Unconditional Support or Public Constraints?
A Fuzzy-Set Analysis of Democracies' War Involvement in Afghanistan

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Comments welcome!

Abstract

This study investigates why and under which conditions democracies decided to join the military intervention in Afghanistan that begun as "Operation Enduring Freedom" in 2001. The paper develops a concept of military participation and examines the extent to which thirty democratic governments decided to participate or abstain in the Afghanistan war. Against the backdrop of the observed variance, the paper suggests an explanation based on various domestic and systemic factors. The fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) yields several findings with theoretical import. First, evidence in support of the participatory constraints argument is found, which holds that democratic governments are constrained by a requirement to gather citizen's support before deploying armed forces to a conflict. While NATO members are most-likely cases for military participation, the analysis finds a correspondence between public support and military participation, as alliance members with low public support end up not participating or reducing their participation to nominal contributions. Second, the findings further support the general argument derived from collective action theory, which expects weak states to ride free on the contributions of more powerful states. Pathways are identified that specify the conditions under which the argument holds, as power alone is not sufficient for military participation. Third, the analysis confirms theoretical expectations regarding constitutional restrictions, which are conceived as a structural veto against military deployments. Finally, with regards to parliamentary veto rights and partisanship no consistent patterns are identified in the present study. While some evidence is found in favor of an interaction between legislative involvement and public opposition, no conclusive evidence can be drawn from the fuzzy-set analysis as to whether or not parliamentary veto rights create a constraint on military participation. Likewise, there are no decisive patterns involving partisanship.

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Introduction[1]

On December 5, 2011, international representatives returned to the Petersberg near Bonn to negotiate the terms of a continued commitment to Afghanistan. Ten years earlier, politicians, diplomats, and military leaders had convened in the same place to find a common ground for governance in Afghanistan after the ousting of the Taliban.[2] As a result of the Petersberg conference, the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of an "International Security Assistance Force" (ISAF), under the initial command of the United Kingdom and with the participation of eighteen other countries, to guarantee the "maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas".[3] While the majority of contributors to ISAF were NATO member states, the operation was initially an *ad hoc* coalition, since NATO assumed authority for ISAF only two years into the conflict, on August 11, 2003. Likewise, ISAF's mandate was not expanded to include the entire country of Afghanistan until October 13, 2003, two months after NATO assumed control.[4]

From its inception, ISAF ran parallel to the US-led "Operation Enduring Freedom" (OEF) that marked the military response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11), and which operated in Afghanistan from October 7, 2001 onward with the declared aim of removing the Taliban regime and destroying Al-Qaeda capabilities.[5] In terms of international law, OEF had been justified on the grounds of individual and collective self-defense, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.[6] In the wake of 9/11, the NATO Council further announced the activation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, affirming that the terrorist attacks constituted an "armed attack" against the United States and calling allied states for their support.[7] Finally, the governments of the United States and the United

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[1] This paper is based on a chapter of my dissertation, submitted to Humboldt-Universität in February 2012.

[2] For historical perspectives on contemporary security issues in Afghanistan and the region of Central Asia, see Rob Johnson (2007) and Ahmed Rashid (2008).

[3] SC Res 1386 (December 20, 2001).

[4] SC Res 1510 (October 13, 2003).

[5] George W. Bush announced the military operation and its aims in a presidential address on October 7, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2001/10.

[6] UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 51 reads: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

[7] On September 12, 2001 the NATO Council declared, "if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington

Kingdom informed the Security Council on October 7, 2001, that they had "clear and compelling information" regarding the responsibility of the Al-Qaeda terrorist group for the attacks on 9/11 and of the terrorists' continued support by Afghanistan's Taliban regime and that they had therefore "initiated actions designed to prevent and deter further attacks".[8]

In contrast to the ISAF mission, the Security Council had not explicitly authorized OEF. Instead, Resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001, which had been passed unanimously, condemned the terrorist attacks in harsh terms, while acknowledging the right of individual and collective self-defense and the readiness of the Security Council "to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks […] and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations". These principles were reaffirmed in Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001, a document that suggested detailed measures to address the threat of terrorism through police investigations, freezing of financial assets, the international exchange of information, and similar measures.[9]

While these resolutions did not authorize the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, they were almost universally perceived as an endorsement of the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack, a right that in the eyes of many extended to the use of force against non-state actors, such as terrorist groups (Heintschel von Heinegg 2005, 192; Gray 2008, 199). Nevertheless, legal debates continued over whether terrorist actions could constitute an armed attack as much as to whether the military intervention in Afghanistan, which included aggravated aerial bombardments, met the requirement of a "necessary and proportionate" response to the terrorist attacks.[10]

This paper seeks to explain democracies' military participation in the Afghanistan war. Why and under which conditions did states decide to join the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom? Moreover, how can apparent differences be explained when examining the military involvement of NATO allies and other democracies allied to the United States? To which

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Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe and North America shall be considered an attack against all." (NATO Press Release 2001-124). The formal invocation of Article 5 was announced on October 2, 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm.

[8] Letter dated October 7, 2001, from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America addressed to the Security Council, UN doc S/2001/946. For the letter from the United Kingdom, see UN doc S/2001/947.

[9] SC Res 1368 (September 12, 2001); SC Res 1373 (September 28, 2001).

[10] These are just some of the most prevalent legal concerns regarding OEF. A discussion of the right of self-defense is provided in Greenwood (2008, 5–9). On the concept of armed attack, see Gray (2008, 202). The unwritten principle of a proportionate response is detailed in Heintschel von Heinegg (2005, 195–7). Anand argues that the military intervention constituted "an illegal and unjustifiable use of force in the name of provisions of self-defense in international law" (2009, 92). Frank, by contrast, refutes several arguments made regarding the "alleged illegality of U.S. recourse to force" (2001, 839).

extent did domestic factors, such as public support for intervention, legislative involvement in security affairs, or the partisan composition of government matter in these decisions?

Before addressing these questions, I will briefly review findings from recent studies on the Afghanistan conflict to draw out some implications for the research design of the present study. This section also serves to identify aspects of the military intervention that have been attended to in detail and those areas that have not been sufficiently studied as of now. The subsequent section provides a detailed specification of all elements of the research design, including case selection criteria and the conceptualization of the outcome military participation and the included explanatory conditions. This is followed by an analytical section, which details the fsQCA procedure and discusses the results and their theoretical implications. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the main findings.

Review

The inherent complexity of the Afghanistan war presents a range of challenges to any comparative study. First, it needs to be recognized that OEF and ISAF constitute separate but interrelated military operations, which are based on different mandates; while many countries contribute to both missions, the extent to which they are involved in each of these varies substantially.[11] Second, as military operations are ongoing in Afghanistan it is not possible to provide a conclusive assessment of the conflict. This also means that some information about the extent of military participation is not in the public domain and will require archival work in decades to come.

With these caveats in mind, it is not surprising to find relatively few studies that are based on a comparative research design and seek to explain the conditions under which states decided to participate in the Afghanistan war. Exceptions include comparative studies by Davidson (2011) and Viehrig (2010). Others also focus on the Afghanistan conflict, but with different research objectives, including the prevalence of political restrictions in multinational operations (Saideman and Auerswald 2011), the apparent mismatch between public opinion and the responsiveness of the political leadership (Kreps 2010; Schoen 2010), or the public legitimation of the Afghanistan conflict as a "democratic war" (Müller and Wolff 2011). I will discuss these in turn before drawing out some conclusions for the research design of the present study.

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[11] There is also the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which was established on March 28, 2002 (SC Res 1401). Unlike the other operations, this mission does not have a military component and focuses on political, humanitarian, and development issues.

Jason Davidson (2011) investigates decision-making in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom with regards to participation in *Operation Enduring Freedom*. His analysis builds on a neoclassical realist approach that comprises threat perception, public opinion, and alliance considerations, tested against alternative constructivist hypotheses that focus on norm compliance and state identity. Based on separate country studies, Davidson asserts that "alliance value was very clearly on the line and it was a factor in each country's decision – the evidence suggests it was the dominant factor in the British and Italian cases". Regarding French involvement Davidson argues that, in addition to alliance value, "a desire to enhance France's prestige drove the decision" (2011, 131). Davidson concludes that only by taking into account alliance considerations can it be explained that countries made a contribution when the United States seemed fully committed to the Afghanistan conflict, which otherwise would have been a likely scenario for free-riding on part of the allies (Davidson 2011, 131).

As part of a larger study, Henrike Viehrig (2010) contrasts the military participation of six European countries in Afghanistan, seeking to investigate whether systemic or domestic factors provide a better explanation of deployment decisions in the observed countries. While Viehrig employs a range of factors, she finds that, based on an analysis of fourteen military operations, three indicators stand out: historical ties, alliance membership, and relations towards the lead nation, all three of which are found to be strong in terms of explanatory power (2010, 176). However, with regards to military participation in OEF, Viehrig finds no consistent pattern in the conditions that she investigates: only three countries were fully involved while all are coded as having strong relations with the lead nation, lack historical ties to Afghanistan, and are either members of NATO or, as in the case of Austria, a partner country of the alliance (Viehrig 2010, 93–104).

Stephen Saideman and David Auerswald (2011) focus on the prevalence of national "caveats" in multinational military operations. Caveats are understood as political restrictions on the scope of operations that military forces are allowed to engage in as part of their mission (2011, 3). Examining ISAF contributions across sixteen countries, Saideman and Auerswald find substantial variance in national caveats, which they explain primarily on the grounds of differences in political institutions.[12] The authors suggest that Lijphart's conceptualization of consensus and majoritarian democracies can be extended to explain the presence or absence of these caveats. Accordingly, Saideman and Auerswald find that coalition governments tend to impose greater restrictions on the armed forces once deployed, while presidential or

[12] The study by Saideman and Auerswald focuses on contributions to ISAF between 2003 and 2009.

majoritarian parliamentary governments tend to give the military more discretion over operational decisions in the field (Saideman and Auerswald 2011, 5).[13]

Sarah Kreps (2010) takes on the participatory constraints argument, which holds that democratic governments ought to be responsive to public demands. However, as Kreps argues, this poses a puzzle when applied to the Afghanistan war where public support has been in decline for years while most of the involved governments further increased their military commitment. To account for the observed incongruity between foreign policy and public opinion Kreps refers what she describes as an "elite consensus" on the war, a tacit agreement among political actors that has effectively inoculated governments from public opinion and electoral backlash (2010, 192). However, Kreps asserts that this is "not the effect of collusion among political elites with an eye toward electoral immunity", but rather the outcome of "systemic incentives associated with participation in a formal alliance" (Kreps 2010, 201).

Whereas Kreps concludes that public opinion "hardly matters" for NATO operations in Afghanistan, Harald Schoen (2010) suggests that public opinion might well affect decision-making by way of anticipation. Based on an analysis of German public opinion on military operations in Afghanistan, Schoen argues that there were few incentives for the established parties to engage in political competition over the military involvement in Afghanistan. Rather, parties attempted to de-emphasize the topic because there was little to gain in a climate that is, in general, very critical towards military operations (Schoen 2010, 399).

Harald Müller and Jonas Wolff (2011) investigate the extent to which the political justification of Germany's involvement in Afghanistan relates to the concept of a "democratic war" as conceptualized by the same authors in earlier studies (Müller and Wolff 2006; see also Geis, Müller, and Schörnig 2010). To address this question, Müller and Wolff analyze thirteen parliamentary debates from the German *Bundestag* in relation to the ISAF mandate and its renewal between 2001 and 2011. As part of their findings, the authors identify two thematic clusters that appear in about half of the analyzed speeches: "democracy promotion" and "universal values" (Müller and Wolff 2011, 207),[14]which correspond to the acknowledged role conception of Germany as a "civilian power" (Maull 1990, 92).

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[13] Saideman and Auerswald note that Denmark features "loose" caveats and thus constitutes an exception among countries governed by coalitions, since all other coalition governments included in their study have either "medium" or "tight" restrictions on military operations (2011, 6).

[14] The authors note that both of these themes appear somewhat less frequently in later debates (Müller and Wolff 2011, 207).

While this brief review makes no claim to be comprehensive, it shows that a number of aspects have not been sufficiently addressed in extant studies. First, as some of the above studies point out, alliance considerations are an important factor in explaining the level of commitment and eventual military participation. Yet, while this should apply equally to alliance members we see substantial differences in the degree to which governments decided to become involved in Afghanistan. Davidson argues that alliance considerations were the "dominant factor in the British and Italian cases" (2011, 131). But how can it be explained that Italy deployed a few dozen engineers to OEF when the United Kingdom sent an infantry battle group of 1,700 soldiers? Viehrig holds that alliance membership is a "strong indicator" to explain military participation across the cases that she investigates (2010, 176). However, with regards to OEF and ISAF Viehrig finds no consistent pattern involving alliance membership. In order to redress these problems, I suggest at least two differentiations; these entail a detailed conceptualization of military participation that is specific to the case of Afghanistan as well as an account of military power positions to further differentiate alliance members.

Second, authors have rightly pointed out the apparent disconnect between domestic public opinion in Western democracies and military involvement in Afghanistan, especially in recent years. To draw the conclusion that "public opinion hardly matters", as Kreps asserts (2010), might be unwarranted however. How strong was public support for military intervention at the outset of OEF in 2001? To which extent did support levels vary across countries at that time? These questions need to be addressed before drawing conclusions about the timeframe 2006-2009 which Kreps focuses on in her study.

Third, the prevalence of political restrictions in multinational military operations is an important phenomenon that has so far received little attention in academic studies. Saideman and Auerswald argue that coalition governments tend to impose tighter caveats on their military once deployed (2011, 5). Their study, however, does not distinguish within the group of parliamentary democracies with proportional electoral systems. Here, it seems warranted to take into account institutional differences regarding the involvement of parliament in security affairs. For instance, countries with mandatory legislative approval of military operations might be expected to impose more restrictions or to abstain from military participation altogether.

Research design

This paper investigates democracies' participation in the military intervention in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, for the timeframe 2001-2002. The analysis in this study is based on the approach and method of fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA; Ragin 1987; 2000; 2008). This section introduces criteria that informed the selection of countries, the operationalization of the outcome military participation, and the causal conditions included in the analysis of countries' military involvement in Afghanistan.

Selection of countries

Countries were selected based on two criteria: (1) the presence of uncontested democratic political institutions and (2) institutionalized security cooperation with other democracies. In terms of a pragmatic threshold for the first criterion, I employed the Polity IV data to exclude countries with a score of seven and below on the combined autocracy-democracy scale.[15] Institutionalized security cooperation in the context of Operation Enduring Freedom refers to countries with bilateral security agreements with the United States, NATO membership or cooperation agreements, or countries in the process of accession negotiations with NATO. To enhance cross-case comparability, I further applied a scope condition, excluding countries with a population below one million inhabitants.[16] Based on these criteria, I selected thirty democracies from Europe, North America, and the Pacific region.

At the time the military intervention in Afghanistan was announced, sixteen of these countries were alliance members, while seven Central and Eastern European countries were in the process of accession.[17] I further include Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden – four countries that retain a legal status of permanent neutrality or follow a traditional policy of non-alignment, but which have formalized their cooperation with NATO and increased their participation in multilateral military operations.[18] Finally, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand are no alliance members but have engaged with NATO as formal partner countries. Australia and Japan also retain bilateral security agreements with the United States. Table A.1 in the

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[15] This corresponds to the criteria set in the majority of studies that use the Polity IV data.

[16] This scope condition leads to the exclusion of Iceland and Luxembourg, whereas Turkey is excluded due to its Polity score of 7 throughout the observed time period.

[17] While they were formally invited to begin accession talks at NATO's Prague Summit in November 21-22, 2002, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia had all been part of a "Membership Action Plan" since 1999 and had thus formalized their cooperation with NATO.
See, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37356.htm.

[18] Switzerland also retains a legal status of permanent neutrality and has been cooperating with NATO through the "Partnership for Peace" framework since 1996. See, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52129.htm.

appendix lists all selected countries, their executives, parties in power, and government type for October 2001, as the time when military operations were initiated. Besides two exceptions, there is no ambiguity which government was responsible for a deployment decision (or the decision to abstain). In Denmark, Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen lost the general election in November 2001. The new government under Anders Fogh Rasmussen submitted a proposal for military participation that was approved in the *Folketing* on December 14, 2001. The Estonian deployment decision was made in 2002, under the newly elected Siim Kallas who preceded Mart Laar as Prime Minister.

Military participation in Operation Enduring Freedom

My measure of military participation focuses on national deployments to Afghanistan in the context of the U.S.-led OEF that began on October 7, 2001. I include deployments made throughout the first year of the military operation. This restriction of the timeframe helps to separate political decisions pertaining to Afghanistan from the evolving political controversy over the U.S. government's war plans for Iraq, which had been circulating within the administration, but had not been detailed in public statements until the fall of 2002.[19] I focus on OEF because the military intervention explicitly included *offensive operations*, aimed against the Taliban regime and al Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan, whereas the UN-endorsed ISAF operation was initially conceived as a peace support mission limited to the Kabul area.[20] Admittedly, this distinction between the two operations has become increasingly blurred as ISAF turned into a NATO operation in 2003 and was subsequently expanded across Afghanistan. However, if public statements by political leaders are an indication, then it can be assumed that many governments were sensitive to these differences and consciously decided whether and to which extent they would contribute to the military fight against

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[19] The "Downing Street Memo", dated July 23, 2001, revealed that the Bush administration had been planning for war at least eight months before coalition forces invaded Iraq (Ehrenberg, McSherry, Sánchez, and Marji Sayej 2010, 67–9). However, while cabinet members had sought to direct public attention to an "Iraq threat" throughout the year, a comprehensive statement of U.S. foreign policy toward Iraq was not formulated until the fall. On October 7, 2002, Bush gave a speech in Cincinnati, Ohio, that lined out the alleged link between the regime of Saddam Hussein, international terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction in some detail (transcript provided in Ehrenberg et al. 2010, 85–91). The U.S. Congress essentially adopted this threat perception and authorized the president to use force against Iraq "as he determines necessary and appropriate", see "Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq" (Public Law 107-243, approved October 16, 2002, Sec. 3).

[20] For the aims of the military operation, see note 112. Regarding ISAF, the relevant documents are the Bonn Agreement that established the Afghan Interim Authority (S/2001/1154) and the subsequent Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001).

terrorism on the one hand, and the provision of security and reconstruction in Afghanistan on the other.[21]

In terms of sources, my coding of military participation rests on unclassified and recently declassified government documents, newspaper articles, secondary sources, and other forms of publicly available information. I have sought to cross-validate the evidence by using at least two independent sources for each country's contribution. Throughout the observed timeframe, a large part of military operations in Afghanistan were conducted by Special Forces, which are considered classified information by most countries.[22] However, several governments openly shared information about the extent of their involvement in special operations. In addition, and partly due to the multinational character of operations, a lot of information has entered the public domain, forcing governments to comment on press coverage regarding the involvement of Special Forces in Afghanistan.[23] Hence, from the perspective of the general public, these covert operations became almost equivalent to regular combat operations. From a legal perspective it is important to note that, as Blaise Cathcart points out, "[t]here is no special law for special operations forces. SOF, like conventional forces, must fully comply with international law, and, where applicable, domestic law, in all their operations" (Cathcart 2010, 395). Therefore, I decided to include these in my measure of military participation.

The fuzzy-set coding of the outcome is based on the type of contribution that a government authorized for deployment. On a primary level, I differentiate between combat

[21] In Italy, for instance, Defense Minister Antonio Martino stated that his country would only participate in peacekeeping operations, but would not "go through the mountains of Afghanistan to impose peace by force" ("Opereremo solo come forza di pace", *Corriere della Sera*, November 19, 2001, p.2, author's translation). The German government, while providing Special Forces, held that political and military risks prohibited the deployment of regular ground forces to OEF, as Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer argues in his memoir (2011, 42–3).

[22] This strategy is documented in a partly declassified memorandum from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, dated October 30, 2001. In this document, Rumsfeld urges to "insert many more CIA teams and Special Forces", including forces from countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. This memorandum is documented at the National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB358a/index.htm#18.

[23] This was the case in New Zealand after a newspaper article mentioned the presence of the countries' "Special Air Service" commando forces in Afghanistan ("Kabul Attack Shows Resilience of Afghan Militants", *New York Times*, January 18, 2010, p. A1). While publicly available U.S. government documents had listed New Zealand's participation in OEF from 2002 onward (Department of Defense 2002b, 8), and the annual report of New Zealand's Ministry of Defence explicitly mentions its efforts "to help Afghanistan eliminate terrorist groups through the deployment of our Special Air Services" (Ministry of Defence 2003, 17–8), the wider public only became aware of these proceedings after the newspaper coverage, which led Prime Minister John Key to confirm the countries' military involvement ("SAS involved in Kabul Defence: Key", *New Zealand Herald*, January 20, 2010).

forces, non-combat support units, logistical support, and non-participation. In order to qualify for membership in the set military participation (receive a fuzzy score greater than 0.5) a deployment has to comprise *combat forces* with respective tasks. This is based on the rationale that combat forces are exposed to a higher level of risk in getting wounded or killed than, for instance, rear support units like medical staff working in field hospitals or liaison officers deployed to headquarters. Studies on casualty aversion have shown that democratic leaders are aware of these risks and thus emphasize the nature of military deployments, caveats placed on mandates, and the distinction between combat operations and non-combat and humanitarian tasks.[24] On a secondary level, I make more fine-grained distinctions between contributions, based on the overall scope and level of risk associated with a deployment. As such, the provision of ground combat forces is coded higher than the deployment of fighter aircraft, which is in turn a more substantial and risk-inherent contribution than a small contingent of Special Forces, while all three are rather in the set military participation (fuzzy score above 0.5). Accordingly, for non-combat contributions I distinguish between military support units such as engineers and medical teams, which are not involved in combat operations, but still more exposed than, for instance, officers at headquarters. At the low end of the scale are forms of logistical support and non-participation in military operations.

Based on these criteria countries are coded from 1 to 0 on a fuzzy scale, indicating a range from full membership in the set of countries that participated militarily to full non-membership. At the high end of the scale are states that participated in the full spectrum of offensive operations. These comprise the United States, United Kingdom, Canada (fuzzy score 1.0), and, to a lesser extent, Romania and France (fuzzy-set score 0.9).[25] The latter two did not participate with Special Forces, but Romania provided a sizable infantry battalion to Kandahar whereas France had an infantry contingent in Mazar-e-Sharif and took part in bombing missions from Kyrgyzstan.[26] These are followed by countries that did not participate

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[24] Democratic leaders are assumed to be casualty-averse because they fear an electoral backlash in response to rising numbers of war casualties. However, recent studies have challenged the notion that the public is generally averse to casualties. Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2009) argue that it is rather the perception of success that affects the public's tolerance for casualties. On casualty aversion and the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, see also Baum and Potter (2008) and Smith (2005).

[25] An account of OEF by the U.S. Army is provided in Stewart (2010, 468–74). British Secretary of State for Defence Geoffrey Hoon lined out his country's military involvement to the House of Commons (Hoon 2002). For a summary of Canadian military involvement, see Cox (2007, 1–2).

[26] According to congressional hearing, Romania took part in combat operations with regular ground forces (Bereuter 2003, 5; Bradtke 2003, 12). The French contribution is detailed in Department of Defense (2003, 1).

with regular ground forces, but which provided aircraft to fly combat missions in Afghanistan, while some of these also deployed Special Forces. Accordingly, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands receive a lower coding than the previous group but remain well inside the set military participation (fuzzy score 0.8).[27] Finally, another group of countries contributed to OEF with Special Forces and some support elements, but did not send regular ground forces or fighter aircraft for operations in Afghanistan. This group comprises Australia, Germany, New Zealand, and Lithuania (fuzzy score 0.7).[28]

In contrast to the aforementioned, six countries provided non-combat support with ground units. Spain deployed a military field hospital and support aircraft, while Italy, Poland, and Slovakia contributed engineers (fuzzy score 0.4).[29] Two countries contributed to OEF, but did not deploy any units to Afghanistan. Greece sent a frigate to the Arabian Sea with the ability to conduct a variety of missions. Japan also sent vessels to the region, providing fuel

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France deployed Special Forces to Afghanistan from August 2003 onward; hence these are outside the considered timeframe and thus not included in the coding. Compare, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations /afghanistan/dossier/afghanistan-chronologie-et-reperes-historiques.

[27] The Danish *Folketing* voted 101-11 in favor of a government proposal for the deployment of a contingent of about 100 Special Forces and four F-16 fighter planes accompanied by up to 250 military personnel to support US-led operations in Afghanistan (*Folketing, Beslutningsforslag* B 37, 2. *Samling*, December 14, 2001). Norway deployed four F-16s and about 70 Special Forces for combat operations in Afghanistan (IISS 2002, 353). According to a press release by its embassy, Norwegian Special Forces were involved in the US-led ground offensive "Operation Anaconda" that took place in March 2002 in the Paktika Province in southern Afghanistan: http://www.norway.org/archive/news/archive/2002/200201forces/. In addition to support aircraft, the Netherlands contributed six F-16 fighter planes, which were initially mandated to fulfill reconnaissance tasks only. These restrictions were lifted upon deployment, however, and the aircraft flew some 800 sorties as close air support for combat operations from October 1, 2002 onward (Ministry of Defence 2011).

[28] Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Australia invoked the mutual defense clause of the ANZUS Treaty and contributed Special Forces to OEF from October 2001 onward (Brangwin and Rann, 2010, 2). Following a contested plenary debate on November 16, 2001, the German Bundestag voted 336-326 in favor of the deployment of Special Forces to Afghanistan, as part of a broader contribution in the context of the fight against terrorism, including sizable naval forces off the Horn of Africa (*Antrag der Bundesregierung*, 14/7926, November 7, 2001; *Plenarprotokoll*, 14/202, November 16, 2001). Fearing opposition from within the Social Democrats and especially from his coalition partner the Greens, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had linked the vote on military participation with a vote of confidence that required a majority among members of parliament, which stood at 334 votes. On New Zealand's contribution see the previous discussion in note 132. Lithuania deployed a contingent of thirty-seven Special Forces soldiers to the OEF mission in Afghanistan (Bradtke 2003, 12).

[29] In addition to delivering humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, Spain contributed a military hospital to Bagram airbase, supporting American and British OEF forces stationed in the region ("Un Hércules español llega a Kabul cargado de ayuda humanitaria", *El País*, January 18, 2002). Italy deployed support aircraft and engineers to repair the runway at Bagram airbase (Department of Defense 2002b, 6). Polish engineers were mainly involved in mine clearance activity (Department of Defense 2002b, 9). The Slovak government deployed engineers to the Kabul area (Bradtke 2003, 12).

support to coalition forces in the context of OEF.[30] The Japanese deployment was made possible after the legislature passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, which was approved by the *Diet* on October 29, 2001 and allowed the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to conduct support operations in the context of OEF.[31]

Two countries provided local logistical support (fuzzy score 0.2). Latvia sent a team of cargo handlers, while Estonia deployed an explosives detection dog team to enhance security at Bagram airport.[32] Other forms of logistical support include the detachment of liaison officers to the U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida (fuzzy score 0.1). The Czech Republic, Finland, Belgium, Portugal, and Sweden contributed in this way, whereas Bulgaria hosted transport aircraft on its territory.[33] Finally, four countries did not participate militarily in Operation Enduring Freedom during the observed timeframe (fuzzy score 0): Austria, Hungary, Ireland, and Slovenia. Table 1 summarizes the data that informed the coding of military participation across countries, including details on contributions, classification by type of contribution, troop numbers during the observed timeframe, and the resulting fuzzy-set coding of the outcome.

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[30] Since the focus of this study is on Afghanistan, I do not consider naval contributions in the wider context of OEF. However, instead of counting Greece and Japan as non-participators, I code their contributions as indirect forms of military support. For details on the Greek deployment, see Department of Defense Department of Defense (2002b, 6). On Japan's role, see Blair (2002, 4–5).

[31] An English translation of the legal text is available at: http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html.

[32] Latvian cargo handlers were deployed to Manas, Kyrgyzstan in support of a Danish contingent Department of Defense 2002b, 7. Estonian Foreign Minister Kristiina Ojuland explicitly mentions her country's contribution to OEF in her address to the UN General Assembly (General Debate, 57th Session, September 20, 2002).

[33] For information regarding liaison officers, see White House (2002) and information from U.S. Central Command: http://www.centcom.mil/coalition-countries.

Table 1 Military participation in Operation Enduring Freedom, 2001–2002

Country	MP	Type		Contribution	Troops
United States	1.0	Full spectrum	Combat	Ground and special forces, bomber aircraft	8500
United Kingdom				Ground and special forces, support aircraft	1700
Canada				Ground and special forces, support aircraft	1100
Romania	0.9	Ground forces		Ground forces	475
France				Ground forces, fighter and support aircraft	220
Denmark	0.8	Combat aircraft		Special forces, fighter aircraft	258
Norway				Special forces, fighter and support aircraft	183
Netherlands				Fighter and support aircraft	204
Australia	0.7	Special forces		Special forces, support aircraft	150
Germany				Special forces, support aircraft	100
New Zealand				Special forces, support aircraft	50
Lithuania				Special forces, logistical support	37
Spain	0.4	Ground units	Non-combat	Military field hospital, support aircraft	480
Italy				Engineers, support aircraft	43
Poland				Engineers	87
Slovakia				Engineers	40
Greece	0.3	Indirect		Naval support, liaison officers	2
Japan				Naval support, fleet refueling	n.a.
Latvia	0.2	Local	Logistical	Cargo handlers, overflight, facilities	10
Estonia				Airport security, overflight	5
Czech Republic	0.1	External		Liaison officers, overflight	4
Finland				Liaison officers	3
Belgium				Liaison officers	2
Portugal				Liaison officers	2
Sweden				Liaison officers	2
Bulgaria				Hosting transport aircraft	-
Austria	0.0	-	No participation	-	-
Hungary				-	-
Ireland				-	-
Slovenia				-	-

Sources: A detailed list with the respective sources for each country is given in the appendix.
Notes: MP is the fuzzy set military participation. Troop numbers indicate military personnel related to OEF operations in Afghanistan.

Parliamentary veto rights

The analysis includes two institutional conditions: parliamentary veto rights and constitutional restrictions. I treat these separately because I regard them as governed by different causal mechanisms: while the former constitutes a "veto point" under specific partisan compositions of the legislature (Immergut 1990), constitutional restrictions are conceived as a structural veto point to military deployments *irrespective* of the preference distribution in parliament.

I operationalize parliamentary veto rights on a dimension that ranges from mandatory parliamentary approval in advance of any military deployment (fuzzy score 1.0), to the complete absence of parliamentary involvement in troop deployment decisions (fuzzy score 0). The central criterion to distinguish whether a country is rather in the fuzzy set of "parliamentary veto rights" (receive a fuzzy score above 0.5), or whether it is situated rather outside that set (receive a fuzzy score below 0.5) is the presence or absence of a basic parliamentary veto right. Depending on the comprehensiveness of this institutional practice,

fuzzy scores in the first group can take values between 1.0 for a full *ex ante* veto, 0.8 indicating an *ex ante* veto with restrictions, and 0.6 for an *ex post* veto. In turn, countries without parliamentary veto rights, but other forms of legislative influence, are coded 0.4 when parliament is informed in advance of a military operation, 0.2 indicating *ex post* information of parliament, and 0 in cases where there is no relevant involvement of the legislature in the decision-making process.[34]

My coding of parliamentary veto rights draws primarily on the ParlCon dataset compiled by Wolfgang Wagner, Dirk Peters, and Cosima Glahn (2010). ParlCon classifies the parliamentary control level of countries in terms of the presence or absence of an *ex ante* veto right, which, in case of the former, translates into high values on the fuzzy scale (1.0 or 0.8, depending on whether a full or limited *ex ante* veto is present). In addition to its binary coding of veto rights, ParlCon provides brief country studies that focus on the institutional role and political practice of parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions. I used these country briefs provided in ParlCon for the fuzzy-set coding in order to distinguish *degrees* in parliamentary veto rights. In some cases, however, the characterization of institutional provisions did not suffice to make an informed coding decision. Hence, I have drawn on further country studies and two additional surveys of parliamentary war powers (Born and Hänggi 2005; Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall 2010).[35]

In the observed timeframe of 2001-2002, twelve countries have parliaments with an *ex ante* veto on all military deployments (fuzzy score 1.0). Among EU-15 member states, this includes Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, and Sweden.[36] CEE countries with full parliamentary veto rights comprise Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania.[37] In Slovenia, parliamentary veto rights are restricted to operations outside treaty

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[34] These conceptual distinctions draw on Dieterich et al. (2010) and Wagner et al. (2010).

[35] Two collections of country studies were most helpful in this regard (Ku and Jacobson 2003b; Nolte 2003). A series of reports commissioned by the British House of Lords (2006; 2007) and a legislative bill submitted to the House of Commons (2005) and reports on this (2006b; 2006a) provided further background and international comparison. In the United States the legal interpretation and constitutional practice of the War Powers Resolution remains contested. Recently, a bi-partisan commission was authorized to investigate the historical record and to make recommendations for improving the effectiveness of current legal provisions. For its final report, see Baker and Christopher (2009).

[36] While parliamentary approval is mandatory in Austria, decisions on military deployments in the *Nationalrat* are delegated to the *Hauptausschuss* as the main committee of parliament. In the 22nd legislative term (10/1999-12/2002) this committee comprised twenty-eight members, including sixteen from the reigning ÖVP/FPÖ coalition.

[37] The coding of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania corresponds with Dieterich et al. who classify these countries as having "very strong parliamentary war powers" (2010, 17-19; 28-32). For a similar coding of Lithuania, see Wagner et al. (2010, 69). Throughout their democratic transition, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania firmly

obligations (fuzzy score 0.8). [38] Three countries feature *ex post* veto rights or equivalent regulations (fuzzy score 0.6). The Czech Constitution restricts parliamentary involvement to retrospective approval for multinational operations in "common defence against aggression". [39] In the wake of 9/11, the Japanese government introduced legislation to allow for the participation of its armed forces in support of United States military operations against terrorism. While the scope of permitted operations remains restricted, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law authorized government to deploy military forces for anti-terrorism purposes, while the involvement of the *Diet* is limited an *ex post* veto on such deployments (Wagner, Peters, and Glahn 2010, 67). In Italy, constitutional interpretations that regard parliamentary involvement in decision-making as mandatory remain controversial. While most analysts agree that a basic parliamentary veto right exists, there is no consensus on its reach. Hence, the coding reflects the presence of a weak parliamentary veto right. [40]

In the Netherlands the *Staten-Generaal* is informed prior to military deployments, a practice that became policy tradition and was formalized in 2000 with the introduction of Article 100 to the Dutch Constitution (fuzzy score 0.4). [41] In Belgium, Canada, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, and the United States military deployments are primarily a matter of the executive, but parliament has to be informed within a certain timeframe after deployments have been made (fuzzy score 0.2). [42] Lastly, countries with an executive

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established parliamentary authority in security affairs, but these provisions were curbed in 2003 to accommodate the NATO accession process, exempting military operations outside treaty obligations from parliamentary approval Wagner, Peters, and Glahn (2010, 38; 58; 84).

[38] In 1994, the Slovenian legislature passed the Law on Defence that authorizes the executive to decide on "the level of participation of the Slovenian Army in fulfilling the obligations assumed with international organization treaties" Wagner, Peters, and Glahn (2010, 86).

[39] Article 43 (4a) of the Czech Constitution refers to operations that arise from "international contractual obligations". While the invocation of NATO Article 5 did not entail mandatory military participation in OEF, many NATO member states explained their participation on the basis of alliance obligations.

[40] Wagner et al. conclude that, "all in all, it is not clear, who has the power to deploy military troops and personnel abroad" and thus code Italy as an "inconclusive case" Wagner, Peters, and Glahn (2010, 65). In contrast, Dieterich et al. classify Italy as a country "with very strong war powers" Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall (2010, 26). Luther argues that the constitutional debate has been settled in favor of a parliamentary veto, "[t]he participation of Parliament in the decision to deploy the armed forces in other cases was, previously, a point of contention but is now well-established" Luther (2003, 452).

[41] See Besselink (2003, 553) and Wagner et al. (2010, 74).

[42] Slovakia introduced a constitutional amendment in February 2001, which curbed parliamentary involvement for most operations Wagner, Peters, and Glahn (2010, 85). Unlike in the Czech Republic, where Art. 43 (6) gives parliament an *ex post* veto right, no such provision is found in the respective Slovakian amendment of Article 119 (p). In the United States, the extent of presidential war powers, and – vice versa – congressional influence remain heavily debated. Most commentators agree, however, that the executive branch is relatively free in its decision to *initiate* the use of force, while Congress holds more leverage in the long-term through its wielding of the "power of the purse" (Baker and Christopher 2009).

prerogative over foreign policy and thus no mandatory parliamentary involvement comprise Australia, France, Greece, New Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdom (fuzzy score 0).[43] Table 2 summarizes the range of parliamentary involvement and the resultant fuzzy scores for each country.

Table 2 Parliamentary veto rights

Parliamentary veto rights	V	Country
Ex ante veto on military deployments	1.0	Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Sweden
Ex ante veto on military deployments with restrictions	0.8	Slovenia
Ex post veto on military deployments	0.6	Czech Republic, Italy, Japan
No veto; parliament is informed prior to military deployments	0.4	Netherlands
No veto; parliament is informed ex post military deployments	0.2	Belgium, Canada, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, United States
No parliamentary involvement	0.0	Australia, France, Greece, New Zealand, Spain, United Kingdom

Sources: Nolte (2003); Dieterich et al. (2010); Wagner et al. (2010).
Notes: V is the fuzzy set parliamentary veto rights for "Operation Enduring Freedom" in 2001-2002.

Constitutional restrictions

In contrast to parliamentary veto rights, constitutional restrictions are assumed to form a structural veto point against military deployment *irrespective* of the preference distribution in parliament. While regulations vary across countries, I distinguish three sets of constraints on the basis of provisions that prohibit or restrict military participation either (a) on the grounds of international law, (b) outside certain organizational frameworks, or (c) beyond a set of permissible tasks. Provisions in the first area can range from a strict requirement of UN authorization to instructions binding the armed forces to act in accordance with international law broadly conceived. The second area relates to requirements regarding the involvement of multilateral organizational frameworks. Finally, some democracies specify a limited range of permissible tasks for military deployments to prohibit, for instance, offensive military operations.

My operationalization of constitutional restrictions ranges from comprehensive restrictions on military deployments (fuzzy score 1.0) to the absence of any relevant

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[43] Spain introduced a parliamentary veto right in 2005 (Ley Orgánica de la Defensa Nacional, 5/2005, 17 Noviembre).

constraints (fuzzy score 0). The central criterion to distinguish whether a country is rather in the fuzzy set of "constitutional restrictions" (receive a fuzzy score above 0.5), or whether it is situated rather outside that set (receive a fuzzy score below 0.5) is the presence or absence of constitutional provisions that prohibit or severely restrict military participation in the given case. The coding of constitutional restrictions is based on an analysis of primary sources, as in constitutional documents and legislative bills that delimit the use of the armed forces, and on secondary sources, which proved helpful in interpreting regulations against the background of specific national contexts.

In the case of Operation Enduring Freedom three types of constraints are expected to be individually sufficient to avert military participation. First, while the military operation of OEF had been justified on the grounds of individual and collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, it did not receive explicit Security Council authorization. Hence, governments from countries with a strict requirement of UN authorization of the use of force were constrained in their decision on whether or not to participate militarily. Second, as the military operation was explicitly aimed to combat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, countries with restrictions on the scope of permissive operations are expected to refrain from military participation. Finally, being an *ad hoc* coalition, OEF by definition excludes countries that are constitutionally bound to participate only in specific multilateral organizational frameworks, such as operations under the auspices of the UN or NATO.

Countries with comprehensive constitutional restrictions (fuzzy score 1.0) comprise Austria, Finland, Ireland, Japan, and Sweden. All of these countries require explicit UN authorization and restrict the scope of permissible tasks to peace support missions, meaning that they cannot participate in offensive operations.[44] Austria is further restricted by its constitution to participate only in operations under UN, OSCE, or EU auspices.

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[44] Austrian deployment provisions to this effect are contained in the *Bundesverfassungsgesetz* of April 21, 1997 (I, 1-2). Finland amended its constitutional framework several times throughout the past two decades, but constitutional restrictions continue to rule out operations beyond the defensive use of force and those without a UN or OSCE mandate (Jakobsen 2006, 120–1). For Ireland, respective provisions are stated in the *Defence Act* of 1954 and several amendments made through 1983, which can be accessed at: http://www.attorneygeneral.ie /slru/restatements.html. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution of 1946 renounces the use of force and the maintenance of armed forces. While subsequent legislation enabled Japanese participation in peace support operations, as in the Peacekeeping Law of 1992, the use of force remains prohibited (Shibata 2003, 211–3). This principle is evident also in the Anti-Terrorism Law of 2001, which explicitly states, that the measures in support of OEF "must not constitute the threat or use of force" (Art. 3, II). Sweden adapted its legal framework in the 1990s to allow participation in a greater range of peace support operations, but the general requirement of a UN mandate remained (Jakobsen 2006, 183–4).

In contrast to the countries mentioned, eleven of the observed democracies have only minor restrictions in the sense that foreign military deployments are required to be in accordance with international law. These provisions, however, are usually stated in broad and general terms and can thus not be regarded as a sufficient constraint on military participation (fuzzy score 0.2). Countries in this group comprise Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, and Romania.[45]

While Denmark had previously required a UN or OSCE mandate, this legal provision was removed when the "Act on the Aims, Tasks, and Organization of the Armed Forces" became effective on March 1, 2001.[46] This legislation asserted the right to partake in military operations even in cases where the Security Council had not authorized the use of force and was thus a reaction to public debates over the controversial Danish participation in the Kosovo war (Jensen 2003, 241; Jakobsen 2006, 90).

While German participation in military operations is subject to several restrictions, legal scholars widely agree that the *Bundeswehr* is permitted to participate in operations within the context of individual and collective self-defense, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter (Tomuschat 2001, 22; Wiefelspütz 2008, 29; Geiger 2010, 318–22). Hence, based on the premise that the conditions of Article 51 were met, there were no provisions that prohibit German participation in OEF.[47]

Preceding the legislation passed by the Danish *Folketing*, Norway implemented a similar law on June 4, 1999, in the immediate aftermath of NATO's *Operation Allied Force*. While the adopted bill stresses the importance of international law and specifically the authority of the Security Council, it preserves a right to deploy military forces without a UN mandate if circumstances require such an action.[48] Finally, thirteen of the countries included in this study show no relevant constitutional restrictions on military deployments (fuzzy score 0). These include Australia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary,

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[45] In Italy, for instance, Article 10 (1) of the Constitution requires operations to be in accordance with the "generally recognized tenets of international law". But apart from this lenient provision, there are "no specific constitutional limits for international operations undertaken jointly with armed forces of other states" (Luther 2003, 447). For reasons of space, a full documentation of relevant provisions is given in the appendix.

[46] This document is available at, https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=6294.

[47] For a discussion of constitutional concerns regarding OEF, see also Fischer and Fischer-Lescano (2002).

[48] The legal text can be accessed at, http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/dok/regpubl/stmeld/19981999.

Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States.[49] Table 3 summarizes the coding of constitutional restrictions.

Table 3 Constitutional restrictions

Constitutional restrictions	C	Country
Comprehensive restrictions	1.0	Austria, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Sweden
Minor restrictions	0.2	Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania
No restrictions	0.0	Australia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom, United States

Sources: Ku and Jacobson (2003); Nolte (2003); Jakobsen (2006); Wagner et al. (2010).
Note: C is the fuzzy set constitutional restrictions on participation in "Operation Enduring Freedom" in 2001-2002.

Executive partisanship

This condition refers to the position of a country's executive on a left-right scale in political space. My estimate of partisan positions draws on the extensive research of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP; Budge and Klingemann 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). The CMP data is based on a qualitative coding of statements in party election programs along fifty-six policy categories and seven policy domains that range from domestic issues to external relations. Thirteen of the policy categories are associated with positions traditionally emphasized by left parties, such as peaceful international cooperation, welfare state expansion, and economic regulation, while another thirteen categories indicate policy positions that are commonly highlighted by right parties, as, for instance, strong defense, free enterprise and traditional moral values (Budge and Klingemann 2001).

A particular strength of the CMP is the provision of meaningful indicators of cross-national variation, whereas estimates that are based on party-family affiliation or expert judgment of particular countries can be misleading when used for comparative purposes. In terms of its political program, for instance, Norway's *Arbeiderparti* (Labour Party) is considerably further on the left than Australia's Labour Party, yet both belong to the social democratic party family. This difference is due in part to Norway's political space, which is located further to the left than most countries' party systems. In contrast to some alternative measures, the CMP approach is sensitive to this kind of cross-national variation (cf. Klingemann et al. 2006, 63–85). Hence the resulting left-right values do not necessarily

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[49] Across this group of countries, constitutional provisions with regards to military deployments are either non-existent or decidedly open in their formulation. For France, see Gerkrath (2003, 287). For Spain, see Cotino Hueso (2003, 726).

reflect popular perceptions of party positions. For instance, Britain's 'New Labour' under Blair made a decisive turn toward the right, which is reflected in a CMP value that characterizes Labour as a center or center-right party, in contrast to its familiar classification as a social democratic party.

The calculation of CMP left-right values results from subtracting the sum of left statements from the sum of right statements for each party and each election. For the estimate of partisan positions I follow the approach suggested by Michael Laver and John Garry (2000, 628) and calculate the "substantive" policy position for each party. This technique is an adaptation of the original CMP calculation. In essence, it discounts the salience a party places on a category in favor of its "pure" policy position, dividing the CMP left-right values by the sum of left-right references. A party's left-right position, P_{LR}, is thus defined as:

$$P_{LR} = (P_R - P_L)/(P_R + P_L)$$

While this calculation is straightforward for single-party governments and presidential systems, the majority of parliamentary democracies typically feature coalition government (Müller and Strøm 2000). Hence for multi-party governments in parliamentary democracies I calculate a weighted score where each coalition partner's left-right value is set in relation to its parliamentary seat shares and the overall number of seats of the governing coalition.[50] This calculation is based on the assumption that coalition partners distribute cabinet posts in accordance with their relative seat shares, a conjecture that is well supported by empirical studies (Powell, 2000, 173). Thus, if S_a indicates the parliamentary seat share of government party GP_a, the executive's partisan position on a left-right scale, E_{LR}, is defined as:

$$E_{LR} = \frac{\left[\left(GP_{LR_a} * S_a\right) + \ldots \left(GP_{LR_n} * S_n\right)\right]}{\sum S_i}$$

In order to transform the resultant CMP values into fuzzy sets, I employ the "direct method" of calibration (Ragin 2008, 85–94). This approach requires the researcher to define three qualitative breakpoints that indicate full set membership, a point of maximum ambiguity, and full set non-membership. Based on a scale of substantive CMP values that ranges from -100

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[50] For presidential systems, the executive position is calculated on the basis of the president's party.

(all left statements) to 100 (all right statements), I define full membership in the fuzzy set "right executive" as any CMP value equal to or above 50. Likewise, values equal to or below - 50 are defined as indicating full non-membership, while 0 marks a natural crossover point. Table A.2 in the appendix displays the resultant substantive CMP values and calibrated fuzzy values.

Public support

This condition is based on the citizen-policy link postulated by proponents of the democratic peace. If scholars are correct in their assumption that democratic leaders are constrained by a requirement to gather citizens' support for decisions on war and peace, then public opinion should be a critical factor in assessing whether or not a country engages in military conflict. Hence, as a working hypothesis, public support is expected to be a necessary condition for military participation. Vice versa, the absence of public support is assumed to be sufficient for military non-participation.

My estimate of public support for military involvement in Afghanistan is based on selected opinion polls across the thirty democracies included in this study. Since governments considered deployments to OEF from October 2001 onward, I focus on opinion polls from this time period, beginning with the initial phase of military operations that started on October 7, up until December 20, as the date when the UN Security Council formally authorized the ISAF operation.[51] Regarding data, I draw mainly on two cross-national surveys with similar question wording and coverage of a large range of countries. The Flash Eurobarometer 114 "International Crisis" survey covers the EU-15 member states. More encompassing is the "End of Year Terrorism Poll 2001" by Gallup International, which comprises twenty-five of the thirty countries included in this study. For the remaining five countries I complemented the data with similar polls.[52]

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[51] While the United Stated initiated Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7, most countries that eventually joined the operation did not authorize deployments before December 2001. Hence, for the United States I consider opinion polls from October, while the cross-national surveys focus on public support for military participation between November and December of 2001.

[52] Countries not covered in the two cross-national surveys are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Hungary, and Slovenia. For Canada, the estimate is based on polls conducted by EKOS in November and December. The Australian estimate draws on a survey conducted by Newspoll for *The Australian* in October. Regarding New Zealand, public opinion data was scarce for the observed time period; hence I used a poll conducted by DigiPoll for the *New Zealand Herald* at the end of September. No comparable opinion polls exist for Hungary and Slovenia, which I discuss below. See table 6 for detailed information on the polls that were used for the estimate of public support.

Before proceeding, some caveats are in order because a comparative study using public opinion data from up to thirty countries faces several challenges. First, because there is no survey that covers all of the included countries, my estimate of public support is required to draw on a range of polls, with differences regarding question wording, polling technique, sample size, and the time during which the fieldwork was conducted. I sought to rein in these difficulties by restricting the timeframe and drawing on large cross-national surveys. Some limitations remain, however, and these need to be kept in mind. First, while question wording is similar across polls, each contains specific connotations that could have influenced respondents.[53] The Gallup International survey states as a fact that NATO members "have agreed to participate in the military action in Afghanistan". This has to be seen against the background of NATO's activation of the mutual defense clause in the wake of 9/11. However, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty does not irrevocably lead toward military involvement – rather, each member state is to decide how to assist the others with "action as it deems necessary, including the use of force". In that regard, the Eurobarometer survey is more sensitive since it leaves the question open on which policies should be pursued. However, the question shifts the focus on fighting "with the U.S. forces", rather than on Afghanistan or the aim of removing the Taliban regime in that country.[54]

With these limitations on mind, the fuzzy set "public support" is constructed to reflect in which countries support for military involvement was rather strong and where it was largely absent. I calculate fuzzy set membership values using the direct method of calibration (Ragin 2008, 85). Across the opinion polls that inform my estimate, on average 10% of the

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[53] The Gallup International survey asked: "Some countries and all NATO member states have agreed to participate in the military action against Afghanistan. Do you agree or disagree that (your country) should take part with the United States in military action against Afghanistan?". The Flash Eurobarometer survey asked respondents about their agreement with five policy options in response to the threat of international terrorism, one of them being military force: "In any case (our country) is to take or has already taken decisions about which policy should be applied now. Amongst the following measures, which ones seem appropriate to you [...] (D) To send (nationality) troops to fight with the U.S. forces".

[54] The effects of different question wording can be illustrated with an example from the German Politbarometer poll (2001), which I considered but did not include in this study. First, respondents were asked about German military participation in US-led operations, a question that was raised against the backdrop of Chancellor Schröder's promise of military support to the United States. While the resultant 56.43% public support corresponds with the Gallup survey results, a question wording with less background would have been preferable. The Politbarometer poll also raised the issue of German participation in a "UN peacekeeping force" in Afghanistan, which yielded overwhelming public support of 81.57%. However, the question was phrased in a way that passed over the fact that while the UN authorized ISAF, it was not the "blue helmet" operation that the question alluded to.

respondents gave no answer or were undecided.[55] Therefore, the point of maximum ambiguity would be at 45% public support – a point at which it is likely that an equal share of respondents were opposed to military involvement. Accordingly, I define three qualitative breakpoints: countries with 75% supporters are considered fully in the set public support (fuzzy score 1.0), the cut-off point of maximum ambiguity is set at 45% public support (fuzzy score 0.5), and countries with less than 15% supporters are considered fully outside of the set (fuzzy score 0). Table A.3 in the appendix displays the resultant fuzzy values as well as the average share of public support and the opinion polls that informed the estimate.

Not surprisingly, public support for the use of military force in Afghanistan was greatest in the United States (fuzzy score 0.99). Likewise, the included Commonwealth states of New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada all showed high levels of public support for using force, followed by the Netherlands and France (fuzzy scores ranging from 0.90 and 0.82). Intermediate positions were taken by Germany, Italy, Denmark, and Norway (fuzzy scores between 0.76 and 0.69). Still within the set of public support, but not as pronounced were the levels of support in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Belgium. Lower levels of public support for using force were found in Romania, Portugal, Spain, and Slovakia (fuzzy scores ranging from 0.35 to 0.21). Finally, a group of ten countries indicates substantial public opposition to military participation in Afghanistan, including Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Sweden, Japan, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Austria, Greece, and Finland (fuzzy scores between 0.14 and 0.02). For Hungary and Slovenia no comparable polls were available for the given timeframe. Hence, rather than using data from a later time period or pertaining to the ISAF mission, I set these countries' level of public support to 45%, yielding a fuzzy score of 0.5 to indicate that these are "neither in not out" of the fuzzy set of public support (Ragin 2008, 30).

Military power

This condition derives from collective action theory the general expectation that powerful states make disproportionately large contributions, whereas weak states have strong incentives to ride free or limit their participation to nominal contributions. In order to apply this hypothesis to Afghanistan, however, we need to specify the respective collective good and the relative material strength of the countries involved.

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[55] Naturally, this share varies across polls. In the Gallup International survey an average of 11% of respondents were undecided or gave no answer. The Flash Eurobarometer survey had 8% of respondents in the undecided or no answer category, including those that answered "maybe if …" to the survey question.

Since the military intervention in Afghanistan was justified in reference to the right of individual and collective self-defense based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, it can be said that the primary collective good at stake was the defense against terrorist acts that posed a "threat to international peace and security" as the Security Council termed the attacks of 9/11.[56] While it remains debatable whether the *military* response to these terrorist attacks actually helped to restore international peace and security, it is evident that in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 the international reaction was one of almost unanimous solidarity with the United States. In line with the resolution passed by the Security Council on the same day, the UN General Assembly condemned the terrorist acts and expressed its solidarity with the United States, while calling for "international cooperation to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the outrages of 11 September 2001".[57] On October 2, NATO formally declared the activation of Article 5, affirming that the terrorist attacks constituted an "armed attack" against the United States and calling allied states for their support.[58] When the military intervention of Afghanistan was announced on October 7, the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, extended the Commission's "total solidarity with the action", while a day later the foreign ministers of the EU expressed their "wholehearted support for the action that is being taken in self-defence."[59]

It can thus be concluded that the common response to the threat of international terrorism presented a collective good to the countries involved. However, this is not to imply that governments agreed on all aspects of what constituted a proper response and the concrete aims of a military intervention in Afghanistan. In fact, government declarations and policy statements were characterized by a fair amount of ambiguity;[60] one could argue whether this was intentional or due to a lack of policy coordination, but that should not matter for the collective action hypothesis at hand.

The reasoning behind the collective action argument builds on the assumption that more powerful states stand to gain larger absolute benefits from the collective good than their

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[56] SC Res 1368 (September 12, 2001).

[57] GA Res 56/1 (September 12, 2001).

[58] The formal invocation of Article 5 was announced on October 2, 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech /2001/s011002a.htm. See also NATO Press Release 2001-124 (September 12, 2001).

[59] EU Press Release, Memo 01/327 (October 15, 2001).

[60] To this effect the recollections of former Prime Minister Tony Blair are revealing: "To us then, and I believe this to be true now, there is no neat distinction between a campaign to exorcise al-Qaeda, or to prevent Taliban re-emergence, or to build democracy, or to ensure there is a proper, not a narco, economy. There is no 'or' about it." (Blair 2011, 362). A similar mentioning of varied goals, entailing solidarity with the United States, fighting terrorism, preserving liberal values, and protecting human rights, can be found in the memoir of former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (2011, 43–6).

weaker counterparts. Hence, powerful states will bear a disproportionate share in the provision of the collective good, while weak states – whose relative contribution has little influence on the provision of the public good – will exploit the opportunity to free ride on the provisions of the more powerful or to limit their participation to a nominal contribution.

What constitutes a powerful state? There are many ways to conceptualize power. However, as the theoretical argument on collective action problems in alliance contexts is based on material conceptions of power, I will restrict my conceptualization of power to countries' relative material capabilities as indicators of *military* power.[61] In the context of Operation Enduring Freedom, my estimate of military power is based on a country's relative military expenditure as a standard indicator for material capabilities.[62]

The fuzzy set "military power" is constructed on the basis of absolute military expenditure values for 2001, as listed in the widely-used reference *The Military Balance* (IISS 2002). These values were standardized and transformed into a fuzzy set using the direct method of calibration (Ragin 2008, 85). I define full membership in the set military power as any z-score equal to or above 0.5 standard deviations. In turn, full non-membership relates to z-scores equal to or below -0.5 standard deviations, while 0 marks a natural crossover point. Table 4 shows absolute military expenditures, standardized scores, and the resultant fuzzy set military power.

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[61] For a discussion of different concepts of power and their usage in IR theory, see David Baldwin (2002).

[62] As an example for neorealist approaches to measuring power, see Walt (1987, 22-23; 289-291). Mearsheimer further distinguishes between latent power and military power, arguing that "it is impossible to simply equate wealth with military might" as many neorealist studies have done (2001, 82).

Table 4 Military expenditure in 2001 and calibrated fuzzy-values

Country	M	Z-score	Military expenditure (2001, bn US$)	Country	M	Z-score	Military expenditure (2001, bn US$)
United States	1.00	5.27	308.50	Denmark	0.16	-0.27	2.50
Japan	0.92	0.41	40.30	Portugal	0.16	-0.28	2.30
United Kingdom	0.87	0.32	35.40	Austria	0.15	-0.29	1.50
France	0.85	0.29	33.60	Finland	0.15	-0.29	1.40
Germany	0.75	0.18	27.50	Czech Republic	0.14	-0.30	1.19
Italy	0.60	0.07	21.40	Romania	0.14	-0.30	0.99
Canada	0.26	-0.18	7.90	Hungary	0.14	-0.30	0.93
Spain	0.24	-0.19	7.10	New Zealand	0.14	-0.31	0.68
Australia	0.24	-0.19	6.90	Ireland	0.14	-0.31	0.64
Netherlands	0.23	-0.20	6.40	Slovakia	0.13	-0.31	0.39
Greece	0.21	-0.22	5.60	Bulgaria	0.13	-0.31	0.37
Sweden	0.18	-0.25	3.90	Slovenia	0.13	-0.31	0.28
Poland	0.18	-0.26	3.50	Lithuania	0.13	-0.31	0.22
Belgium	0.17	-0.26	3.00	Estonia	0.13	-0.32	0.09
Norway	0.17	-0.26	3.00	Latvia	0.13	-0.32	0.09

Sources: Expenditure data from International Institute for Strategic Studies (2002).
Notes: M is the fuzzy set military power. Membership values were calibrated on the basis of standardized scores with qualitative anchors at 0.5 (full membership), 0 (cut-off), and -0.5 (full non-membership).

Fuzzy-set analysis

This section presents the results of the fuzzy-set analysis of military participation in Afghanistan across the observed democracies. In the next section, I interpret these results against the backdrop of the theoretical expectations formulated in chapter three. Following good practice, the analysis comprises two separate fsQCA procedures, one for the outcome and another for its negation, since the results for one cannot be inferred from the other (Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 408). Furthermore, the theoretical section yielded asymmetric hypotheses that can only be tested in separate analyses.

I exclude Hungary and Slovenia from the fuzzy-set analysis, because there is no comparable data on public support for these countries. As a possible solution to this lack of data, one could assign the fuzzy score 0.50 to indicate "maximum ambiguity" in terms of set membership (cf. Ragin 2000, 158). This approach would dilute the results, however, because both countries would indicate membership in *neither* of the two configurations (the presence and absence of public support). Hence, I decide for a conservative estimate and the exclusion of these countries from the main analysis.

Before proceeding with the analysis of sufficient conditions, it is prudent to test for necessary conditions. In fuzzy-set analysis a potential necessary condition is indicated when instances of the outcome are a subset of instances of a condition (Ragin 2009, 110). In formal

terms, necessary conditions are calculated on the basis of separate measures for consistency and coverage:

$$\text{Consistency}_{\text{Necessary Condition}}(Y_i \leq X_i) = \frac{\sum \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum Y_i}$$

$$\text{Coverage}_{\text{Necessary Condition}}(X_i \leq Y_i) = \frac{\sum \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum X_i}$$

The consistency value reflects the extent to which the condition in question overlaps the outcome. In turn, the coverage value can be said to indicate the relevancy of a condition. While a condition could be a perfectly consistent superset, and thus in formal terms a necessary condition, it might be irrelevant because it is present across cases that show the outcome as well as among those that do not show the outcome.[63] Hence, it is important to also assess coverage for conditions with high consistency, since the identification of a necessary condition with low coverage values is unlikely to yield inferential leverage.

The results of these calculations are presented in Table 8.[64] Each condition and its negation are tested separately for both outcomes, while conditions with a consistency value equal to or above 0.85 are tested for coverage.[65] The analysis identifies two necessary conditions and a third condition that could be considered "almost necessary". For the outcome military participation, the absence of constitutional restrictions (~C) can be regarded as a necessary condition, indicated by a consistency value of 0.94 at a coverage value of 0.60. The absence of military power (~M) can be seen as a necessary condition for military non-participation, with a consistency value of 0.90 and a coverage value of 0.69. Apart from these two conditions, the absence of public support (~S) is "almost necessary" for military non-participation, based on a consistency of 0.85 and a coverage of 0.81.

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[63] See Braumoeller and Goertz (2000, 855) on the distinction between trivial and non-trivial necessary conditions.

[64] As indicated, coverage values are only meaningful for those conditions that pass fuzzy-set consistency (cf. Schneider and Wagemann 2007, 95; Ragin 2008, 62).

[65] In an earlier publication, Ragin uses a threshold of 0.80 to indicate an "almost necessary" condition (2003, 194). Schneider and Wagemann (2007, 213) recommend a threshold of "at least" 0.90 to identify potential necessary conditions.

Table 5 Tests for necessary conditions by outcome

	MP		~MP			MP		~MP	
	Consis-tency	Cover-age	Consis-tency	Cover-age		Consis-tency	Cover-age	Consis-tency	Cover-age
M	0.55	-	0.34	-	~M	0.73	-	0.90	0.69
V	0.47	-	0.69	-	~V	0.67	-	0.43	-
C	0.21	-	0.45	-	~C	0.94	0.60	0.68	-
S	0.78	-	0.36	-	~S	0.46	-	0.85	0.81
E	0.66	-	0.64	-	~E	0.64	-	0.62	-

M: Military Power, V: Parliamentary Veto Rights, C: Constitutional Restrictions, S: Public Support, E: Right Executive, MP: Military Participation, [~] indicates the negation of a condition, coverage is calculated for consistency values ≥ 0.85.

Based on the data displayed in table 5 it would not be unreasonable to ask whether there are substantive differences between ~C, ~M, and ~S based on the criteria for necessary conditions. Hence, to illustrate the underlying set relations and also to clarify the difference between consistency and coverage, I construct three Venn diagrams based on the fuzzy set membership scores of the twenty-eight democracies in this study. Figure 1 displays the three conditions in relation to the outcome for which they come close to being a necessary condition (military participation in the first diagram and military non-participation in the other two). Each set is represented by a circle, whose size corresponds to the sum of fuzzy set membership scores for that set. The overlap between sets is a function of the consistency measure given in table 5. The diagrams thus demonstrate the *consistency* of the subset relation between each condition and the respective outcome, as well as its *coverage*, which refers to the relative sizes of the two circles.

Figure 1 Venn diagrams illustrating consistency and coverage

It is evident that ~C has the highest consistency, since MP is almost entirely contained within the condition, indicating a strong subset relation. Diagram two displays a similar, yet less pronounced subset relation, as a larger area of ~MP remains outside ~M. However, both

sets are almost equal in size, indicating a higher coverage than in the first diagram where ~C is larger than MP. Finally, the third diagram shows the relation between the sets ~S and ~MP, which are about equal in size and overlap to a large extent, yet not as much as in the other two diagrams. This illustrates that ~S yields a high coverage value but a lower consistency than the other conditions. These diagrams further underline that coverage can only be meaningful as an indicator when consistency passes a certain threshold, whether 0.85 or 0.90, because otherwise it would merely indicate that the sets are about the same size, while the overlap might be small.

Before continuing with the analysis of sufficient conditions, it is useful to derive the logical implications of the identified necessary conditions. If a condition is necessary for an outcome, it follows that its negation must be sufficient for the negation of the outcome. Hence, since ~M is a necessary condition for military non-participation (~MP), M must be sufficient for military participation (MP), either on its own, or as part of a conjunction of conditions. Equally, since ~C is necessary for MP, C must be sufficient for ~MP. While less consistent, ~S is still almost necessary for ~MP and thus S should be almost sufficient for MP. These implications seem intuitive against the backdrop of the formulated theoretical expectations, but they still need to be confirmed in the fsQCA procedure.[66]

Military participation in Operation Enduring Freedom

Under which conditions did democracies participate in military actions against the Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan? Is it possible to identify pathways that correspond to our theoretical expectations? In order to answer these questions, the fuzzy-set analysis builds on a sequence of steps, the core of which can be carried out with the QCA software.[67]

The first step entails the construction of a *truth table*, based on countries' fuzzy-set membership scores for each condition and the outcome. This procedure helps to identify patterns in the empirical data. The fuzzy-set truth table represents a multidimensional vector space with 2^k corners, where k relates to the number of conditions and each corner of the resulting property space signifies a distinct combination of conditions, represented by a separate row in the truth table. Based on their fuzzy-set membership scores for each condition

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[66] In order to enhance analytical leverage, I retain the identified necessary conditions during the following fsQCA procedure. While it has previously been advised to drop these conditions (Ragin 2009, 110), recent publications acknowledge the value of keeping necessary conditions during the analysis of sufficient conditions (Mendel and Ragin 2011, 24).

[67] Version 2.5 of fsQCA was used. The software can be accessed at: http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin.

in a respective combination, countries are assigned to the respective corners of the property space (Ragin 2008, 124–35).

Table 6 displays the truth table for the outcome military participation and the five conditions military power (M), parliamentary veto rights (V), constitutional restrictions (C), public support (S), and right executive (E). Because the model contains five conditions, the truth table comprises $2^{5\,(M,\,V,\,C,\,S,\,E)}$ = 32 rows. For reasons of space, the table is limited to the thirteen rows that are filled with empirical cases.[68] Each country's membership in the respective conjunction of conditions is given in brackets. Denmark, for instance, holds a membership of 0.70 in the conjunction given in row four, which comprises the absence of both military power and constitutional restrictions with the presence of parliamentary veto rights, public support, and a right executive. The consistency column indicates the extent to which the fuzzy-set values for a conjunction are sufficient for the outcome military participation across all cases. Based on these consistency scores a cut-off point is determined to separate combinations that pass fuzzy-set sufficiency from those that do not (Ragin 2008, 135). To proceed with the analysis, I decide for a consistency threshold of 0.79. Hence all configurations below row six are excluded from the ensuing minimization procedure.[69]

Table 6 Truth table for the outcome military participation

Row	M	V	C	S	E	MP	Consis-tency	N	Countries
1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0.98	3	USA (.80), GBR (.65), FRA (.61)
2	1	1	0	1	0	1	0.93	1	DEU (.56)
3	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.90	1	ITA (.60)
4	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.87	2	DNK (.70), CZE (.51)
5	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.84	2	AUS (.76), POL (.52)
6	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.79	5	NZL (.80), CAN (.74), NLD (.60), NOR (.55), BEL (.54)
7	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.78	1	ESP (.66)
8	1	1	1	0	1	0	0.72	1	JPN (.60)
9	0	1	0	0	1	0	0.70	1	LVA (.62)
10	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	4	LTU (.73), BGR (.72), ROU (.65), EST (.54)
11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.58	3	GRC (.79), PRT (.72), SVK (.56)
12	0	1	1	0	0	0	0.56	1	SWE (.60)
13	0	1	1	0	1	0	0.47	3	AUT (.85), IRE (.66), FIN (.60)

M: Military Power, V: Parliamentary Veto Rights, C: Constitutional Restrictions, S: Public Support, E: Right Executive, MP: Military Participation; Rows 14-32 are not displayed as these contain no empirical cases.

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[68] Rows 14 through 32 contain *logical remainders*, which represent combinations of conditions not filled with empirical cases. These can be included in an intermediate solution if one can make plausible assumptions about their potential outcomes.

[69] I decide against including row seven, since it would reduce the overall consistency of the solution, while adding only a single case with a low outcome value to the minimization procedure.

In the second step, the truth table is reduced to identify minimal combinations of conditions that are sufficient for the outcome (Ragin 1987, 93–7). On the basis of Boolean logic, the QCA software derives three solution terms, which differ in their treatment of logical remainders. The *complex solution* provides the most conservative estimate, making no assumptions beyond the empirical cases. The *parsimonious solution* incorporates logical remainders but does not assess their plausibility. While this procedure yields solution terms that are easier to interpret, the results of the parsimonious solution should be treated with care and always contrasted with the other solutions. Finally, the *intermediate solution* allows the researcher to specify how logical remainders ought to be treated, based on explicit assumptions about the causal relationship. It is thus positioned in between the complex and parsimonious solutions.

Table 7 displays each of the three solutions and their constituent conjunctions of conditions that are sufficient for the outcome military participation. In addition, the previously identified necessary condition ~C is listed. The numbered paths present alternate routes toward the outcome. On the right hand side, consistency and coverage scores are given by solution and for each respective path. While *raw coverage* refers to 'how much' of the outcome a path can account for, *unique coverage* discounts empirical overlap between paths to indicate only the specific explanatory contribution of the respective path.

Table 7 Solution terms for military participation

Path	Conjunction	Relation	Consistency	Raw coverage	Unique coverage
Necessary condition					
	~C	← MP	0.94	0.60	-
Parsimonious solution			0.82	0.78	-
(1)	S	→ MP	0.82	0.78	0.78
Intermediate solution			0.84	0.74	-
(1)	M*~C*S	+	0.94	0.48	0.02
(2)	~V*~C*S	+	0.85	0.57	0.13
(3)	~C*S*E	→ MP	0.85	0.55	0.05
Complex solution			0.83	0.70	-
(1)	M*V*~C*S	+	0.88	0.24	0.02
(2)	~C*S*E	+	0.85	0.55	0.18
(3)	~M*~V*~C*S	→ MP	0.81	0.40	0.13

Tilde [~] indicates the absence of a condition, multiplication [*] refers to a logical 'and', addition [+] represents a logical 'or', [←] indicates a necessary condition, [→] indicates sufficient conjunctions.

Due to the different treatment of logical remainders, the three solution terms vary in terms of complexity. The parsimonious solution is the most general and comprises more cases (coverage of 0.78) than the other two solution terms. In contrast to the parsimonious solution term, the intermediate and complex solution terms entail three alternate pathways. For the current analysis I will focus on the intermediate solution, as it provides the best combination of consistency and coverage values in relation to the level of detail specified by its constituent pathways.

While a theoretical interpretation of the results will be provided in the subsequent section, a few observations are evident from the three configurations that comprise the intermediate solution. First, the absence of constitutional restrictions (~C) is part of each of the three sufficient conjunctions for military participation. Hence, this condition constitutes a "necessary element of a sufficient set" of conditions (NESS condition; Wright 1988, 1019). Second, public support constitutes another NESS condition. Its significance is underlined by the parsimonious solution where public support is by itself sufficient for the outcome. Third, regarding specific pathways it is apparent that countries participate militarily either because they are militarily powerful, due to an absence of parliamentary veto rights, or because of a right executive. Each of these conditions combines with the NESS conjunction (~C*S), which is present in all pathways of the intermediate and complex solution terms.

By themselves, the solution terms are rather abstract and do not provide detail on the distribution of cases and the overall fit of the model. To redress this shortcoming, I construct an x-y plot that displays the position of each country by tracing membership in the solution term against membership in the outcome.[70] Figure 2 demonstrates the fit of the intermediate solution term as a sufficient condition for military participation in Afghanistan. The diagonal line demarcates points that hold equal membership in both sets. More importantly, it separates cases with a higher value in the outcome than in the solution (above the line), from those where membership in the solution exceeds that of the outcome (below the line). While the former can indicate a sufficient condition, the latter can signal a necessary condition. In set-theoretic terms, it is crucial to distinguish whether a case rather holds membership in a given set ($X_i > 0.50$) or whether it is situated rather outside that set ($X_i < 0.50$). This lets us

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[70] In their "standards of good practice", Schneider and Wagemann specifically suggest that an x-y plot can be an effective tool for "assessing the quality of the fsQCA results" (2010, 411). On the visualization of fsQCA results see also Schneider and Grofman (2006).

divide the x-y plot into six distinct zones, which differ in their theoretical relevance, depending on the analytical aim of the research (Schneider and Rohlfing 2009, 37).

While the x-y plot demonstrates visually that the intermediate solution accounts for all except two countries that participated militarily, it also shows that some deviant cases exist. Out of twelve democracies that participated militarily in OEF (zones 1-2 & 6), ten hold membership in the solution term (zones 1-2), seven of which can be considered 'typical cases' (zone 1). Due to their position below the main diagonal, Australia, Germany, and New Zealand cannot be considered typical cases in a strict sense, but they nevertheless hold membership in the solution and show the expected outcome. By contrast, Italy in zone 3 can be considered a 'deviant case', as the country holds a fairly high membership value in the solution but does not show the expected outcome.[71] Two countries also participated militarily, but are not explained by the solution: Romania and Latvia (zone 6). This finding, however, does not undermine the theoretical argument, but it lowers the coverage values for the solution term. Finally, countries in the lower left corner hold low membership values in both the outcome and the solution. Hence, these can be considered mostly irrelevant for the theoretical argument.

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[71] To a lesser extent this also applies to Belgium, the Czech Republic, and Poland. Unlike Italy, however, these countries hold much lower values in the solution term.

Figure 2 X-Y Plot of solution term and military participation in Afghanistan

Military non-participation in Operation Enduring Freedom

Which conditions led democracies to abstain from military participation? Does the empirical analysis reflect theoretical expectations? In order to address these questions, the fuzzy-set analysis will proceed through the steps introduced in the previous section.

Table 8 displays the truth table for the outcome military non-participation. Note that the conditions and countries' membership values for each conjunction are identical to the previous analysis. However, because the inquiry is now directed towards the non-outcome, consistency values inevitably differ. In terms of a consistency threshold, I decide on 0.81 to include the first seven rows in the following minimization procedure.

Table 8 Truth table for the outcome military non-participation

Row	M	V	C	S	E	~MP	Consistency	N	Countries
1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0.95	3	AUT (.85), IRE (.66), FIN (.60)
2	1	1	1	0	1	1	0.94	1	JPN (.60)
3	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.93	1	SWE (.60)
4	0	1	0	0	1	1	0.91	1	LVA (.62)
5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.90	3	GRC (.79), PRT (.72), SVK (.56)
6	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.88	1	ESP (.66)
7	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.81	1	ITA (.60)
8	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.78	4	LTU (.73), BGR (.72), ROU (.65), EST (.54)
9	1	1	0	1	0	0	0.78	1	DEU (.56)
10	0	1	0	1	1	0	0.76	2	DNK (.70), CZE (.51)
11	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.73	2	AUS (.76), POL (.52)
12	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.58	5	NZL (.80), CAN (.74), NLD (.60), NOR (.55), BEL (.54)
13	1	0	0	1	1	0	0.50	3	USA (.80), GBR (.65), FRA (.61)

M: Military Power, V: Parliamentary Veto Rights, C: Constitutional Restrictions, S: Public Support, E: Right Executive, ~MP: Military Non-Participation; Rows 14-32 are not displayed as these contain no empirical cases.

In the second step of the analysis, the truth table is minimized on the basis of Boolean logic. Due to the inclusion of seven rows, this procedure retains a fair amount of complexity, even for the parsimonious solution term. Table 9 displays the resultant solution terms and their constituent pathways toward the outcome military non-participation. In addition, the two identified necessary conditions ~M and ~C are displayed.[72] I will concentrate on the intermediate solution term, which provides a good combination of consistency and coverage in relation to the level of detail given in its constituent pathways. It is evident that, of the four pathways that comprise the intermediate solution term, there is substantial empirical overlap between the paths. The conjunction (~M*~S) is present in all but the third path. This corresponds with the identification of ~M and ~S as necessary conditions for ~MP. The third path, however, presents an unexpected finding since its combination of military power, a right executive, and parliamentary veto rights yields a sufficient path toward military non-participation.

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[72] As discussed above, the condition ~C should be considered 'almost' necessary.

Table 9 Solution terms for military non-participation

Path	Conjunction	Relation	Consistency	Raw coverage	Unique coverage
Necessary condition					
	~M	← ~MP	0.90	0.69	-
	~S		0.85	0.81	
Parsimonious solution			0.84	0.82	-
(1)	~S*E	+	0.92	0.58	0.07
(2)	C	+	0.89	0.45	0.09
(3)	M*V*E	+	0.87	0.27	0.03
(4)	~V*~S	→ ~MP	0.83	0.35	0.10
Intermediate solution			0.88	0.77	-
(1)	~M*C*~S	+	0.96	0.37	0.06
(2)	~M*~S*E	+	0.92	0.54	0.07
(3)	M*V*E	+	0.87	0.27	0.07
(4)	~M*~V*~S	→ ~MP	0.85	0.33	0.10
Complex solution			0.88	0.78	-
(1)	~M*V*C*~S	+	0.96	0.36	0.06
(2)	V*C*~S*E	+	0.96	0.33	0.04
(3)	~M*V*~S*E	+	0.94	0.44	0.07
(4)	~M*~V*~C*~S	+	0.85	0.33	0.20
(5)	M*V*~C*S*E	→ ~MP	0.81	0.17	0.03

Tilde [~] indicates the absence of a condition, multiplication [*] refers to a logical 'and', addition [+] represents a logical 'or', [←] indicates a necessary condition, [→] indicates sufficient conjunctions.

How are the countries distributed across the solution terms? In order to visualize the fsQCA result for military non-participation, I construct an x-y plot by tracing membership in the intermediate solution term against membership in the outcome. Figure 3 shows the empirical fit of the solution as a sufficient condition for the non-outcome. What is evident is that a large number of cases are clustered around zone 1. In fact, ten countries can be considered typical cases, while three reside in zone 2, but nevertheless show the outcome and membership in the solution term. Also, there are no deviant cases that show membership in the solution term but not in the outcome (zone 3). Several cases hold values ($X_i < 0.50$) in the solution term but show the outcome (zone 6), indicating that these are not explained by the solution term. Finally, countries in the bottom left corner hold low membership in both sets and are thus irrelevant for the theoretical argument.

Figure 3 X-Y Plot of solution term and military non-participation in Afghanistan

Interpretation of the results

The analysis found public support to be present in all pathways toward military participation. Likewise, the absence of public support is 'almost' necessary for military non-participation and an element in three out of four sufficient pathways toward that outcome. This finding presents strong empirical evidence in support of the postulated link between public opinion and foreign policy, which suggests that democratic governments are constrained by a requirement to gather citizen's support before deploying armed forces to a conflict.

If public opinion were a negligible factor to political leaders, then we should see evidence for military involvement even in cases were citizens were largely opposed to the military intervention. Yet ten out of twelve countries that deployed combat forces to OEF had public support.[73] With regards to NATO member states, it is noteworthy that for these countries military participation directly corresponded to public support, as the six countries

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[73] The cases where this pattern does not hold are discussed below.

with lowest public support among alliance members ended up not participating or sending non-combat support units.

While this finding indicates a robust pattern, it does not make a claim about the direction of the causal link between public opinion and foreign policy. Causality could have been reversed: because political leaders planned to send troops, they prepared the public for their decision with legitimizing rhetoric and arguments in support of military participation. Likewise, citizens of countries with constitutional restrictions on military involvement could be, on average, more critical towards the use of force. However, this would not explain why a number of NATO countries did not participate more fully when their political leadership would have had an interest in expressing alliance solidarity through a strong military commitment. Furthermore, it is unlikely that political rhetoric could gather sustained support for military intervention if the public was generally opposed to such actions.

With regards to power status, the analysis yielded several findings. First, it was demonstrated that the absence of military power is a necessary condition for military non-participation and that it also is an element in three out of four sufficient pathways toward that outcome. This supports the general expectation derived from collective action theory, which assumes that weak states have strong incentives for free riding or easy riding, as in limiting their participation to a nominal contribution. Second, while the theoretical expectations with regards to military power where necessarily quite general, the identified pathways helped to specify the conditions under which the argument holds. Military power alone is not sufficient for military participation; it rather requires public support and the absence of constitutional restrictions in each respective case. This is demonstrated by the first path of the intermediate solution term, shown in table 7. Similarly, the absence of military power further requires the absence of public support in combination with any of the other three conditions to be sufficient for military non-participation, which is demonstrated in the intermediate solution term given in table 9.

Furthermore, the analysis confirmed the previously outlined theoretical expectations regarding constitutional restrictions on the use of force. First, the absence of constitutional restrictions was identified as a necessary condition for military participation, which resonates with the theoretical argument that conceives such constraints as a structural veto against military deployments. This finding receives further support from the analysis of military non-participation, where constitutional restrictions are found to be sufficient either on their own,

or in combination with the absence of military power and public support, as indicated in the parsimonious and intermediate solution terms shown in table 9.

Unlike some of the other conditions, parliamentary veto rights were not by themselves expected to lead towards either outcome. However, in combination with the absence of public support these institutional rights were expected to create a veto point against military deployment even when other conditions favor participation. This pattern was found in ten countries, only two of which did contribute militarily to OEF. Yet some of the countries that fall in this group are overdetermined with regards to the expected outcome, since they also happen to have constitutional restrictions that prohibit military participation. If we exclude those cases, five countries remain: Bulgaria, Estonia, and Latvia – none of which made a military contribution. But this combination also applies to Lithuania and Romania and these countries did contribute militarily. Hence no conclusive evidence can be drawn from the present study as to whether parliamentary veto rights created a constraint on military participation.

Finally, with regards to executive partisanship in relation to military deployments to OEF, theory yielded no determinate expectations. While it is generally assumed that right executives would endorse exclusivist uses force, while left executives support inclusivist uses of force, both arguments were present in the debates preceding the military intervention in Afghanistan. This corresponds to the analytical results, which show that right executives are an element in paths toward both outcomes, but that there is no decisive pattern involving right executives. Hence, for the case of Afghanistan it is concluded that partisanship cannot be regarded as an explanatory factor.

Conclusion

At the outset of this paper the question was posed why and under which conditions democracies decided to join the military intervention in Afghanistan that begun as *Operation Enduring Freedom* on October 7, 2001. The introductory section provided some historical and legal background to the Afghanistan war, emphasizing important differences between OEF, as the military response to 9/11, and the ISAF mission that had initially been conceived as a peace support operation restricted to the Kabul area. Against this backdrop, the paper proceeded with a brief review of some recent studies on the military involvement of democracies in Afghanistan to derive implications for the research design of the present study.

Consequently, a central element in the research design was the conception of military participation in the context of the Afghanistan war. Due to differences regarding the military objectives as well as the legal background, it was decided to focus on OEF rather than ISAF in the specification of the outcome. Furthermore, in order to be able to trace a deployment decision to the government that was responsible for that decision it was decided to limit the timeframe to the period between October 2001 and December 2002. Based on explicit criteria, the study proceeded to categorize the extent of military participation across the democracies selected for study. This yielded a group of twelve out of thirty countries that participated with combat forces, while eighteen countries abstained from participation or provided non-combat support. With regards to the sixteen included NATO countries, these were evenly split, whereas half of the states participated militarily, the other half abstained or fulfilled limited support functions.

The analysis of public support for military participation revealed considerable variance that did not seem to reflect the widespread international expressions of solidarity with the United States in the aftermath of 9/11. Even among NATO members there were large differences between states, including substantial opposition to the war in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, as well as lukewarm public support in Belgium, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Consequently, none of these countries deployed combat forces to Afghanistan in the observed timeframe.

In sum, the fsQCA procedure yielded three main findings that are deemed to have theoretical import. First, substantial empirical evidence was found in support of the participatory constraints argument, which holds that democratic governments are constrained by a requirement to gather citizen's support before deploying armed forces to a conflict. While NATO members were 'most likely' cases for military participation, the analysis found a correspondence between public support and military participation, since those alliance members with low public support ended up not participating or reducing their participation to nominal contributions. Second, the findings broadly support the general argument derived from collective action theory, which expects weak states to ride free on the contributions of more powerful states. The identified pathways further specified the conditions under which this argument holds, as power alone is not sufficient for military participation. Third, the analysis also confirmed the previously outlined theoretical expectations concerning constitutional restrictions, which are conceived as a structural veto against military deployments. Finally, with regards to parliamentary veto rights and partisanship no consistent

patterns were identified in the present study. While there is some evidence in favor of an interaction between legislative involvement and public opposition, no conclusive evidence could be drawn from the fuzzy-set analysis as to whether or not parliamentary veto rights created a constraint on military participation. Likewise, there were no decisive patterns involving partisanship.

Appendix

Table A.1 Executives, parties, and government types

Country	Code	Executive leader	Since	Executive party / Coalition	Government type
Australia	AUS	John W. Howard	10/1998[a]	Liberal, National	Majority coalition
Austria	AUT	Wolfgang Schüssel	02/2000	ÖVP, FPÖ	Majority coalition
Belgium	BEL	Guy Verhofstadt	07/1999	VLD, PS, PRL, SP, Eco., Aga.	Majority coalition
Bulgaria	BGR	S. Sakskoburggotski	07/2001	NDSV, DPS	Majority coalition
Canada	CAN	John Chrétien	11/2000	Liberal	Single-party majority
Czech Republic	CZE	Miloš Zeman	07/1998	ČSSD	Single-party minority
Denmark	DNK	Anders F. Rasmussen	11/2001[b]	Venstre, KF	Minority coalition
Estonia	EST	Siim Kallas	01/2002[c]	Center, Reform	Minority coalition
Finland	FIN	Paavo Lipponen	03/1999	SDP, KOK, VAS, SFP, VIHR	Majority coalition
France	FRA	Jacques Chirac[d]	05/1995	RPR, UDF	Divided government
Germany	DEU	Gerhard Schröder	10/1998	SPD, Greens	Majority coalition
Greece	GRC	Kostas Simitis	04/2000	PASOK	Single-party majority
Hungary	HUN	Viktor Orbán	07/1998	Fidesz, FKGP, MDF	Majority coalition
Ireland	IRL	Bertie Ahern	06/1997	FF, PD	Minority coalition
Italy	ITA	Silvio Berlusconi	06/2001	FI, AN, CCD-CDU, LN, NPSI	Majority coalition
Japan	JPN	Junichiro Koizumi	04/2001	LDP	Single-party minority
Latvia	LVA	Andris Berzins	05/2000	TP, LC, TB/LNNK	Majority coalition
Lithuania	LTU	Algirdas Brazauskas	04/2001	SDC, NS/SL	Majority coalition
Netherlands	NLD	Wim Kok	08/1998	PvdA, VVD, D66	Majority coalition
New Zealand	NZL	Helen Clark	11/1999	Labour, Alliance	Majority coalition
Norway	NOR	Kjell M. Bondevik	10/2001	Hoyre, KrF, V	Minority coalition
Poland	POL	Leszek Miller	10/2001	SLD, PSL	Majority coalition
Portugal	PRT	António Guterres[e]	10/1999	PS	Single-party minority
Romania	ROU	Adrian Nastase	12/2000	PDSR	Single-party minority
Slovakia	SVK	Mikulás Dzurinda	10/1998	SDK, SDL, SMK-MKP, SOP	Majority coalition
Slovenia	SVN	Janez Drnovsek	11/2000	LDS2, ZLSD, SLS+SKD	Majority coalition
Spain	ESP	José M. Aznar	03/2000	PP	Single-party majority
Sweden	SWE	Göran Persson	09/1998	SAP	Single-party minority
United Kingdom	GBR	Tony Blair	06/2001	Labour	Single-party majority
United States	USA	George W. Bush	01/2001	Republican	Unified government[f]

Sources: Nohlen (2005); Ismayr (2009; 2010); Nohlen and Stöver (2010). Missing data is based on national election reports.
Notes: Country codes refer to the ISO format. Dates indicate the beginning of term or a cabinet change.
[a] The coalition was re-elected on November 10, 2001, while military deployments had been initiated in October.
[b] The new government submitted a deployment proposal, approved by the Folketing with 101-11 votes on December 14, 2001.
[c] Estonia deployed an airport security team to OEF in June 2002.
[d] President Chirac shared executive power with Prime Minister Jospin, who headed a coalition between the PS, PCF, and Greens.
[e] Prime Minister Guterres' resignation led to early elections in March 2002.
[f] President with a legislative majority.

Table A.2 Executive partisanship

Country	Executive party / Coalition	Executive L-R	Right executive
Australia	Liberal, National	63.95	0.98
Austria	ÖVP, FPÖ	34.52	0.89
Belgium	VLD, PS, PRL, SP, Eco., Aga.	-15.04	0.29
Bulgaria	NDSV, DPS	-15.33	0.28
Canada	Liberal	-23.14	0.20
Czech Republic	ČSSD	0.63	0.51
Denmark	Venstre, KF	51.10	0.96
Estonia	Center, Reform	-2.88	0.46
Finland	SDP, KOK, VAS, SFP, VIHR	6.87	0.60
France	RPR, UDF	7.14	0.61
Germany	SPD, Greens	-3.72	0.44
Greece	PASOK	-42.76	0.07
Hungary	Fidesz, FKGP, MDF	17.15	0.74
Ireland	FF, PD	11.07	0.66
Italy	FI, AN, CCD-CDU, LN, NPSI	53.83	0.96
Japan	LDP	11.12	0.66
Latvia	TP, LC, TB/LNNK	8.44	0.62
Lithuania	SDC, NS/SL	-16.58	0.27
Netherlands	PvdA, VVD, D66	-21.21	0.22
New Zealand	Labour, Alliance	-33.73	0.12
Norway	Hoyre, KrF, V	-3.10	0.45
Poland	SLD, PSL	1.21	0.52
Portugal	PS	-39.63	0.08
Romania	PDSR	-15.74	0.28
Slovakia	SDK, SDL, SMK-MKP, SOP	-4.03	0.44
Slovenia	LDS2, ZLSD, SLS+SKD	5.27	0.58
Spain	PP	11.42	0.66
Sweden	SAP	-6.67	0.40
United Kingdom	Labour	10.26	0.65
United States	Republican	52.09	0.96

Sources: CMP data from Budge et al. (2001); Klingemann et al. (2006).
Notes: Negative L-R values indicate left partisanship. Qualitative anchors for the fuzzy set right executive were set at 50 (full membership), 0 (cut-off), and -50 (full non-membership).

Table A.3 Public support for military participation in Afghanistan

Country	S	Support	Polls
United States	0.99	89.0	Gallup, 7 Oct, 90% support (N=660); 19-21 Oct, 88% support, (N=1006)
New Zealand	0.90	67.0	DigiPoll/New Zealand Herald, 28-30 Sep, 67% support (N=552)
Australia	0.89	66.0	Newspoll/The Australian, 26-28 Oct, 66% support (N=1200)
United Kingdom	0.89	65.8	[a]NOP, 13-22 Nov, 65.5% support (N=1006); [b]TNS, 23-27 Nov, 66% support (N=1057)
Canada	0.87	64.0	EKOS, 12-14 Nov, 62% support (N=300); 10-12 Dec, 66% support (N=300)
Netherlands	0.87	63.6	[a]NIPO, 15-22 Nov, 61.1% support (N=1002); [b]8-11 Dec, 66% support (N=966)
France	0.82	60.5	[a]TNS Sofres, 14-17 Nov, 54% support (N=1007); [b]14-15 Dec, 67% support (N=1000)
Germany	0.76	56.3	[a]TNS Emnid, 14-17 Nov, 54.6% support (N=1001); [b]14 Dec, 58% support (N=500)
Italy	0.72	54.2	[a]DOXA, 15-18 Nov, 57% support, (N=978); [b]15-19 Nov, 51.3% support (N=1001)
Denmark	0.70	53.6	[a]TNS Gallup, 14-19 Nov, 64% support (N=1000); [b]8-15 Dec, 43.2% support (N=602)
Norway	0.69	53.0	[b]Norsk Gallup, 2-9 Dec, 53% support (N=1015)
Czech Republic	0.57	48.0	[b]Mareco Praha, 28 Nov-17 Dec, 48% support (N=1000)
Poland	0.57	48.0	[b]Mareco Polska, 26-30 Nov, 48% support (N=1252)
Belgium	0.54	46.5	[a]TNS Dimarso, 13-21 Nov, 42.9% support (N=959); [b]3-8 Dec, 50% support (N=1019)
Romania	0.35	39.0	[b]CSOP, 30 Nov-6 Dec, 39% support (N=1204)
Portugal	0.28	35.8	[a]Metris, 13-20 Nov, 26.5% support (N=1002); [b]TNS Eurot., 14-20 Dec, 45% support (N=1000)
Spain	0.22	32.4	[a]Demos., 16-20 Nov, 31.7% support (N=1007); [b]Sigma Dos, 17-18 Dec, 33% support (N=500)
Slovakia	0.21	32.0	[b]Mareco Praha, 28 Nov-17 Dec, 32% support (N=1000)
Estonia	0.14	27.0	[b]EMOR, 28 Nov-5 Dec, 27% support (N=503)
Ireland	0.11	24.0	[a]Marketing Surveys,13-20 Nov, 26% support (N=1000); [b]16 Nov-6 Dec, 22% support (N=n.a.)
Latvia	0.11	24.0	[b]Baltic Data House, 20 Nov-4 Dec, 24% support (N=504)
Sweden	0.10	23.0	[a]Svenska Gallup, 14-19 Nov, 19.9% support (N=1000); [b]19-29 Nov, 26% support (N=1000)
Japan	0.08	21.0	[b]Nippon Research Center, 28 Nov-6 Dec, 21% support (N=1385)
Lithuania	0.05	16.0	[b]SIC Rinkos Tyrimai, 28 Nov-2 Dec, 16% support (N=503)
Bulgaria	0.04	14.0	[b]BBSS, 1-10 Dec, 14% support (N=1119)
Austria	0.02	7.2	[a]Österr. Gallup, 20-26 Nov, 6% support (N=500); [b]16-20 Nov, 8.4% support (N=1000)
Greece	0.02	6.1	[a]ICAP Hellas, 13-27 Nov, 7% support (N=1000); [b]14-22 Nov, 5.2% support (N=1000)
Finland	0.02	6.0	[a]Suomen Gallup, 14-16 Nov, 5% support (N=1001); [b]7-11 Dec, 7% support (N=802)
Hungary	0.50	-	n.a.
Slovenia	0.50	-	n.a.

Sources: [a] Flash Eurobarometer 114. [b] Gallup Internaional End of Year Terrorism Poll 2001. Other polls as indicated.
Notes: S is the fuzzy set public support. Membership values were calculated on the basis of average support across polls, using the direct method of calibration, with qualitative anchors at 75% (full membership), 45% (cut-off), and 15% public support (full non-membership). For Hungary and Slovenia no comparable data exists, hence these countries received a fuzzy value of 0.50 to indicate maximum ambiguity.

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