

Online Appendix to ‘Incentives and Constraints: A Configurational Account of European Involvement in the anti-Daesh Coalition’

Table A1: Calibration of Conditions and Outcome

Condition	Measure	Calibration	Threshold range
External Threat	Citizens who went to Syria or Iraq to join Daesh as foreign fighters (TSC 2017)	Direct method (1, 2, 200)	Exclusion: -1, 1, 1 Crossover: 2, 2, NA Inclusion: NA, 200, NA
Alliance Value	Index: NATO membership, Atlanticism, and alliance dependence (Asmus et al. 2004; GMF 2014)	Direct method (0.75, 1.25, 2)	Exclusion: -0.75, 0.75, 0.75 Crossover: 1.25, 1.25, 1.75 Inclusion: 1.5, 2, NA
Right Executive	Left-right position of governing party/coalition (Bakker et al. 2015; Döring/Manow 2018)	Direct method (4, 5, 6)	Exclusion: 3, 4, 4.5 Crossover: 4.5, 5, 5 Inclusion: 5.5, 6, NA
Parliamentary Veto Rights	Legislature's right to veto military deployments (Dieterich et al. 2015; Wagner et al. 2010)	Qualitative assignment	Not applicable
Public Threat Perception	Public opinion on the challenge arising from terrorism, including the foreign fighters phenomenon (Special Eurobarometer 2015)	Direct method (0.50, 0.625, 0.70)	Exclusion: 0.3, 0.5, 0.5 Crossover: 0.625, 0.625, 0.625 Inclusion: 0.7, 0.7, 0.8
Military Participation	Military contributions to the anti-Daesh coalition (Drennan 2014; McInnis 2016; Saideman 2016; ministries of defense, https://theglobalcoalition.org)	Qualitative assignment	Not applicable

Note: Threshold range indicates the range of empirical anchors for a condition’s calibration within which the solution term does not change. This test was conducted with the “rob.calibrange” function of the SetMethods package (Oana and Schneider 2018), “NA” indicates that the function could not find a limit to the range.

Figure A1: Histograms of Calibrated Sets




Table A2: Truth Table with Logical Remainders

Conditions					Outcome		Consistency	PRI	Country
T	A	R	V	P	MP	N			
1	1	1	0	1	1	2	1.00	1.00	Netherlands, United Kingdom
1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1.00	1.00	France
1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1.00	1.00	Belgium
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1.00	1.00	Denmark
1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0.98	0.97	Italy
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.91	0.88	Germany
0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.87	0.80	Poland
0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0.39	0.16	Portugal
0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.29	0.02	Hungary
1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0.28	0.04	Sweden
0	1	1	1	0	0	2	0.24	0.01	Estonia, Latvia
1	0	1	1	1	0	2	0.23	0.04	Austria, Finland
0	0	1	1	1	0	2	0.22	0.02	Cyprus, Ireland
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.20	0.00	Slovakia
0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.19	0.02	Croatia
1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0.19	0.02	Spain
0	1	0	1	0	0	2	0.19	0.01	Lithuania, Romania
0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.14	0.02	Slovenia
0	0	0	1	1	0	3	0.14	0.02	Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Malta
1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.13	0.04	Bulgaria
0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0.10	0.02	Greece
0	0	1	0	0	?	– *			
0	1	0	0	0	?	–			
0	1	0	0	1	?	–			
0	1	0	1	1	?	–			
0	1	1	1	1	?	–			
1	0	0	0	0	?	– *			
1	0	0	1	0	?	–			
1	0	1	0	0	?	– *			
1	1	0	0	0	?	– *			
1	1	0	1	0	?	–			
1	1	1	0	0	?	– *			

Notes : T = External Threat, A = Alliance Value, R = Right Executive, V = Parliamentary Veto Rights, P = Public Threat Perception, MP = Military Participation, bold cases hold membership >0.50 in the outcome, asterisks (*) indicate logical remainders used as simplifying assumptions for the intermediate solution (based on directional expectations, as indicated in the paper).

Table A3: Conservative Solution

This table displays the conservative solution (also referred to as complex solution). The configurations are identical to the intermediate solution except for a single condition in the five-condition configuration that comprises path 3 (the absence of external threat). The measures of fit for individual paths and the overall solution are also identical (except for a slightly lower PRI in Path 3, when compared to the intermediate solution).

	Paths		
	1	2	3
External Threat	●	●	⊗
Alliance Value	●		●
Right Executive			●
Parliamentary Veto Rights		⊗	⊗
Public Threat Perception	●	●	⊗
Consistency	0.95	0.99	0.87
PRI	0.94	0.99	0.80
Raw Coverage	0.53	0.52	0.08
Unique Coverage	0.19	0.18	0.08
Covered Cases / Uniquely Covered Cases (Bold)	DEU DNK GBR ITA NLD	BEL FRA GBR ITA NLD	POL
Solution Consistency	0.95		
Solution PRI	0.95		
Solution Coverage	0.79		
Model/Total	M1/1		

Note: Black circles indicate the presence of a condition, crossed-out circles refer to the absence of the condition.

Table A4: Parsimonious Solution, Models 1 and 2

This table displays the two logically equivalent models of the parsimonious solution. Apart from slightly different measures of fit, the configurations are identical except for a single condition in Path 3 (the presence of alliance value in model 1 and the presence of right executive in model 2). The parsimonious solution also resonates with the substantive interpretation provided in the paper, which was based on the intermediate solution.

	Paths		
	1	2	3
External Threat	●	●	
Alliance Value	●		●
Right Executive			●
Parliamentary Veto Rights		⊗	⊗
Public Threat Perception	●		⊗
Consistency	0.95	0.99	0.77
PRI	0.94	0.99	0.63
Raw Coverage	0.53	0.53	0.10
Unique Coverage	0.19	0.19	0.09
Covered Cases / Uniquely Covered Cases (Bold)	DEU DNK GBR ITA NLD	BEL FRA GBR ITA NLD	POL
Solution Consistency		0.93	
Solution PRI		0.92	
Solution Coverage		0.80	
Model/Total		M1/2	

Note: Black circles indicate the presence of a condition, crossed-out circles refer to the absence of the condition.

	Paths		
	1	2	3
External Threat	●	●	
Alliance Value	●		
Right Executive			●
Parliamentary Veto Rights		⊗	⊗
Public Threat Perception	●		⊗
Consistency	0.95	0.99	0.77
PRI	0.94	0.99	0.63
Raw Coverage	0.53	0.53	0.08
Unique Coverage	0.19	0.19	0.08
Covered Cases / Uniquely Covered Cases (Bold)	DEU DNK GBR ITA NLD	BEL FRA GBR ITA NLD	POL
Solution Consistency		0.95	
Solution PRI		0.95	
Solution Coverage		0.79	
Model/Total		M2/2	

Note: Black circles indicate the presence of a condition, crossed-out circles refer to the absence of the condition.

Table A5: Robustness Test (Crisp Sets)

For this robustness test, all of the study’s fuzzy-set conditions were transformed into crisp sets (dichotomized). A comparison with Table 5 shows that the results are substantively identical, and thus robust, both in terms of the solution paths and the case attribution. What changes are the measures of fit, which show perfect solution consistency, coverage, and PRI when crisp sets are used in the analysis.

	Paths		
	1	2	3
External Threat	●	●	
Alliance Value	●		●
Right Executive			●
Parliamentary Veto Rights		⊗	⊗
Public Threat Perception	●	●	⊗
Consistency	1.00	1.00	1.00
PRI	1.00	1.00	1.00
Raw Coverage	0.63	0.63	0.13
Unique Coverage	0.25	0.25	0.13
Covered Cases / Uniquely Covered Cases (Bold)	DEU DNK GBR ITA NLD	BEL FRA GBR ITA NLD	POL
Solution Consistency		1.00	
Solution PRI		1.00	
Solution Coverage		1.00	
Model/Total		M1/1	

Note: Black circles indicate the presence of a condition, crossed-out circles refer to the absence of the condition.

Table A6: Robustness Test (Alternative Calibration of the Outcome)

For this robustness test, more weight was assigned to lower-level military contributions like the training of local forces (fuzzy scores of 0.3 and 0.4, respectively, depending on the number of personnel) and logistical support such as overflight and basing rights (fuzzy score 0.2). Also, political support was assigned a fuzzy score of 0.1 (for a comparison to the original values, see Table 1). This robustness test yields results that are substantively identical to those reported in Table 5. A difference can be seen with regards to consistency, PRI, and coverage – with the former two increasing and the latter decreasing due to the alternative calibration of the outcome.

	Paths		
	1	2	3
External Threat	●	●	
Alliance Value	●		●
Right Executive			●
Parliamentary Veto Rights		⊗	⊗
Public Threat Perception	●	●	⊗
Consistency	0.96	0.99	1.00
PRI	0.96	0.99	1.00
Raw Coverage	0.40	0.39	0.07
Unique Coverage	0.15	0.13	0.07
Covered Cases /	DEU	BEL	POL
Uniquely Covered Cases	DNK	FRA	
(Bold)	GBR	GBR	
	ITA	ITA	
	NLD	NLD	
Solution Consistency		0.98	
Solution PRI		0.97	
Solution Coverage		0.60	
Model/Total		M1/1	

Note: Black circles indicate the presence of a condition, crossed-out circles refer to the absence of the condition.

Table A7: Robustness Test (Restricted Analysis)

For this robustness test, an analysis was conducted solely with the three conditions external threat, alliance value, and parliamentary veto rights (the three conditions that comprise Path 2 of the intermediate solution term reported in Table 5). The result confirms the pattern previously identified. However, due to the exclusion of the conditions right executive and public threat perception, fewer cases are covered and thus there is only a single solution path, which entails only five of the eight cases that show the outcome, whereas the intermediate solution with five conditions accounts for all of these cases (coverage drops from 0.79 to 0.53 in the restricted analysis). Hence, the intermediate solution with the full model of five conditions is the preferred solution for the substantive interpretation.

	Path
	1
External Threat	●
Alliance Value	
Parliamentary Veto Rights	⊗
Consistency	0.99
PRI	0.99
Raw Coverage	0.53
Unique Coverage	–
Covered Cases	BEL FRA GBR ITA NLD
Solution Consistency	0.99
Solution PRI	0.99
Solution Coverage	0.53
Model/Total	M1/1

Note: Black circles indicate the presence of a condition, crossed-out circles refer to the absence of the condition.

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