

a helpful discussion of selection issues in related datasets and how COIL is able to mitigate them). IR scholars will no doubt make significant use of this public good (the COIL data are available for download), which could be used as an alternative to the widely used Correlates of War IO membership data.

While it is beyond the scope of this brief review to discuss COIL's empirical findings in detail, the central result is robust evidence in favor of the 12 conjectures. Not every conjecture is supported by the data, but the statistical analysis broadly confirms that the patterns hypothesized describe the continent in the way Koremenos argues. This result is a powerful demonstration of logical coherence in international law, and is the book's greatest contribution.

That said, the empirical approach also raises some questions about how to interpret the results. Most of the analysis consists of probit, logit, or OLS regressions that find correlations between the variables identified in the conjectures. As Koremenos notes, this puts the work more in the realm of comparative statics than causal identification, which is appropriate given the nature of the conjectures. That being said, in several cases the regressions consider additional complications, such as by taking conjectures in combination, as opposed to individually. Koremenos presents theoretically plausible reasons for these departures from the book's basic theoretical apparatus; however, without more theoretical elaboration such moves could also be seen as *ad hoc*. Similarly, various control variables are sprinkled into the analysis, like regime type or whether or not an agreement includes the United States. COIL briefly connects these factors to their theoretical bases (e.g. theories of domestic politics, hegemony), but none are developed as meaningful alternative explanations, and so they again take on an *ad hoc* quality. Finally, COIL makes effective use of anecdotal information regarding certain international agreements to exemplify the logic of the conjectures. While they are readable and engaging examples of the dynamics COIL describes, these qualitative snippets are not able to provide additional evidence for COIL's theoretical arguments because the observable implications of the hypotheses for qualitative data are never laid out. Again, more attention to the micro-foundations of the theories would have been helpful in this regard.

The core idea that Koremenos pulls from this vast project is that international law matters because states create it rationally. To understand this contribution, it is important to situate it in a relatively long arc of intellectual history. IR scholars began to use rational choice to explain systematically the emergence and function of international institutions in the 1980s. Institutionalism originally intended to modify realist theories, which could only account for institutions as extensions and epiphenomena of state power. By the early 1990s, however, institutionalism and realism had come to be treated

(explicitly or implicitly) by many scholars as alternative “-isms” battling for dominance. As is often the case when paradigms come to see themselves not as competing explanations but as intellectual enemies, scholars sometimes framed their research around questions that were more useful as swords for disciplinary civil war than as ploughshares to cultivate our knowledge of world politics. One such distraction was the question of whether international institutions “matter” or not. The productive version of this question (how, and under what conditions, do international institutions affect state behaviour and other outcomes of interest?) was too often reduced to a binary and ultimately trivial debate. Happily, out of these paradigm wars emerged a rationalist approach to IR that took anarchy, power, *and* institutions seriously. In IPE, at least, rational institutionalism became the dominant approach within the discipline, and remains so today.

In some ways, COIL does not seem fully aware of this status, directing its contribution to an older literature. Koremenos asserts that IR has not paid sufficient attention to international law (p. 6), but then cites a range of studies that do exactly that, including her own work over a distinguished career. The book emphasizes the contribution of the dataset by stating, “Until recently, the empirical side of the field of international cooperation consisted mostly of case studies,” which would surprise the generations of scholars, many of whom are cited in COIL, who have made their careers around the quantitative study of preferential trade agreements, bilateral investment treaties, human rights agreements, environmental treaties, or similar work. The reader therefore wishes that Koremenos would have extended her discussion of how her ‘continent’ and the rationalist ideas that define it relate to other features of the contemporary IPE landscape. COIL succeeds in affirming the importance of rationalist theories of institutional design. But, focused on deepening a well-established paradigm, it is able to tell us much less about how and why such ideas matter. How much more is there to discover on this continent?

**Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict: Military Involvement in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.** By Patrick Mello. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 259p. \$110.00 cloth, \$24.99 paper.  
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Patrick A. Mello addresses a set of important questions: Why and under what conditions do democracies participate in armed conflict? Do constitutional provisions that define limits to participation in military actions, the rights of parliaments to veto participation, or public opinion provide effective constraints on democratic leaders? Are conservative, rightist governments more war prone than leftist governments? Or is military capacity—that is,

governments' ability to actually conduct such interventions—the most effective constraint?

One of the most important findings of *Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict* is that constitutional provisions matter. They provide effective barriers against the participation of democracies, especially for interventions whose international legal basis is controversial. Thus, where international law fails to prevent such wars, domestic constitutions step in—at least in the case of established democracies. None of the democracies with constitutional constraints have participated in such interventions. Another important finding is that military power matters, too, but in ways not anticipated by some theories of international relations. Parliamentary veto points and lack of public support seem to constrain only militarily weak states. Military power alone is not a sufficient condition for participation, but it only works together with other factors, such as the absence of constitutional constraints, public support, or the existence of a right-wing executive. These surprisingly unambiguous findings result from three systematic case studies involving between 23 and 30 democracies for each case.

Mello's studies start from the observation that the involvement of democracies shows considerable variation, not only regarding military participation or military nonparticipation but also regarding the extent of participation. Some states contribute troops; others provide only logistical support. What is the explanation for their participation in different degrees? And what is the explanation for nonparticipation?

The first chapter provides the scholarly context for the studies, which is set by the democratic peace literature. In an excellently written literature review, Mello carves out the research gap that he seeks to address. The democratic peace literature pays too little attention to gradations of democracies and to different types of domestic constraints. Yet democratic participation varies widely over different cases of military involvement.

The second chapter provides the state of the art on domestic constraints on military involvement by democracies. Here, Mello casts the net widely and discusses three groups of factors in depth, comprising eight separate explanations analyzing the military involvement of democracies. These follow the logic of institutional, constructivist, and realist explanations for democratic participation.

The third chapter presents, as Mello claims, a theory of military participation by democracies that combines domestic factors—including different forms of institutional constraints—and structural factors. However, to speak of a theory of military involvement is certainly an overstatement if one considers the conventional meaning of theory as a set of connected statements providing a causal explanation for a phenomenon. Altogether, Mello develops 10 hypotheses on military (non)participation,

establishing a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for each outcome. Apart from the fact that he does not connect these factors to a narrative on how they actually work together to cause an outcome, some readers not familiar with fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) language might find it hard to follow the various types of necessity and sufficiency conditions here, such as INUS and INESS.

Chapter 4 explains the methodological approach of the book—fsQCA. The discussion demonstrates that fsQCA has seen an almost revolutionary development over the last decade in terms of its technical requirements and methodological depth of the discussion. The discussion itself is technical, but necessary for understanding the following empirical chapters. Chapters 5–7 explore democratic war (non)participation in three case studies that occurred within a brief period of time: the Kosovo War in 1999, the Afghanistan War of 2001, and the Iraq War of 2003. The cases are similar, according to Mello, to the extent that they all constitute military actions—actually enforcement measures—that did not have explicit authorization by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). At the same time, the cases vary, according to the author, as they involve different coalitions of states. In the case of Kosovo, NATO conducted the intervention in its capacity as a regional organization, without proper UNSC authorization. Such an authorization would have been necessary given that NATO acted without the consent of the affected state and as a regional organization out of its geographical area. In the second case of Afghanistan, the intervention was conducted by an ad hoc coalition of willing states expressing their solidarity with the U.S. government after the attacks of 9/11 and acting under the UN Charter's self-defense provisions. Here, the intervention can be regarded as legal, even if there was no explicit UNSC authorization. In the third case, Iraq, the United States, and the British government led an intervention that did not have UNSC approval. The international legal community was almost united in evaluating the U.S. and British justifications for intervention as not covered by international law.

Each of these case studies is similarly structured: A brief overview and lucidly written narrative of the historical context of the interventions is followed by discussion of the major case-specific explanations for each case. Mello then explains the coding procedure for his key variables: parliamentary veto rights, constitutional restrictions, partisanship, public support, and military power. This is followed by the computer-aided analysis leading to distinct causal pathways for participation and nonparticipation in each armed conflict. The contribution of the findings to the literature—whether they provide support for a hypothesis or not—is then discussed. Finally, Chapter 8 provides a cross-case analysis of the case studies and the book's key findings.

*Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict* is clearly structured, and the reader is well guided through the chapters. The author does a very good job of spelling out the contribution to the existing literature. Moreover, Mello makes a case for the superiority of fsQCA over both quantitative approaches and case studies. He stakes out his claims well, but his arguments are not always convincing. For example, it does not become clear why fsQCA should be superior to a quantitative test of the hypotheses apart from the fact that the data are missing with regard to the latter. A clear focus on and argument for fsQCA's ability to provide a different causal pathway might have been more convincing.

In addition, Mello's desire to make a methodological contribution besides an empirical one leads to an over-emphasis on methods. There is no explanation as to why it is necessary to explain the coding procedure in such great detail for each case study, especially if the procedure is almost identical over the case studies. Here, it would have been more efficient to either explain the coding procedure for all cases in the methods chapter or move these parts to the appendix.

A substantial interpretation and contextualization of Mello's findings would also have been useful. The most important and robust finding that constitutional constraints matter for war participation is not sufficiently discussed in view of its political relevance. Thus, the most compelling message almost gets lost. Additionally, the relevance of other cogent factors, such as military power, is hard to generalize across the cases, especially as the empirical chapters do not always discuss the same factors. Overall, Mello's contribution is highly elucidating and provides an important piece of the puzzle to the democratic peace literature, even if it is overtly wedded to and ultimately constrained by its method.

**Human Rights Protection in Global Politics: Responsibilities of States and Non-State Actors.** Edited by Kurt Mills and David Jason Karp. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 316p. \$105. \$105.00 cloth, \$100.00 paper.  
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Academics are often late in recognizing the obvious. In international politics, this is the case because a lot of research still focuses on the behavior of states and overlooks nonstate actors, which are increasing in number, economic clout, and spheres of activity. It is also true that certain methodological assumptions and practices constrain what is studied and what is not. When it comes to human rights research in political science, much of it still focuses on states and human rights violations, thereby ignoring a whole host of global actors and important activities. What is necessary and what this substantive edited volume by Kurt Mills and David Karp

does is to provide an interdisciplinary and multifaceted look at how different state and non-state actors understand and act on human rights responsibilities. Fourteen chapters written by a mixture of academics and practitioners prevent a substantive review of any single chapter, but the volume's careful organization and meaty substance make it an important and coherent read. The central point of *Human Rights Protection in Global Politics* is clear: To understand the range and depth of human rights activities one must look beyond states and at more than just violations.

Alternating between normative theory, conceptual issues, and empirical studies, the volume transcends disciplinary, thematic, and geographic boundaries. Part I provides a solid framework to consider the idea and implementation of human rights responsibility. It is evident in the Introduction and throughout that the authors want to highlight the work of nonstate actors; this largely means attention to businesses but even more so to the United Nations' Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (rather than the behavior of nonstate actors themselves). The chapter by Glenn Mitoma and Kerry Bystrom is particularly good at examining the different understandings of humanitarian responsibility. The focus on responsibility and virtue and power is both timely and welcomed, as is the discussion of the differences between humanitarian responsibility and human rights.

From different vantage points, the chapters in Part II examine the various responsibilities of states. But rather than looking at states' behavior per se, Mátyás Bódi's chapter explores the work of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), arguing that it has been "a trailblazer" in its development of a complex framework for states' human rights obligations (p. 50). The chapter by Daniel J. Whelen retains this focus on economic, social, and cultural rights, explaining why economic and social rights are equal to civil and political rights. It also provides a more historical look at how the United States (under President Franklin Roosevelt) tried to create a facilitating environment to secure economic and social well-being. The connection to the next chapter is Mark Gibney's interest in understanding why individual accountability, rather than state responsibility, is more common when it comes to addressing human rights violations. Using empirical evidence from the Balkans and the European Court of Human Rights, Gibney argues persuasively that state responsibility and individual accountability can and should work together to prevent human rights violations.

Part III turns to the responsibilities and the role of nonstate actors, with three of the five chapters focusing specifically on the practices of business. In all three, the UN's Guiding Principles play some role, representing for some (like the authors of Chapter 6) "a governance innovation," which, unfortunately, has a long way to go