National Behaviour in Multilateral Military Operations

Tim Haesebrouck

Abstract
What accounts for the diverging contributions to multinational military operations? Over two decades ago, Bennett, Lepgold and Unger published a seminal study that aimed to explain the division of the burdens of the Desert Storm Coalition. This article reviews four recent monographs on national behaviour in multinational operations against the backdrop of their conclusions. While the four reviewed titles suggest that the bulk of the conclusions of Bennett, Lepgold and Unger’s study hold beyond the scope of the Desert Storm Coalition, each of them also makes a distinct contribution to the literature. Baltrusaitis offers three excellent case studies on burden sharing in the 2003 Iraq War, Davidson provides essential insights on the impact of alliance value and threat and the studies of Auerswald and Saideman and Mello invoke important domestic variables that were not structurally examined by Bennett, Lepgold and Unger. Altogether, the reviewed titles provide convincing explanations for the behaviour of democratic states in US-led operations. Consequently, the article concludes by arguing that the most promising avenue for future research would be to focus on military operations in which the United States has a more limited role and on the contributions of non-democratic states to multinational operations.


Keywords
foreign policy, military operations, burden sharing

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What accounts for the diverging contributions to multinational military operations? Why do some states carry a disproportionate share of an operation’s burden, while others refuse to contribute entirely? Over two decades ago, Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1994) published a seminal article that aimed to explain the division of the burdens of the Desert Storm Coalition, which ousted Iraq from Kuwait during the 1991 Gulf War. Three years later, they edited a book that presented more detailed case studies of the diverging contributions to the Desert Storm Coalition (Bennett et al., 1997). This study was innovative in many respects. Prior research had almost exclusively focused on testing whether or not collective-action-based models explain the diverging levels of military spending among the NATO allies.1 In contrast, Bennett et al. (1997) combined collective action theory with other international- and domestic-level variables to explain contributions to a multinational military operation.2

This article reviews four recent monographs on national behaviour in multinational operations against the backdrop of the conclusions of Bennett, Lepgold and Unger’s seminal study.3 Hereby, it aims to assess how these works contribute to the body of knowledge on multilateral military interventions, ascertain whether or not important questions have remained unaddressed and point towards future avenues of research. Each of the reviewed titles concentrates on specific dimensions of military contributions and examines a different set of countries and operations: Davidson (2011) aims to explain the military contributions of Britain, France and Italy to seven US-led interventions; Mello (2014) examines the level of military support of 30 democracies to Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and the 2003 intervention in Iraq; Baltrusaitis (2010) provides an in-depth analysis of the contributions of South Korea, Turkey and Germany to the Iraq War; and Auerswald and Saideman (2014) examine the extent to which NATO allies control their contingents in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan (p. 12). Together, these four recent studies present the state of the art of published monographs on national contributions to multinational operations.

This article is structured around three main sections. The first two, respectively, discuss international- and domestic-level explanations for national behaviour in multinational operations. The final section recapitulates the review’s major findings and points towards future avenues of research.

### International-Level Explanations

Bennett et al. (1997: 8–14) invoke three externally driven explanations for contributions to the Desert Storm Coalition: collective action, balance of threat and alliance dependence. None of the four monographs introduces original international-level determinants. The theoretical framework of Auerswald and Saideman (2014) does not include international-level explanations and the study of Mello (2014) only examines a collective-action-based variable, while Baltrusaitis (2010) and Davidson (2011) assess the impact of alliance politics and threat.

#### Collective Action

Bennett, Lepgold and Unger’s first externally driven hypothesis builds on collective action theory. The latter has dominated burden sharing research ever since Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) introduced their economic theory of alliances, which expects ‘the
“larger” members […] to bear a disproportionate share of the burden’ (p. 628). Bennett et al. (1997: 346) conclude that the collective action hypothesis explains the disproportionate contribution of the United States to the Desert Storm Coalition, but does not account for the behaviour of other states. Since Washington made a large contribution at the operation’s outset, both strong and weak states could have taken a free ride on its efforts. Daniel Baltrusaitis (2010) and Jason Davidson (2011) confirm this finding. The former concludes that collective action theory would erroneously have predicted that other states would free-ride on the United States since the latter was willing and able to unilaterally disarm Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Such anomalous lack of free riding is the central research puzzle of Davidson (2011), who tries to explain why ‘America’s allies make rather costly contributions when they could have taken a free ride off American military might?’ (p. 5).

The conclusion of Patrick Mello (2014) does suggest that collective action arguments account for more than only the United States’ contribution to multinational operations. The collective action hypothesis is tested by assessing whether or not military power is linked to a state’s level of participation. His analyses of the NATO intervention in Kosovo and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan support the hypothesis: the absence of military power was necessary for abstention in both operations, while its presence was part of a sufficient combination for participation (Mello, 2014: 187). However, this is not sufficient to confirm collective action theory. First of all, while Olson and Zeckhauser’s economic theory of alliances expected the contributions of powerful states to be disproportionately large, Mello focuses on the states’ absolute level of military support and, hereby, only demonstrates that militarily powerful states make larger, but not necessarily disproportionate, contributions. Moreover, a small state that does not participate in an operation is not necessarily free riding, but might simply not have the military capabilities to operate flawlessly with the United States and other powerful allies.

More generally, none of the reviewed titles provides a plausible explanation for why the collective action hypothesis would expect other states to contribute if the United States is capable of conducting an operation by itself. The conclusion of Bennett et al. (1997: 346) that collective action theory only accounts for the disproportionate contribution of the United States is, thus, not refuted by the reviewed books. This suggests it applies beyond the scope of the Desert Storm Coalition.

**Balance of Threat**

The balance of threat hypothesis constitutes the first alternative to collective-action-based explanations. Building on Stephen Walt’s neo-realist theory of alliance formation (Walt, 1987: 17–33), which suggests that states enter alliances to balance against threat, Bennett et al. (1997: 10–11) expected the states that were most threatened by Iraq’s offensive military capabilities to carry a high share of the operation’s burden. However, their case studies did not provide convincing support for the impact of threat, which was ‘neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for contributions’ (Bennett et al., 1997: 347). While Baltrusaitis (2010: 205) arrives at similar conclusions, Davidson (2011: 174) concludes that threat was the single most important determinant for contributions to US-led operations.

In all probability, the dissension on the explanatory value of the balance of threat hypothesis is caused by the fundamental differences in the authors’ definitions of ‘threat’.
In line with Walt’s original definition, Bennett et al. (1997: 27) and Baltrusaitis (2010) focus on safety from a potential Iraqi military threat. However, neither study includes a state that faced a very high threat from Iraq. Strikingly, the discussion of threat in the concluding chapter of Baltrusaitis (2010: 205) is limited to the statement that there was a ‘lack of threat from Iraq for most coalition partners’, which renders the inclusion of the balance of threat hypothesis in his analytical framework superfluous. In contrast, Davidson (2011: 16–17) focuses on threats to ‘the state’s territorial integrity or its citizens, the state’s economy (including significant economic interests abroad) or a natural resource of economic or security significance’ (Davidson, 2011: 16). By building on this more comprehensive definition, the study of Davidson (2011) actually includes cases that did face a high threat from the targets of the interventions, which allowed for a more substantial assessment of the link between threats and contributions to multinational operations.

Moreover, in contrast to both Bennett et al. (1997) and Baltrusaitis (2010), Davidson (2011: 17) correctly assumes that states can take a free ride if the United States is capable of countering the threat on its own. Throughout his book, Davidson (2011), however, provides two convincing reasons for states not to ride cheap on the United States when faced with threats. First, he argues that allied contributions were sometimes important for political rather than military reasons. In his case study of Operation Unified Protector in Kosovo, for example, Davidson argues that Milošević was only expected to agree to NATO’s terms if the alliance signalled unity, which required a contribution of NATO’s most important members. Consequently, although the participation of France and the United Kingdom was not necessary in ‘pure military terms, it was necessary in political terms’ (Davidson, 2011: 80). Second, Davidson argues that an intervention can implicate a state’s prestige, defined as ‘the social recognition of its relative power’ (Davidson, 2011: 17–18). Refusing military support in the face of threats can lead others to believe that a state is not capable of contributing to operations, which considerably affects its reputation as a powerful actor in international relations.

By building on a more comprehensive definition of threat and explaining why states do not ride cheap on the United States when faced with threats, the research of Davidson (2011) convincingly demonstrates that threats constitute an important incentive to participate in military operations. Hereby, his study challenges the conclusions of Bennett et al. (1997), providing additional insights on the determinants of national contributions to multinational operations.

**Alliance Politics**

The alliance dependence hypothesis constitutes the third externally driven hypothesis of Bennett et al. (1997: 12–14). This hypothesis builds on Glenn Snyder’s (1984) ‘Alliance Security Dilemma’ and expects states that are dependent on US-provided security to carry a high burden in US-led operations. Bennett et al. (1997: 347) conclude that alliance dependence provides the most convincing explanation for the lack of free riding on the United States during the Gulf War. The study of Baltrusaitis (2010) shows that alliance dependence was equally important during the 2003 Iraq War. This is most clearly illustrated by his in-depth case study of South Korea, which deployed the third largest military contingent of the coalition of the willing between 2003 and 2006. Given its dependence on the United States in the longstanding conflict with North Korea, Seoul was very vulnerable to pressure from the United States and contributed despite popular opposition to participation and the lack of threat from Iraq.
Similarly, the study by Davidson shows that alliance politics was among the most important factors in a third of his cases. However, he prefers the term ‘alliance value’ over ‘alliance dependence’ because states ‘may value an ally for myriad reasons and value does not necessarily entail dependence’ (Davidson, 2011: 15). Davidson’s case studies provide ample evidence that a state’s value for its alliance with the United States is not solely conditional upon its dependence on America’s security guarantee. This is clearly demonstrated by Britain’s strong support for the military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although the UK was not dependent on the US to counter existential threats, its alliance relationship with the United States was a key factor for explaining the Blair government’s decision to provide military support. Hereby, London believed it would gain greater influence over US foreign policy, which would allow Britain to punch above its weight in world affairs (Davidson, 2011: 107).

Davidson (2011) and Baltrusaitis (2010), thus, confirm the conclusions of Bennett et al. (1997) that alliance politics constitute an important explanation for contributions to multilateral interventions. However, a potentially important dimension of alliance politics remains largely unexamined in the reviewed monographs. In his conclusion, Baltrusaitis (2010: 204) argues that the initiator of an ad hoc coalition has far less leverage over its potential allies than the leader of a formal alliance, such as NATO. However, since his study only examines burden sharing in the 2003 Iraq War, Baltrusaitis does not actually test whether or not an operation’s institutional framework has an impact on alliance politics. The monograph by Davidson does include a NATO intervention: Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. This case suggests that the involvement of NATO indeed played a role since defending the alliance’s credibility was one of the reasons why Italy, France and the United Kingdom participated in the operation (Davidson, 2011: 103). However, since Davidson’s other cases suggest that alliance value was at least as important for operations conducted by coalitions of the willing, it is not possible to deduce from his research whether or not the impact of alliance value is contingent on the institutional framework under which an operation is conducted.

International-Level Explanations

Bennett et al. (1997: 347–348) conclude that collective action theory only explains the disproportionately large contribution of the United States. The balance of threat hypothesis resulted in several anomalies and alliance dependence was the most important international-level determinant for contributions to the Desert Storm coalition. Out of the four reviewed titles, Davidson (2011) clearly provides the most additional insight on these international-level explanations. Not only does his comprehensive definition of alliance value most adequately capture the impact of alliance relations, his study convincingly challenges the conclusions of Bennett et al. (1997) regarding the limited explanatory value of threat. In his conclusions, Davidson even asserts that ‘alliance value is significantly less important than threat and prestige’. Unfortunately, his book does not provide a single example of a state that contributed to a US-led operation that did not highly value its relationship with the United States. While the fact that ‘alliance and threat tend to covary’ explains why such an observation is missing, it would have significantly strengthened his argument if one of his cases demonstrated that threats spur contributions irrespective of alliance value (Davidson, 2011: 175).
Domestic-Level Explanations

Bennett et al. (1997) invoke two internally driven hypotheses: ‘historical learning’ and ‘domestic structure and politics’. The reviewed titles take into account additional domestic-level variables, which can be divided into two broad categories: ‘preferences of political leaders’ and ‘public opinion and domestic institutions’.

Preferences of Political Leaders

A first category of domestic-level explanations concerns the personal preferences of political leaders. To account for these preferences, Bennett et al. (1997: 14) invoke the historical learning hypothesis, which expects domestic actors to analogise from their personal and society’s experiences as they make foreign policy decisions. This hypothesis was most clearly confirmed by Germany and Japan choosing not to make military contributions to the Desert Storm Coalition because of the continuing legacies of World War II (Bennett et al., 1997: 348). Baltrusaitis (2010: 16–17) provides additional evidence for this hypothesis. The impact of historical learning is clearly illustrated by Turkey’s lack of support for the 2003 Iraq War, which was considerably influenced by its experience during the 1991 Gulf War (Baltrusaitis, 2010: 162–165). Turkey had expected to gain economic benefits and a closer relationship with the West for its support of the Desert Storm Coalition. Instead, the Gulf War created a safe haven for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which allowed it to export its war to Turkey.

Auerswald and Saideman (2014: 66–67) more narrowly focus on political leaders’ personal experiences to explain their preferences. By showing that changes in key actors produced sudden changes in the behaviour of the contingents of several states during the ISAF operation, they provide ample evidence for the importance of personal preferences. However, they do not systematically relate back to political leaders’ experiences to account for their preferences. Their case study of France, for example, describes how Nicolas Sarkozy significantly relaxed restrictions on French troops’ participation. However, Auerswald and Saideman (2014: 104–109) explain this increased commitment by pointing to Sarkozy’s desire to gain influence in NATO, not to his prior experiences with the use of force. Similarly, they argue that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates did not have the same aversion to counter-insurgency efforts as Donald Rumsfeld, but do not clarify on which prior personal experiences these different attitudes are based.

The lack of consistent evidence on the impact of personal experience on the preferences of lead executives suggests that a narrow focus on experience oversimplifies the cognitive structures that influence a political leader’s beliefs and behaviour. However, in the absence of a convincing explanation for personal attitudes, explaining a country’s level of support by pointing to the preferences of its leaders is nearly tautological. Consequently, an interesting avenue for future research would be to go beyond the historical learning hypothesis and dig deeper into the actual sources of the subjective understandings of central decision makers. In the International Relations subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis, there exists a rich literature on the link between foreign policy behaviour and political leaders’ preferences, which suggests that the latter are determined not solely by prior experience but also by personal characteristics, leadership style and other cognitive factors (e.g. Hermann, 1980; Hudson, 2005: 10–15). None of the reviewed titles, however, build on this literature to provide a more comprehensive explanation for individual attitudes towards military deployments.
The theoretical frameworks of Auerswald and Saideman (2014) and Mello (2014) do invoke one alternative source of preferences: political ideology. Both studies build on the work of Brian Rathbun (2004: 18–21), who asserts that left-leaning parties are generally more antimilitaristic, prefer pursuing their interests through multilateral frameworks and follow a more inclusive conception of their national interest. Mello (2014) and Auerswald and Saideman (2014) deduce from this typology that members of parties situated at the left of the ideological spectrum should be more averse to the use of force. In line with this expectation, Auerswald and Saideman (2014) demonstrate that political leaders belonging to left-wing parties are generally less enthusiastic about military interventions and tend to put more constraints on their military contingents. The results of Mello (2014: 187) indicate that leftist parties were less likely to participate in the interventions in Kosovo and Iraq. This is, however, rather counterintuitive for the Kosovo operation, where leftist governments were expected to provide support for humanitarian reasons.

A plausible explanation for this inconsistency is that the attitude of political parties can be expected to depend on historical experiences. Rathbun (2004: 27) actually argued that leftist parties will only support peace enforcement operations in ‘countries where coercive foreign policy means are seen to have in the past helped realise inclusive goals’. Similar to the preferences of individual leaders, the preferences of political parties can, thus, be expected to be shaped by historical experience. Second, partisan politics could also interact with the specific reason for which a state participates in an operation. While a left-wing government might participate in an operation for humanitarian reasons, a right-wing government might support the same operation because it counters a threat to its country’s national interest. Consequently, the impact of government ideology could be contingent on the specific incentives that spur contributions.

**Domestic Institutions and Public Opinion**

The second internally driven hypothesis of Bennett et al. (1997: 17–20), domestic institutions and politics, expects public opposition to constrain political leaders from implementing their preferences or contributing in response to international-level incentives. However, Bennett et al. (1997) only expect public opposition to constrain political leaders who cannot autonomously decide on contributions. The case studies of Baltrusaitis (2010) provide strong support for these inferences. While South Korea’s autonomous executive was capable of committing resources to the Iraq War despite popular opposition, Germany only provided support on issues for which consent from the Bundestag was not required.

Mello (2014) and Auerswald and Saideman (2014) agree that the impact of public opinion depends on other variables but build on different theories of domestic institutions. While Bennett et al. (1997) operationalise executive autonomy in an ad hoc, case-specific way, Mello (2014: 32–34) invokes a more generalisable and parsimonious concept: parliamentary veto power. Although his results suggest that legislative involvement inhibited participation in the operations in Iraq and Kosovo, Mello (2014: 186) does not find a clear cross-case pattern. A plausible explanation for the seeming instability in the impact of parliamentary veto powers is that a legislative veto only constitutes a legal frame, which requires activation to become effective. Parliament can reasonably be expected only to veto executive decisions if legislative veto players disagree with the government. To establish a clear cross-case pattern, it seems that parliamentary veto power should be examined in conjunction with the preferences of legislative veto players.4
Auerswald and Saideman (2014), in turn, differentiate between individual and collective decision makers. Whereas lead executives can decide relatively independently on the use of force in presidential regimes and single-party parliamentary governments, contributions of coalition governments are the result of bargaining between members of different parties (Auerswald and Saideman, 2014: 65). Because enthusiasm for deployment is likely to vary among coalition partners, Auerswald and Saideman (2014) expect that coalition governments will generally impose tighter restrictions on their military contingents, with coalitions composed of a greater number of parties, ideologically opposing parties or left-leaning parties imposing the greatest restrictions. The pattern of national control on military contingents in the ISAF operation clearly confirms these inferences (Auerswald and Saideman, 2014: 219). Consequently, Auerswald and Saideman’s parsimonious typology of domestic institutions clearly constitutes a valuable addition to the body of knowledge on national behaviour in multilateral operations.

The books invoke two other domestic-level variables that were expected to affect the ability of decision makers to implement their preferences or contribute in response to international-level incentives. First, Mello (2014: 34) draws attention to the substantial variation in constitutional restrictions on the military operations in which states are permitted to participate. His study provides extensive evidence for the detrimental importance of this causal factor: the absence of constitutional restrictions was a necessary condition for participation in the three operations under investigation. Second, Davidson (2011: 18–20) expects democratic leaders to refrain from acting against public opinion when this could have electoral ramifications. The latter will be the case when elections are scheduled in the near-to-median future and opposition parties offer the public an alternative policy option (Davidson, 2011: 19). However, Davidson argues that governments will rarely face an electorally relevant public since government and opposition seldom disagree on contributions to multinational operations. His analysis supports this conjecture, showing that electoral politics only mattered in 2 of his 21 cases: Berlusconi’s refusal to provide military support to the 2003 Iraq War and the Wilson government’s decision not to contribute British troops to the Vietnam War (Davidson, 2011: 173).

**Domestic-Level Explanations**

Bennett et al. (1997) argued that the preferences of key decision makers have an impact on national behaviour in multilateral operations and that their ability to contribute depends on public opinion and executive autonomy. While the study of Baltrusaitis (2010) shows that these hypotheses help explain burden sharing in the 2003 Iraq War, the other monographs invoke innovative domestic-level variables. Mello (2014) and Auerswald and Saideman (2014) demonstrate that ideology has an impact on contributions and, respectively, develop a generalisable and parsimonious typology of domestic institutions and demonstrate that constitutional restrictions inhibit military support. Davidson (2011), in turn, shows that electoral politics impede military contributions, but only in a very limited number of cases.

**Conclusion and Future Research Directions**

While the reviewed titles suggest that the bulk of the conclusions of Bennett, Lepgold and Unger’s study hold beyond the scope of the Desert Storm Coalition, each one of them also makes a distinct contribution to the literature: Baltrusaitis (2010) offers three excellent
case studies on burden sharing decisions during the Iraq War, Davidson (2011) provides essential insights on the impact of alliance value and threat, and the studies of Auerswald and Saideman (2014) and Mello (2014) invoke important domestic variables that were not structurally examined by Bennett, Lepgold and Unger, such as constitutional restrictions and political ideology. Although the books leave some interesting questions unaddressed, such as the impact of historical experience on party preferences, they provide convincing explanations for the behaviour of democracies in US-led operations. Consequently, the most promising avenue for future research would be to focus on military operations in which the United States had a more limited role or on the diverging contributions of non-democratic states.

First, the causal impact of several international-level variables should be quite different for operations in which the US has a more limited role, like the 2011 intervention in Libya. Since the US withdrew its fighter aircraft 2 weeks into the campaign, its allies were denied the opportunity to ride cheap on its efforts. In line with expectations of the collective action hypothesis, France and the UK – the NATO-allies with the second and third largest military budgets – picked up the slack and flew more than half of the campaign’s strike missions (Chivvis, 2014: 190). Moreover, according to Marton and Eichler (2013: 10), the NATO members did not perceive the United States to attach ‘great importance to significant contributions’ to the Libya campaign, suggesting that dependence on the US did not constitute an important incentive to participate. In sharp contrast to the conclusions of the reviewed books, hypotheses based on alliance politics do not seem to explain much of the burden sharing dynamics of the Libya operations, while collective action theory could possibly account for contributions of other states than the United States.

Furthermore, there are ample examples of military missions in which the United States did not participate, like the many operations conducted under the aegis of the United Nations or other inter-governmental organisations. The division of the burden of UN peacekeeping operations has been examined extensively for almost two decades, but the bulk of this research consists of statistical tests of collective-action-based models. However, a structured comparison of the diverging contributions to a single UN-peacekeeping operation, that builds on a combination of international and domestic explanations, has not yet been produced (Haesebrouck, 2015). In the group of regional organisations, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) seems to constitute an especially interesting target for future research. Despite the relatively modest goals of its missions, the CSDP has experienced serious difficulties in staffing its military operations. For example, EUFOR RCA (European Union Force Central African Republic), the most recently launched CSDP operation involving ground forces, required six force generation conferences to acquire the planned strength of 800 troops, causing the formal launch of the operation to be delayed on several occasions (Haesebrouck and Van Meirvenne, 2015: 279). It would be interesting to examine whether or not the hypotheses invoked in research on US-led operations explain this general reluctance to participate and/or account for why small states like Estonia and Georgia made some of the most sizeable contributions to this operation.

Finally, future research could focus on the contributions of non-democratic states. Autocracies like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates made sizeable contributions to the recent operations in Libya and against Islamic State. Since these countries were threatened by the targets of the interventions and are US allies, balance of threat and alliance value constitutes plausible externally driven explanations for these contributions.
However, while research on the foreign policy of non-democracies has demonstrated that authoritarian leaders are also constrained by domestic audience costs, the domestic-level explanations invoked in the reviewed titles cannot straightforwardly be applied to these cases (Kaarbo, 2015: 9). Consequently, a study on non-democratic contributions to collective military operations would provide a valuable complement to the conclusions provided in these works.

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Notes
1 See Sandler (1993) for a comprehensive review of this literature.
2 Bennett et al. (1997) were not the first to combine hypotheses generated from international and domestic models of international politics. In fact, four of their five explanatory variables had already been invoked by Kupchan (1988). However, Bennett et al. (1997) were the first to invoke these variables to explain burden sharing in multinational operations.
3 Two recent books are not included in this review because they do not primarily aim to explain diverging contributions to multinational military operations: Kreps (2010) and Weitsman (2013). The former examines why powerful states form coalitions despite having the capacity for unilateral action; the latter aims to show ‘how and to what degree alliances and coalitions serve as coalitions to project US power’ (Weitsman, 2013: 2).
4 In fact, Mello (2012) takes into account the ideological orientation of the parliament in an article that aims to explain the pattern of participation in the 2003 Iraq War, in which he concludes that ‘Under conditions of broad executive majorities or partisan convergence mandatory parliamentary approval is unlikely to amount to a legislative veto point’ (p. 447).

References


**Author Biography**

Tim Haesebrouck is a PhD candidate in political science at Ghent University, Belgium. His current research interests include military burden sharing, crisis management operations, R2P and the Common Security and Defence Policy. He has recently published in *International Politics, Foreign Policy Analysis and European Foreign Affairs Review*. 