculated on the basis of separate measures for consistency and coverage, as outlined in Chapter 4. These calculations reveal two necessary
conditions and a third condition that could be considered “almost necessary.” For the outcome military participation the absence of constitutional restrictions (~C) is a necessary condition, at 0.94 consistency and 0.60 coverage. In turn, the absence of military power (~M) is a necessary condition for military non-participation, with 0.90 consistency and 0.69 coverage. Moreover, the absence of public support (~S) is “almost necessary” for military non-participation, at 0.85 consistency and 0.81 coverage.

By implication, if a condition is necessary for an outcome, its negation must be sufficient for the negation of the outcome. Hence, since military weakness (~M) is a necessary condition for military non-participation (~MP), military power (M) must be sufficient for military participation (MP). Equally, since (~C) is necessary for (MP), constitutional restrictions (C) must be sufficient for military non-participation (~MP). While less consistent, (~S) is almost necessary for (~MP) and thus public support (S) should be almost sufficient for military participation (MP). Yet, although these implications are plausible given the formulated theoretical expectations, they still need to be confirmed in the fsQCA procedure.

Military participation in Operation Enduring Freedom

Under which conditions did democracies participate in military action against the Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan? Is it possible to identify pathways that correspond to the previously stated theoretical expectations? To address these points, the fuzzy-set analysis comprises a sequence of steps, the core of which can be carried out with the QCA software.

Table 6.4 displays the truth table for the outcome military participation and the five explanatory conditions. Because the model contains five conditions, the truth table comprises $\mathbf{2^5} = 32$ rows. For reasons of space, the table is limited to 13 rows that are filled with empirical cases. Each country’s membership in the respective conjunction of conditions is given in brackets. For example, Denmark holds a membership of 0.70 in the conjunction given in Row 4, which comprises the absence of both military power and constitutional restrictions with the presence of parliamentary veto rights, public support, and a right executive. The consistency column indicates the extent to which the fuzzy-set values for a conjunction are sufficient for the outcome military participation across all cases. Based on these scores a cut-off point is determined to separate combinations that pass fuzzy-set sufficiency from those that do not. To proceed with the analysis, I decide
for a consistency threshold of 0.79. Hence all configurations below Row 6 are excluded from the ensuing minimization procedure.\textsuperscript{45}

Next, the truth table is reduced to identify minimal combinations of conditions that are sufficient for the outcome. On the basis of Boolean logic, the QCA software derives three solution terms, which differ in their treatment of logical remainders. Table 6.5 displays the solutions and their constituent conjunctions of conditions that are sufficient for military participation. In addition, the previously identified necessary condition ($\neg C$) is listed. At the bottom of the table are the results for military non-participation, which are discussed below. The numbered paths present alternate routes toward an outcome. On the right hand side, consistency and coverage scores are given by solution and for each respective path. Due to their different treatment of logical remainders, the solution terms vary in terms of complexity. For the current analysis I will focus on the intermediate solution, as it provides a good combination of consistency and coverage in relation to the level of detail specified by its constituent pathways.

Whereas an interpretation of the results is given at the end of this section, a few observations are evident from the intermediate solution.

---

**Table 6.4**  Truth table for military participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>MP</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>USA (.80), GBR (.65), FRA (.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>DEU (.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ITA (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>DNK (.70), CZE (.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>AUS (.76), POL (.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NZL (.80), CAN (.74), NLD (.60), NOR (.55), BEL (.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ESP (.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>JPN (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>LVA (.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>LTU (.73), BGR (.72), ROU (.65), EST (.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>GRC (.79), PRT (.72), SVK (.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SWE (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>AUT (.85), IRE (.66), FIN (.60)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5  Afghanistan: Analytical results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Conjunction</th>
<th>Relation</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Necessary condition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~C</td>
<td>← MP</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parsimonious solution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>→ MP</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intermediate solution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>M<em>~C</em>S</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>~V<em>~C</em>S</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>~C<em>S</em>E</td>
<td>→ MP</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complex solution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>M<em>V</em>~C*S</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>~C<em>S</em>E</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>~M<em>~V</em>~C*S</td>
<td>→ MP</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Necessary condition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~M</td>
<td>← ~MP</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>~S</td>
<td>← ~MP</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parsimonious solution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>~S*E</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>M<em>V</em>E</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intermediate solution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>~M<em>C</em>~S</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>~M<em>~S</em>E</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>M<em>V</em>E</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>~M<em>~V</em>~S</td>
<td>→ ~MP</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complex solution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>~M<em>V</em>C*~S</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>V<em>C</em>~S*E</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>~M<em>V</em>~S*E</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>~M<em>~V</em>~C*~S</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>M<em>V</em>~C<em>~S</em>E</td>
<td>→ ~MP</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


First, the absence of constitutional restrictions (~C) is part of each sufficient conjunction for military participation. Hence, this condition constitutes a “necessary element of a sufficient set” of conditions (NESS condition; Wright, 1988: 1019). Second, public support constitutes
another NESS condition. Its significance is underlined by the parsimo-
nous solution where public support is in itself sufficient for the out-
come. Third, regarding specific pathways, it is apparent that countries
participate militarily either because they are militarily powerful, due to
an absence of parliamentary veto rights, or because of a right executive.
Each of these conditions combines with the NESS conjunction (~C*S),
which is present in all pathways of the intermediate and complex
solution terms.

To provide detail on the distribution of cases and the overall fit of the
model, I construct an x-y plot that displays the position of each coun-
try by tracing membership in the solution term against membership in
the outcome. This is shown in Figure 6.1. The diagonal line demarcates
points that hold equal membership in both sets. It further separates
cases with a higher value in the outcome than in the solution, from
those where membership in the solution exceeds that of the outcome.
While the former can indicate a sufficient condition, the latter can sig-
nal a necessary condition. In set-theoretic terms, it is crucial to distin-
guish whether a case rather holds membership in a given set (Xi>0.50)

![Figure 6.1](image-url)
or whether it is situated rather outside that set \((X_i < 0.50)\). This division yields six distinct zones, which differ in their theoretical relevance.

The \(x\)-\(y\) plot demonstrates visually that the intermediate solution accounts for all except two countries that participated militarily; but it also shows that some deviant cases exist. Out of 12 democracies that participated militarily in OEF (Zone 1, 2 & 6), ten hold membership in the solution term (Zone 1 & 2), seven of which can be considered “typical cases” (Zone 1). Due to their position below the main diagonal, Australia, Germany and New Zealand cannot be considered typical cases in a strict sense, but they nevertheless hold membership in the solution and show the expected outcome. By contrast, Italy in Zone 3 can be considered a “deviant case,” as the country holds a fairly high membership value in the solution but does not show the expected outcome.46 Two countries also participated militarily, but are not explained by the solution: Romania and Latvia (Zone 6). This finding, however, does not undermine the theoretical argument, but it lowers the coverage values for the solution term. Finally, countries in the lower left corner hold low membership values in both the outcome and the solution. Hence, these can be considered mostly irrelevant for the theoretical argument.

Military non-participation in Operation Enduring Freedom

Which conditions led democracies to abstain from military participation in OEF? Does the empirical analysis reflect theoretical expectations? To answer these questions the fuzzy-set analysis applies the procedure introduced in the previous section. Table 6.6 displays the truth table for the outcome military non-participation. Note that the conditions and countries’ membership values for each conjunction are identical to the previous analysis. However, because the inquiry is now directed toward the non-outcome, consistency values inevitably differ. In terms of a consistency threshold, I decide on 0.81 to include the first seven rows in the following minimization procedure.

In the second step, the truth table is minimized on the basis of Boolean logic. Due to the inclusion of seven rows, this procedure preserves a fair amount of complexity, even for the parsimonious solution. The bottom half of Table 6.5 displays the resulting solutions and their constituent pathways toward the outcome military non-participation. In addition, the necessary condition \((\sim M)\) and the almost necessary condition \((\sim S)\) are displayed. Here, I concentrate on the intermediate solution term, which provides a good combination of consistency and
coverage in relation to the level of detail given in its constituent pathways. It is evident that of the four pathways that comprise the solution, substantial empirical overlap exists between the paths. The conjunction (~M*~S) is present in three out of four paths. This corresponds with the identification of these conditions as (almost) necessary conditions for military non-participation. Path 14, however, presents an unexpected finding since its combination of military power, a right executive and parliamentary veto rights also yields a sufficient path toward military non-participation.

How are the countries distributed across the solution terms? Figure 6.2 shows the empirical fit of the solution as a sufficient condition for the non-outcome. What is evident is that a large number of cases are clustered around Zone 1. In fact, ten countries can be considered “typical cases,” while three reside in Zone 2, but nevertheless show the outcome and membership in the solution term. It is also notable that there are no “deviant cases” that show membership in the solution term but not in the outcome (Zone 3). Yet, several cases hold values (X<0.50) in the solution term but show the outcome (Zone 6), indicating that these are

Table 6.6  Truth table for military non-participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>~MP</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>AUT (.85), IRE (.66), FIN (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>JPN (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SWE (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>LVA (.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
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Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict

Analytical findings

In sum, the fuzzy-set analyses yield five sets of findings with theoretical significance. I will address these in sequence before turning to limitations of the present study and prospects for future research. First, the analysis found public support in all pathways toward military participation. Likewise, the absence of public support was found to be almost necessary for military non-participation and an element in three out of four sufficient pathways toward that outcome (Table 6.5). These findings present strong empirical evidence in support of the postulated link between public opinion and foreign policy, which suggests that democratic governments are constrained by a requirement to gather citizen’s support before deploying armed forces to a conflict. The results thus support hypotheses $H_{4a}$ and $H_{4b}$, in the sense that public opinion turned out to be an INUS condition for both outcomes, respectively.

*Figure 6.2* Afghanistan: Military non-participation and solution term

not explained by the solution term. Finally, countries in the bottom left corner hold low membership in both sets and are thus irrelevant for the theoretical argument.
By contrast, if public opinion were a negligible factor to political leaders, as suggested by Kreps (2010), then we should see more evidence for military involvement in cases were citizens were opposed to the military intervention. Yet ten out of 12 countries that deployed combat forces to OEF had public support. Furthermore, for NATO member states, it is noteworthy that military participation directly corresponded to public support, as the six countries with lowest public support among alliance members ended up not participating or sending non-combat support units. This finding is also at odds with the arguments of Davidson (2011) and Viehrig (2010) discussed earlier, who both emphasize the centrality of alliance membership in determining military contributions.

While these findings indicate a robust pattern, no claim is made about the direction of the causal link between public opinion and foreign policy. Causality could have been reversed: because political leaders planned to send troops, they prepared the public for their decision with legitimizing rhetoric and arguments in support of military participation. Likewise, citizens of countries with constitutional restrictions on military involvement could be, on average, more critical toward the use of force. However, this would not explain why a number of NATO countries did not participate more fully when their political leadership would have had an interest in expressing alliance solidarity through a strong military commitment. Furthermore, it is unlikely that political rhetoric could gather sustained support for military intervention if the public were generally opposed to such actions.

Second, with regard to alliance behavior and power status, several findings can be derived from the analyses. To begin with, it was demonstrated that the absence of military power is a necessary condition for military non-participation and that it also is an element in three out of four sufficient pathways toward that outcome. This supports the expectation derived from collective action theory, which assumes that weak states have strong incentives for free riding or easy riding, as in limiting their participation to a nominal contribution. The identified pathways further help to specify the conditions under which collective action theory applies. Military power alone is not sufficient for military participation. This contrasts with the collective action argument as deduced from Olson and Zeckhauser (1966b). Military power rather requires public support and the absence of constitutional restrictions to be jointly sufficient for military involvement (see Table 6.5, Path 2). Similarly, the absence of military power must further be combined with the absence of public support and any of the other three conditions to be sufficient for military non-participation, which is demonstrated in the intermediate
solution term (Table 6.5, Paths 12–13, 15). In sum, these findings substantiate hypotheses $H_{5a}$ and $H_{5b}$, as developed in Chapter 3.

Third, with regard to institutional constraints, the analysis confirmed previously outlined theoretical expectations. The absence of constitutional restrictions was identified as a necessary condition for military participation. This is empirical evidence in favor of the argument that such constraints are a structural veto against military deployments, as stated in hypothesis $H_{2b}$. This finding concurs with the analysis of military non-participation, where constitutional restrictions were found to be sufficient either on their own, or in combination with the absence of military power and public support, as indicated in the parsimonious and intermediate solutions shown in Table 6.5 and in support of hypothesis $H_{2a}$.

Fourth, unlike some other conditions, parliamentary veto rights were not by themselves expected to lead toward either outcome. Yet, in combination with the absence of public support these institutional rights were expected to create a veto point against military deployment even when other conditions favor participation ($H_{1b}$). This pattern was found in ten countries, only two of which did contribute militarily to OEF. Yet some of the countries that fall in this group are over-determined with regard to the expected outcome, since they also happen to have constitutional restrictions that prohibit military participation. If we exclude those cases, Bulgaria, Estonia, and Latvia remain – none of which made a military contribution. But this combination also applies to Lithuania and Romania and these countries did contribute militarily. Hence no conclusive evidence can be drawn from the present study as to whether parliamentary veto rights created a constraint on military participation.

Fifth, with regard to executive partisanship in relation to military deployments to OEF, theory yielded no determinate expectations. While it is generally assumed that right executives would endorse exclusivist uses of force, whereas left executives tend to support inclusivist causes, both arguments were present in the debates preceding the war in Afghanistan. The primary stated reason for intervening in Afghanistan was the terrorist threat emerging from Al-Qaeda’s continued presence in the country. Yet, this was complemented with liberal arguments that emphasized democratization, state-building, stable institutions, and the protection of human rights. This mixture of motives is partly reflected in the results, which show that right executives constituted paths toward both outcomes, but that there is no pattern involving left executives. Hence, for the case of Afghanistan it is concluded that partisanship cannot be regarded as an explanatory factor.

Finally, although this study did not entail a direct test of institutional arguments relating to government type and military participation
Unconditional Support but Selective Engagement?

(Auerswald, 1999) or political restrictions (Saideman and Auerswald, 2012), it is possible to draw out some preliminary observations. Institutional arguments expect coalition governments to be severely constrained in their foreign and security policy. Thus they should be more reluctant to use force than their majoritarian counterparts, for fear of domestic political backlash from failed military operations. However, the empirical evidence provided in this chapter contradicts such claims. Seven out of 12 countries that participated with combat forces in OEF had coalition governments. Denmark and Norway even featured minority governments at the time, while in the Netherlands a multi-party coalition held office. If these governments were as constrained as institutionalist arguments would have us believe, then their degree of military involvement in OEF becomes hard to explain. By contrast, the analysis in this chapter indicates that, with the exception of Latvia, all coalition governments that ended up contributing militarily shared two characteristics, namely they had no relevant constitutional restrictions and their citizens were largely in favor of the use of force – hence these governments were far less constrained than previously assumed (Table 6.1 and Table 6.4).

With regard to limitations of this study, two points stand out. First, as previously mentioned, a major challenge to any comparative study of the Afghanistan conflict lies in the fact that parallel military operations with diverse mandates and different sources of legitimacy took place. This chapter focuses on OEF since this mission explicitly included offensive aims, whereas the UN-endorsed ISAF was conceived as a peace support mission, but gradually turned into a combat operation. Prospective studies could compare OEF and ISAF and investigate the parallel development of these operations over time. The second limitation concerns the availability of public opinion data. Because of a lack of comparable data on public support for Hungary and Slovenia, these countries were excluded from the fuzzy-set analysis. However, the Appendix provides a re-analysis where Hungary and Slovenia are coded as missing values and this demonstrates that the inclusion of the two indeterminate cases does not yield substantively different results. Irrespective of whether one decides to include or exclude these two underspecified cases, the decision does not substantively alter the results.

Conclusion

At the outset of this chapter the question was posed why and under which conditions democracies decided to join the military intervention in Afghanistan that begun as Operation Enduring Freedom on
October 7, 2001. The introductory section provided historical and legal background to the Afghanistan War, emphasizing important differences between OEF, as the military response to 9/11, and the ISAF mission that had been created as a peace support operation restricted to the Kabul area. Against this backdrop, the chapter proceeded with a review of recent studies on the military involvement of democracies in Afghanistan and their contending arguments. This section yielded several implications for the research design of the present study and a specification of the theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter 3.

Consequently, a vital element in the research design was the qualitative measurement of military participation in the context of the Afghanistan War. Due to differences regarding the military objectives and the legal background, it was decided to focus on OEF rather than ISAF in the specification of the outcome. Furthermore, in order to be able to trace a political deployment decision to the government that was responsible for that decision it was decided to limit the timeframe to the period between October 2001 and December 2002. Based on explicit criteria, the study proceeded to categorize the extent of military participation across 30 democracies from Europe, North America, and the Pacific. Twelve countries participated with combat forces, while 18 countries abstained from participation or provided non-combat support. With regard to the 16 included NATO countries, these were evenly split – half of the states participated militarily, whereas the other half abstained or fulfilled limited support functions.

The analysis of public support for military participation revealed considerable variance, which did not seem to reflect the widespread international expressions of solidarity with the US in the aftermath of 9/11, nor did it resonate with scholarly expectations. Even among NATO members there were large differences between states, including substantial opposition to the war in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, as well as lukewarm public support in Belgium, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Consequently, none of these countries deployed combat forces to Afghanistan in the observed timeframe.

In sum, the fsQCA procedure yielded several findings that are deemed to have theoretical import. First, substantial empirical evidence was found in support of the participatory constraints argument, which holds that democratic governments are constrained by a requirement to gather citizen’s support before deploying armed forces to a conflict. While NATO members were most-likely cases for military participation, the analysis found a correspondence between public support and military participation, since those alliance members with low public
support ended up not participating or reducing their participation to nominal contributions. Second, the findings broadly support the general argument derived from collective action theory, which expects weak states to ride free on the contributions of more powerful states. The identified pathways further specified the conditions under which this argument holds, as power alone is not sufficient for military participation. Third, the analysis also confirmed the previously outlined theoretical expectations concerning constitutional restrictions, which are conceived as a structural veto against military deployments. Fourth, with regard to parliamentary veto rights and partisanship no consistent patterns were identified in the present study. While there is some evidence in favor of an interaction between legislative involvement and public opposition, no conclusive evidence could be drawn from the fuzzy-set analysis as to whether or not parliamentary veto rights created a constraint on military participation. Likewise, there were no decisive patterns involving partisanship. Finally, the analysis casts serious doubt on institutional arguments that suggest that coalition governments are generally constrained in their foreign policy options when compared to their majoritarian counterparts. By contrast, seven out of 12 countries that participated with combat forces in OEF had coalition governments, while some of these even featured minority governments or multiparty coalitions. It was shown that the combination of public support and the absence of constitutional restrictions were better able to account for this pattern than a purely institutional argument based on government type.
Iraq: Parliamentary Peace or Partisan Politics?

When President Barack H. Obama announced on August 31, 2010, that “Operation Iraqi Freedom” was officially over (US-WH, 2010), he put an end to what has arguably been the most controversial war democracies have fought in the post-Cold War era. During the past two decades democratic states have used substantial military force on a number of occasions and with varying justifications, as the preceding chapters have shown, but the preventive war against Iraq, initiated by President George W. Bush on March 19, 2003, and joined by an ad hoc coalition of states, stands out in terms of the harm inflicted on soldiers and civilians killed or wounded, its extraordinary economic costs, and its long-term toll on democratic politics and the project of democracy at large.¹

As the confidential “Downing Street Memo” became public, it was revealed that the Bush administration had been planning for war against Iraq at least eight months before the eventual invasion and several months before Iraq was publicly declared a potential target of US military intervention.² Written by an aide to David Manning, himself a key foreign policy advisor to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the Downing Street Memo documented a meeting on July 23, 2002, between Blair and his senior advisors and defense and intelligence officials.³ A critical section of the memo includes observations from Richard Dearlove, head of the British intelligence agency MI6 and denoted as “C,” who related his impressions from earlier meetings with members of the US administration in Washington,

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The
NSC [National Security Council] had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action. (UK-PM, 2002: 1)

Besides confirming that the Bush administration had decided on forcible regime change in Iraq months before the alleged threat was made public, Dearlove’s comments show that intelligence was being “fixed” to support political objectives. It is further noted that influential members within the US administration, represented in the National Security Council, were opposed to “the UN route,” which the British still regarded as necessary to generate a legal justification for the use of force. Specifically, as Attorney General Peter Goldsmith noted in the meeting, “the desire for regime change was not a legal basis for military action,” whereas according to the principles of international law only three circumstances could provide such a legal foundation, including cases of “self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorization.”

Foreign Secretary Jack Straw added that the “the case was thin,” because the Iraqi regime did not pose an immediate threat to its neighbors and its WMD capability was smaller than that of countries like Iran, Libya, or North Korea. Against this backdrop, it was concluded at the Downing Street meeting that the Foreign Secretary would “work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors,” even if only to “help with the legal justification for the use of force,” while the Attorney General would tend to critical legal issues (UK-PM, 2002: 2–3).

Though this part has been rarely discussed, it should be noted that the Downing Street Memo already contained a consideration of US military options and potential British contributions to the Iraq War. Chief of Defence Staff Michael Boyce briefed the Prime Minister on what were regarded as essentially two military options: either a “generated start” with an incremental build-up of up to 250,000 US forces, requiring at least 90 days’ time for preparation and deployment, or a “running start” that relied on a much smaller number of forces, which were already in the region, though Boyce termed the latter a “hazardous option.”

With regard to a UK contribution, Boyce remarked that the Americans saw British involvement as “essential” and “critical for either option” because that meant basing opportunities on the atoll Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and in Cyprus in the Mediterranean. He sketched three scenarios for British involvement, ranging from a restricted contribution limited to basing rights and the participation of several Special
Forces squadrons, to the provision of naval and air force units, and the contribution of up to 40,000 ground troops as the option that the UK government eventually decided upon (UK-PM, 2002: 1–2).

The alleged link between the regime of Saddam Hussein, international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction was made public in the fall of 2002. On September 12, in an address to the UN General Assembly and speaking after Secretary-General Kofi Annan, President Bush lined out the security challenge his administration perceived in the combination of international terrorism with weapons of mass destruction: “our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies enabling them to kill on a massive scale.” According to Bush, it was precisely this threat that surfaced in Iraq: “In one place, in one regime, we find all of these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms – exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to confront” (UN-GA, 2002: 6). Whereas the Secretary-General had appealed to the “unique legitimacy provided by the United Nations” and had demanded a “full use of multilateral institutions” as a proper response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (UN-GA, 2002: 1–2), the US President held that the “conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations,” which led him to ask rhetorically whether UN resolutions were “to be honoured and enforced or cast aside without consequence” (UN-GA, 2002: 8). Even though the UN route led to a dead end eventually, former Attorney General Goldsmith has argued in retrospect, when questioned before the British Iraq Inquiry, that the written legal advice he provided to Blair after their meeting on July 23, 2002, which stressed the centrality of the UN, “may well have been one of the contributing factors to the Prime Minister, to his great credit, persuading President Bush that he must go down the United Nations route” (UK-PCCI, 2010: 23).

While the implications of continued Iraqi defiance of UN resolutions were left open in the US President’s speech before the General Assembly, the National Security Strategy (NSS) of September 17, 2002, laid out the principles of the administration’s security policy, or what became known as the “Bush doctrine” in sharp relief. Foreshadowing the formation of the “coalition of the willing,” the NSS gave a nod to multilateralism but stated in clear terms that a unilateral approach and “preemptive action” as self-defense were being considered against the perceived threats:

While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if
necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists [...] (US-WH, 2002b: 6)

Large parts of the NSS were devoted to the nexus between renegade states and weapons of mass destruction, which were regarded as a qualitatively new threat that, in the eyes of the Bush administration, required an adaption of basic principles in international law. Specifically, the document argued for a wider definition of the term “imminent threat,” so as to allow preemptive and even preventive military action before an attack had become manifest:

We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. [...] The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. (US-WH, 2002b: 15)

On October 16, 2002, a Joint Resolution by US Congress was signed into law that essentially adopted the threat perception of the administration and authorized the president to use force against Iraq “as he determines necessary and appropriate [...] to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” and to “enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq” (US-CO, 2002: 1501). Notably, the resolution determined that Iraq constituted a “threat to the national security of the United States” and that it was “actively seeking” nuclear weapons while “harboring terrorist organizations,” specifically “members of al Qaida,” who were “known to be in Iraq” (US-CO, 2002: 1498–1499). As commentators have pointed out, the resolution effectively “gave the president a ‘blank check’ to deal with Iraq” (Ehrenberg et al., 2010: 91). However, in contrast to the Joint Resolution that passed almost unanimously in the wake of 9/11, the authorization on the use of force against Iraq indicated an emerging partisan divide in both legislative chambers, as 215 out of 223 Republicans in the House of Representatives voted in favor and 126 out of 208 Democrats voted against the proposal. In the Senate, 48 out of 49 Republicans supported the resolution, while 21 out of 50 Democrats rejected it.6

On November 8, 2002, after many weeks of negotiations and several draft proposals, the UN Security Council unanimously passed resolution
Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict

1441, based upon a draft submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States. Though the resolution did not authorize the use of "all necessary means" as the Security Council had done in previous instances, prominently in resolution 678 as the legal basis for the multinational intervention on behalf of Kuwait in 1991, it nevertheless declared that, "Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions." Yet, it was determined that Iraq were to be given "a final opportunity to comply with disarmament obligations" – a purpose for which the Security Council devised an "enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687" (UN-SC, 2002b: 3).

After the members of the Security Council had cast their vote on resolution 1441, both the American Representative, John Negroponte, and his British counterpart, Jeremy Greenstock, as joint sponsors, emphasized that the document did not contain an automatic resort to arms should Iraq fail to comply with its obligations and that the case would be placed before the Council under such circumstances. Negroponte stated:

As we have said on numerous occasions to Council members, this resolution contains no 'hidden triggers' and no 'automaticity' with respect to the use of force. If there is a further Iraqi breach, reported to the Council by UNMOVIC, the IAEA or a Member State, the matter will return to the Council for discussions as required in paragraph 12. [...] If the Security Council fails to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violations, this resolution does not constrain any Member State from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and security. (UN-SC, 2002a: 3)

Negroponte's statement reveals that the US took the view that member states could report breaches, in addition to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), represented by Executive Chairman Hans Blix and Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, respectively. It further shows that the US claimed a right 'to defend itself' against the Iraqi threat, if the Council "fails to act decisively" (UN-SC, 2002a: 3). These interpretations stand in conflict with the assessment of most legal scholars (cf. Weller, 2010: 156), and also diverge from the views expressed by most members of the Council, as articulated in the meeting on November 8. In fact, most delegations agreed with the
adopted resolution precisely since it did not contain any automaticity and because it upheld the primacy of the Security Council.

As the French Representative Jean-David Levitte stated regarding the procedure following a potential future violation of Iraqi obligations, “the Council would meet immediately to evaluate the seriousness of the violations and draw appropriate conclusions. France welcomes the fact that all ambiguity on this point and all elements of automaticity have disappeared from the resolution” (UN-SC, 2002a: 5). In a similar vein, the Irish Representative Richard Ryan noted, “we welcome the assurances given by the sponsors that their purpose in presenting this resolution was to achieve disarmament through inspections, and not to establish a basis for the use of military force” (UN-SC, 2002a: 7). Likewise, Representative Ole Peter Kolby of Norway held, “Norway wants the conflict with Iraq to be resolved peacefully. [...] the resolution sets out a procedure whereby the Security Council will convene immediately in order to secure international peace and security” (UN-SC, 2002a: 10).

Though weapons inspections had been resumed after the adoption of resolution 1441, it soon became apparent that the Bush administration intended to act irrespective of the inspectors’ assessment of Iraqi WMD capability. This prompted an international response from both supporters and opponents to the use of force. While the European Council submitted a diplomatic note on January 27 that merely emphasized the “key role” of the Security Council in the ongoing crisis (EU-EC, 2003: 9), the European Parliament expressly rejected the use of force and voiced its “opposition to any unilateral military action,” while underlining the authority of the Security Council in resolving the current crisis. Notably, the resolution dated January 30, attested that, “breaches of UNSCR 1441 currently identified by the inspectors with regard to weapons of mass destruction do not justify military action” (EP, 2003: 67). By contrast, a group of European government leaders issued a plea for transatlantic allegiance that became known as the “Letter of Eight” and was published across international newspapers on the same day as the European Parliament adopted its resolution on Iraq.8 The letters signatories emphasized that, “Resolution 1441 is Saddam Hussein’s last chance to disarm using peaceful means,” which implicitly argued against the requirement of a second resolution before military action could be taken (Ehrenberg et al., 2010: 124).

On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell convened the Security Council for a meeting reminiscent of US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson’s address to the Council at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. Presenting an array of evidence from satellite
photographs to tape recordings of intercepted phone conversations to statements from former Iraqi officials, Powell held that it were “irrefutable and undeniable” that Iraq was in “material breach of its obligations,” as lined out in preceding UN resolutions, specifically Resolution 1441. Referring to a “sinister nexus between Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorist network,” he reiterated the alleged link between the regime of Saddam Hussein and international terrorism, which added urgency to the perceived threat posed by Iraqi WMD (UN-SC, 2003a: 8, 14).9

Issued on the same day as the Security Council meeting on Iraq, the US position was publicly endorsed in the “Vilnius Statement” – a joint declaration by ten Foreign Ministers from Central and Eastern Europe who convened in Lithuania at the time. These European leaders concluded that, “it has now become clear that Iraq is in material breach of UN Security Council Resolutions, including UN Resolution 1441.” Based on this assessment, it was argued that the situation demanded “a united response from the community of democracies.” With regards to potential military action the CEE leaders markedly declared that, “we are prepared to contribute to an international coalition to enforce its provisions and the disarmament of Iraq.”10 The Vilnius Statement thus went farther than the Letter of Eight by Western and Central European leaders, who had also identified WMD and terrorism as a “threat of incalculable consequences,” but had left the implications unaddressed.

While the Council convened in New York, the Australian Senate passed a vote of no confidence against Prime Minister John Howard, who had been a firm supporter of the Bush administration’s Iraq policy and had recently initiated a deployment of Australian naval forces, including 150 combat troops, as part of a military buildup in the Persian Gulf. Although the vote carried no palpable implications for Howard and a similar motion was defeated in the House of Representatives due to a government majority in that chamber, it was still considered an important gesture of political opposition in a country where an overwhelming majority of the public rejected military participation in a war against Iraq (BBC, 2003a).

On March 5, 2003, two days before a critical meeting of the Security Council were the first UNMOVIC report since the adoption of resolution 1441 and the subsequent resumption of weapons inspections was to be presented, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and Russia met in Paris and issued a letter to the Council in which they urged for a focus on “peaceful means” in order to achieve the aim of “full and effective disarmament of Iraq.” Threatening to use their veto as permanent members, France and Russia further stated that they “will not let a
proposed resolution pass that would authorize the use of force” (UN-SC, 2003c). This referred to a draft proposal for a “second resolution” by Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which had been circulating since February 24 and was expected to be tabled at the Security Council meeting on March 7, though it had not been determined whether the document would merely be considered or also set up for a vote (UN-SC, 2003g). The proposed resolution was widely interpreted as an ultimatum to the Iraqi leadership (Ehrenberg et al., 2010: 143), though it did not contain the phrase “all necessary means,” nor did it mention the use of force in its operative part. However, being aware that they could not muster a majority within the Council to authorize the use of force against Iraq, the sponsors of the draft resolution “reversed the possibility of a veto” (Weller, 2010: 178). Iraq was to be given “a final opportunity” in order to demonstrate “full, unconditional, immediate and active cooperation,” which needed to be confirmed in a vote by the Security Council on or before March 17, otherwise Iraq would unavoidably be found in non-compliance and trigger the consequences set out in previous resolutions.

However, as the ensuing debate over the draft proposal and the opening statements of Blix and ElBaradei showed, the rift between those who favored a continuation of weapons inspections and diplomatic efforts and those in the Council who supported the use of force had widened significantly. As a proponent of the former position, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer concluded on March 7:

The alternatives are clear: the disarmament of Iraq by war or its disarmament by exhausting all peaceful means. The risks of a military option are evident to us all. There is good reason to believe that the region would not become more stable, but rather more unstable, through a war, and, what is more, that in the long term international terrorism would be strengthened, not weakened, and that our joint efforts to resolve the Middle East conflict would be hindered. (UN-SC, 2003b: 10)

Secretary Powell responded that based on his reading of the UNMOVIC report Iraq had not shown the required extent of cooperation set out in resolution 1441:

But I was sorry to learn that all of it is still coming in a grudging manner, that Iraq is still refusing to offer what was called for by resolution 1441 (2002): immediate, active and unconditional cooperation – not
later, but immediate; not passive, but active; not conditional, but unconditional in every respect. [...] I still consider what I heard this morning to be a catalogue of non-cooperation. [...] The inspectors should not have to look under every rock, go to every crossroads and peer into every cave for evidence, for proof. We must not allow Iraq to shift the burden of proof onto the inspectors. (UN-SC, 2003b: 14)

Eventually – as it became apparent that the international community would not support a war against Iraq – Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced on March 17, that they would give up their efforts to attain a “second resolution” that would authorize the use of force (UN-NC, 2003). This announcement followed upon a meeting on the Azores, mid-way in the Atlantic, on March 16, where Aznar, Bush, Blair, and the Portuguese Prime Minister Barroso had issued a statement of “transatlantic solidarity” and proclaimed their “vision for Iraq and the Iraqi people,” as a last-ditch effort to sway the international community to join them in their cause (US-WH, 2003b).

Though the British parliament has no prescribed function in the approval of military deployments, the Blair government decided to lay the case for war against Iraq before the House of Commons, if partly to rein in critics from within the Labour Party. On March 18, 2003, concluding a heated debate that lasted for more than nine hours, members of parliament passed a motion to authorize the use of “all means necessary to ensure the disarmament of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction” with 412 against 149 votes. Before the government proposal was approved parliament had defeated an amendment by critics of the Iraq War, who sought to replace the authorization of force stating that, “the case for war against Iraq has not been established, especially given the absence of specific United Nations authorisation.” The amendment evidently expressed the position of many within and outside of government, most prominently the former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, who had resigned from Blair’s cabinet on March 17, in order to be able to vote against the government. However, the amended text did not gain a majority, with 396 votes against it and 217 votes in favor (UK-HoC, 2003). In his parliamentary speech, Blair justified his government’s course of action and commented on what he regarded as an “unreasonable” decision by the French President Chirac to announce that France would veto any resolution that authorizes the use of force against Iraq.

In resolution 1441, we said that it was Saddam’s final opportunity and that he had to comply. That was agreed upon by all members
of the Security Council. What is surely unreasonable is for a country to come forward now, at the very point when we might reach agreement and when we are – not unreasonably – saying that he must comply with the UN, after all these months without full compliance, on the basis of the six tests or action will follow. For that country to say that it will veto such a resolution in all circumstances is what I would call unreasonable (UK-HoC, 2003: 765).

On March 19, 2003, the war against Iraq began with a series of air strikes against artillery installations and air defense systems, while the full-scale invasion with ground forces started in the early morning hours of March 20 (UK-MoD, 2003a: 10; US-WH, 2003a). However, despite the prominence of the “preemptive action” doctrine in government statements and public discourse, this line of argumentation did not become a part of the legal case for war put forth by the American and British governments.11 In separate letters to the Council, dated March 20, the United States and the United Kingdom claimed authority for engaging in military action on the grounds of a “material breach” of the obligations that were placed upon Iraq in previous resolutions (UN-SC, 2003d, 2003e). Specifically, the US letter suggested a “revival” of a previous authorization of force due to the removal of the conditions for the ceasefire between Iraq and coalition forces in 1991, arguing that the “material breach of these obligations removes the basis of the ceasefire and revives the authority to use force under resolution 678 (1990)” (UN-SC, 2003e).

Irrespective of the distinction between the doctrine of preemptive war and the narrowly construed legal case, the Iraq War indicated a rift between the United States and the international community. Outside the US administration, legal scholars seemed to agree that the doctrine of preventive war had to be “widely rejected” (Weller, 2010: 143) and that it received “little international support” (Gray, 2008: 213). In 2004, fearing a dangerous precedent for future conflicts, the UN Secretary General commissioned a high-level panel to investigate global security threats and to make recommendations for an appropriate collective response to these threats. While the panel in principle acknowledged the right of self-defense against imminent threats, it firmly rejected any notion of “anticipatory self-defence” against “non-imminent” threats:

[I]n a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive
action as distinct from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to allow all. (UN-HP, 2004: 63)

**Prevalent accounts of the Iraq War**

The conflict over Iraq presents various puzzles to IR theory. To begin with, the Iraq War demolished the long held claim that democracies do not fight preventive wars. This was argued on the notion that, “democratic public opinion generates an institutional heritage of openness and a division of powers that inhibits the preventive motivation for war” (Schweller, 1992: 244). While Randall Schweller emphasizes public opinion as well as institutional checks and balances as the causes of (partial) democratic benevolence, Reiter and Stam argue solely on the basis of democratic public opinion: “democracies have an especially acute need to generate contemporaneous consent before going to war,” which is why “no democratic great power has ever launched a preventive war” (2002: 88). Yet, scholars widely agree in their assessment that the Iraq conflict was indeed a preventive war (Lake, 2010: 7; Levy, 2008: 2), even though it has been one of the first such wars in contemporary history. At the least, this puts into question the constraining effects of public opinion and institutional rules.

How can it be explained that democratic governments authorized military deployments to join the *ad hoc* coalition when their citizens were overwhelmingly against the use of force? Aside from the preventive war argument, this also undermines a purported mechanism of the democratic peace, namely the link between citizen preferences and policy implementation by government representatives. Realists, by contrast, see a principle cause for the use of force in the presence of a substantial threat to a state’s national interests. But why did the United States and the United Kingdom initiate war when there was no conclusive evidence that Iraq posed a threat? Why did numerous democratic leaders join them? In fact, a group of prominent American IR scholars, most of whom share a realist perspective, pointed out as early as September 2002 that a war with Iraq would, plainly, not be in the national interest of the United States. Moreover, why did the British Prime Minister decide to steer his Labour government into war, despite hostile public opinion, against segments of his party base and in conflict with influential members of his cabinet?

On the other hand, how can it be explained that France abstained from military participation in Iraq and blocked every effort to authorize the use of force in the Security Council? Historically, one could have
expected the French government to be more forthcoming in authorizing military measures. And, generally speaking, a conservative President in the Élysée should have made it more rather than less likely that force would be used. Why did other governments refuse to become involved militarily? Finally, why did many smaller countries support the United States in its policy? Some have argued that the structure of the international system can account for this behavior. However, this leaves substantial variation unaccounted for, as numerous smaller countries were vocal opponents to the Iraq War.

Given its impact on global politics at large and the plethora of questions that it raises for theories of international politics, it is not surprising that the number of academic studies and policy papers on the Iraq War has reached overwhelming proportions. However, many works are single-case studies, focusing on the United States, the United Kingdom or some other countries’ government to provide an account for why and how decision-makers positioned themselves toward an impending war against Iraq. Others investigate related issues, such as threat inflation in the run-up to the conflict (Kaufmann, 2004), the reasons for intelligence failure (Jervis, 2006), the abuse of democratic peace theory as a justification for regime change through the use of force (Owen, 2005; Russett, 2005), or the motivation behind US unilateralism (Kreps, 2011). By contrast, this section focuses on contending explanations for democratic war involvement in Iraq. While scholars and analysts seem to be in agreement over the historical development of the conflict, their assessments diverge when it comes to explaining why governments made their decisions and how much weight should be attributed to the suggested causes.

Many studies highlight ideational factors as central elements of American and British decision-making on Iraq. Authors have pointed to the critical role of neoconservatism within the Bush administration, an ideological influence that is held to have served as a “necessary but not sufficient condition of Operation Iraqi Freedom” (Khong, 2008: 262). It has further been argued that neoconservatives won out over realists in the debate that preceded the Iraq War because their ideology was able to link “questions of foreign policy directly to issues of domestic politics, and placing concerns about social and moral ‘decay’ within a vision of politics as a whole” (Schmidt and Williams, 2008: 219). At its core, neoconservatism comprises four elements: (a) a Manichean worldview that splits the world into liberal democracies on the one hand, and authoritarian and totalitarian regimes on the other, (b) a conception of the United States as a benevolent hegemon, (c) firm belief in the
utility of military force, and (d) distrust in international organizations and international law (Khong, 2008: 256–258). These four tenets were reflected in the Bush doctrine of preventive war, as outlined above, a document that originated from the office of National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice (US-WH, 2002b).

Despite the acknowledged centrality of ideology, scholars have also recognized that neoconservative policy still needed an opportunity for its implementation – an opening that emerged in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (Flibbert, 2012: 92; Khong, 2008: 264). To this date, political leaders point to 9/11 as a watershed event that changed all subsequent security assessments. For instance, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated in a Senate Hearing on “lessons learnt” in Afghanistan and Iraq:

The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass murder. We acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light through the prism of our experience on September 11. On that day, we saw thousands of innocent men, women, and children killed by terrorists, and that experience changed our appreciation of our vulnerability and the risks the U.S. faces from terrorist states and terrorist networks armed with powerful weapons. (US-SE, 2003: 13)

An alternative account argues that the emphasis on neoconservatism as a necessary condition for war is misplaced because principal members of the administration were not neoconservatives themselves, but shared the policy goal of forcible regime change in Iraq. As Jane Cramer and Edward Duggan demonstrate, high-ranking leaders such as Vice President Richard Cheney and Rumsfeld “already wanted to pursue regime change in Iraq upon taking office” (2012: 201). Hence there was no need to persuade them into that policy and 9/11 merely gave them an opportunity to implement preconceived plans – contrary to Rumsfeld’s post hoc and self-serving justification before the Armed Services Committee.17

Partly complementary to those who highlight neoconservative ideas or conceptions of American hegemony as central influences on the US administration, others have focused on individual leadership traits among administration members, for instance to explain decision-makers’ willingness to violate international norms in the run-up to the war (Shannon and Keller, 2007). The focus on individual decision-makers has also proven fruitful to explain British involvement in Iraq, which has been attributed mostly to the personality of Prime Minister
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Blair. As such, studies have found a firm belief in the ability to control events and a high need for power among Blair’s core characteristics as a political leader (Dyson, 2006: 293–295). These traits dovetailed with the doctrine of “liberal interventionism” that emerged with the arrival of New Labour, as well as Blair’s evident attempt to influence “the course of American grand strategy” (Dunne, 2008: 340) and his apparent aim to “maximize British influence on international security issues” (Keohane, 2005: 70).

Still others have focused on the dynamics of small group decision-making on Iraq as an instance of the recognized phenomenon of “groupthink” originated by Irving Janis (1982). Dina Badie concludes that the Bush administration was “[p]lagued by groupthink,” which led to “rushed, incomplete and inaccurate estimates” (2010: 293). Tim Dunne holds that similar failures occurred in Britain, where “Blair preferred an informal style of leadership based around a charmed circle of advisers” and subsequent evidence surfaced in the Hutton Inquiry indicates that “formal government processes were not operational through 2002 and early 2003” (2008: 354).^18^ However, their emphasis on the context of decision-making notwithstanding, groupthink approaches still presuppose the existence of distinct preferences, whether these stem from neo-conservative beliefs, a quest for American hegemony, or an expression of liberal interventionism.

Comparative studies on democracies’ involvement in the Iraq War propose contending explanations for the puzzles raised. Broadly in line with the emphasis on ideology and noting that it had been primarily right governments that gave political support for the Iraq War, studies suggest that partisanship helps to explain why certain countries participated and others did not (Schuster and Maier, 2006). Based on party family affiliation and expert judgments, Jürgen Schuster and Herbert Maier identify clear partisan patterns across Western Europe.^19^ Their argument resonates with recent work on partisan politics in relation to the use of force (Arena and Palmer, 2009; Rathbun, 2004).

Another line of argument focuses on national legislatures and their authority in security policy. It suggests that if parliaments have a say on military deployments they can serve as an effective check on war participation, which amounts to a parliamentary peace if the premise of a war-averse public is met (Dieterich et al., 2009). This institutional perspective contributes to the wider literature on legislative constraints in specifying a concrete mechanism by which parliaments can influence the foreign policy process and troop deployment decisions (e.g., Reiter and Tillman, 2002). Illustrating similar processes for the case of
Turkey, it has been shown that public dissent and an indecisive executive enabled the Turkish parliament to exert substantial influence on foreign policy, effectively blocking participation in the Iraq War except for logistical support (Kesgin and Kaarbo, 2010). A different institutional argument suggests that electoral institutions mediate the effect of public opinion on policy. However, the authors find no confirming evidence for their hypothesis that presidential and majoritarian systems should be more responsive to public opinion than electoral systems with proportional representation (Chan and Safran, 2006: 153).

Institutional and partisan arguments could help to fill the explanatory gaps uncovered by those who have investigated the assumedly constraining effect of public opinion. Based on contributions to a volume on public attitudes toward the Iraq conflict across twelve countries, Peter Furia and Bethany Barratt conclude that the effects of public constraints were less clear-cut than could have been expected, giving executives “considerable leeway to act” whenever there was at least some division among the public and political parties (2012: 231). In other cases executives simply ignored public opinion, as in Poland, where “leaders pursued a policy that contradicted public preferences” (Radziszewski and Wolfe, 2012: 69). By contrast, government decisions in France, Germany, and several other countries were seemingly driven by public opinion. This prompts the question under which conditions public opposition amounted to an actual constraint on decision-makers and, vice versa, which factors undermined its influence.

Other studies argue that economic incentives led to participation. As Randall Newnham (2008) shows, a number of smaller and medium-sized states were successfully induced by economic incentives to grant political if not military support to the US war effort in Iraq. However, as Newnham acknowledges, “economics was not the only factor motivating Coalition states” (2008: 197). Arguably, an additional factor that influenced small state behavior could have been the structure of the international system, an established realist proposition. Robert Jervis holds that numerous smaller states supported the Iraq War despite public opposition out of fear of “Franco-German” dominance. To Jervis this is not surprising, since “seeking a distant protector is a standard practice in international politics” (2005: 98). Davidson complements this with an argument that emphasizes alliance value as the primary reason behind large European powers’ decisions, whether British and Italian support for the Iraq War, or French refusal to become involved (2011: 168).

In line with analyses that emphasize material factors, Atsushi Tago finds coalition participation to be “very strongly associated” with a
country’s *power position* and military capability (Tago, 2007: 197). In a separate study, Tago analyzes coalition withdrawal from Iraq, concluding somewhat counter-intuitively that *constitutional restrictions* did not affect decision-making in this case (2009: 232). Finally and in contrast to materialist arguments, other authors suggest that constructivist accounts help explain the allegiance between several CEE countries and the United States, as in the Czech Republic and Slovakia where *norm entrepreneurs* acted as promoters of an “Atlanticist normative framework” (Mikulova, 2011: 8).

Though this review remains limited in scope, it prompts several questions for the present study and invites focus on particular aspects of the Iraq conflict. First, since the majority of studies have focused on *political* support for the Iraq War, there is a neglect of actual military participation and different degrees of military involvement. Schuster and Maier (2006) identify a relationship between partisanship and political support, but they do not investigate whether this also holds for military participation. Furia and Barratt contrast public support levels with military participation, yet their coding indicates “participation” without any discussion of the concrete deployment a country decided upon (2012: 238). A comprehensive treatment of military participation is given by Dieterich et al. (2009: 24–28), who classify contributions according to five categories. However, their coding rests on a timeframe that ends in April 2003, which means that several countries are counted as non-participants although they did contribute militarily during the post-invasion and occupation phases. Hence, the present study focuses on actual military participation in the Iraq War and it takes into account various phases at which deployment were made.

Second, with regards to public opinion it has become evident that its constraining effects on democratic leaders have likely been overstated. However, previous studies on public opinion have focused on a limited number of countries and drawn on dissimilar sources of public opinion data. The volume by Sobel et al. (2012) provides a detailed assessment of the effects of public opinion in each country study, but it is restricted to 12 cases. Schuster and Maier discuss public opinion as part of a larger framework, but their coding of public attitudes remains binary (2006: 238). Chan and Safran investigate 19 countries, yet their study entails public opinion data on ten countries only (2006: 141). Here questions arise whether similar patterns of public support and military participation can be identified for a wider group of countries and whether public attitudes toward political support mirror those on military participation.
Third, the review has further shown that authors have dissimilar conceptualizations of institutional constraints. I argue that proximate institutional structures should have a greater impact on eventual decision-making than remote configurations. If institutions truly exert a constraining effect on foreign policy, then it should be discernible where parliamentary veto rights or constitutional restrictions on the use of force are found, more so than for differences in regime type, executive-legislative relations, or electoral systems. Hence, it appears premature to suggest that “the constitutional setting to control the use of force abroad does not govern decisions,” as Tago holds (2009: 232). Likewise, it is problematic when the concept of “institutional constraints” that operate in democratic regimes is reduced to the distinction between majoritarian and PR electoral systems (cf. Chan and Safran, 2006).

Fourth, concerning partisanship evidence suggests that war participation in Iraq corresponded broadly with government ideology, even though the pattern seems to be more pronounced among Western European countries and alternative measures of partisanship have not been employed (cf. Schuster and Maier, 2006). Yet, this finding reflects the three dimensions of partisan differences outlined in Chapter 3, according to which the Iraq War would present a typical case for a conflict over which to expect partisan dispute. As an ad hoc military operation that was not authorized by the UN it was preceded by an intense and polarized political debate within and across countries (Danchev and MacMillan, 2005; Gordon and Shapiro, 2004). Arguments brought forth in favor of intervention from October 2002 to the beginning of the war where overwhelmingly based on the perceived threat of weapons of mass destruction and narrowly defined security interests. Furthermore, the use of force was not the only option available. Observers pointed out at the time that a continuation of UN sanctions and weapons inspections could have been a viable alternative to the use of force (Malone, 2006: 197). Yet, this view was rejected by those who urged for a strong stand against Iraq, including the willingness to go to war. Despite some efforts at coalition building by the United States and the United Kingdom, the Iraq War further lacked essential characteristics to be considered “multilateral” in a comprehensive sense of the term, as there was no authorization from an international organization and a minimal level of coordination among allies.

Finally, whereas prior studies have identified institutional and partisanship differences as potential explanations for the observed variance in democratic war involvement, the interaction of institutions and partisanship has gone largely unobserved. I argue that these need to
be analyzed in conjunction: institutional constraints, and especially parliamentary veto rights, presume actors that fulfill their role as veto players to the executive. And partisan politics is equally embedded in institutional frames that enable or constrain decision-making.

Explaining military participation in Iraq

This chapter investigates democracies’ military participation in the ad hoc coalition assembled for the Iraq War, including the ensuing occupation and reconstruction phases. The empirical analysis is based on the approach and method of fsQCA as introduced in Chapter 4. This section discusses coding procedure for the outcome condition military participation and the five explanatory conditions: parliamentary veto rights, constitutional restrictions, executive partisanship, public support, and military power. Before moving to these conditions, I will present the criteria that informed the case selection and specify executives, parties, and government types across the 30 democracies included in this study.

Country and cabinet selection

Countries were selected on the basis of two criteria: (1) uncontested democratic political institutions and (2) institutionalized security cooperation with other democracies. As a threshold for the first criterion, I employed the Polity IV data to exclude countries with a score of seven and below on the combined autocracy-democracy scale. Within the context of the Iraq conflict, the second criterion of institutionalized security cooperation refers to countries with EU or NATO membership, or cooperation agreements with either organization. In addition to these two criteria and to enhance cross-case comparability, a scope condition is applied, excluding countries that have a population size below one million inhabitants.

On this basis, 30 democracies from Europe, Asia-Pacific, and North America were selected for study (see Table 1.2). At the time of the Iraq crisis 23 of these countries were either members of NATO or in the final stages of accession negotiations, as the seven CEE states that joined NATO on March 29, 2004: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The study further includes Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden – four countries that retain a legal status of permanent neutrality or follow a traditional policy of non-alignment, but which have formalized their cooperation with NATO and extended their military cooperation within multilateral frameworks. With Australia, Japan, and New Zealand, this study also comprises three
“contact countries” of NATO that are not formal alliance members, but which have institutionalized their cooperation with the organization. Moreover, Australia and Japan maintain bilateral security agreements with the United States.

Table 7.1 lists the selected countries and their respective governments, partisan composition, and government type. The units of analysis are the relevant cabinets during the run-up to the Iraq War and the beginning of the occupation phase. With the exception of Estonia, Finland, and the Netherlands this was clear-cut. In Estonia, the predecessor government under Prime Minister Siim Kallas had drafted a deployment proposal, but the successor government led by Juhan Parts submitted a bill on sending troops to Iraq to parliament, which voted in favor of the deployment on May 7, 2003 (EE-MoFA, 2003a, 2003b). In Finland, parliamentary elections were held on March 16, 2003. While these resulted in a loss for the reigning coalition, the decision to abstain from any military participation had been made public prior to the elections.21 The Dutch government under Prime Minister Jan P. Balkenende was re-elected on January 22, 2003. The deployment decision was made under the new cabinet that assumed office on May 27.

While the democracies selected are identical to those analyzed for the Afghanistan conflict in the previous chapter, half of these countries saw a change in government or a re-election of the executive between 2001 and 2003. In the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Portugal, and Slovenia leaders came into power that had not been in office during the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the initiation of OEF. Meanwhile, several democratic governments were re-elected between 9/11 and the initiation of the Iraq War, as in Australia, Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Slovakia, and Sweden, whereas in the remaining 15 countries governments maintained office.

With regards to government type, 21 of the included parliamentary democracies featured government coalitions of two or more parties. Six countries further saw minority governments in power, whether by a single party as in Japan, Romania, and Sweden, or on the basis of a coalition, as in Denmark, New Zealand, and Norway. The two presidential systems experienced unified government with a Republican White House and Congress in the United States and a conservative President and Prime Minister in France. Although government type is not included in the fuzzy-set analysis proper, some of its implications vis-à-vis alternative factors will be discussed in the final section of the analysis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Executive leader</th>
<th>Since</th>
<th>Executive party/Coalition</th>
<th>Government type</th>
<th>Executive L-R</th>
<th>Right executive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>John W. Howard</td>
<td>11/2001</td>
<td>Liberal, National</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>39.25</td>
<td>0.91</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>AUT</td>
<td>Wolfgang Schüssel</td>
<td>11/2002</td>
<td>ÖVP, FPÖ</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.51</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>BEL</td>
<td>Guy Verhofstadt</td>
<td>07/1999</td>
<td>VLD, PS, PRL, SP, Eco., Aga.</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>−15.04</td>
<td>0.29</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>BGR</td>
<td>S. Sakskoburggotski</td>
<td>07/2001</td>
<td>NDSV, DPS</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>−15.33</td>
<td>0.28</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>John Chrétien</td>
<td>11/2000</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Single-party majority</td>
<td>−23.14</td>
<td>0.20</td>
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<td>Czech</td>
<td>CZE</td>
<td>Vladimir Spidla</td>
<td>07/2002</td>
<td>CSSD, KDU-CSL/US-DEU</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>−9.37</td>
<td>0.36</td>
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<td>Republic</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>DNK</td>
<td>Anders F. Rasmussen</td>
<td>11/2001</td>
<td>V, KF</td>
<td>Minority coalition</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>0.96</td>
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<td>Estonia</td>
<td>EST</td>
<td>Juhan Parts</td>
<td>04/2003a</td>
<td>RP, Ref., EME/ERL SDP, KOK, VAS, SFP, VIHR</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>0.55</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>Paavo Lipponen</td>
<td>03/1999b</td>
<td></td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>6.87</td>
<td>0.60</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>Jacques Chirac</td>
<td>05/2002</td>
<td>UMP, UDF</td>
<td>Unified governmentd</td>
<td>−12.83</td>
<td>0.32</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>DEU</td>
<td>Gerhard Schröder</td>
<td>09/2002</td>
<td>SPD, Green</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>−16.66</td>
<td>0.27</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>Kostas Simitis</td>
<td>04/2000</td>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>Single-party majority</td>
<td>−42.76</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
<td>HUN</td>
<td>Péter Medgyessy</td>
<td>05/2002</td>
<td>MSZP, SZDSZ</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
<td>IRL</td>
<td>Bertie Ahern</td>
<td>05/2002</td>
<td>FF, PD</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>−18.22</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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<td>ITA</td>
<td>Silvio Berlusconi</td>
<td>06/2001</td>
<td>FI, AN, CCD-CDU, LN, NPSI</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>53.83</td>
<td>0.96</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
<td>JPN</td>
<td>Junichiro Koizumi</td>
<td>04/2001</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Single-party minority</td>
<td>11.12</td>
<td>0.66</td>
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<td>Latvia</td>
<td>LVA</td>
<td>Einars Repše</td>
<td>11/2002</td>
<td>JL, ZZS, LPP, TB/LNNK</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>−7.92</td>
<td>0.38</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>LTU</td>
<td>Algirdas Brazauskas</td>
<td>04/2001</td>
<td>SDC, NS/SL</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>−16.58</td>
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<th>Country</th>
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<td>NLD</td>
<td>Jan P. Balkenende</td>
<td>05/2003</td>
<td>CDA, VVD, D66</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>20.05</td>
<td>0.77</td>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>NZL</td>
<td>Helen Clark</td>
<td>07/2002</td>
<td>Labour, Progr. Coal.</td>
<td>Minority coalition</td>
<td>−47.92</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>NOR</td>
<td>Kjell M. Bondevik</td>
<td>10/2001</td>
<td>H, KrF, V</td>
<td>Minority coalition</td>
<td>−3.1</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>POL</td>
<td>Leszek Miller</td>
<td>10/2001</td>
<td>SLD, PSL</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>J. M. Durão Barroso</td>
<td>04/2002</td>
<td>PSD, CDS-PP</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>ROU</td>
<td>Adrian Nastase</td>
<td>12/2000</td>
<td>PDSR</td>
<td>Single-party minority</td>
<td>−15.74</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>SVK</td>
<td>Mikulás Dzurinda</td>
<td>09/2002</td>
<td>SDKU, SMK-MKP, KDH, ANO</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>40.17</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>SVN</td>
<td>Anton Rop</td>
<td>12/2002</td>
<td>LDS2, ZLSD, SLS+SKD</td>
<td>Majority coalition</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>José M. Aznar</td>
<td>03/2000</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Single-party majority</td>
<td>11.42</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>SWE</td>
<td>Göran Persson</td>
<td>09/2002</td>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Single-party minority</td>
<td>−33.33</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>Tony Blair</td>
<td>06/2001</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Single-party majority</td>
<td>10.26</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>01/2001</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Unified government</td>
<td>52.09</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Country codes refer to the ISO format. Dates indicate the beginning of term or a cabinet change. Negative L-R values indicate left partisanship.

a The Parts cabinet submitted a bill on military participation prepared by its predecessor and approved in parliament on May 7, 2003.
b Parliamentary elections were held on March 16, 2003 resulting in a loss for the reigning coalition.
c President Chirac shared executive power with a partisan government led by Prime Minister Raffarin.
d President with a legislative majority.
e The Balkenende government was re-elected on January 22, 2003. The relevant cabinet assumed office on May 27, 2003.
f The SLD-led government under Prime Minister Miller ended the coalition with the PSL in March 2003 to form a minority government.
Military participation in the Iraq War

Given the specific characteristics of the Iraq War, I base my measurement of military participation on two criteria, relating to (1) the type of military contribution that a government approved for deployment, and (2) the time for which a deployment was authorized. The first criterion helps to distinguish between qualitatively different kinds of military contributions that range from combat forces to non-combat support units and logistical support. In order to qualify for membership in the fuzzy set military participation, a deployment has to include ground forces with combat tasks. This draws on the rationale that combat forces are exposed to higher levels of risk in getting wounded or killed than, for instance, rear support units like engineers that reconstruct bridges or medical staff working in a field hospital. Evidence indicates that politicians are sensitive to such risks, as they seek to avert political losses and electoral punishment by a public that is widely assumed to be casualty-averse. Studies have demonstrated repeatedly that elites’ fear of casualty-aversion, whether justified or not, influences decision-making in foreign and security policy (Baum and Potter, 2008; Schörnig, 2007; Smith, 2005). Thus, leaders tend to emphasize the nature of military deployments and caveats placed on mandates, indicating a clear distinction between combat operations on the one hand and non-combat and humanitarian tasks on the other. This also indicates, however, that decision-makers can have incentives to misrepresent their country’s military involvement. Hence, in order to cross-validate the evidence that informs my coding of military participation, I employ a range of sources that includes unclassified and recently declassified government documents, independent reports, newspaper articles, academic studies, and other publicly available information.

The second criterion relates to changes in the legal situation and the nature of the conflict as the war in Iraq evolved. Rather than making a binary distinction between war fighting and reconstruction phases, where only involvement in the former would be counted toward participation, my conception of military participation accounts for different stages of the Iraq conflict, comprising a larger timeframe than the 44 days from the invasion of Iraq on March 19, 2003, to the declared “end of major combat operations” on May 1, 2003. I distinguish four phases: (a) the invasion of Iraq in March, (b) the post-invasion phase until the end of May, (c) the occupation phase until October, and (d) the ensuing reconstruction phase. These coincide roughly with consecutive UN resolutions that clarified the legal status of the occupation and called for international support in the reconstruction of Iraq. Resolution 1483
of May 22, 2003, recognized the status of the United States and the United Kingdom as *de facto* occupying powers and thus marks the shift from post-invasion to the occupation phase. In turn, the “Multinational Force Iraq” was acknowledged by resolution 1511 of October 16, 2003, signifying the beginning of the reconstruction phase. Hence, the fuzzy-set coding assigns higher values to earlier deployments to account for the sequential shift in the nature of the conflict from war fighting to reconstruction.

On the basis of these criteria, countries are coded from 1 to 0 on a fuzzy scale, indicating a range from full membership in the set of countries that participated militarily to full non-membership. At one end of the fuzzy scale are countries that participated with combat forces from the invasion phase onward, notwithstanding different levels of involvement. This includes the United States, United Kingdom, Poland, and Australia (fuzzy score 1.0). The next group contains countries that participated with combat forces, but who deployed troops after the invasion. Here, the sequence of deployments justifies qualitative distinctions. Spain, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Latvia made contributions in April and May (fuzzy score 0.9). A lower coding was given to Denmark, Estonia, Italy, Netherlands, and Romania, as these countries deployed troops in June and August, during the occupation phase (fuzzy score 0.8).

In contrast to the aforementioned, three groups of countries provided non-combat support. The Czech Republic made an early deployment in May, but restricted its contribution to a field hospital and military police, while Hungary sent ground transportation units in July (fuzzy score 0.4). Slovakia and Norway deployed in June and July, but their contribution of mine clearance units led to a lower coding (fuzzy score 0.3). New Zealand, Portugal, Japan, and Canada provided non-combat support with a focus on reconstruction (fuzzy score 0.2). In contrast, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, and Slovenia provided no direct military contribution, but offered logistical help by opening bases, providing facilities, or granting overflight rights (fuzzy score 0.1). Finally, three out of 30 countries did not contribute to the Iraq War in any function: Austria, Finland, and Sweden (fuzzy score 0).

Table 7.2 displays military participation across countries, including the type of contribution, time of deployment, troop numbers, and the resulting fuzzy-set coding for the outcome. While troop numbers indicate the relative size of a deployment, it should be noted that personnel levels fluctuate and that calculations vary depending on whether troops based outside of Iraq (as in Kuwait or Saudi-Arabia) and non-military staff are included. Hence, these are reported to provide additional
Table 7.2  Military participation in the Iraq War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MP</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Deployment</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Invasion</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>03-2003</td>
<td>Army, naval, air force units</td>
<td>150,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>03-2003</td>
<td>Army, naval, air force units</td>
<td>46,150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>03-2003</td>
<td>Special forces, mechanized infantry</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>03-2003</td>
<td>Army, naval, air force units</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>Post-invasion</td>
<td>Marine infantry, support units</td>
<td>04-2003</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>04-2003</td>
<td>Infantry, logistics, medical officers</td>
<td>130</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>05-2003</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>485</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>05-2003</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>145</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Infantry battle group, helicopters</td>
<td>06-2003</td>
<td>410</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>06-2003</td>
<td>Infantry platoon</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>07-2003</td>
<td>mechanized infantry, helicopters</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>08-2003</td>
<td>Infantry, marine battle group, helicopters</td>
<td>1,345</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>08-2003</td>
<td>Infantry battle group, military police</td>
<td>730</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Non-combat</td>
<td>Military field hospital, military police</td>
<td>05-2003</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>07-2003</td>
<td>Ground transportation</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>07-2003</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>07-2003</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Reconstruction</td>
<td>Engineers, reconstruction</td>
<td>09-2003</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>11-2003</td>
<td>Military police</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>02-2004</td>
<td>Reconstruction, airlift</td>
<td>960</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>06-2003</td>
<td>Airlift</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MP</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Deployment</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Logistical</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Overflight rights</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Overflight rights</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Overflight and basing rights</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Overflight and basing rights, port access</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Overflight and basing rights</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Overflight rights</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: MP is the fuzzy set military participation. Troop numbers indicate peak deployment levels not counting rotations.*

*Sources: See chapter notes for a detailed documentation.*
information, but the coding rests primarily on the type of contribution and the time of deployment.

**Parliamentary veto rights**

In terms of institutional conditions, the analysis includes parliamentary veto rights and constitutional restrictions, which are treated separately because they are governed by different causal mechanisms: whereas legislative rights can amount to a veto point under distinct preference distributions, constitutional restrictions form a structural veto point to military deployments regardless of the preference distribution in parliament or among the public.

Parliamentary veto rights are operationalized on a dimension that ranges from obligatory legislative approval of all deployments decisions (ex ante veto, fuzzy score 1.0), to the complete absence of parliamentary involvement in decision-making (fuzzy score 0). Hence, the central criterion for set membership is the presence of a parliamentary veto right (fuzzy score above 0.5). Regulations vary in their extent of comprehensiveness, from a restricted ex ante veto that applies only to operations outside treaty obligations or above a certain personnel threshold to mere ex post rights of information.

My coding of parliamentary veto rights draws primarily on the ParlCon data set (Wagner et al., 2010). ParlCon categorizes countries’ parliamentary control level in terms of the presence or absence of an ex ante veto right, which matches with my primary coding criterion. In order to further distinguish degrees in veto rights for the fuzzy-set coding and to complement data on countries that are not covered in ParlCon, I draw on a number of country studies (Baker and Christopher, 2009; Besselink, 2003; Jensen, 2003; Kowalski, 2003; Ku and Jacobson, 2003b; Luther, 2003) and two additional surveys of parliamentary war powers (Born and Hänggi, 2005; Dieterich et al., 2010).

During the observed timeframe of the Iraq War, ten countries have parliaments with an ex ante veto on all military deployments (fuzzy score 1.0). This includes six EU-15 member states and four CEE countries: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, and Sweden, as well as Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and Lithuania. While the majority of former communist countries established strong parliamentary authority during their democratic consolidation, some of these states later curbed parliamentary involvement to accommodate the NATO accession process. This shows in the classification of Bulgaria and Romania, who receive the coding for a restricted ex ante veto (fuzzy score 0.8) due to newly adopted legislation prior to the Iraq War. Other countries with a restricted ex ante
Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict

veto include the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia.\textsuperscript{30} In turn, Italy and Japan feature a weak \textit{ex ante} veto and an \textit{ex post} veto, respectively, resulting in a coding of 0.6.\textsuperscript{31} In the Netherlands no formal veto right exists, despite traditional parliamentary involvement and information prior to military deployments (fuzzy score 0.4). In Belgium, Canada, Norway, Poland, Portugal, and the United States military deployments are primarily a matter of the executive, but parliament has to be informed within a certain timeframe (fuzzy score 0.2). Finally, countries with an executive prerogative over foreign policy comprise Australia, France, Greece, New Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdom (fuzzy score 0).\textsuperscript{32}

\textbf{Constitutional restrictions}

With regards to constitutional restrictions, three sets of constraints are distinguished that relate to legislation that interdicts or limits military participation either (a) on the basis of international law, (b) outside predefined organizational frameworks, or (c) exceeding a set of permissible tasks. The first set of constraints can range from a rigorous requirement of UN authorization to directives that bind the military to act in accordance with international law broadly conceived. The second set relates to a requirement concerning the involvement of multilateral organizational frameworks, whereas the third group refers to restrictions in terms of permissible tasks for the armed forces to delimit, for instance, offensive combat involvement.

Constitutional restrictions are operationalized along a dimension that ranges from comprehensive restrictions on military deployments (fuzzy score 1.0) to the complete absence of relevant constraints (fuzzy score 0). The central criterion to distinguish whether a country is rather in the fuzzy set of constitutional restrictions (receive a fuzzy score above 0.5), or whether it is situated rather outside that set (receive a fuzzy score below 0.5) is the presence or absence of constitutional provisions that prohibit or severely restrict military participation.

For the Iraq War, all three types of constitutional restrictions are expected to be individually sufficient to prevent military participation. First, due to the evident violation of international law and the authority of the Security Council as a pretext to the invasion, governments from countries with a rigorous requirement of UN authorization of the use of force were severely constrained in their decision on whether or not to become involved militarily. Second, as an \textit{ad hoc} military coalition that was formed outside existing organizational frameworks such as NATO or the UN, the invasion of Iraq precludes any countries from participation that require specific multilateral organizational settings. Third,
due to the offensive nature of OIF and the explicit aim to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein, countries with a restricted scope of permissive operations were incapable to participate militarily with their own forces. The measure of constitutional restrictions draws on primary and secondary sources, including constitutional documents, legislative bills, government reports, and academic studies. Secondary sources were particularly valuable in interpreting constitutional restrictions against specific national backgrounds.

Countries with wide-ranging constitutional restrictions (fuzzy score 1.0) comprise Austria, Finland, Ireland, Japan, and Sweden. Each of these countries is restricted in at least two areas. The Japanese constitution prohibits the use of force except for self-defense purposes (Article 9) and is generally interpreted to require UN authorization prior to any dispatch of its forces (Miyagi, 2009; Shibata, 2003). Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden require multilateral organizational frameworks and restrict the scope of permissible tasks to peace support operations. Finland and Ireland formally prohibit operations without UN authorization, while Austria is constitutionally allowed to participate only in operations under UN, OSCE, or EU auspices. Sweden has adapted its legal framework in recent years, but the general requirement of a UN mandate remains (Jakobsen, 2006: 183–185; Wunderlich, 2013).

Countries with considerable constitutional restrictions include Germany and Norway (fuzzy score 0.8). Article 24 (2) of the German Grundgesetz prohibits military operations outside “the sufficiently dense political and organizational framework of an international treaty-regime” (Nolte, 2003: 352). Hence, participation in ad hoc coalitions as the invasion of Iraq would be problematic to justify in constitutional terms. Norway, like other Nordic countries, made steps toward waiving an explicit requirement of UN authorization. Nevertheless, constitutional practice demands that a military operation have “the highest degree of political and legal legitimacy possible,” a criterion that was not fulfilled in Iraq, as the Norwegian government stated upon the launch of the war (Jakobsen, 2006: 151).

In contrast to the aforementioned seven countries, the majority of the observed democracies are characterized by, at most, minor constitutional restrictions. These include either a requirement of military operations to be in accordance with international law broadly conceived or some limitation on the purposes for which the armed forces can be sent abroad. Countries with minor restrictions (fuzzy score 0.2) include Belgium, Canada, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, and Romania. The remaining 13 countries have no
relevant constitutional restrictions and are coded accordingly (Ku and Jacobson, 2003a; Nolte, 2003; Wagner et al., 2010).

**Executive partisanship**

The measurement of partisanship applied here reflects the position of a country’s executive on a left-right scale in political space, drawing on the extensive research from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP, Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006). The CMP employs a qualitative coding of statements from party election programs along policy categories associated with right parties, such as strong defense, free enterprise and traditional moral values, or with left parties, such as peaceful international cooperation, welfare state expansion, and economic regulation (Budge and Klingemann, 2001). When compared to alternative measures of partisanship, such as approaches that are based on party-family affiliation or expert judgment, a specific advantage of the CMP is that it provides meaningful indicators of cross-national variation, whereas alternatives can be misleading when employed for comparative purposes.

In my calculation of partisan positions I follow an approach suggested by Laver and Garry (2000: 628) that determines the “substantive” policy position for each party. In contrast to the original CMP calculation, this approach discounts the salience a party places on a category in favor of its “pure” policy position, dividing the CMP left-right values by the sum of left-right references. These the resulting CMP values are transformed into fuzzy sets by using the direct method of calibration. This procedure entails three qualitative breakpoints that indicate full set membership, the point of maximum ambiguity, and full set non-membership. On the basis of a scale of substantive CMP values that ranges from -100 (all left statements) to 100 (all right statements), full membership in the fuzzy set right executive is defined as any CMP value equal to or above 50. In turn, values equal to or below -50 are defined as indicating full non-membership, whereas 0 marks a natural crossover point. Table 7.1 shows the calculated CMP values and calibrated fuzzy values for each party or coalition across the 30 democracies selected. The fuzzy values indicate that fifteen out of 30 cabinets are considered right executives to varying extents (fuzzy values above 0.50), while six of these are almost fully in the respective set (fuzzy values greater than 0.70). In turn, ten governments are almost fully in the set left executive (fuzzy value below 0.30).

**Public support**

Liberalist arguments suggest that democratic leaders face public constraints in their conduct of foreign policy, particularly when it comes to
questions of war involvement. On this basis, public support is expected to be a necessary condition for military participation, while the absence of public support should be sufficient for military non-participation. If critics who question the influence of public opinion on policy-making are correct, however, then there should be no consistent patterns involving public support or opposition. Yet, contrary to these diametrically opposed positions, evidence suggests that public opinion should be examined in combination with additional factors, as reasoned in Chapter 3. I argue that one factor that should alter outcomes in combination with public opinion are parliamentary veto rights. Apart from this specific combination of conditions, I conceive of public opinion as an INUS condition for military participation and non-participation, respectively.

My estimate of public support for the war against Iraq is based on selected opinion polls across the 30 democracies included in this study. The “International Crisis Survey” conducted by EOS Gallup Europe covers all 25 European states that are contained in my sample. For the remaining countries, I draw on the “Iraq 2003 Poll” by Gallup International, which encompasses comparable data for Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. For Japan, I refer to poll data published in the January 27 edition of Asahi Shimbun and reported in Midford (2006: 29).

Fieldwork for the selected polls took place in the timeframe January 14–27, 2003. Hence, the opinion polls were conducted at a time when war against Iraq was looming but not inexorable, as the flurry of diplomatic initiatives showed. Question wording is largely similar across the selected polls. The EOS Gallup Europe survey asked respondents whether or not they would consider it justified that their “country participates in a military intervention in Iraq (...) without a preliminary decision of the United Nations.” The Gallup International poll asked respondents under which circumstances they would support “military action against Iraq.” Here, only those responses that were in favor of military action “unilaterally by America and its allies” are counted as public support. The Asahi Shimbun poll is more general and inquired whether respondents supported or opposed a potential United States’ attack on Iraq.33

The fuzzy set public support is constructed to reflect the extent to which citizens approved a potential military involvement of their own country in a war against Iraq. I calculate fuzzy set membership values using the direct method of calibration. Since roughly 10 per cent of the respondents gave no answer or were undecided, the point of maximum ambiguity is at 45 per cent public support – a point at which an equal share of respondents were opposed to military involvement. Hence, I define three qualitative breakpoints: countries with 75 per cent
supporters are considered fully in the set public support (fuzzy score 1.0), the cut-off point of maximum ambiguity is set at 45 per cent public support (fuzzy score 0.5), and countries with less than 15 per cent supporters are considered fully outside of the set (fuzzy score 0). Table 7.3 displays the resultant fuzzy values, the share of public support, and the opinion polls that inform the estimate.

Public support for military involvement in Iraq did not reach a majority in any of the included democracies during the observed timeframe. While not amounting to a majority or even a plurality, fairly high levels of support were found in the United States (33%) and the United Kingdom (27%) as the initiators of the war plans, as well as among the Central European states Slovakia (41%), the Czech Republic (30%), and, to a lesser extent, in Poland (21%). These were followed by Japan (20%) and Italy (18%). Among the remaining countries public support ranged from 16 per cent, as in Portugal and Romania, to 6 per cent in Bulgaria.

It should be noted, however, that the selected measure reflects public opinion toward military action without UN sanction. When respondents were asked about their attitudes toward military action with UN consent, support levels increased significantly. Yet, given the political

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>Public support</th>
<th>Poll</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>Public support</th>
<th>Poll</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>GEICS</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>GEICS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>33.0</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>10.0</td>
<td>GIIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>GEICS</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>10.0</td>
<td>GEICS</td>
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<tr>
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<td>21.0</td>
<td>GEICS</td>
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<td>GEICS</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>8.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>13.0</td>
<td>GEICS</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>8.0</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13.0</td>
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<td>GEICS</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
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<td>7.0</td>
<td>GEICS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>13.0</td>
<td>GEICS</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>GEICS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
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<td>12.0</td>
<td>GIIP</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>GEICS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: S is the fuzzy set public support for military action against Iraq.
circumstances at the time, UN consent for military action against Iraq was highly improbable.

Military power
This condition is based on burden-sharing arguments derived from collective action theory that expect powerful states to make disproportionately large contributions, while weak states have strong incentives to ride free or limit their military involvement to nominal contributions. It follows that military power is expected to be an element in combinations of conditions that are sufficient for military participation, whereas military weakness is predicted to be present in combinations of conditions sufficient for military non-participation. Yet, before these general hypotheses can be applied to the Iraq conflict, first the collective good in question and the relative material strength of the countries involved need to be specified.

If public justifications of the war against Iraq are taken at face value, then the collective good at stake entailed the removal of an imminent threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. This interpretation reflects the US position as articulated by Secretary Powell in his address to the Council on February 5, 2003. In addition to this collective good, several private goods arguably affected government decision-making on whether or not to become part of the coalition against Iraq. Studies have shown that the US government used a “remarkably diverse array of economic instruments to build an alliance” in Iraq, including the prospect of reconstruction contracts, the relocation of US military bases, preferential trade agreements, direct foreign investment, and an enhanced repayment of Iraqi debts (Newnham, 2008: 198). For example, in terms of economic benefits for allied countries, the United States started negotiations over a free trade agreement with Australia on March 18, 2003 – a day before the war against Iraq was begun (Shaw, 2003). When the agreement was signed in 2004, Australian Trade Minister Mark Vaile did not hesitate to draw the connection between security cooperation and economics, praising the contract as “the commercial equivalent to the ANZUS treaty” (Wilkinson, 2004; US-TR, 2004). A few months later, upon congressional ratification of the treaty, President Bush remarked notably, “The United States and Australia have never been closer. We’re allies in the war on terror. We’re partners in the effort to help democracy take root in Afghanistan and Iraq and throughout the world” (US-WH, 2004). Among CEE countries, political and military support for the Iraq War also raised the prospect of economic benefits. Bulgaria and Romania received a “business development mission” from the US Department of Commerce in July 2003, led by Deputy Secretary
Samuel Bodman, which sought to “help U.S. companies explore business opportunities in Romania and Bulgaria.” While reconstruction contracts within Iraq were predominantly given to US companies, the official lists of contractors and subcontractors for the fiscal years 2003 and 2004 also include companies from the United Kingdom, Australia, Netherlands, Italy, and Spain – all countries that supported the United States in Iraq (US-DoC, 2003, 2004).

Hence, with regards to the Iraq case the collective good argument is undermined by two factors. First, considerable disagreement existed about the collective good at stake. While the US position was supported politically by 16 of the observed countries, the remaining 13 democracies were skeptical if not in outright disagreement with the American threat assessment. Second, due to the presence of private goods, particularly for smaller and economically less developed countries, free-riding incentives were effectively negated for many governments. This implies that the collective action hypotheses should only apply to a subset of countries, namely those in the “coalition of the willing,” and even among those free riding should not be the norm, due to the prospect of side payments.

Irrespective of these caveats, the fuzzy set military power is constructed on the basis of absolute military expenditure data for 2002, as listed for each country in the widely used reference *The Military Balance* (IISS, 2003). Raw values were standardized and transformed into a fuzzy set using the direct method of calibration. Full membership in the fuzzy set military power is defined as any z-score equal to or above 0.5 standard deviations. In turn, full non-membership reflects z-scores equal to or below -0.5 standard deviations, while 0 marks a natural crossover point.

Table A.5 in the Appendix shows absolute military expenditures, standardized scores, and the resultant fuzzy set military power. When compared to the IISS data for 2002 that was used in the previous chapter on Afghanistan, it becomes apparent that the already substantial gap between the United States and the other democracies included in the sample has widened further, reflected in an increase of 40 billion USD in American military expenditure that equals the total amount of France, as the country with the second largest defense outlay. While others have also increased their budgets, the relative distribution has become more skewed toward the US, as indicated by the standardized scores.

**Fuzzy-set analysis**

The fuzzy-set analysis entails separate fsQCA procedures for the investigation of the outcome and its negation. Before analyzing sufficient
conditions, however, it is advised to test for necessary conditions. These are calculated on the basis of distinct measures of fuzzy-set consistency and coverage, as outlined in Chapter 4. This procedure reveals that the absence of constitutional restrictions (~C) is a necessary condition for military participation, at 0.94 consistency and 0.64 coverage. This lends support to the hypothesis that military participation requires a lack of constitutional restrictions (H2b) and implies, vice versa, that substantive constitutional restrictions amount to a structural veto against military participation. The calculations further show that the absence of public support (~S) is necessary for both outcomes, at 0.99 consistency for military non-participation and 0.97 consistency for military participation. Yet, given near unanimous public opposition to the Iraq War across the observed democracies (Table 7.3), this finding is far from surprising. As the respective coverage scores of 0.50 and 0.55 indicate, the inferential value of this necessary condition is rather limited.

**Military participation in the Iraq War**

Which conditions led democracies to contribute to the Iraq War? Are pathways toward war participation congruent with suggested explanations of democratic war involvement? To address these questions, the fuzzy-set analysis proceeds through several steps, carried out with the fsQCA software.

Table 7.4 displays the truth table for the outcome and explanatory conditions. Since the model entails five conditions, the resulting truth table contains $2^5 = 32$ rows. Note that only 12 rows contain empirical cases, whereas the others are logical remainders that represent combinations of conditions that can be included in an intermediate solution if one can make plausible assumptions about their potential outcomes. Each country’s membership in the respective conjunction of conditions is given in brackets. Spain, for instance, holds a membership of 0.66 in the conjunction given in the third row, which comprises the absence of military power, parliamentary veto rights, constitutional restrictions, and public support, combined with the presence of a right executive. The consistency column indicates the extent to which the fuzzy-set values of all cases in a conjunction are sufficient for the outcome military participation. Based on the consistency scores, a cut-off point is determined to separate combinations that pass fuzzy-set sufficiency from those that do not. Here, I decide for a consistency threshold of 0.84. Thus, all configurations below Row 5 are excluded from the ensuing minimization procedure.35

In the next step, sufficient combinations of conditions for the outcome are identified, using Boolean algebra to minimize the truth table.
Employing the Quine-McCluskey algorithm, the fsQCA software calculates three solution terms that vary in their treatment of logical remainders. Table 7.5 shows the previously identified necessary conditions, absence of constitutional restrictions (\(\neg C\)) and public opposition (\(\neg S\)), and the three solution terms with their constituent conjunctions of conditions that are sufficient for the outcome military participation. The bottom of the table displays the results for military non-participation, to be discussed below.

As expected based on the analysis of necessity, all paths toward military participation contain the absence of constitutional restrictions (\(\neg C\)). It is thus a “necessary element of a sufficient set” of conditions (NESS condition; Wright, 1988: 1019). The complex solution further entails public opposition (\(\neg S\)) as a NESS condition, which is implicated also in the other solution terms, but not part of the minimized formulae. The solution terms demonstrate that two consistent pathways toward military participation exist. The first entails a right executive (E) and the absence of constitutional restrictions (\(\neg C\)), as indicated in Path 3. The second comprises the absence of military power (\(\neg M\)) and

---

**Table 7.4 Truth table for military participation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>MP</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>USA (.77), GBR (.65)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>AUS (.76), ESP (.66), NLD (.60), PRT (.60), POL (.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>DNK (.84), SVK (.60), SVN (.58), EST (.55)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>LTU (.73), BGR (.72), ROU (.72), HUN (.69), CZE (.64), LVA (.62)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>NOR (.55)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>FRA (.68)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>JPN (.60)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>FIN (.60), AUT (.51)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0.58</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>SWE (.82), IRL (.75)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.5  Iraq: Analytical results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Conjunction</th>
<th>Relation</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Necessary condition</td>
<td>~C</td>
<td>← MP</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~S</td>
<td>← MP</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parsimonious solution</td>
<td>1 ~C*E</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 V*~C</td>
<td>→ MP</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate solution</td>
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<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 ~M<em>V</em>~C</td>
<td>→ MP</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex solution</td>
<td>5 ~C<em>~S</em>E</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 ~M<em>V</em>~C*~S</td>
<td>→ MP</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessary condition</td>
<td>~S</td>
<td>← ~MP</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parsimonious solution</td>
<td>7 C</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 ~V*~E</td>
<td>→ ~MP</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate solution</td>
<td>9 V<em>C</em>~S</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 ~V<em>~S</em>~E</td>
<td>→ ~MP</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex solution</td>
<td>11 V<em>C</em>~S</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 ~M<em>C</em>~S*~E</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13 ~V<em>~C</em>~S*~E</td>
<td>→ ~MP</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


constitutional restrictions (~C) with parliamentary veto rights (V), as in Path 4. This lends some support to the partisan argument and the expectation that small powers without constitutional restrictions have had incentives to become involved militarily in the Iraq War.

To demonstrate the validity of the results and the empirical pattern across cases, I construct an x-y plot. Figure 7.1 shows the position of each country, tracing membership in the complex solution term against membership in the outcome. It demonstrates that the complex solution provides an almost sufficient condition for military participation since
Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict

A large majority of countries are placed above the main diagonal. The x-y plot shows four distinct groups of cases. Countries in the lower left corner hold low membership values in both the outcome and the solution and can thus be considered substantially irrelevant for the analysis of sufficiency. By contrast, of the 30 democracies under review, 12 hold membership in the solution term (Zone 1-3), eight of which can be considered typical cases (Zone 1). Arguably, Denmark could be included in this group of countries, despite its position below the main diagonal as it shows the outcome and holds substantial membership in the solution term. In contrast, three deviant cases are placed in Zone 3, which are countries with membership in the solution term but that do not show the expected outcome. In other words, based on their political and institutional configuration, one would have expected Portugal, Slovenia, and Slovakia to contribute militarily to the Iraq War beyond their actual involvement, which ranged from logistical support in the case of Slovenia to the deployment of mine clearance units by the Slovak government. Yet, as the x-y plot also shows, these countries barely hold membership in the solution term, which renders them somewhat less

Figure 7.1 Iraq: Military participation and solution term
“deviant” cases. Finally, Zone 4 entails four countries that show the outcome, but which do not hold membership in the solution term. This implies that alternative explanations might better account for the observed pattern in these particular cases.

**Military non-participation in the Iraq War**

Under which conditions did democracies decide against military involvement? To which extent do patterns of abstention differ from those governments that participated in the Iraq War? To address these questions, the procedure outlined in the previous section is applied to the outcome military non-participation. The first step entails the construction of the truth table, which comprises the same conditions as in the preceding analysis and thus also contains $2^5 (M, V, C, E, P) = 32$ rows. Furthermore, each country’s membership scores in the configurations of conditions are identical to the values reported in Table 7.4. However, because the analysis is now geared toward the negation of the outcome, consistency scores inevitably differ. Table 7.6 displays the truth table for military non-participation. It is apparent that seven rows pass the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>MP</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Countries</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>ITA (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>USA (.77), GBR (.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>AUS (.76), ESP (.66), NLD (.60), PRT (.60), POL (.52)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>DNK (.84), SVK (.60), SVN (.58), EST (.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>LTU (.73), BGR (.72), ROU (.72), HUN (.69), CZE (.64), LVA (.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>NOR (.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>FRA (.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>JPN (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.58</td>
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<td>FIN (.60), AUT (.51)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0.58</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>DEU (.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>SWE (.82), IRL (.75)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

conventional threshold for consistency (>0.75), while the first five rows are highly consistent with values equal to or above 0.90. To retain a large empirical base for the ensuing minimization procedure, I set the consistency threshold at 0.76, which includes the first seven rows of the truth table.

In the next step, the truth table is minimized to identify sufficient combinations of conditions. This procedure yields an intermediate solution term that comprises two paths toward military non-participation (Table 7.5). Path 9 comprises parliamentary veto rights, constitutional restrictions, and public opposition ($V*C*~S$), while Path 10 combines left partisanship with an absence of parliamentary veto rights and public opposition ($~V*~S*~E$). Both paths are characterized by high unique coverage values, indicating distinct patterns with little empirical overlap. These add up to an intermediate solution at 0.87 consistency and 0.74 coverage. The identified pattern is also found in the complex and parsimonious solution terms, albeit at different levels of detail. The former identifies a third path, which has a large empirical overlap with the other configurations, as indicated by a low unique coverage. Nevertheless, the complex solution is the most consistent, and thus most robust, of the three terms.

To illustrate the fit of the complex solution term for military non-participation, another x-y plot is constructed. Figure 7.2 shows that the complex solution term is near sufficient for the outcome since almost all cases are placed above the main diagonal and there are no deviant cases. Twelve democracies hold membership in the solution terms and all of them show the expected outcome. Ireland is located just below the main diagonal, which reduces the solution’s consistency score but does not affect the theoretical argument. While there are no deviant cases, five countries show the outcome but are not explained by either of the two paths, as indicated by their location in the upper left corner (Zone 6). Though this does not affect consistency, as the countries hold low membership values in the solution term, it reduces the coverage score.

**Analytical findings**

How do the analytical results square with theoretical expectations outlined earlier? Five key findings can be derived from the analysis. First, the identified paths lend strong support to both hypotheses on constitutional restrictions, as developed in Chapter 3 ($H_{2a}, H_{2b}$). Governments with legal constraints on the scope of permissible military operations have, without exception, refrained from military involvement in Iraq.
Constitutional restrictions were thus sufficient for military non-participation. *Vice versa*, the absence of constitutional restrictions was found to be a necessary condition for military participation and as a NESS condition (Wright, 1988) it was part of all sufficient conjunctions for that outcome. These findings contradict claims made in previous studies, which held that constitutional settings do not constrain decision-making on the use of force (Tago, 2009: 232).

Evidently, the impact of constitutional restrictions was due to the controversial legal status of a war that was not authorized by the Security Council and which was conducted in an *ad hoc* coalition framework outside existing multilateral structures. Simply put, the Iraq War was not a military operation that the governments of Ireland, Sweden, or Germany could have considered taking part in without raising serious constitutional controversy at home. Constitutional problems are exemplified by the Japanese case: the conservative government led by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi aimed to find a way to contribute to the Iraq War in support of its American ally, but was markedly...
Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict

constrained by legal concerns. Eventually, the Koizumi government deployed non-combat “reconstruction assistance” when the UN passed authorizing resolutions during the post-conflict phase and the operation could be sold to the domestic opposition as a peace support mission (Miyagi, 2009).

Second, the analysis reveals the conditions under which partisanship led to military involvement. As expected, left and right partisanship were in themselves neither necessary nor sufficient for either outcome. Instead it has been shown that these constitute INUS conditions, confirming initial hypotheses (H3a, H3b). Left partisanship was found to be an element in combinations of conditions that consistently led toward military non-participation. Even when there were no institutional constraints, as in parliamentary veto rights or constitutional restrictions, left partisanship led toward non-involvement in the Iraq War. Empirically, this applies to Canada, Greece, New Zealand, and Belgium. For instance, New Zealand’s Labour Prime Minister Helen Clark stated throughout the crisis her demand for UN authorization, a multilateral framework, and a serious attempt to pursue alternative modes of conflict resolution as prerequisites before the use of force would even be considered by her government (NZ-HoR, 2003a, 2003b). By contrast, right government and a lack of constitutional restrictions were sufficient for war involvement in Iraq. Countries with high membership in this path include, among others, Australia, Spain, and the United States. Again, the difference becomes evident comparing Australia’s Prime Minister John Howard to his counterpart in New Zealand. While both executives operated under similar institutional structures, Australia’s Liberal/National coalition under Howard supported the war plan from the beginning and deployed troops during the build-up for the war as early as February 2003, which prompted fierce domestic opposition and a vote of no confidence in the upper house (BBC, 2003a).

Third, the empirical results indicate that the parliamentary peace hypothesis must be rejected (H1b). Prior studies suggest that parliamentary veto rights should serve as an effective constraint against war involvement, especially when combined with widespread public opposition to the use of force (Dieterich et al., 2009). Accordingly, one would have expected to find evidence for the interaction between parliamentary veto rights and public opposition (V*~S) as a mechanism that creates a veto point against military participation. While this pattern was found empirically (Path 9 & Path 11, Table 7.5), it intersects with constitutional restrictions and is thus overdetermined with regards to explaining military non-participation. Countries with membership in the parliamentary veto
point configuration that did not participate militarily in Iraq include Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Japan, and Sweden. However, all of these countries are geared toward non-participation on the basis of their constitutional restrictions. Furthermore, countries such as Italy, Denmark, Bulgaria, and several others also hold membership in \((V^* \sim S)\) but for them the expected mechanism has seemingly failed to produce a veto point against military involvement. At the least, this casts doubt on the suggested causal argument.

Fourth, contrary to long held views in attitude research on foreign policy and assumptions about democratic politics at large, the analysis demonstrates that public constraints did not serve as an effective check on decision-makers. Hence the hypothesis that public support is a necessary element for military participation is rejected \((H_{4a})\). There is no disconfirming evidence for the opposite claim \((H_{4b})\), but due to the limited variation in public opinion across the observed democracies this should not be taken as a substantiation of that hypothesis. This finding supports prior studies’ observation that many governments had substantial discretion on the question of war involvement, irrespective of public sentiments (Furia and Barratt, 2012).

Finally, regarding alliance behavior, the results indicate that traditional collective action arguments are of lesser value in the Iraq case. While free riding should have predominated among smaller and economically weaker countries, the underlying incentives were effectively negated for many states due to executive preferences or the presence of private goods, as prior studies have shown (Newnham, 2008). Therefore, both of the general hypotheses about military power are rejected \((H_{5a}, H_{5b})\). In fact, a consistent pathway toward military participation was identified that specifically comprised small powers with parliamentary veto rights and no constitutional restrictions. Empirically, this contains Denmark and nine countries from Central and Eastern Europe, the majority of which participated militarily in the Iraq War (Table 7.4, Row 4 & 5).

**Conclusion**

This chapter departed from the observation that democratic governments responded in different ways to the Iraq crisis as it evolved in the months preceding the war and after its initiation – while some decided to join the *ad hoc* coalition, others opposed the war plans or chose not to deploy forces to Iraq, whereas still others sent military units during the occupation and reconstruction phases that followed upon the invasion.
In an attempt to account for this variance, this chapter applied fsQCA to explain military participation and non-participation in the Iraq War based on an analysis of 30 democracies. The results demonstrate the utility of an integrated theoretical framework that draws on institutions, preferences, and structure to explain democratic variance in conflict behavior. In sum, three key findings with theoretical import can be derived from the foregoing fuzzy-set analyses. I will discuss these in turn before addressing limitations of the present study and outlining prospects for future research.

First, democracies that retain constitutional restrictions on the scope of permissible military operations have, without exception, abstained from military participation. While specific regulations vary, requirements of UN authorization and multilateral frameworks effectively constrained seven of the countries under study. This book's approach departs from previous studies on legislative war powers by separating parliamentary veto rights from constitutional restrictions. I argue that these two forms of institutional constraints are governed by different causal mechanisms. While the former is dependent upon exogenous preference distributions, the latter presents a structural constraint that is difficult to overcome in the absence of a stable political consensus across parties. Second, the focus on partisanship revealed distinct cross-country patterns, most notably among Western democracies. For those countries that participated in the war the predominant pattern combined a right executive with the absence of both types of institutional constraints. An unconstrained right executive was found, for instance, in Australia, the United States, and Spain. By contrast, countries that did not participate in the war were either institutionally constrained or had left governments. Third, the parliamentary peace hypothesis was rejected. While prior studies suggest that parliamentary veto rights should serve as an effective constraint against war involvement when combined with widespread public opposition to the use of force, no clear-cut evidence was found for the operation of this causal mechanism. In part this was because parliamentary veto rights intersected with constitutional restrictions and hence the observed outcome was often overdetermined. More important, however, was the finding that several countries showed the required causal configuration but it evidently failed to produce a veto point against war involvement in Iraq.

While the present study identifies distinct patterns in the interaction between institutions, preferences, and structure, its conclusions do not apply equally to all countries under study. For instance, it is apparent from the analysis that partisan patterns are less reliable for Central and
Eastern European countries. This could imply that the left-right dimension, which has proven meaningful in other regions, does not capture the structure of political competition within CEE countries. A viable alternative could be conceptions of partisanship that are not based on manifesto data. However, previous studies have also reported an absence of reliable partisan patterns among CEE countries, based on a coding that drew on party family affiliation and expert judgment and thus independent of the CMP data (cf. Schuster and Maier, 2006).

Though its theoretical framework integrates several distinct explanatory approaches, the study nevertheless neglects viable alternative explanations for war involvement. To take an example, it is puzzling that several countries with parliamentary veto rights, left governments, and public opposition nevertheless deployed armed forces to Iraq. Among others, this applies to Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania. However, an explanation might be found in the historical circumstances of these countries – all four of which were in the final stages of accession negotiations with NATO during the Iraq crisis. Arguably, governments in these states faced strong incentives to prove their “reliability” in terms contributing to their future alliance partners in the West. Next to these incentives, prospective studies on the Iraq conflict could include alliance factors and threat perception to further investigate the interaction between the domestic and the international level.
At the outset, this book asked under which conditions democracies participate in armed conflict. This research question emerged against the backdrop of a recent “democratic turn” in security studies (Geis and Wagner, 2011), which enlarged the scope of the democratic peace research program by focusing on democratic conflict involvement. While there is a voluminous literature on the peaceful relations between democracies, researchers are only beginning to conduct systematic analyses of democratic conflict behavior outside the interdemocratic peace. Moreover, few studies have conducted comparative analyses across a wider range of democracies and contemporary conflicts. To address these shortcomings, this book developed an integrative comparative framework and applied this to explain the conflict involvement of up to 30 democracies, including a core sample of 23 countries, across the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Based on an analysis of these three armed conflicts with broader democratic participation, this study identified consistent pathways toward war participation as well as toward abstention from war involvement. In contrast to studies that focus on competing explanations, this book began on the premise that in foreign policy analysis most explanatory factors are interrelated and that these should thus be regarded as configurations. To this effect the study derived concrete theoretical expectations from the prevalent literature and formulated hypotheses regarding the impact of individual factors and their combination. Throughout the case studies it was shown that indeed several of the anticipated mechanisms and relationships could be identified, while others had a theoretical foundation but were not detected empirically.

This chapter comprises five parts. The ensuing section draws on the analytical results of the empirical chapters to investigate cross-case patterns of
war involvement. This is trailed by a discussion of the main theoretical contributions made in this study, including implications for the wider democratic peace research program. In the third section, I review this study's methodological contribution in the context of comparative research on democracy and conflict behavior. The fifth part briefly explores two additional cases, namely the conflicts in Syria and Libya and Western governments' responses to them. Finally, the concluding section summarizes key findings and suggests prospects for future research.

Cross-case patterns of war involvement

This book investigated the preconditions of democratic war involvement in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Each of these conflicts entailed democratic participation in multilateral military operations that fit the definition given in the introductory chapter. More importantly, the selected cases are among the most extensive uses of force democracies initiated after the Cold War, if combat intensity and the duration of the military engagement are taken as indicators. Furthermore, political and public deliberation – and often disputation – preceded each conflict. However, despite these similarities, the conflicts were also characterized by substantial variance. A cross-case comparison thus faces a range of challenges.

First, each of the selected armed conflicts evolved in a distinct historical situation. The Kosovo War stands in the context of the international community's failure to prevent the atrocities that occurred in Sarajevo in 1992, when UN peacekeepers left the city to its fate, its inability to stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, and its helplessness in Srebrenica in 1995, when declared UN safe areas were struck and overrun by Serbian forces. The war in Afghanistan and Western governments' decision to intervene militarily cannot be understood outside the historical context of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. In a rare display of unity, governments and international organizations expressed their solidarity with the United States and agreed that individual and collective self-defense against the attacks would be justified under the circumstances. The war against Iraq has its roots in the decade that followed the Persian Gulf War, with misdirected economic sanctions, a halted weapons inspections regime, and atrocities committed by Saddam Hussein against his own population. Yet it is doubtful that the American and British governments would have opted for war without the pretext, or political opportunity, that was given to them by 9/11.
Second, in terms of their legality and international legitimacy, the analyzed cases are substantively different. The Kosovo War set a precedent that showed the international community’s willingness to disregard the norm of state sovereignty in order to protect people from human rights violations. Controversially, Operation Allied Force demonstrated that NATO was ready to use force without UN authorization. However, while an evident deadlock in the Security Council thwarted efforts to attain an authorizing resolution, a near-consensus formed around the position that legitimate grounds existed for a humanitarian military intervention. The war in Afghanistan was justified in reference to the principle of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack. Yet, in contrast to the ensuing ISAF mission, the Security Council did not explicitly authorize Operation Enduring Freedom. While the right of self-defense was widely perceived to extend to the use of force against non-state actors, legal debates continued over whether terrorist actions could constitute an armed attack and whether OEF met the customary requirements of a necessary and proportionate response. Finally, as in the other two conflicts, the UN did not authorize the use of force against Iraq. However, while Allied Force could claim some legitimacy based on its humanitarian aims and Enduring Freedom was tied to the principle of self-defense, the Iraq War that commenced as Operation Iraqi Freedom was widely perceived as an illegal preventive war. Nonetheless, the American and British governments tried to make the legal case that prior UN authorizations had been revived due to a removal of the conditions for the ceasefire between Iraq and coalition forces in 1991. Their political argument stressed the need to act preemptively against an imminent threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. However, both lines of argument received little international support.

Third, the cases also differ with regard to their embedment in organizational frameworks. Kosovo constituted a NATO operation, while Afghanistan and Iraq were conducted by *ad hoc* coalitions. Yet Operation Enduring Freedom was initiated with tacit support from NATO, while remaining an *ad hoc* coalition outside the formal alliance framework. Operation Iraqi Freedom, however, was begun by the United States and the United Kingdom without referral to an established institutional framework.

Finally, the conflicts vary in terms of scope and the intensity of armed conflict. The initial phase of the Kosovo War was restricted to aerial bombardments, while ground forces entered the country at a later point when the fighting had largely been concluded. While OEF extended geographically over a much larger region, its force structure consisted mainly of small units of Special Forces. By contrast, coalition forces for
the war against Iraq amounted to ten times as many soldiers as had initially been deployed to Afghanistan.

With these caveats in mind, Table 8.1 summarizes the analytical findings of the case study chapters by listing necessary conditions and sufficient pathways toward military participation and non-participation in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Note that for presentational purposes the table excludes consistency and coverage values and focuses on a single solution term for each outcome and case study. Full analytical results are documented in Chapters 5–7, while the methodology of fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis is introduced in Chapter 4. In terms of cross-case patterns, the following observations can be made.

With regard to institutional constraints, the analytical results show that constitutional restrictions on the use of force present a structural veto to military deployments, irrespective of political preferences or systemic influences. The absence of constitutional restrictions was found to be a necessary condition for military participation in all three cases and across 30 democracies. The identified pattern is further strengthened by the absence of constitutional restrictions as an element in six out of eight sufficient pathways toward military participation. This cross-case finding contradicts claims made in recent studies, according

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Necessary conditions</th>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Military participation</th>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Military non-participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo (Operation Allied Force, 03/1999–06/1999)</td>
<td>~C ↔ MP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>M*-C +</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>~M<em>V</em>-S → ~MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>~V*S +</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~M ↔ ~MP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>~V*E → MP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>~V*-C*S +</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>C +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~M ↔ ~MP</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>~C<em>S</em>E → MP</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~S ↔ ~MP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>~C<em>S</em>E</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~S ↔ ~MP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>~M<em>V</em>-C*-S*E</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The empirical chapters thus demonstrate the analytical utility of this book’s conception of constitutional restrictions. Rather than employing an abstract notion of institutional constraints, I distinguish three sets of constitutional restrictions on the basis of provisions that prohibit or limit military participation, either (a) on the grounds of international law, (b) outside specified organizational frameworks, or (b) beyond a set of permissible tasks. The first set ranges from a firm requirement of UN authorization to instructions that bind the armed forces to act in accordance with international law. The second set relates to requirements on the involvement of specific multilateral organizational frameworks, whereas the third set refers to restrictions that prohibit, for instance, offensive military operations.

Yet the empirical chapters also document the substantial tension that some countries’ constitutional frameworks were being subjected to. For example, Denmark and Norway both contributed to NATO air strikes despite legal constraints in the run-up to the Kosovo conflict. In both countries controversies erupted over the constitutionality of the Kosovo War and the requirement of proper UN authorization, which led to a subsequent loosening of constitutional restrictions to allow for broader participation in military operations.

Contrary to constitutional restrictions, no cross-case pattern could be identified for parliamentary veto rights. Prior studies suggest that mandatory legislative involvement in deployment decisions can lead toward a “parliamentary peace” when combined with strong public opposition to a planned military operation (Dieterich et al., 2009). For this study, I expected a “parliamentary veto point” to arise from the combination of parliamentary veto rights and public opposition, which was predicted to be jointly sufficient for military non-participation. But the analytical results provide a mixed picture. For Kosovo, the analysis identified a single consistent pathway toward abstention that featured the postulated parliamentary veto point in the context of militarily weaker states (Table 8.1, Path 9). Afghanistan revealed no conclusive evidence. However, the analysis of the Iraq War shows that the veto point combination was present in a number of countries, yet the mechanism apparently failed to produce the expected outcome among weak states, as indicated by Path 8. While these findings are not conclusive, they shed doubt on the otherwise compelling “parliamentary peace” proposition. Prospective studies could investigate more closely the reasons why specific legislatures decided to support the Iraq War when citizens were in vocal opposition to military involvement.
As far as alliance behavior and power status are concerned, a distinct cross-case pattern emerges for the wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan, whereas collective action arguments are of lesser value in explaining democracies’ military involvement in Iraq. Based on collective action theory, one would expect military power to be sufficient for war involvement, either on its own or as part of a conjunction of conditions. *Vice versa*, the absence of military power should be necessary for military abstention. This is precisely what the empirical analysis reveals for Kosovo and Afghanistan. The absence of military power is identified as a necessary condition for non-participation, whereas military power is an element in a combination that is in both cases sufficient for military participation (Path 1, Path 4). However, with regard to the related free-rider hypothesis that expects militarily weak states to abstain, evidence to the contrary was found. This was most pronounced in the Iraq War, where several militarily weaker countries contributed *despite* legislative involvement and public opposition (Path 8).

For partisanship findings are also dissimilar across cases, though some evidence suggests that right governments are, in general terms, more willing to engage militarily than their left counterparts. This holds true for the Kosovo conflict (Path 3), though it is somewhat counter-intuitive, since scholars have made the case that many left governments were supportive of intervention for humanitarian reasons, while right governments typically had reservations about becoming involved militarily (Rathbun, 2004). Partisanship was found to have strong explanatory power in the case of the Iraq War, where left partisanship led consistently toward abstention (Path 15, Path 16), and right partisanship was sufficient for military involvement when combined with a lack of constitutional restrictions (Path 7). By contrast, for the Afghanistan conflict partisanship did not generate a conclusive pattern.

Finally, public support also yields mixed results. For Afghanistan the analysis found strong supportive evidence for the postulated link between public opinion and foreign policy. Here, public support was part of *all* sufficient pathways toward military participation, while public opposition was a necessary condition for military non-participation and an element in two sufficient conjunctions for that outcome (Path 10, Path 13). These findings contrast markedly with the claim that “public opinion hardly matters” in Afghanistan (Kreps, 2010). A similar pattern emerged for the Kosovo War, though here public opposition did not turn out to be a necessary condition in a formal sense. For the Iraq War, however, the central puzzle surrounded precisely the relationship between, on the one hand, almost uniform cross-national public
opposition to the war and, on the other hand, the observed range of
government responses to it – from outspoken opposition and absten-
tion to political support and full military participation.

**Theoretical contribution and implications for the democratic peace**

At the beginning of this study stood the observation that democracies
are evidently characterized by substantial variance – internally as well as
in their external conflict behavior. However, the research program on
the democratic peace was essentially built on the idea that democracies
are somehow distinct from non-democracies and that these regime-
type differences should be investigated more thoroughly, even though
this came at the expense of intra-democratic variation. Nonetheless, in
recent years a number of scholars have initiated through their work a
renewed interest for intra-democratic differences. This book built on
these foundations laid by others to investigate patterns of democratic
war involvement in relation to internal as well as external factors.

While the concluding parts of each case study chapter summarize
the main findings of this book in more detail, this section serves to
derive some theoretical contributions made in this study and to draw
out implications for further research on the democratic peace. First, a
central element in the research design of this study was the case-specific
conception of military participation. Consequently, each chapter
derived explicit criteria to categorize the extent of military participa-
tion in relation to the historical circumstances of each armed conflict.
Rather than setting an arbitrary numerical threshold for what counts as
military involvement, the study argued for a qualitative assessment of
military participation.

Second, while numerous studies include forms of “institutional con-
straints” in their research design, this book incorporated two institutional
conditions: parliamentary veto rights and constitutional restrictions.
Due to the proximity of these factors to eventual decisions on military
deployments, as well as because of their specificity to each case in ques-
tion, it was argued that the inclusion of these conditions makes for a
stronger research design than alternative measures. Yet, while the inclu-
sion of parliamentary veto rights was justified on a theoretical level,
it was argued that their significance might have been overstated by
previous studies. In particular, it was shown empirically that the “par-
liamentary peace” hypothesis requires further specification, because
parliamentary approval is unlikely to amount to a legislative veto point
under conditions of broad executive majorities or partisan convergence. Evidence from the case studies further confirmed the theoretical expectation that constitutional restrictions form a structural veto against military deployments.

Third, two of the case studies yielded substantial empirical evidence in support of the participatory constraints argument, according to which democratic governments are constrained by a requirement to gather citizens’ support before deploying armed forces to a conflict. This was particularly pronounced in the case of Afghanistan, where the analysis found a close correspondence between public support and military participation, as countries with low public backing did not participate or limited their participation to nominal contributions.

Fourth, the findings broadly support the general argument derived from collective action theory that expects weak states to free-ride on the contributions of more powerful states. The identified pathways further specified the conditions under which this argument holds, as power alone is not sufficient for military participation. Finally, as theoretical expectations with regard to partisanship were less pronounced, it was not surprising to find no robust cross-case pattern for this condition. Yet, for politically controversial cases in ad hoc frameworks, such as the Iraq War, a clear partisan pattern emerged out of the empirical analysis. This implies that it should be possible to identify similar patterns for cases with analogous characteristics.

What do the findings imply for further research on the democratic peace? To begin with, the case studies’ analytical results disprove some widely held conceptions about democracy and war involvement. This entails the well-known statements that (1) democracies do not fight preventive wars (Reiter and Stam, 2002; Schweller, 1992) and that (2) democracies do not fight unpopular wars (Doyle, 1983a). The case studies demonstrate that these propositions rest on flawed assumptions about democratic politics. The Iraq War showed that democratic governments do indeed engage in preventive wars, if certain preconditions are met. It further revealed that public opinion does not always have the constraining effect that many scholars ascribed to it. However, this should not imply that “public opinion hardly matters” (Kreps, 2010), as it was also shown that public approval played a substantial role in decisions on Afghanistan and Kosovo, but it indicates that democratic governments have substantial leeway when making foreign policy choices. Executive discretion on war involvement is limited only by constitutional restrictions, which formed a structural veto across all of the observed cases. This contrasts with the results of some recent
studies (Tago, 2009). Relatedly, the suggested institutional mechanism of “parliamentary peace” (Dieterich et al., 2009) seemingly failed to bring about the expected outcome. Future studies could further explore the identified deviant cases. Finally, while government type was not included in the analytical framework proper, the empirical data indicates no systematic pattern concerning the relationship between war involvement and type of government, which contrasts with institutional arguments that expect coalition governments to be severely constrained in security policy (Auerswald, 1999).

Methodological contribution

The empirical analysis in this book draws on fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, as introduced in Chapter 4. This method has gained increased awareness in the social sciences in recent years, which is reflected in a growing number of articles in peer-reviewed journals that employ some of its variants. However, to date there have been few IR studies that apply a set-theoretical approach and their number has been particularly sparse in conflict studies. To my knowledge, this book is the first to apply fuzzy-set analysis in research on the democratic peace and, specifically, the relationship between democracy and war involvement.

Prior studies in this research area tend to be divided into statistical work and case studies. Against this backdrop, I argued in Chapter 4 that fuzzy-set analysis has distinct advantages over these approaches for the research aim of investigating the conditions under which democracies participate in war. First, through its focus on specific armed conflicts, the approach enables a fine-grained qualitative assessment of war involvement that takes into account historical context. By contrast, statistical aggregation tends to conceal considerable variance with regard to intra-democratic differences or degrees in conflict involvement. As this study has shown in its empirical chapters, each conflict mandates particular coding criteria to assess the meaning of military participation in the given context. Second, because fuzzy-set analysis attends to configurations of conditions rather than net effects of individual variables, it is particularly amenable to the study of foreign policy, where equifinality and conjunctural causation are expected and it is rare that an outcome can be attributed to a single cause. For example, parliamentary veto rights were expected to be jointly sufficient for military non-participation only when combined with public opposition. Likewise right and left partisanship were conceived as INUS conditions for military participation and non-participation, respectively. Finally, based
on its rigorous analytical framework and comparative research design, the approach is well suited to investigate intra-democratic variance that previous studies recognized but have not explored much further. This comparative dimension is a distinct advantage over small-n studies of one or several cases.

This study demonstrated the analytical utility of fsQCA, as summarized in the previous section, while a cross-case comparison of the results is given in Table 8.1. It was shown that consistent pathways toward military participation and non-participation exist and that these are broadly in line with previously formulated theoretical expectations. While some conditions proved to be more important than others, it was also shown that specific combinations of conditions yield particular outcomes, a fact that can seem counter-intuitive when examining only the presence or absence of a single condition, but makes sense when taking into account the interaction between conditions.

Exploring additional cases: Libya and Syria

Are the analytical findings for Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq generalizable to other cases of multilateral military intervention? As discussed in the introductory chapter, the universe of cases for this study consisted of 11 armed conflicts that comprised 28 distinct military operations (see Table 1.1). Of these, the engagement in Libya is of particular interest since it constitutes the first military intervention under the “responsibility to protect” banner and also because the operation shares several characteristics with the Kosovo War. By contrast, the civil war in Syria has been ongoing since March 2011 and, at the time of writing it (still) represents a case of non-intervention, though Western governments were on the brink of a direct military engagement in September 2013. The following sections briefly explore some key characteristics of these two cases.

Libya: evoking the responsibility to protect

The events that later became known as the “Arab Spring” started with protests in Tunisia, which eventually led to the fall of the Ben Ali regime on January 14, 2011. Less than a month later, on February 11, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak gave in to public protests and stepped down as president to hand power over to the military. Shortly afterwards, on February 15, protests and demonstrations erupted in Libya, following the arrest of a human rights activist by police forces in Benghazi (Blight et al., 2012). Undeterred, the Libyan regime responded with a violent crackdown on protesters in various parts of the country.
Against this backdrop, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 on February 26, 2011. The document explicitly mentioned the “Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population” (UN-SC, 2011b, emphasis added) and it referred the case to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The resolution further established a comprehensive arms embargo against Libya, in addition to a travel ban and asset freeze against members of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. However, in the weeks following Resolution 1970, the situation became increasingly perilous for rebel groups and the civilian population as the Gaddafi regime violently fought back uprisings across the country and started to use its air force to bomb cities taken by insurgents (BBC, 2011). On March 17, 2011, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 with 10 votes in favor and five abstentions coming from Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia. This resolution established a no-fly zone over Libya, strengthened enforcement measures for the previously introduced arms embargo, and authorized member states “acting nationally or through regional organizations […] to take all necessary measures […] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory” (UN-SC, 2011c, emphasis added).

On March 19, 2011, a US-led ad hoc coalition initiated “Operation Odyssey Dawn” to enforce a no-fly zone and to protect the civilian population in Libya. On March 31, command was taken over by NATO under the operational name “Unified Protector”. Of its 28 members, 12 NATO countries contributed air assets to the military operation: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Bulgaria and Romania provided ships to enforce the arms embargo against the Libyan regime. Meanwhile, 16 countries abstained from NATO operations, including the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, and Slovakia. Notably though, NATO non-member Sweden made a substantial contribution to the air strikes. Operation Unified Protector ended on October 31, 2011.

How can the observed variation in democracies’ involvement in Libya be explained? Because the intervention was explicitly authorized by the Security Council and since it operated under NATO auspices (though launched as an ad hoc coalition), few countries faced constitutional restrictions that barred them from participation. Moreover, the clarified legal status of Operation Unified Protector and the early exclusion of a ground force component made the mission relatively uncontroversial
in political terms. Hence, there was little partisan dispute on Libya across Western countries and parliaments largely backed deployment decisions. A case in point is Denmark, where all political parties, the media, and large segments of the population supported the government’s decision to deploy F-16 fighter jets to partake in the NATO mission (Jakobsen and Møller, 2012: 106).

But why did other NATO members abstain from participation? One possible explanation for the refusal of countries like Germany, Poland, and Slovakia to become involved militarily could be that in these countries the public was highly skeptical of the military intervention. Cross-national survey data from May 2011 shows that public opinion was sharply divided on Libya. On the one hand, in states such as France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States public support was close to 60% and higher. On the other hand, in countries like Germany, Poland, and Slovakia, public approval of the military operation did not exceed 37% (GMF, 2011: 29). Future studies could further explore cross-national patterns in public opinion, media coverage, and government policy prior to the intervention, focusing on the weeks that preceded the two Security Council resolutions in February and March 2011.

**Syria: non-intervention despite continued atrocities**

By the end of March 2011, large-scale demonstrations erupted in various parts of Syria. Protests also reached the capital of Damascus, where security guards had previously dissolved any display of public dissent in short order. As the unrest spread across the country, the regime of Bashar al-Assad dispatched its armed forces to break up protests, which led to the death of dozens of peaceful demonstrators (Marsh et al., 2011). By June 2011, reports indicated that regime forces had “killed hundreds of protesters and arbitrarily arrested thousands, subjecting many of them to brutal torture in detention” (HRW, 2011: 1).

In response to the worsening situation in Syria, the EU imposed a comprehensive arms embargo on May 9, 2011 (EU-EC, 2011). Yet, because European states disagreed over whether Syrian opposition forces should be supplied with arms and thus exempted from the sanctions regime, large parts of the embargo were effectively lifted on June 1, 2013 (EU-EC, 2013). Meanwhile, due to an impasse in the Security Council, three draft resolutions were vetoed by China and the Russian Federation on October 4, 2011, February 4, 2012, and July 19, 2012, respectively. These resolutions aimed to condemn the continued atrocities conducted by government forces and armed opposition groups and to impose sanctions in case the spiral of violence would not be stopped.
Nonetheless, the Security Council passed several “presidential statements” on the issue and the General Assembly adopted a resolution on February 16, 2012 that strongly condemned the “continued widespread and systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Syrian authorities” (UN-GA, 2012).7

Despite renewed diplomatic initiatives by the Arab League and UN Special Envoy Kofi Annan, atrocities continued in Syria as regime forces initiated a series of violent attacks on cities and towns controlled by the opposition (HRW, 2012: 2). Speaking to journalists on the situation in Syria, US President Obama warned the Assad regime on August 20, 2012 that with regard to chemical weapons: “that’s a red line for us and that there would be enormous consequences if we start seeing movement on the chemical weapons front or the use of chemical weapons. That would change my calculations significantly” (US-WH, 2012). While there had been unconfirmed reports about earlier, small-scale usage of chemical weapons, the Syrian regime did eventually use these weapons in an attack against rebel groups and the civilian population in the opposition-controlled suburbs of Damascus on August 21, 2013, as was later confirmed by an UN mission (UN-SG, 2013).

Against this backdrop, the liberal-conservative government under British Prime Minister David Cameron submitted a motion to the House of Commons on August 29, 2013 which aimed to provide the ground for a military strike against Syria. In his parliamentary address, Cameron sought to emphasize the limited nature of the planned operation and its necessity as a response to the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime, “it is not about invading, it is not about regime change […] it is about the large-scale use of chemical weapons and our response to a war crime – nothing else.” (UK-HoC, 2013: 1426).

However, the proposal was defeated with 272 votes to 285, as dozens of conservative members of parliament voted against their own government. Following the failed motion, when asked by Labour leader Edward Miliband whether he could confirm that he would “not use the royal prerogative to order the UK to be part of military action,” Cameron replied: “I can give that assurance […] it is very clear tonight that […] the British parliament, reflecting the views of the British people, does not want to see British military action. I get that and the government will act accordingly” (UK-HoC, 2013: 1556). From an institutional point of view it is noteworthy that the British parliament successfully used a veto power that it formally does not enjoy. Traditionally, the executive holds a royal prerogative in matters of foreign policy, which gives the government nearly free hand to deploy the armed forces whenever it regards this as necessary.
Irrespective of the British decision to abstain from military involvement in Syria, Barack Obama announced on August 31, 2013 that his government had decided “that the United States should take military action against Syrian regime targets’ and that he would ‘seek authorization for the use of force from the American people’s representatives in Congress’ (US-WH, 2013b). As tension grew in anticipation of the congressional votes, a short-term Russian initiative proposed that Assad destroy his stock of chemical weapons and join the Chemical Weapons Convention, which Syria had not signed up until that point. In consequence, Obama requested leaders of Congress to pull the scheduled votes from the calendar and give the diplomatic path time to succeed (US-WH, 2013a).

How to explain the sudden decision to call off the military intervention in Syria? It is revealing to compare public opinion on the Libyan intervention, as outlined above, with attitudes toward a potential military operation in Syria. Survey data from June 2013 shows that, across all 14 countries included in the questionnaire, an average majority of 72% of respondents held that their country “should stay out completely” with regard to the potential use of military force in Syria. Likewise, support for intervention averaged around 22%, while the highest approval ratings were found in France (33%) and Sweden (31%) (GMF, 2013: 34). These figures seem to reflect a reluctance to become involved militarily in a conflict that eludes a simple solution. That might also be one of the reasons why Western governments settled for the diplomatic opening that occurred when the Syrian regime agreed to cooperate on the disarmament of its chemical weapons.

Arguably though, with the civil war continuing and scores of people injured, dead or displaced, the conditions on the ground have not improved much, despite the regime’s collaboration on disarmament issues. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon concluded in his latest report on the responsibility to protect, “[o]ur collective failure to prevent atrocity crimes in the Syrian Arab Republic over the past two and a half years will remain a heavy moral burden on the standing of the United Nations and its Member States” (UN-GA, 2013: 16).

Conclusion

Set against the backdrop of recurring debates on interdemocratic peace and democratic war involvement, this study provided empirical evidence that demonstrates the explanatory value of a differentiated perspective on democracy. As such, it was shown in the case studies that variation in constitutional provisions regarding the range of
legally permissible military operations affects the war participation of
democratic governments. Likewise, differences in terms of the involve-
ment of national legislatures in decision-making processes on the use
of force influenced military engagements, though evidence in favor of
a “parliamentary peace” mechanism was not consistently found across
the observed cases. The latter finding dovetails with the results concern-
ing “participatory constraints,” as one of the central mechanisms of
the democratic peace. While it was shown that public opinion played a
substantial role in at least two conflicts, it also became clear that demo-
cratic leaders enjoy considerable leeway when making foreign policy
choices, irrespective of public approval.

At the time of writing, the conflicts examined throughout this book
are continuing, though some military operations have ended, are about
to be concluded, or have been substantially reduced in scope. Future
studies could investigate more closely the time dimension as a central
characteristic of military engagements. Under which conditions do dem-
ocratic governments decide to withdraw from a multilateral operation?
When do democracies renege on their commitments? To which extent
do domestic factors, such as the electoral cycle, affect such decisions?
Other areas for prospective work include the relationship between parti-
sanship and security policy and the dynamics of legislative deployment
decisions. Is it true that parties prefer a tacit truce to political competi-
tion over these issues, as some evidence seems to suggest? While partisan
politics only seemed to play an influential role in Iraq, a closer investiga-
tion of individual countries could seek to identify partisan differences
with regard to democracies’ participation in other conflicts, such as the
recent intervention in Libya or the debate about military action in Syria.

Relatedly, it could be fruitful to explore the political dynamics that
precede legislative decisions on the use of force. The surprising outcome
of the British government’s vote call over a potential military engage-
ment in Syria shows that these decisions can have dramatic conse-
quences, yet they are not fully understood. The issue of parliamentary
involvement in foreign and security policy remains heavily debated
and in flux in several of the observed countries. Also, despite the British
House of Commons’ decision to abstain from military involvement
in Syria, there is reason to doubt parliamentarians’ general ability and
willingness to engage the executive on the issue of using force. As
numerous cases show, and some of them have been documented in
this study, parliamentary decisions are frequently made in accordance
with the executive and without public deliberation – in contrast to the
democratic ideal conceived by political theory.
### Table A.1 Kosovo: Replication data for fuzzy-set analyses

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### Table A.4  
Iraq: Replication data for fuzzy-set analyses

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*Note:* M is the fuzzy set military power. Membership values were calibrated on the basis of standardized scores with qualitative anchors at 0.5 (full membership), 0 (cut-off) and -0.5 (full non-membership). Expenditure refers to billion USD in 1998, 2001, and 2002.

1 Introduction

2. The contracting of private military and security companies (PMSCs) has gained increased attention in recent years, partly because this practice threatens to undermine the democratic control of the armed forces and raises accountability problems due to a lack of transparency. On the role of PMSCs in Iraq, see Avant and Sigelman (2010). For a general argument on why states use PMSCs, see Kruck (2013).
3. This rather lean definition contrasts with a richer conception that regards coordination on the basis of “generalized principles of conduct” as essential to multilateralism (Ruggie, 1992: 571).
5. This scope condition leads to the exclusion of several small-scale operations, such as the EU’s Operation Concordia (2003) and EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2008).
6. For recent examples, see, for instance, the UN missions in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, 1999–2005) or Sudan (UNMIS, 2005–2011), where the majority of troops originate from Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan.
7. Another case that could have been explored in this study is the Persian Gulf War. However, this episode has already been the subject of several comparative studies (Bennett et al., 1994, 1997).
8. On issue salience in international politics, see the contributions in Oppermann and Viehrig (2011).
9. According to Harry Eckstein, “most-likely cases” are anticipated to confirm a theory, “if any cases can be expected to do so” (1975: 118). An “extreme case” is understood as being “prototypical” of some phenomenon of interest (Gerring, 2007: 101–102). On different types of cases, see also George and Bennett (2005: 120–123).
10. This corresponds to the criteria set in the majority of studies that use the Polity IV data.

2 Democracy and War Involvement

1. The central findings and explanatory approaches of the democratic peace research program are well established. Hence, I will not provide a comprehensive overview, but focus on works that are key to frame my own argument. Excellent reviews are provided in Huth and Allee (2002), Ray (2003), George and Bennett (2005), Geis and Wagner (2011), and Hayes (2012).
3. In the original version of his essay Kant uses the German phrase “Beistimmung der Staatsbürger,” which can be read as going beyond mere approval of an executive decision to comprise actual participation in the decision-making process (Kant, 1996: 205).


5. In their game theoretic model Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman explicitly set out to test what they perceive as Kant’s claim: “As we will try to show, the game replicates Kant’s expectations of peace between liberal republics and of a higher risk of war when both sides are not liberal republics” (1992: 146).

6. Stephen Walt points out that the assumption of democratic preemptive attacks contradicts the larger theoretical model that Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman sketch and that it conflicts with some of the empirical evidence provided in their book (Walt, 2000b: 32–38). Note the reply by Bueno de Mesquita and James Morrow (2000: 56–57).

7. Russett and Oneal make a conscious effort to evaluate Kant’s theory “using social scientific methods” (2001: 272). One could object, however, that their reading of Kant is rather narrow, drawing mainly on the interpretation popularized by Michael Doyle (1983a, 1983b). This view has been expressed forcefully by John MacMillan, who argues that Kant’s “unique authority as a liberal philosopher has been exploited to establish a new series of exclusionary practices by liberal against non-liberal states” (1995: 549). MacMillan emphasizes that the predominant view neglects central aspects of Kant’s political writings “which would turn the spotlight of responsibilities and reform upon existing liberal states” (1995: 553). See also a study by Oliver Eberl, who provides a rich analysis of the reception of Kant’s work among IR scholars (2008: 87–118).

8. James Lee Ray has also made this argument (1995: 2).


10. On difficulties in comparing presidential and parliamentary regimes, see Ireland and Gartner (2001: 549). Hence, the majority of studies focus on distinguishing between various kinds of parliamentary democracies.

11. A similar tendency is reported in Palmer et al. (2004: 16).

12. However, Tsebelis points out that the dataset by Henisz (2000) is partly inaccurate in its measure of the number and the distance between veto players (Tsebelis, 2002: 204–205). Another source of potentially flawed inferences is that the data employed by Choi does not differentiate between policy areas and thus misses important constitutional differences with regard to veto players (cf. Choi, 2010: 451).


14. Converse (1964) found evidence that seemed to support Almond’s argument regarding the lack of intellectual coherence in public attitudes toward domestic
and foreign policy issues. This sparked a debate about the structure of political beliefs among the general public (Holsti, 2004: 34–36; Russett, 1990: 110–118).

15. See also Page and Shapiro (1992).

16. Holsti (1979: 343–352) distinguishes “cold war internationalists,” “post-cold war internationalists,” and “isolationists.” The first group emphasizes military security and regards international politics as a zero-sum game, whereas the second takes a liberal-internationalist outlook that entails a more inclusive view of security challenges. Finally, isolationists are pessimistic about the benefits of foreign involvement and prioritize domestic issues.

17. For recent reviews of constructivist theory, see Hurd (2008) and Adler (2013). A comprehensive survey of international security studies, with an emphasis on constructivist approaches, is provided in Buzan and Hansen (2009). For a concise overview of recent developments in the area of “security culture,” see Daase (2011).

18. Nonetheless, the separation between IR and FPA should not be overstated. Influential constructivist studies in IR, such as Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics (1999), draw substantially on role theory. As Wendt explains, “I argue that anarchy can have at least three kinds of structure at the macro-level, based on what kind of roles enemy, rival, and friend dominate the system.” (1999: 247).

19. A comprehensive review of this extensive literature is provided in Thies (2010). See also Kaarbo (2003).


21. A detailed account of this historical episode is provided in Lafeber (1994: 491–508).

22. The terms ‘collective’ and ‘public good’ are used almost interchangeably in the literature. On distinctions between these goods regarding their origin and production, see Schubert (2005: 442). Russell Hardin defines the essential characteristics of a public good as combining the “jointness of supply” with an “impossibility of exclusion” (Hardin, 1982: 17, original emphasis).

23. On the “free rider” problem, see Buchanan (1965: 13). Cornes and Sandler introduce a valuable distinction between free riders and “easy riders”: while the first term describes complete abstention from the provision of the public good, the latter term designates contributions “short of the ‘right’ amount” (Cornes and Sandler, 1984: 580).

24. This relates to what Olson terms a “privileged group,” where at least one member of a group has a sufficiently strong interest “to see that the collective good is provided, even if he has to bear the full burden of providing it himself” (1971: 49–50).

25. Defense provisions, however, can also be spent on private goods that do not further the common objective of a security alliance, as when states pursue a nationalist agenda with military means. Portugal, for example, increased its defense expenditures dramatically in the pursuit of colonial wars in Angola and Mozambique from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s. Following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, Greece and Turkey both significantly expanded their defense budgets, as Oneal points out (1990: 387).
26. While individual definitions of realism vary, most scholars working in this tradition regard these as the fundamental assumptions of realism (Mearsheimer, 2001: 17–18; Morgenthau, 1967: 3–14; Snyder, 1997: 16–20; Waltz, 1979: 116–120). However, some argue that the assumption that nation states are the central actors in world politics is a mischaracterization of realism: “no realist believes that the theory is restricted to a particular form of polity. But if by ‘state’ we mean polity or group, we should simply say that in order to avoid confusion” (Wohlforth, 2008: 133).

27. Due to the preponderant military power of the United States as the sole remaining superpower, most realist scholars have characterized the international system as unipolar since the end of the Cold War (Jervis, 2009; Krauthammer, 1991; Layne, 1993; Walt, 2009; Wohlforth, 1999). But see Christensen and Snyder (1990: 139) and Snyder (1997: 371). However, the theoretical implications of this systemic feature are less clear and remain contested even among neorealists.

28. This sparked a debate about the proper domain for neorealist approaches. Elman (1996a; 1996b) argues that there are, in principle, no reasons not to use neorealist theories to explain foreign policy outcomes. The fact that a number of theories are underspecified or inherently ambiguous merely undermines their success in explaining observations. Fearon (1998) makes a similar argument. A thorough critique of Waltz's balancing argument is provided in Vasquez (1998: 240–286). See also Waltz's reply to Elman (Waltz, 1996).

29. Walt defines alliances as a “formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states” (1987: 1).

30. Critics have taken Walt’s inclusion of perceptions as an indication of a degenerative shift in realism (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999: 35–38).

31. On the security dilemma, see also Wolfers (1962: 84). An important contribution was made by Robert Jervis, who distinguishes offensive from defensive postures and argues that, given certain preconditions, “[a] state can increase its own security without decreasing that of others” (Jervis, 1978: 199). For a modern discussion of the security dilemma with a foreword by the late John Herz, see Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler (2008).

32. The terms “fear of abandonment” and “fear of entrapment” were introduced by Michael Mandelbaum in the context of NATO politics on nuclear arms during the 1960s (1981: 152).

33. Additional factors include the presence of shared interests, the nature of the alliance agreement and past behavior (Snyder, 1984: 471–475).

3 Explaining Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict

1. This practice also seems fairly common in fsQCA applications. For a review and critique of these, see Mello (2012a).

2. A systematic formulation of neoclassical realism is provided in Lobell et al. (2009). See also Rose (1998).


4. For a discussion of veto point and veto player approaches, see Chapter 2.

5. Scholars disagree on which countries to consider de jure neutral states as opposed to countries that are de facto neutral. Damrosch regards Switzerland as
the sole legally and “internationally recognized” neutral state, whereas Austrian neutrality is seen as rooted in policy tradition (Damrosch, 2003: 58). By contrast, Bothe holds that both Austria and Switzerland are the only states “which still possess a legally based status of permanent neutrality” (Bothe, 2008: 577).

6. This realist argument is found, for instance, in Krasner (1978) and Gowa (1998).
7. This applies even more to cases of external military intervention into “new wars.” On their characteristics and the debate about a transformation of war, see Mello (2010).
8. For a detailed discussion of these arguments, see Chapter 2.

4 Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

1. This methodological categorization excludes a third group of approaches, namely studies that employ formal models to explore democratic conflict behavior, such as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999), or Schultz (1999). However, to the extent that these studies conduct empirical tests of their game-theoretic models, these are largely based on statistical evidence.
2. Other salient studies on the democratic peace that employ statistical methods include Cederman (2001), Gartzke (1998), Maoz and Russett (1993), Rousseau et al. (1996), Russett (1993), and Slantchev et al. (2005).
3. For a discussion of additional studies that use a case-study approach and their research design, see George and Bennett (2005: 287–325).
4. Case-oriented researchers have addressed each of these concerns in detail. These scholars argue that part of the criticism seems misguided as it disregards the specifics of qualitative methodology. At the same time, it is held that other methodological problems, such as heterogeneity among cases and the interpretation of qualitative evidence remain critical for case-study research, but have not received due attention because they do not readily fit the quantitative template (Bennett, 2004: 39–45; Brady and Collier, 2010; Van Evera, 1997: 50–55; Yin, 2009: 14–16).
5. See Mahoney et al. (2009) for an inventory of five types of causes derived from set theory.
6. Since fsQCA equally draws on propositional logic, Boolean algebra, and fuzzy-set theory, scholars tend to use different notational systems. This book employs a notation that is also used in the seminal textbook on set-theoretic approaches in the social sciences (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).
7. This section draws on Ragin (2008: 34–37).
8. On negative case selection, see Mahoney and Goertz (2004).
10. Braumoeller and Goertz (2000: 855) discuss this distinction in relation to “trivial” and “non-trivial” necessary conditions.
11. Schneider and Wagemann do not address this issue directly. Their textbook implies, however, that necessary conditions ought to be included in the fsQCA procedure (2012: 143).
12. See Mendel and Ragin (2011: 24) for an exchange on fsQCA where Ragin also explains that he has recently changed his position on the issue of excluding necessary conditions from the truth table procedure.

13. The current version of fsQCA (2.5) is available at: http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin.


15. In their “standards of good practice,” Schneider and Wagemann specifically suggest that an x-y plot can be an effective tool for “assessing the quality of the fsQCA results” (2010: 411).

16. For a critique of “neopositivist” methodology, see also Herborn (2011: 145). However, Herborn fails to distinguish between such different methodological perspectives as those developed in King et al. (1994), Brady and Collier (2010), or Ragin (2000) although the latter two explicitly and substantially distance themselves from the quantitative template prominently suggested by King and his co-authors.

17. For a more comprehensive discussion of strengths and limitations of QCA, see the symposia in the APSA Newsletter Qualitative Methods, 2004 (2) 2, in Studies in Comparative International Development, Spring 2005 (40) 1, and Political Research Quarterly 2013 (66) 1. A detailed reply to critiques is further given in Meur et al. (2009).

18. The issue of measurement error and ways of addressing it are subject to a larger debate among quantitative and qualitative methodologists (cf. Bartels, 2010).

19. Barbara Vis (2012) provides an empirical comparison of fsQCA and regression analysis and concludes that because each method has distinct advantages, complementary fsQCA and regression analyses become an option to gain additional inferential leverage. This applies in particular to intermediate and large-n studies of more than 50 cases, where both approaches can be reasonably employed.

5 Kosovo: Forced Allies or Willing Contributors?

1. While subsequent reports faced difficulties in determining the exact scope and perpetrators of some of the committed atrocities, a consensus formed around the position that “massive violations of human rights and rights of ethnic minorities” had taken place in Kosovo, but that these acts did not amount to “acts of genocide in the sense of the 1948 Convention” (Simma, 1999: 2). In a seminal report on the Kosovo War and its implication for international law, the International Independent Commission on Kosovo (IICK), headed by Richard Goldstone and Carl Tham, noted that with respect to the time period immediately preceding NATO air strikes, “[a] precise quantification of abuses, particularly killings was difficult if not impossible to determine because detailed, verified data was not readily available” (IICK, 2000: 83). See also IICK (2001).

2. Resolution 1160 addressed both conflict parties, equally calling the government of the FRY to take the “necessary steps to achieve a political solution to
the issue of Kosovo through dialogue,” while urging “the Kosovar Albanian leadership to condemn all terrorist action” and to “pursue their goals by peaceful means only” (UN-SC, 1998a). In turn, Resolution 1199 demanded the Serbian leadership to implement several concrete measures, while threatening, “to consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region,” should the demands of the Security Council not be fulfilled (UN-SC, 1998b).


5. As Foreign Minister Kinkel held, “Der Beschluß der NATO darf nicht zum Präzedenzfall werden. Wir dürfen nicht auf eine schief Bahn kommen, was das Gewaltmonopol des Sicherheitsrates anbelangt” (DE-BT, 1998b: 23129).


9. At the outset of the Washington summit a declaration on the situation in Kosovo was passed, which declared that the alliance would be “intensifying NATO’s military actions to increase the pressure on Belgrade.” See NATO Press Release (1999) No. 062, available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/.

10. The fuzzy-set values for all conditions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix.

11. Though not formal members of NATO, these candidate states are included due to the familiar “aspirations of non-members” (Wallander, 2000: 730), whose behavior often resembles that of proper member states. This also applies to Slovenia, but the country is not included because it was part of former Yugoslavia.

12. Switzerland also retains a legal status of permanent neutrality and has been engaged with NATO through the “Partnership for Peace” framework since 1996. Yet cooperation between Swiss armed forces and NATO has been limited to individual officers and groups of up to 20 persons and has not included permanent coordination between Swiss armed forces and NATO staff (CH-CoS, 2009). Hence, due to the circumscribed nature of its security cooperation, Switzerland is not included in this study.

13. The casualty-aversion argument goes back to John Mueller’s (1973) seminal study of American public opinion on the wars in Korea and Vietnam. Mueller argues that even small numbers of casualties at the outset of a conflict can lead to a significant decrease in public support, while this effect lessens during later stages of a conflict and leads to a relative tolerance toward casualties.

14. Two collections of country studies proved most helpful in this regard (Ku and Jacobson, 2003a; Nolte, 2003). A series of reports commissioned by
the British House of Lords (2006, 2007) and a legislative bill submitted to the House of Commons (2005) and reports on this (2004b, 2006a, 2006b) provided helpful background and international comparison. In the United States the legal interpretation and constitutional practice of the War Powers Resolution remains contested. Recently, a bi-partisan commission was authorized to investigate the historical record and to make recommendations for improving the effectiveness of current legal provisions. For its final report, see Baker and Christopher (2009).

15. Note that a number of Central and Eastern European countries later curbed parliamentary involvement to accommodate the NATO accession process. Of the observed countries this applies to Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia.

16. Regarding parliamentary veto rights in Italy, Wagner et al. conclude that, “all in all, it is not clear, who has the power to deploy military troops and personnel abroad.” Consequently, they code Italy as an “inconclusive case” (2010: 65). In contrast, Dieterich et al. code Italy as a country “with very strong war powers” (2010: 26). Jörg Luther asserts that “[t]he participation of Parliament in the decision to deploy the armed forces in other cases was, previously, a point of contention but is now well-established” (Luther 2003: 452). Luther also refers to the time of the Kosovo crisis, which I take as an indication that, at least during this timeframe, a coding of a weak \textit{ex ante} veto can be justified.

17. In the United States, the extent of presidential war powers and, \textit{vice versa}, congressional influence remain heavily debated. Most commentators agree, however, that the executive branch is relatively free in its decision to \textit{initiate} the use of force, while Congress holds more leverage in the long term, through its wielding of the “power of the purse” (Baker and Christopher, 2009).

18. The coding refers to the institutional situation in 1999. Since then several countries have amended their constitutions. Spain, for instance, introduced a parliamentary veto right in 2005 (Ley Orgánica de la Defensa Nacional, 5/2005, 17 Noviembre).

19. Finland has amended its constitutional framework several times in the past two decades. At the time of the Kosovo crisis, however, constitutional restrictions effectively ruled out operations beyond a strictly defensive use of force or those that lacked a UN or OSCE mandate (Jakobsen, 2006: 120–122; Wagner et al., 2010: 50–51). Austrian deployment provisions to this effect are contained in the \textit{Bundesverfassungsgesetz} of April 21, 1997 (I, 1–2). For Ireland, see respective provisions in the \textit{Defence Act} of 1954 and several amendments made through 1983. These are available at: http://www.attorneygeneral.ie/srlu/restatements.html.

20. After the controversy surrounding the Kosovo War, Denmark passed the “Act on the Aims, Tasks and Organization of the Armed Forces” which lifted the legal requirement of a UN mandate (Jakobsen, 2006: 90).

21. According to Knut Nustad and Henrik Thune, the decision to partake in the preparation for OAF was “a break with previous policies” (2003: 161), indicating that Norway at the time was at least partially constrained by established constitutional practice. This estimate receives further support from the fact that, after the Kosovo crisis, the Norwegian government saw the need to
formalize the new foreign policy in a white paper that was subsequently approved by parliament, as Peter Viggo Jakobsen points out (2006: 151).

22. The relevant provisions are enclosed in Article 87a (1) “The Federation shall establish Armed Forces for purposes of defence […],” Article 24 (2) “the Federation may enter into a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a lasting peace in Europe and among the nations of the world,” and Article 25 “The general rules of international law shall be an integral part of federal law […].” An official translation of the *Grundgesetz* is available at the parliamentary website, http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/documents/legal/index.html.

23. For presidential systems, the executive position is calculated on the basis of the president’s party.


25. While the question wording differs across polls, these were variations of the question: “Do you support the NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia?” (Everts, 2002: 156–157).

26. I restrict my estimate of public support to the first month of NATO air strikes, up until the Washington summit, in order exclude any effects the change in policy and increased media outreach might have had on public opinion after that time period.

27. As Hardin argues, a collective good may be characterized by a “jointness in production,” indicating that a single good may comprise multiple attributes, which are valued differently by members of the group (1982: 76).

28. Arguments along similar lines can be found in the memoirs of the British Prime Minister (Blair, 2011: 226–228) and the US Secretary of State (Albright, 2003: 485). See also the detailed account of the German Foreign Minister, which includes a specific justification of NATO’s actions as a “humanitarian intervention” (Fischer, 2011: 85–159).

29. For a discussion of different concepts of power and their usage in IR theory, see Baldwin (2002).

30. For an example of a neorealist approaches to measuring power, see Walt (1987: 22–23, 289–291). Mearsheimer further distinguishes between latent power and military power, arguing that “it is impossible to simply equate wealth with military might,” as many neorealist studies have done (2001: 82).

31. In an earlier publication, Ragin uses a threshold of 0.80 to indicate an “almost necessary” condition (2003: 194). Schneider and Wagemann (2007: 213) recommend a threshold of “at least” 0.90 to identify potential necessary conditions.

32. In general, the consistency threshold should be set at least to 0.75. Here, I decide on a threshold of 0.87 to prioritize consistency at the expense of coverage, since the top seven rows contain highly consistent cases and I do not want to dilute consistency by including further rows.

33. For the calculation of the intermediate solution three assumptions were made, presuming that the conditions (M), (S), and (~C) contribute toward the outcome.
6 Afghanistan: Unconditional Support but Selective Engagement?

1. For historical perspectives on contemporary security issues in Afghanistan and the region of Central Asia, see Johnson (2007) and Rashid (2008).
4. UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 51 reads: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security”.
5. As the only member of either house to vote against the proposal, Representative Barbara Lee of California felt the need to justify her decision: “It was a blank check to the president to attack anyone involved in the September 11 events – anywhere, in any country, without regard to our nation’s long-term foreign policy, economic and national security interests, and without time limit. In granting these overly broad powers, the Congress failed its responsibility to understand the dimensions of its declaration. I could not support such a grant of war-making authority to the president.” (Lee, 2001)
7. On September 12, 2001 the NAC declared, “if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe and North America shall be considered an attack against all.” (NATO Press Release, 2001: 124). The formal invocation of Article 5 was announced on October 2, 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm.
9. On this decision, see also Erlanger (2001).
10. While Finnemore (2003: 52–84) focuses on cases of humanitarian military intervention, her reasoning suggests that the argument can also be applied to other types of military intervention.


12. The study focuses on contributions to ISAF between 2003 and 2009.

13. Saideman and Auerswald note that Denmark features “loose” caveats and thus constitutes an exception among countries governed by coalitions, since all other coalition governments included in their study have either “medium” or “tight” restrictions on military operations (2012: 6).

14. While they were formally invited to begin accession talks at NATO’s Prague summit on November 21–22, 2002, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia had all been part of a “Membership Action Plan” since 1999 and had thus formalized their cooperation with NATO. See, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natolive/topics_37356.htm.

15. For an assessment of the military importance of Special Forces to OEF, see O’Hanlon (2002).


17. This was the case in New Zealand after an article in the New York Times mentioned the presence of the countries’ “Special Air Service” commando forces in Afghanistan (Filkins, 2010). While publicly available US government documents had listed New Zealand’s participation in OEF from 2002 onward (US-DoD, 2002: 8), and the annual report of New Zealand’s Ministry of Defence explicitly mentions its efforts “to help Afghanistan eliminate terrorist groups through the deployment of our Special Air Services” (NZ-MoD, 2003: 17–18), the wider public only became aware of these proceedings after the newspaper coverage, which led Prime Minister John Key to confirm the countries’ military involvement (Young, 2010).


20. The Danish Folketing voted 101–111 in favor of a government proposal for the deployment of a contingent of about 100 Special Forces and four F-16 fighter planes accompanied by up to 250 military personnel to support US-led operations in Afghanistan (DK-FT, 2001). Norway deployed four F-16s and about 70 Special Forces for combat operations in Afghanistan (IISS, 2002: 353). According to a press release by its embassy, Norwegian Special Forces were involved in the US-led ground offensive “Operation Anaconda” that took place in March 2002 in the Paktika Province in southern Afghanistan:
In addition to support aircraft, the Netherlands contributed six F-16 fighter planes, which were initially mandated to fulfill reconnaissance tasks only. These restrictions were lifted upon deployment, however, and the aircraft flew more than 800 sorties as close air support for combat operations from October 1, 2002 onward (NL-MoD, 2009).

21. In the context of invoking the mutual defense clause of the ANZUS Treaty, Australia contributed Special Forces to OEF from October 2001 onward (AU-DPS, 2010: 2). The German Bundestag voted 336–326 in favor of the deployment of Special Forces to Afghanistan, as part of a broader contribution in the context of the fight against terrorism, including sizable naval forces off the Horn of Africa (DE-BT, 2001a; 2001c). For New Zealand's contribution see the previous note in this section. Lithuania deployed a contingent of 37 Special Forces soldiers to the OEF mission in Afghanistan (US-HoR, 2003: 12).

22. In addition to delivering humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, Spain contributed a military hospital to Bagram airbase, supporting American and British OEF forces stationed in the region (González, 2002). Italy deployed support aircraft and engineers to repair the runway at Bagram airbase (US-DoD, 2002: 6). Polish engineers were mainly involved in mine clearance activity (US-DoD, 2002: 9). The Slovak government deployed engineers to the Kabul area (US-HoR, 2003: 12).

23. Since the focus of this case study is on Afghanistan, I do not consider naval contributions in the wider context of OEF. However, instead of counting Greece and Japan as non-participants, I code their contributions as indirect forms of military support (US-DoD, 2002: 6). On Japan's role, see also US-SE (2002: 403).


25. Latvian cargo handlers were deployed to Manas, Kyrgyzstan, in support of a Danish contingent (US-DoD, 2002: 7). Estonian Foreign Minister Kristiina Ojuland explicitly mentions her country's contribution to OEF in her address to the UN General Assembly (General Debate, 57th Session, September 20, 2002).


27. While parliamentary approval is mandatory in Austria, decisions on military deployments in the Nationalrat are delegated to the Hauptausschuss as the main committee of parliament. In the 22nd legislative term (10/1999-12/2002) this committee comprised 28 members, including 16 from the reigning ÖVP/FPO coalition.

28. The coding of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania corresponds with Dieterich et al. who classify these countries as having 'very strong parliamentary war powers' (2010: 17–19, 28–32). For a similar coding of Lithuania, see Wagner et al. (2010: 69). Throughout their democratic transition, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania firmly established parliamentary authority in security affairs, but these provisions were curbed in 2003 to accommodate the NATO accession process, restricting mandatory parliamentary approval to military operations outside treaty obligations (Wagner et al., 2010: 38, 58, 84).
29. In 1994, the Slovenian legislature passed the Law on Defence that authorizes the executive to decide on “the level of participation of the Slovenian Army in fulfilling the obligations assumed with international organization treaties” (Wagner et al., 2010: 86).

30. Article 43 (4a) of the Czech Constitution refers to operations that arise from “international contractual obligations.” While the invocation of NATO Article 5 did not entail mandatory military participation in OEF, many NATO member states explained their participation on the basis of alliance obligations.

31. See the different evaluations in Dieterich et al. (2010: 26), Luther (2003: 452), and Wagner et al. (2010: 65).

32. See Besselink (2003: 553) and Wagner et al. (2010: 74).

33. Slovakia introduced a constitutional amendment in February 2001, which curbed parliamentary involvement for most operations (Wagner et al., 2010: 85). Unlike in the Czech Republic, where Art. 43 (6) gives parliament an *ex post* veto right, no such provision is found in the respective Slovakian amendment of Article 119 (p). On the United States, see Baker and Christopher (2009).


35. Austrian deployment provisions to this effect are contained in the *Bundesverfassungsgesetz* of April 21, 1997 (I, 1–2). Finland amended its constitutional framework several times throughout the past two decades, but constitutional restrictions continue to rule out operations beyond the defensive use of force and those without a UN or OSCE mandate (Jakobsen, 2006: 120–121). For Ireland, respective provisions are stated in the *Defence Act* of 1954 and several amendments made through 1983, which can be accessed at: http://www.attorneygeneral.ie/slru/restatements.html.

In Japan, Article 9 of the Constitution of 1946 renounces the use of force and the maintenance of armed forces. While subsequent legislation enabled Japanese participation in peace support operations, as in the Peacekeeping Law of 1992, the use of force remains prohibited (Shibata, 2003: 211–213). This principle is evident also in the Anti-Terrorism Law of 2001, which explicitly states, that the measures in support of OEF “must not constitute the threat or use of force” (Art. 3, II). Sweden adapted its legal framework in the 1990s to allow participation in a greater range of peace support operations, but the general requirement of a UN mandate remained (Jakobsen, 2006: 183–184).

36. In Italy, for instance, Article 10 (1) of the Constitution requires operations to be in accordance with the “generally recognized tenets of international law.” But apart from this lenient provision, there are “no specific constitutional limits for international operations undertaken jointly with armed forces of other states” (Luther, 2003: 447).

37. This document is available at, https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=6294.


39. Across this group of countries, constitutional provisions with regard to military deployments are either non-existent or decidedly open in their
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40. While the United States initiated OEF on October 7, most countries that eventually joined the operation did not authorize deployments before December. Hence, for the United States I consider opinion polls from October, while the cross-national surveys focus on public support for military participation between November and December of 2001.

41. The Gallup International survey asked: “Some countries and all NATO member states have agreed to participate in the military action against Afghanistan. Do you agree or disagree that (your country) should take part with the United States in military action against Afghanistan?” The Flash Eurobarometer survey asked respondents about their agreement with five policy options in response to the threat of international terrorism, one of them being military force: “In any case (our country) is to take or has already taken decisions about which policy should be applied now. Amongst the following measures, which ones seem appropriate to you […] (D) To send (nationality) troops to fight with the U.S. forces.”

42. The effects of different question wording can be illustrated with an example from the German Politbarometer poll (2001), which I considered but did not include in this study. First, respondents were asked about German military participation in US-led operations, a question that was raised against the backdrop of Chancellor Schröder’s promise of military support to the United States. While the resultant 56 per cent public support corresponds with the Gallup survey results, a question wording with less background would have been preferable. The Politbarometer poll also raised the issue of German participation in a “UN peacekeeping force” in Afghanistan, which yielded overwhelming public support of 82 per cent. However, the question was phrased in a way that passed over the fact that while the UN authorized ISAF, it was not the “blue helmet” operation that the question alluded to.

43. Naturally, this share varies across polls. In the Gallup International survey an average of 11 per cent of respondents were undecided or gave no answer. The Flash Eurobarometer survey had 8 per cent of respondents in the undecided or no answer category, including those that answered “maybe if …” to the survey question.

44. To this effect the recollections of former Prime Minister Blair are revealing: “To us then, and I believe this to be true now, there is no neat distinction between a campaign to exorcise al-Qaeda, or to prevent Taliban re-emergence, or to build democracy, or to ensure there is a proper, not a narco, economy. There is no ‘or’ about it” (Blair, 2011: 362). A similar mentioning of varied goals, entailing solidarity with the United States, fighting terrorism, preserving liberal values, and protecting human rights, can be found in the memoir of former Foreign Minister Fischer (2011: 43–46).

45. I decide against including row seven, since it would reduce the overall consistency of the solution, while adding only a single case with a low outcome value to the minimization procedure.

46. To a lesser extent this also applies to Belgium, the Czech Republic, and Poland. Unlike Italy, however, these countries hold much lower values in the solution term.
7 Iraq: Parliamentary Peace or Partisan Politics?


2. Recently declassified material indicates that the Department of Defense under Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had made war plans against Iraq as early as November 2001 (US-DoD, 2001a).

3. The Downing Street Memo and related documents were first published on May 1, 2005 in the British newspaper *The Sunday Times*. The document can be accessed at the National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB418/.

4. Despite initial reservations about the legality of the use of force against Iraq, Goldsmith adopted the US position on “revived authorization” after a visit to Washington in early 2003, arguing in a confidential legal advice to the Prime Minister, dated February 12, that “a reasonable case can be made that resolution 1441 revives the authorisation to use force in resolution 678” (UK-AG, 2003: 6).

5. Formed in 2009 after an announcement by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the Iraq Inquiry sought to investigate the decision-making process that led to the British involvement in the Iraq War. The Inquiry website hosts a comprehensive collection of primary material, which can be accessed at, http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk.


8. The letter was signed by prime ministers José M. Aznar, Spain; José M. D. Barroso, Portugal; Silvio Berlusconi, Italy; Tony Blair, United Kingdom; Peter Medgyessy, Hungary; Leszek Miller, Poland; Anders F. Rasmussen, Denmark; as well as president Václav Havel, Czech Republic. The letter appeared in the January 30th editions of several international newspapers, including the *Wall Street Journal*. It is reprinted in Ehrenberg et al. (2010: 124–125).

9. News reports and governmental investigations later confirmed that Powell’s speech had been based on false information, mostly from the notorious informant named “Curveball” (Chulov and Pidd, 2011). On February 6, 2004, President Bush had established a commission by executive order, which was to investigate US intelligence capabilities regarding WMD. Submitting their report in March 2005, the Commissioners were blunt in their assessment, concluding that, “the Intelligence Community was dead wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction” (US-WH, 2005: cover letter). With regard to Powell’s speech, it was found that critical information that doubted Curveball’s credibility had not been passed along to the Department of State:

   The Commission also learned that, on the eve of the war, the Intelligence Community failed to convey important information to policymakers.
After the October 2002 NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] was published, but before Secretary of State Powell made his address about Iraq’s WMD programs to the United Nations, serious doubts became known within the Intelligence Community about Curveball, the aforementioned human intelligence source whose reporting was so critical to the Intelligence Community’s pre-war biological warfare assessments. These doubts never found their way to Secretary Powell, who was at that time attempting to strip questionable information from his speech. (US-WH, 2005: 50).


12. The empirical pattern notwithstanding, preventive war has always been a “lurking possibility” between adversarial states, as Thomas Schelling noted (1966: 269).


14. The collective statement appeared as a paid advertisement in the September 22, 2002 edition of the New York Times. It was signed by realist scholars such as John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, and Kenneth Waltz but also by constructivist scholars such as Elizabeth Kier, to name just a few of the 33 signatories.

15. However, this should not imply that there was a “public debate” between neoconservatives and realists in a true sense of the word, as one of the striking characteristics of the months preceding the conflict was precisely the lack of any substantial political opposition to the Bush administration’s war plans against Iraq.

16. An early articulation of the neoconservative worldview, then labelled as a “Neo-Reaganite” approach to foreign policy, is put forth in a Foreign Affairs article by William Kristol and Robert Kagan, who turn against what they perceive as “Wilsonian multilateralism” and “idealistic whimsy” of the Clinton presidency (1996: 18, 27).

17. While Cheney and Rumsfeld are characterized as “US primacists” by Cramer and Duggan (2012: 202), other authors reveal differences on whether these members of the Bush administration should be conceived as neoconservative. For instance, Khong sees a “common thread” between neoconservatives and those who favored forcible regime in Iraq. Nevertheless he notes, “To be sure, Rumsfeld is not usually thought of as a neoconservative. Neither is Vice-President Dick Cheney” (2008: 258). By contrast, Schmidt and Williams define both Rumsfeld and Cheney as neoconservative and argue with regard to the latter, “we think the evidence indicates that Cheney is closely associated with the position of the neoconservatives, at least as an ‘implementer’ if not an ‘originator’ of their ideas” (2008: 193, 201).
19. Schuster and Maier focus on political support but their study suggests that the argument also holds for military participation as dependent variable (2006: 232). In contrast to the results for Western Europe, the authors find no consistent partisan pattern among CEE countries.
21. Political controversy erupted over the leak of confidential documents suggesting that Prime Minister Lipponen had promised military support to the United States. While Lipponen publicly denied these claims, his challenger Anneli Jaatteenmaki of the Social Democrats capitalized on the issue and won the elections, but had to step down within two months of becoming Finland’s first female Prime Minister (BBC, 2004a; HS, 2003).
22. In legal terms the occupation ended on June 30, 2004 with the Interim Government of Iraq assuming “full authority and responsibility,” according to SC Res 1546 (June 8, 2004).
23. American and British forces carried out the largest part of the invasion of Iraq, while Australian and Polish contingents were also involved in major combat operations from the invasion phase onward. US forces in Iraq amounted to 150,816 troops, while about the same number were deployed to Kuwait (Gordon and Trainor, 2006: 555). British forces numbered 46,150 soldiers, including 28,000 army personnel (UK-MoD, 2003a, 2003b: 84). Detailed accounts of the Iraq War from a US military perspective are provided in Cordesman (2003), Gordon and Trainor (2006), and Ricks (2007). Poland initially deployed 125 Special Forces, 74 chemical and biological warfare specialists and support units. In August 2003, when Poland took the lead of a sector in south-central Iraq, these forces were replaced with 2,400 mechanized infantry soldiers (US-CMH, 2011: 98; US-CRS, 2003: 25). See also Heimann and Palm (2003). The Australian contribution contained about 500 Special Forces, as well as other army, naval, and air force units. Their tasks involved measures against potential Scud missile attacks and highway patrols in western Iraq (AU-DoD, 2003: 21–26; US-CMH, 2011: 39–41). See also Eastley (2009).
24. The Spanish government contributed a marine infantry company from April 2003 onward, in addition to support units such as NBC personnel and a medical echelon. In July, the deployment was enlarged to 1,300 forces, as part of the multinational brigade “Plus Ultra” that was led by Poland in the Iraqi province of An Najaf (BBC, 2004b; ES-MoD, 2008). Lithuania sent military medics, logistical specialists, and infantry units about 130 soldiers in total in April 2003, which were deployed in the British and Polish sectors and conducted security patrols, among other tasks (LT-MoD, 2008; US-CRS, 2003: 21). Bulgaria made an initial contribution of 485 infantry soldiers in May 2003, a deployment that was replaced with a smaller contingent in 2005 (BBC, 2005; Kostadinov, 2008). Latvia deployed 145 infantry soldiers to the Qadisiyyah province in Central Iraq from May 2003 onward (LV-MoFA, 2011: 21; US-CRS, 2005: 22).
25. Denmark sent 410 soldiers in June 2003, consisting of an armored infantry division, a reconnaissance squadron, other support units, and armed
vehicles (DK-FT, 2003; DK-MoD, 2003). Estonia contributed an infantry platoon of about 55 soldiers from June 2003 onward, to secure supply convoys in western Baghdad as part of a joint operation with US troops of the 10th Mountain Division (Foley, 2005; EE-MoFA, 2003a). Italy sent 2,400 troops in July 2003, including mechanized infantry, helicopter units, and 400 *Carabinieri* police officers, which are part of the military structure. Italian forces served among a multinational division led by the British in the Dhi Qar Province, where they fulfilled mainly patrol tasks (BBC, 2003b; US-CMH, 2011: 68–70; US-CRS, 2003: 18–19). The Netherlands and Romania deployed troops in August 2003. Dutch forces comprised a deployment of 1,345 soldiers, including infantry, a marine battle group and helicopters. These were stationed at different locations within the province of Al Muthanna, serving to rebuild infrastructure and provide force protection, among other tasks (NL-CO, 2010; US-CMH, 2011). The Romanian contribution entailed about 730 soldiers, including an infantry battalion, military police, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists (Marquis, 2004; US-CMH, 2011: 105–107; US-CRS, 2003: 26).


27. In September 2003, New Zealand deployed engineers and reconstruction units to southern Iraq, near Al Basrah (NZ-HoR, 2003a, 2003b; US-CMH, 2011: 90–92). Portugal sent 128 military police to serve alongside Italian *Carabinieri* between October 2003 and February 2005 (BBC, 2003c; US-CRS, 2003: 25). In February 2004, Japan deployed engineers for reconstruction as well as several C-130 air crews for airlift (BBC, 2008; Miyagi, 2009). Unlike the other three countries, Canada was not involved with ground units, but provided airlift with three C-130 Hercules transport aircraft from June onward, carrying coalition soldiers and equipment (Cordesman, 2003: 24; CA-DoD, 2003).


29. Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel reiterated in public statements that his government would not support military action without UN authorization (Standard, 2003). While the Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson of the Social Democrats had initially taken a moderate position toward US policy, he called upon Swedes to demonstrate against the war as the conflict loomed closer (AFP, 2003a). Despite controversy over alleged support to the United States, Finnish Prime Minister Lipponen publicly distanced himself from the
Iraq War plans (HS, 2003). The US State Department confirmed this notion, stating that it did not consider Finland “part of a war coalition” (AFP, 2003b).

30. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, parliamentary veto rights were more comprehensive than for Afghanistan, because unlike OEF, the war against Iraq could not be considered “defense against aggression.”

31. This coding reflects the presence of a basic veto right. In Italy its effectiveness is limited by contending constitutional interpretations. The Japanese Diet is restricted to an ex post authorization of military deployments, that applies after a period of 20 days has passed (Wagner et al., 2010: 67).

32. The coding refers to the situation in 2002–2003. Since then the legal situation has changed in some countries. Spain, for instance, introduced a parliamentary veto right in 2005 (Ley Orgánica de la Defensa Nacional, 5/2005, 17 Noviembre).

33. The exact question wording is not documented (cf. Midford, 2006: 29).


35. I decide against including Row 6 as it would lower the overall consistency but add only a single case to the minimization procedure. Furthermore, Norway holds a low membership (0.55) in the respective configuration and thus cannot yield much inferential leverage for this specific combination of conditions.

8 Democracies and the Wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq

1. The principle of a “responsibility to protect” was first articulated in a report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS, 2001). In 2005, the UN General Assembly included this principle in paragraphs 138 and 139 of its outcome document at the World Summit (UN-GA, 2005). In 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon published the first report in a series of documents that address the implementation of the responsibility to protect (UN-GA, 2009). These documents can be accessed at, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/.

2. It goes without saying that these sections cannot replace a detailed analysis, but they shall serve to illustrate the evolution of both conflicts and potential explanations for military (non-) involvement.

3. As a long-standing NATO member, Germany's abstention came as a surprise to many. Ambassador Peter Wittig explained that his government favored “strong sanctions” as an instrument “to initiate the necessary political transition” in Libya. He justified the refusal to use force by emphasizing the inherent risks, including a “large-scale loss of life” and “the danger of being drawn into a protracted military conflict that would affect the wider region” (UN-SC, 2011a: 5).

4. Operation Odyssey Dawn was the term used by the United States. The British mission ran under the codename “Operation Ellamy,” whereas the French called it “Operation Harmattan” (US-CRS, 2011).

5. With the exception of Denmark and Norway all NATO members that contributed to the air operations also made naval contributions. Information
on NATO activities in Libya is provided at, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/71679.htm. For details on countries’ individual deployments, see Rogers (2011).

6. However, in the United States, the House of Representatives voted against the authorization of the military operation in Libya, though it did not use its “power of the purse” to cut funding (US-HoR, 2011), as some delegates had initially threatened to do (Steinhauer, 2011). This reflects a long-standing controversy between the executive and legislative branches over the proper domain of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (cf. Baker and Christopher, 2009).

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