Democracy Unpacked: A Fuzzy-Set Analysis of Institutions, Partisanship, and War Participation

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Abstract

This paper seeks to identify sources of institutional and political variation among democracies to account for observable differences in conflict behavior. After briefly revisiting the debate on democracy and war, the paper provides a fuzzy-set analysis of thirty democracies' military participation in the Iraq War. Prior studies have identified institutional and partisan differences as potential explanatory factors for the observed variance. The interaction of institutions and partisanship, however, has gone largely unobserved. I argue that these factors require to be analyzed in conjunction: institutional constraints presume actors that fulfill their role as veto players to the executive. Likewise, partisan politics is embedded in institutional frames that enable or constrain decision-making. Hence I suggest a comparative approach that combines these factors to explain why some democracies joined the ad hoc coalition against Iraq and others did not. To investigate the interaction between institutions, partisanship and war participation I apply fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). The analysis reveals, for instance, that the conjunction of right-of-center governments with an absence of both parliamentary veto rights and constitutional restrictions was sufficient for participation in the Iraq War. In turn, for countries in which the constitution requires parliamentary approval of military deployments, the distribution of preferences within the legislature proved to be decisive for military participation or non-participation.
Introduction

Compared to the amount of research devoted to the interdemocratic peace proposition, the flipside of democratic participation in armed conflict has received considerably less attention. Moreover, due to a widespread focus on regime type differences, many studies in International Relations (IR) implicitly treat democratic regimes as a homogenous group and thus fail to account for substantial variation within the group of democracies. While scholars have persuasively made the case that ‘democracy’ needs to be unpacked to be meaningful (Elman 2000), this remains rarely done in IR studies. In Comparative Politics, on the other hand, research on democratic subtypes and their virtues and weaknesses abounds, but this knowledge is seldom applied to matters of security policy. In this context, a number of publications have initiated what may constitute a ‘democratic turn’ in security studies (cf. Geis and Wagner 2010). Works in this vein have broadened the democratic peace research program by focusing on the conditions under which democracies use military force, democracy’s inherent ambiguities, and the differences between democratic states regarding their constitutional structure, domestic institutions, political culture, and partisan politics.¹

Against this backdrop, three general questions arise concerning the domestic sources of democracies’ foreign policy and the interaction of domestic and international factors in relation to conflict behavior. First, under which conditions do domestic institutions constrain or enable government use of force? Previous research has conceptualized institutional constraints in various ways, yet the question remains how specific institutional mechanisms constrain or enable government use of military force. Second, to what extent does partisanship matter in military deployment decisions? The traditional (realist) perspective suggests that ‘politics stops at the waters’ edge’ (Gowa 1998), expecting a foreign policy consensus over decisions on war and peace. This conception seems to be misguided, however, since studies have repeatedly demonstrated partisan divides over security issues. Third, how do international organizational frameworks influence democracies’ participation in military operations? It seems plausible to assume that the organizational auspices under which an operation is run affect government decisions; i.e. whether missions are carried out through the United Nations (UN), by regional organizations such as the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or in ad hoc coalition frameworks – but it is not clear how exactly these different frameworks enable or constrain decision-making.

This paper is based on a dissertation project that comparatively investigates democracies’ participation in several wars and military interventions conducted in various frameworks during

¹ See, for instance, Müller (2004); Daase (2006); Dieterich et al. (2009); and Geis et al. (2010).
the past two decades. For this essay the theoretical focus rests on *ad hoc* military coalitions, based on a fuzzy-set analysis of thirty democracies’ participation in the Iraq War of 2003. The essay is divided into three parts. Part one revisits the general literature on democracy and war participation before focusing on institutional and partisan explanations of democratic conflict behavior and outlining the paper’s theoretical approach. Since the main arguments in the democratic peace debate are well established, I will not provide a comprehensive review, but focus on works that are central to frame my own argument. Part two introduces the research design for the Iraq War case study, the methodological approach of QCA, and the coding criteria for the fuzzy-set analysis. In turn, part three presents the results of the empirical analysis. The final section concludes the paper and proposes areas for future research.

**Democracy and War Participation**

Research on regime type and conflict behaviour has yielded a host of findings, the most well known of which remains the democratic peace. In the past three decades, numerous studies have focused on the benign effects of ‘democracy’, whether in support of the dyadic argument that democracies do not fight each other (e.g., Doyle 1986), or to maintain the monadic argument that democracies are generally more peaceful when compared to non-democratic regimes (e.g., Rummel 1995). The focus on differences between regime types, however, has led studies to implicitly treat democracies as a homogenous group. Scholars have pointed out that this lack of differentiation conceals variation at the domestic level – a factor that could explain why some democracies are more war-prone than others (Elman 2000; Palmer *et al.* 2004).

In this context a number of studies have begun to investigate democracies’ varying institutional settings and political configurations in relation to conflict behaviour. For instance, Prins and Sprecher (1999) examine parliamentary democracies and, counter-intuitively, find coalition governments more likely to reciprocate disputes than single-party governments. This contrasts with Auerswald (1999), who finds coalition governments restrained in their use of force. Regarding the parliamentary-presidential distinction Reiter and Tillman (2002) as well as Leblang and Chan (2003) report no significant results. Concerning electoral rules, however, these studies find that proportional representation systems are less likely to get involved in war (Leblang and Chan 2003) and that increased political participation reduces the likelihood of conflict initiation (Reiter and Tillman 2002). Palmer, Regan and London (2004) distinguish

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2 For reviews of the evolving democratic peace research program, see, for instance Huth and Allee (2002); Ray (2003); George and Bennett (2005); Geis and Wagner (2010), and Hayes (2011).

3 The theoretical utility of this distinction has been questioned, since most dyadic theories imply the existence of monadic mechanisms, see Müller (2002: 48) and Jervis (2005: 19).
governments by their political position based on expert survey data. Their study lends support to partisan arguments, finding that ‘right’ governments are more likely to become involved in interstate conflict than ‘left’ governments.

In a recent publication, Geis, Müller and Schörnig (2010) ask ‘why some democracies fight and others do not’. The study investigates parliamentary debates preceding the wars in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo and Iraq across seven democracies. An extensive analysis of parliamentary speeches provides evidence of distinct foreign policy cultures in the observed countries, as reflected in the discursive structures of plenary debates. However, while the authors acknowledge that norms and institutions should be analyzed in conjunction, their approach is restricted to normative structures (Geis et al. 2010: 177). Here, an investigation of institutional constraints or the constellation of political actors in the observed democracies could have provided more leverage to explain specific cases of war participation.

**Democratic Governments in the Iraq War**

When President Barack H. Obama announced on 31 October, 2010 that ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ was officially over,\(^4\) he put an end to what has arguably been the most controversial war democracies have fought in the post-cold war era. During the past two decades democratic states have used substantial military force on a number of occasions and with varying justifications, but the preventive war against Iraq, initiated by President George W. Bush on 19 March, 2003 and joined by an *ad hoc* coalition of states, stands out in terms of the harm inflicted on soldiers and civilians killed or wounded, its extraordinary economic costs, and its long-term toll on democratic politics and the project of democracy at large.\(^5\)

Democracies’ military participation in the Iraq War presents a puzzle for theories of the democratic peace, particularly in its monadic variants. One purported mechanism of the democratic peace is the link between citizen preferences and government representatives. But how can it be explained that some governments authorized military deployments to join the *ad hoc* coalition when the public was overwhelmingly against the use of force?\(^6\) Why did other governments refuse military participation?

Comparative studies on democracies’ involvement in the Iraq War propose contending explanations for this puzzle. Some authors suggest that partisan politics helps to explain why

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6. Opinion polls conducted in January and December 2003 have shown strong public opposition to the war across European countries, see Gallup (2003) and Eurobarometer (2003).
certain countries participated and others did not, noting that it was primarily right-of-center governments that gave political support for the Iraq War (Schuster and Maier 2006). This perspective resonates with recent work on partisanship in relation to the use of force (Rathbun 2004; Arena and Palmer 2009). A different line of reasoning centres on national legislatures and their authority in security policy. It is argued that parliaments with extensive influence on military deployments can serve as an effective check on war participation, amounting to a ‘parliamentary peace’ where the premise of a war-averse public is met (Dieterich et al. 2009). This institutional perspective contributes to the wider literature on legislative constraints in specifying a concrete mechanism by which parliaments can influence the foreign policy process and troop deployment decisions (e.g., Reiter and Tillman 2002).

While previous studies have identified institutional and partisan differences as potential explanations for the observed variance in democratic conflict behaviour the interaction of institutions and partisanship has gone largely unobserved. I argue that these factors require to be analyzed in conjunction: institutional constraints, particularly parliamentary veto rights, presume actors that fulfil their role as veto players to the executive. Likewise, partisan politics is embedded in institutional frames that enable or constrain decision-making. The following sections address these factors in sequence before deriving theoretical expectations for the interaction of institutional constraints and partisan politics.

**Institutional Constraints**

Democracies display notable differences concerning the degree of involvement of their national legislatures in decision-making processes on the use of force. Likewise, considerable variation exists at the constitutional level regarding the scope of military operations that democracies are legally permitted to engage in. In recent years, a growing literature has focused on parliamentary veto power and constitutional constraints in the context of democratic accountability and as institutional explanations for democratic participation and non-participation in various kinds of military operations (Ku and Jacobson 2003; Born and Hänggi 2005; Dieterich et al. 2009; Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010; Kolanoski 2010; Wagner 2011).

Regarding parliamentary involvement, it is apparent that some governments face no legislative constraints in sending the military abroad, while others are constitutionally required to seek parliamentary approval before authorizing troop deployments. In contrast to more general notions of executive-legislative relations, the concept of ‘parliamentary war powers’ refers to the concrete authority of the legislature in the field of military deployment policy (Peters and Wagner

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7 Schuster and Maier focus on political support as their independent variable but suggest that their argument holds, to some extent, also for military participation (2006: 232).
Recent work on parliamentary war powers provides an important specification of democratic foreign policy processes, identifying sources of variation among democracies that have not been addressed by previous studies on the democratic peace. Parliamentary war powers are analytically closer and thus, arguably, of more immediate relevance to decisions on the use of force than remote measures of institutional constraints that merely differentiate between constitutional systems. For instance, while numerous studies have examined differences between parliamentary and presidential systems regarding conflict behaviour, few have investigated the concrete involvement of legislatures in decision-making on the use of force. Studies suggest, however, that significant variation exists that eludes the common parliamentary-presidential distinction. It is rather the degree of legislative involvement in military deployment decisions that can, under certain preconditions, reduce war participation (Dieterich et al. 2009; Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010).

Parliamentary war powers foremost concern the question of whether the legislature holds a veto right over executive decisions on military deployments. In its strongest expression this right grants an ex ante veto over all types of military operations. In contrast, an ex post veto grants parliament a vote on operations that have already been initiated. Arguably, the latter is a much weaker form of influence, since the material and reputational costs for revoking a decision are substantial and make it unlikely that parliamentarians are willing to use this power except under severe circumstances (cf. Fearon 1994). At the low end of war powers are informational rights that give parliament no binding veto of any sort, but a right to be informed regularly by the executive and to initiate hearings and parliamentary debate (Dieterich et al. 2010; Wagner et al. 2010).

In their study of European governments’ involvement in the Iraq War, Dieterich, Hummel and Marschall (2009) examine the parliamentary war powers of EU member states in relation to countries’ degree of military participation in the US-led war. The authors propose a ‘parliamentary peace’ hypothesis, suggesting that countries with comprehensive parliamentary war powers abstain from military participation. The argument rests on the premise of a war-averse public, which was the case in the months preceding the Iraq War, where 60-80 percent of the interviewed across European countries rejected an intervention absent an explicit UN authorization (Gallup 2003). But despite this uniform pattern of public opposition, several governments decided in favour of military participation. Dieterich and colleagues argue that this puzzle can be explained with differences in parliamentary war powers. The findings largely confirm their hypothesis: countries that were involved militarily had ‘basic’ or ‘deficient’ war powers, while countries with ‘comprehensive’ war powers made no contribution beyond
logistical support. However, with Denmark and Lithuania there were two deviant cases, since both have substantial parliamentary war powers, but nevertheless supported the *ad hoc* coalition with military force (Dieterich *et al.* 2009: 30).

Independent of formalized parliamentary involvement in troop deployment decisions, a number of democracies have constitutional provisions regarding the scope of military operations they are permitted to engage in. Restrictions vary across countries, but can be grouped in three categories, referring to (a) international law and the requirement of UN authorization, (b) multilateral organizational frameworks as necessary for participation, and (c) the scope of permissible tasks that the armed forces are allowed to engage in (Ku and Jacobson 2003; Nolte 2003; Jakobsen 2006). In some countries these restrictions are based on a legal status of permanent neutrality, as in Austria and Switzerland, while in others they are rooted in a policy tradition of neutrality, as in Sweden, Finland, and Ireland (Bothe 2008: 577). In Germany and Japan, on the other hand, post-war constitutions reflected the historical experience of militarism, placing significant limitations on the participation in military operations (Damrosch 2003: 56). While constitutional provisions are subject to historically contingent legal interpretations and are regularly challenged from within and outside of government, they present the most rigid form of institutional constraint to executive decisions on the use of force.

**Partisan Politics**

An essential part of domestic politics in mature democracies is party politics. This has led to a sizable literature analyzing the link between political partisanship and public policy (cf. Schmidt 1996; Allan and Scruggs 2004). In recent years a number of studies have enlarged the scope of partisan influence analysis to the field of security studies, reporting systematic differences between left and right parties on substantive questions regarding the use of force (Palmer *et al.* 2004; Rathbun 2004; 2007; Schuster and Maier 2006; Arena and Palmer 2009).

Partisan arguments conceive of parties as ‘policy-seekers’ that aim to implement policy in line with their ideological preferences. ‘Office-seeking’ parties, by contrast, are policy-blind. Their primary aim is to maximize control over office (Strom 1990). Research in comparative politics has provided empirical evidence for the adequacy of the policy-seeking model, finding that parties, on average, formulate policy preferences based on their political ideology, present these to the electorate through election programmes, and seek to enact policy that matches their policy preferences (Klingemann *et al.* 1994). Studies have further shown that policy positions are linked across issue areas and can be meaningfully grouped under the categories of ‘left’ and ‘right’ on a one-dimensional scale (Laver and Budge 1992). Right parties tend to emphasize, for instance, free enterprise, a limitation of social services, and a positive view of the military, while left
parties emphasize economic regulation, an expansion of social services, and a negative view of the military (Budge and Klingemann 2001).

How then does political partisanship relate to security issues, and specifically to questions of war involvement? Despite substantive differences between political parties, it is apparent that political conflict does not arise equally over all types of military operations. While some missions are relatively uncontroversial across the political spectrum, others spark fierce partisan debates. In general, I expect increased partisan dispute over wars that are matters of political choice, in contrast to ‘wars of necessity’ where no viable alternative to the use of force exists and therefore a broad partisan consensus would be expected (cf. Haass 2009). An example for a war of necessity would be the use of force for self-defence. Clear cases of self-defence are rare, however, and most wars and military interventions are characterized by some degree of choice on the part of political decision-makers.8

My conception of partisanship in security policy follows the approach suggested by Rathbun (2004), who distinguishes three substantive areas of divergence among ideal-typical parties of the left and the right. Accordingly, parties differ in their definitions and evaluations of (a) the national interest, (b) the appropriateness of military force, and (c) the role of multilateralism in international politics. Left parties typically follow an inclusive conception of the national interest that comprises the promotion of human rights and the welfare of other countries. They are committed to multilateral solutions and reluctant to use military force, emphasizing civilian modes of conflict resolution instead. Right parties, by contrast, typically have a narrower conception of the national interest, focusing on issues that directly affect the well-being of their own country, as opposed to inclusivist humanitarian concerns the left would raise. They prefer unilateral approaches to multilateral alliance operations and regard the use of military force as a necessary instrument of deterrence (Rathbun 2004: 18–21).

Given the characteristics of the Iraq War as an ad hoc military operation that was not authorized by the UN Security Council and preceded by an intense and polarized political debate within and across countries (Gordon and Shapiro 2004; Danchev and MacMillan 2005), I expect to find a pattern of war participation that resonates with government ideology. Based on the three dimensions of partisan differences outlined above, the Iraq War presents a typical case for a conflict over which to expect partisan dispute. First, the arguments brought forth in favour of intervention from October 2002 to the beginning of the war where overwhelmingly based on the perceived threat of weapons of mass destruction and narrowly defined security interests (Kertont-Johnson 2011: 115). Second, the use of force was not the only option available. Observers

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8 This applies even more to cases of external intervention into ‘new wars’. For a recent assessment of the new war thesis and a review of the debate, see Heupel and Zangl (2010) and Mello (2010).
pointed out at the time that a continuation of UN sanctions and weapons inspections could have been a viable alternative to the use of force (Malone 2006: 197). However, this view was rejected by those who urged for a strong stand against Iraq, including the willingness to go to war. Finally, despite some efforts at coalition-building by the United States and the United Kingdom, the Iraq War lacked several characteristics to be considered ‘multilateral’ in a comprehensive sense of the term as there was no authorization from an international organization and a minimal level of coordination among allies.  

Thus far, the relationship between partisan composition of government and military participation in the Iraq War has not received much attention by comparative researchers. A notable exception is the study by Schuster and Maier (2006), which investigates European countries’ political responses to the Iraq crisis, testing neorealist, liberal and constructivist hypotheses for their explanatory value. The authors’ partisan hypothesis expects left governments to oppose the war, while right governments are anticipated to express political support. Their coding is based on party family affiliation and expert judgments. While Schuster and Maier find clear partisan patterns for Western European countries, the hypothesis does less well in Central and Eastern Europe (2006: 233–235).

**The Interaction of Institutions and Partisanship**

Based on the preceding discussion, I suggest a comparative approach that combines the analysis of institutions and partisanship to explore the conditions under which democracies participated in the Iraq War. This approach integrates factors that previous studies have identified as important in explaining war participation, but whose interaction has gone largely unobserved. In terms of institutional factors, I follow recent work on parliamentary war powers, which has provided an important specification of democratic foreign policy processes (Dieterich et al. 2009; 2010; Wagner et al. 2010). However, my approach departs from these studies in the sense that I distinguish a parliamentary veto right from more general constitutional restrictions because these are arguably governed by different mechanisms. While the former is dependent upon the preference distribution in parliament, the latter presents a form of structural constraint that is difficult to overcome in short term. In order to derive theoretical expectations for democracies’ participation in the Iraq War, these institutional factors need to be combined with an analysis of partisanship as the foundation of actors’ preferences. Here, I analyze the partisan position of the

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9 However, despite important differences one should be careful not to reify the distinction between ad hoc coalitions and military operations under the auspices of international organizations. In this context, it can be helpful to understand ad hoc coalitions as ‘spontaneous institutions’ that comprise specific sets of conventions (cf. Daase 1999).
governing party or coalition of parties as well as the centre-of gravity among parties represented in parliament.

In terms of theoretical expectations five modes can be derived from the previous sections, two of which lead toward the outcome whereas three lead toward its negation. The first pertains to constitutional restrictions prohibiting military participation. It is straightforward to assume that substantial constitutional restrictions are a sufficient condition for military non-participation. This implies, vice versa, that the absence of constitutional restrictions is a necessary condition for military participation. Two additional modes can be expected to lead toward non-participation: either due to a left executive or because of the combination of a parliamentary veto right with a left parliament, which would effectively create a ‘veto point’ against military deployments (Immergut 1990). Both of these modes are expected to be sufficient for military non-participation. Military participation, on the other hand, can be expected for countries without constitutional restrictions, a right executive and either no parliamentary veto right or a right-leaning parliament. Figure 1 summarizes the argument in terms of sufficient conditions for the outcome military participation and their constituent necessary elements. In turn, Figure 2 illustrates the argument for the outcome military non-participation.

**Figure 1** Hypotheses for Military Participation in the Iraq War

![Diagram](image)
Figure 2 Hypotheses for Military Non-Participation in the Iraq War

Research Design

The analysis in this paper is based on an application of fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA; Ragin 2000; 2008). FSQCA is a case-oriented approach ideally suited for small to medium numbers of cases. The method investigates the specific conditions under which an outcome occurs, rather than estimating the average effect of a set of independent variables (Mahoney 2010: 132). Hence, causal relations are expressed in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, a substantively important view of causation that has gained increased attention in the social sciences (Collier et al. 2010: 147). While scholars commonly formulate hypotheses in probabilistic terms, many established theories follow an implicit understanding of necessary and sufficient causation, as Goertz (2003) has extensively demonstrated. QCA builds on the idea that configurations of conditions can be jointly necessary and/or sufficient, while their constituent parts might be neither necessary nor sufficient for an outcome. Necessary conditions must be present for an outcome to occur, but their presence does not ensure that the outcome will occur on every occasion. In contrast, the presence of a sufficient condition always leads to the outcome, but the outcome can also occur in its absence. To give an example, democratic peace theory considers a pair of democratic states a sufficient condition for peaceful interstate relations between these countries. However, ‘mutual democracy’ is not a necessary condition for peace, as the existence of peaceful non-democratic dyads demonstrates.

Fuzzy sets complement QCA by providing an intuitive tool to translate categorical concepts into measurable conditions, drawing on the notion that cases can hold degrees of membership in a given set. Thus, fsQCA allows for differentiation: based on empirical knowledge ‘qualitative anchors’ are defined to determine when a case is ‘fully in’ (1) a given set, when it is ‘neither in
nor out’ (0.5), and at which point a case is ‘fully out’ (0) of a set. This coding procedure challenges the implicit assumption in many statistical studies that all variation is equally meaningful (Ragin 2000: 163).

Why not use a conventional approach instead? The pragmatic reason is the low number of cases. Focusing on the Iraq War and a limited number of governments simply provides too few observations for a statistical analysis. While this could be overcome with a different design, substantive reasons indicate that fsQCA is well-suited for this paper’s research aims. First, I am interested in the extent to which governments decided to partake in the military operation in Iraq, which requires a qualitative assessment beyond troop numbers or a binary coding of participation and non-participation. Second, on the explanatory side I expect to see interaction between conditions – parliamentary veto rights, for instance, are expected to constrain executives only under specific partisan configurations. Finally, I am interested in case-specific pathways, and not in an average effect of the hypothesized conditions on democratic war participation, requiring a case-based approach that allows for complex interaction between conditions.

**Case Selection**

This study investigates democracies’ participation in the *ad hoc* coalition assembled for the Iraq War, including the ensuing occupation and reconstruction phases. In the most general sense, the theoretical approach applies to instances of military coalition formation between democracies. Hence, the population of cases comprises countries that meet two criteria: uncontested democratic political institutions and institutionalized security cooperation with other democracies. As a pragmatic threshold for the first criterion, I employed the Polity IV data to exclude countries with a score of seven and below on the combined autocracy-democracy scale. The second criterion of institutionalized security cooperation is restricted to refer to countries with EU or NATO membership, or cooperation agreements with either organization. In addition to these two criteria and to enhance cross-case comparability, two scope conditions were applied, excluding countries that have a population size below one million inhabitants, and states in geographic proximity to Iraq.10 Based on these criteria, I selected thirty democracies from Europe, Asia-Pacific, and North America. At the time of the Iraq crisis twenty-three of these countries were either members of NATO or in the final stages of accession negotiations, as the seven Central and Eastern European states that joined NATO on 29 March 2004. The sample further includes Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden – countries that retain a legal status of permanent neutrality or follow a traditional policy of non-alignment but which have formalized

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10 The first scope condition leads to the exclusion of Cyprus, Iceland, Luxembourg and Malta whereas the second condition affects Israel and Turkey.
their cooperation with NATO. Finally, with Australia, Japan, and New Zealand, three NATO ‘contact countries’ are included. The unit of analysis are country governments during the run-up to the Iraq War and the beginning of the occupation phase. In the Netherlands and Estonia elections were held in January and March 2003, respectively. For these countries I chose the government that was responsible for the eventual deployment decision, as indicated in the notes.

Military Participation in the Iraq War

To measure the outcome of military participation I develop a fuzzy-set coding frame based on two criteria: the type of military contribution that a government authorized for deployment and the time for which a deployment was authorized. The first criterion is used to differentiate between military contributions, distinguishing combat forces, non-combat support units, and logistical support. In order to qualify for membership in the set of military participation (receive a fuzzy-score greater than 0.5) a deployment has to include ground forces with combat or patrol tasks. This is based on the rationale that combat forces are exposed to higher levels of risk in getting wounded or killed than, for instance, rear support units like engineers or medical staff working in field hospitals. Studies indicate that democratic governments are aware of these risks, fearing electoral punishment by a casualty-averse public. In turn, leaders emphasize the nature of military deployments and caveats placed on mandates, indicating a clear distinction between combat operations on the one hand and non-combat and humanitarian tasks on the other. The fuzzy-set coding takes into account these qualitative distinctions.

The second criterion relates to changes in the legal situation and the nature of the conflict as the war in Iraq evolved over time. Rather than making a binary distinction between war fighting and reconstruction phases, where only involvement in the former would be counted towards participation, my conception of military participation accounts for different stages of the Iraq conflict, comprising a larger timeframe than the forty-four days from the invasion of Iraq on 19 March to the declared ‘end of major combat operations’ on 1 May. I distinguish four phases: (a) the invasion of Iraq in March, (b) the post-invasion phase until the end of May, (c) the occupation phase until October, and (d) the ensuing reconstruction phase. These phases coincide roughly with subsequent Security Council Resolutions (SCRs) that sought to clarify the legal status of the occupation and called for international support in the reconstruction of Iraq. SCR 1483 of 22 May 2003 recognized the status of the Unites States and the United Kingdom as de facto occupying

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11 For current reviews of the literature on casualty aversion and the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, see Baum and Potter (2008) and Smith (2005).
12 Under specific circumstances governments can have incentives to downplay their country’s military involvement. Hence the coding is not based solely on self-description, e.g. by countries’ defence departments, but also takes into account foreign sources and external reports.
13 For a chronology of the invasion and occupation phases, see Gordon and Trainor (2006).
powers and thus marks the shift from post-invasion to the occupation phase. In turn, the ‘Multinational Force Iraq’ was acknowledged by SCR 1511 of 16 October 2003, signifying the beginning of the reconstruction phase.\textsuperscript{14} Hence, the fuzzy-set coding assigns higher values to earlier deployments to account for the sequential shift in the nature of the conflict from war fighting to the reconstruction of Iraq.

Based on these criteria countries are coded from 1 to 0 on a fuzzy scale, indicating a range from full membership in the set of countries that participated militarily to full non-membership. At the high end of the scale are states that participated with combat forces from the invasion phase onward. These comprise the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland. The next group contains countries that participated with combat forces, but who deployed troops after the invasion. Here, the sequence of deployments justifies qualitative distinctions. Spain, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Latvia made contributions in April and May, resulting in a higher coding than Denmark, Estonia, Italy, the Netherlands and Romania, who deployed troops between June and August. In contrast, three groups of countries provided non-combat support of various kinds. The Czech Republic deployed in May, with a contribution restricted to a field hospital and military police resulting in the same coding as Hungary which sent transportation units in July. Norway and Slovakia also deployed in July, but their contribution of mine clearance units justifies a lower coding. New Zealand, Portugal, Japan, and Canada provided non-combat support with a focus on reconstruction. Unlike the other three countries, Canada was not involved with ground units, but provided limited airlift from June onward carrying coalition soldiers and equipment. In contrast, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland and Slovenia provided no direct military contribution, but offered logistical help by opening bases, providing facilities, or granting overflight rights. Finally, three out of the thirty countries under study have full non-membership in the set military participation: Austria, Finland and Sweden.

Table 1 summarizes degrees of military participation across countries, including the type of contribution, time of deployment, troop numbers and the resulting fuzzy-set coding for the outcome. While troop numbers indicate the relative size of a deployment, it should be noted that personnel levels fluctuate and that calculations vary depending on whether troops based outside of Iraq (as in Kuwait or Saudi-Arabia) and non-military staff are included. Hence, these are reported to provide additional information, but the coding rests primarily on the type of contribution and the time of deployment.

\textsuperscript{14} In legal terms the occupation ended on 30 June 2004 with the Interim Government of Iraq assuming ‘full authority and responsibility’ (SCR 1546 of 8 June 2004).
Parliamentary Veto Rights and Constitutional Restrictions

The analysis includes two institutional conditions: parliamentary veto rights and constitutional restrictions. I treat these separately because they are governed by different mechanisms: while the former amounts to a ‘veto point’ only under a specific partisan composition of the legislature (Immergut 1990), constitutional restrictions present a structural veto point to military deployments irrespective of the preference distribution in parliament.

Parliamentary veto rights are operationalized on a dimension that ranges from mandatory parliamentary approval of all military deployments (ex ante veto, fuzzy score 1.0), to the complete absence of parliamentary involvement in troop deployment decisions (fuzzy score 0). The central criterion for set membership is the presence of a parliamentary veto right (fuzzy score above 0.5). Between the poles gradations range from a restricted ex ante veto that applies only to operations outside treaty obligations or above a certain personnel threshold, to mere ex post rights of information. The coding of parliamentary veto rights is based primarily on the ParlCon data set compiled by Wagner, Peters, and Glahn (2010). ParlCon classifies the parliamentary control level of countries in terms of the presence or absence of an ex ante veto right, which coincides with my

An appendix with additional documentation is available upon request.
primary coding criterion. To distinguish degrees in veto rights for the fuzzy-set coding and to complement data on countries that are not covered in ParlCon I draw on country studies (Besselink 2003; Jensen 2003; Kowalski 2003; Ku and Jacobson 2003; Luther 2003; Baker and Christopher 2009) and two additional surveys of parliamentary war powers (Born and Hänggi 2005; Dieterich et al. 2010).

Countries where parliament has an \textit{ex ante} veto on all military deployments (1.0) include Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden. The majority of former Communist countries established strong parliamentary authority during their constitutional foundation, but many of them later curbed parliamentary involvement to accommodate the NATO accession process. In turn, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia receive the coding for a restricted \textit{ex ante} veto (0.8). Italy and Japan feature a weak \textit{ex ante} veto and an \textit{ex post} veto, respectively. In consequence, they receive a coding of 0.6.¹⁶ In the Netherlands no formal veto right exists, despite traditional parliamentary involvement and information prior to military deployments (0.4). In Belgium, Canada, Norway, Poland, Portugal and the United States military deployments are primarily a matter of the executive, but parliament has to be informed within a certain timeframe (0.2). Finally, countries with an executive prerogative over foreign policy comprise Australia, France, Greece, New Zealand, Spain and the United Kingdom (0).¹⁷

The coding of constitutional restrictions takes into account provisions that prohibit military participation either (a) on the grounds of international law, (b) outside organizational frameworks, or (c) beyond a set of permissible tasks. Restrictions in the first area can range from an explicit requirement of UN authorization to the use of the armed forces in accordance with international law broadly conceived. The second area relates to requirements regarding multilateral organizational frameworks. Finally, some democracies specify a range of permissible operations for military deployments.

Countries with comprehensive constitutional restrictions (fuzzy-score 1.0) comprise Austria, Finland, Ireland, Japan and Sweden. Each of these countries is restricted in at least two areas. The Japanese constitution prohibits the use of force except for self-defence purposes (Article 9) and is generally interpreted to require UN authorization prior to any dispatch of its forces (Shibata 2003; Miyagi 2009). Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden require multilateral organizational

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¹⁶ This coding reflects the presence of a basic veto right. In Italy its effectiveness is limited by contending constitutional interpretations. The Japanese \textit{Diet} is restricted to an \textit{ex post} authorization of military deployments, that applies after a period of 20 days has passed (Wagner et al. 2010: 67).

¹⁷ The coding refers to the situation in 2002-2003. Since then the legal situation has changed in some countries. Spain, for instance, introduced parliamentary veto rights in 2005 (Ley Orgánica de la Defensa Nacional, 5/2005, 17 Noviembre).
frameworks and restrict the scope of permissible tasks to peace support operations. Finland and Ireland formally prohibit operations without UN authorization, while Austria is constitutionally allowed to participate only in operations under UN, OSCE or EU auspices. Sweden has adapted its legal framework, but the general requirement of a UN mandate retains (Jakobsen 2006: 120-122; 184; Wunderlich 2011).  

In turn, Germany and Norway are countries with considerable constitutional restrictions (0.8). Article 24 (2) of the German Grundgesetz prohibits military operations outside ‘the sufficiently dense political and organisational framework of an international treaty-regime’, which effectively negates participation in ad hoc coalitions as in Iraq (Nolte 2003: 352). Norway, like other Nordic countries, made steps towards waiving an explicit requirement of UN authorization. Nevertheless, constitutional practice demands that a military operation have ‘the highest degree of political and legal legitimacy possible’, a criterion that was not met by the Iraq War, as the Norwegian government declared upon the beginning of the invasion (Jakobsen 2006). In contrast to these seven countries, the majority of the democracies under study are characterized by, at most, minor constitutional restrictions. These relate either to a requirement of military operations to conform to international law broadly conceived or some limitation on the purposes for which the armed forces can be sent abroad. Countries with minor restrictions (0.2) include Belgium, Canada, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, and Romania. The remaining thirteen countries have no relevant constitutional restrictions and are coded accordingly (Nolte 2003; Ku and Jacobson 2003; Wagner et al. 2010).

**Executive and Parliament Partisanship**

These conditions refer to the position of a country’s executive and parliament on a left-right scale in political space. My estimate of partisan positions draws on the extensive research of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP; Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). The CMP data is based on a qualitative coding of statements in party election programmes along fifty-six policy categories and seven policy domains that range from domestic issues to external relations. Thirteen of the policy categories are associated with positions traditionally emphasized by left parties, such as peaceful international cooperation, welfare state expansion, and economic regulation, while another thirteen categories indicate policy positions that are commonly highlighted by right parties, as, for instance, strong defence, free enterprise and traditional moral values (Budge and Klingemann 2001).

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A particular strength of the CMP is the provision of meaningful indicators of cross-national variation, whereas estimates that are based on party-family affiliation or expert judgement of particular countries can be misleading when used for comparative purposes. In terms of its political programme, for instance, Norway’s *Arbeiderparti* (Labour Party) is considerably further on the left than Australia’s Labour Party, yet both belong to the socialdemocratic party family. This difference is due in part to Norway’s political space, which is located further to the left than most countries’ party systems. In contrast to some alternative measures, the CMP approach is sensitive to this kind of cross-national variation (cf. Klingemann et al. 2006: 63–85). Hence the resulting left-right values do not necessarily reflect popular perceptions party positions. For instance, Britain’s ‘New Labour’ under Blair made a decisive turn toward the right, which is reflected in a CMP value that characterizes Labour as a centre or centre-right party – in contrast to its familiar classification as a socialdemocratic party.

The calculation of CMP left-right values results from subtracting the sum of left statements from the sum of right statements for each party and each election. For the estimate of partisan positions I follow the approach suggested by Laver and Garry (2000) and calculate the ‘substantive’ policy position for each party. This technique is a slight adaptation of the original CMP calculation. In essence, it discounts the salience a party places on a category in favour of its ‘pure’ policy position, dividing the CMP left-right values by the sum of left-right references. A party’s left-right position is thus defined as:

\[
P_{LR} = \frac{P_{right} - P_{left}}{P_{right} + P_{left}}
\]

While this calculation is straightforward for single-party governments and presidential systems, the majority of parliamentary democracies typically feature coalition government (Müller and Strøm 2000). Hence for multi-party governments in parliamentary democracies I calculate a weighted score where each coalition partner’s left-right value is set in relation to its parliamentary seat shares and the overall number of seats of the governing coalition.\(^{19}\) This calculation is based on the assumption that coalition partners distribute cabinet posts in accordance with their relative seat shares, a conjecture that is well supported by empirical studies (Powell 2000: 173). Thus, the executive’s partisan position on a left-right scale is specified as:

\[
E_{LR} = \frac{(EP_{LRa} \times Seats_a) + \ldots (EP_{LRn} \times Seats_n)}{Government Seats}
\]

Similar to the calculation of executive partisanship, I estimate the average left-right position of the entire legislature by weighting the position of each party that is represented in parliament against its share of seats. In effect, the resulting left-right value indicates parliament’s ‘centre of

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\(^{19}\) For presidential systems, the executive position is calculated on the basis of the president’s party. In turn, parliament’s position refers to the lower house.
gravity’ in terms of its partisan composition (Cusack 1999). However, since the indicator represents a weighted average party position and not a mere parliamentary majority, it can differ substantially from the executive position. If the executive party or coalition of parties controls a large legislative majority, parliament’s partisan position will be close to the executive position. But under conditions of a minority government or a polarized party system, parliament’s left-right position can be leaning in the opposite direction. 20 Parliament’s partisan position on a left-right scale is defined as:

\[ \text{Parl}_{LR} = \frac{\left( \text{PP}_{LR_1} \ast \text{Seats}_{a_1} \right) + \ldots (\text{PP}_{LR_n} \ast \text{Seats}_{a_n})}{\text{Parliament Seats}} \]

**Analytical Results**

The following sections present the results of the fuzzy-set analysis for the outcomes military participation and non-participation in the Iraq War. It is good practice to conduct separate analyses for an outcome and its negation, as the results for one analysis cannot be inferred from the other (Schneider and Wagemann 2010: 408). Furthermore, the theoretical section yielded asymmetric hypotheses that can only be tested in separate analyses. Before proceeding with the analysis of sufficient conditions it is advised to test for necessary conditions. In fuzzy-set analysis a potential necessary condition is indicated when instances of the outcome are a subset of instances of a condition (Ragin 2009: 109). 21 Here, the analysis reveals that the absence of constitutional restrictions is a necessary condition for military participation, at a consistency of .94 and coverage of .64. This finding confirms the hypothesis that military participation in the Iraq War required an absence of constitutional restrictions. It further implies that substantive constitutional restrictions amounted to a structural veto against military participation – which, as a statement about a sufficient condition, still needs to be confirmed in the fsQCA procedure, which is essentially a test for sufficient conditions.

**Military Participation in the Iraq War**

Which conditions led to democracies’ military participation in the Iraq War? Are pathways toward war participation congruent with theoretical expectations? To address these questions, the fuzzy-set analysis proceeds through several steps, the core of which can be carried with the QCA software. 22 First, a truth table is constructed on the basis of the fuzzy-set membership scores for each condition and the outcome. This procedure helps to identify patterns in the empirical data.

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20 This measure seem more appropriate for decisions on the use of force than, for instance, a simple count of the legislative majority. A similar measure to the one applied here is used by Powell (2000: 173).
21 The respective formula are: Consistency\(_{NC} = \frac{\sum \min(X_i,Y_i)}{\sum Y_i} \); Coverage\(_{NC} = \frac{\sum \min(X_i,Y_i)}{\sum X_i} \).
22 Version 2.5 of fsQCA was used. The software is available at: www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin (12 January 2011).
The fuzzy-set truth table represents a multidimensional vector space with $2^k$ corners, where $k$ relates to the number of conditions and each corner of the resulting property space signifies a distinct combination of conditions. Based on the fuzzy-set membership scores each case can then be assigned to a single corner of the property space (Ragin 2008: 124–135).

Table 2 displays the truth table for military participation and the conditions parliamentary veto rights (V), constitutional restrictions (C), right executive (E), and right parliament (P). Hence, the truth table contains $2^4 = 16$ rows. Each country’s membership in the respective conjunction of conditions is given in brackets. Australia, for instance, holds a membership of .81 in the conjunction given in the first row, comprising the absence of both parliamentary veto rights and constitutional restrictions, combined with a right executive and a right parliament. Note that five conjunctions at the bottom of the table are not filled with empirical cases. These *logical remainders* represent combinations of conditions that can be included in an intermediate solution if one can make plausible assumptions about their potential outcomes. The consistency column indicates the extent to which the fuzzy-set values of all cases in a conjunction are sufficient for the outcome military participation. Based on the consistency scores a cut-off point is determined to separate combinations that pass fuzzy-set sufficiency from those that do not (Ragin 2008: 135). Here, I decide for a consistency threshold of .82. Thus, all configurations below row five are excluded from the ensuing minimization procedure.

**Table 2 Truth Table for the Outcome Military Participation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>MP</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Romania (.72), Lithuania (.58), Bulgaria (.53), Latvia (.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Denmark (.82), Slovakia (.80), Italy (.60), Estonia (.55), Slovenia (.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>.79</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Finland (.59)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Japan (.52), Austria (.51)</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Greece (.86), New Zealand (.77), Canada (.70), France (.68), Belgium (.67)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ireland (.75), Sweden (.70)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V: Parliamentary Veto, C: Constitutional Restrictions, E: Right Executive, P: Right Parliament, MP: Military Participation

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23 In this paper, I focus on the complex solution term as a conservative estimate that makes the least assumptions.

24 I decide against including row six as it would lower the overall consistency but add just a single case to the minimization procedure. More important, however, is that Norway holds a low membership (.55) in that configuration so that it is not a good source for inferential leverage for its specific configuration.
In the next step, sufficient combinations of conditions for the outcome are identified, using Boolean algebra to minimize the truth table (Ragin 1987: 93–97). This procedure yields a complex solution term that comprises three paths toward military participation, which are listed in Table 3 in addition to the full solution term, consistency and coverage values, and the countries that hold membership in each respective path. As expected from the analysis of necessary conditions, all paths require the absence of constitutional restrictions (~C). Path 1 combines this with the absence of parliamentary veto rights (~V) and a right executive (E), while Path 2 adds parliamentary veto rights (V) and a right parliament (P). Path 3 further includes parliamentary veto rights (V) and a left executive (~E). In combination, these paths form a complex solution term with a consistency of .82 and coverage of .77. In terms of substantive relevance Path 1 is most significant, due to its high unique coverage and consistency. The other two paths show some degree of overlap as both contain the conjunction V*~C with different partisan configurations, which results in lower values on unique coverage.

Table 3 Complex Solution Terms and Path Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Conjunction</th>
<th>Relation</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Coverage Raw</th>
<th>Coverage Unique</th>
<th>Path Membership (&gt; .5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>~C</td>
<td>← MP</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>~V<em>~C</em>E</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>V<em>~C</em>P</td>
<td>→ MP</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>V<em>~C</em>~E</td>
<td></td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>V*C</td>
<td></td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>~V<em>~E</em>~P</td>
<td></td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Australia (91), United States (.80), Spain (.66), United Kingdom (.65), Netherlands (.60), Portugal (.60), Poland (.52), Denmark (.82), Slovakia (.80), Italy (.60), Estonia (.58), Slovenia (.54), Lithuania (.73), Bulgaria (.72), Romania (.72), Hungary (.69), Czech Republic (.64), Latvia (.62), Austria (.10), Finland (.10), Ireland (.10), Sweden (.10), Germany (.80), Japan (.60), Greece (.86), New Zealand (.77), Canada (.70), France (.68), Belgium (.67), Norway (.55)

Tilde [~] indicates the absence of a condition; multiplication [*] refers to a logical ‘and’; addition [+] represents a logical ‘or’; [→] indicates a necessary condition; [←] indicates sufficient conjunctions (alternate paths).

How can these results be interpreted against the backdrop of theoretical expectations? Essentially four findings can be derived from the analysis. First, the absence of constitutional restrictions is part of all three sufficient conjunctions for military participation. It is thus a ‘necessary element of a sufficient set’ of conditions (NESS condition; Wright 1988: 1019). This finding further specifies the identification of ~C as a necessary condition and confirms the hypothesis that military participation requires the absence of constraining constitutional frameworks.

Second, the results provide empirical evidence for the argument regarding the interaction of institutions and partisanship as Path 1 closely fits the theoretical model of the unconstrained right
executive outlined above. Countries with high membership in this path include, among others, Australia, Spain, and the United States as conservative governments that were neither constrained by parliamentary veto rights nor constitutional restrictions in their decision to deploy military force to Iraq. In this regard a clear partisan difference was discernable, for instance, between Australia’s Prime Minister John Howard and his counterpart in New Zealand, Helen Clark. While both countries are similar with regards to institutional factors, Australia’s Liberal/National coalition under Howard supported the war plan from the beginning and deployed troops during the build-up for the war as early as in February 2003, which prompted fierce domestic opposition and a vote of no confidence in the upper house (Holloway 2003).

The third finding concerns Path 2, which broadly resembles the model of the unified right government.\textsuperscript{25} Under this partisan configuration it does not matter whether the legislature holds a veto right over military deployments, since parliament is likely to carry executive initiatives to use military force as it shares the preference of the executive. In this sense the second path presents a qualification of the parliamentary peace hypotheses discussed in the literature which holds that parliamentary veto rights should serve as an effective constraint against war participation irrespective of legislative preference distribution. Empirically, this concerns the cases of Denmark, Italy, and Estonia – countries that deployed military force to Iraq despite parliamentary veto rights. Denmark, for instance, is considered a country with ‘strong parliamentary war powers’ (Dieterich et al. 2010: 39). Due to a conservative centre of gravity in parliament, however, the government under Prime Minister Rasmussen was able to get legislative authorization for its military deployment to Iraq, even though it was based on a slim majority of 11 votes (Jakobsen 2006: 87).

Finally, Path 3 provides more of a puzzle. The fact that several countries with parliamentary veto rights and left executives participated in the war confounds theoretical expectations for both institutional and partisan arguments. A possible explanation could lie in the regional distribution of the countries that comprise this path, containing the Baltic republics Latvia and Lithuania as well as Bulgaria and Romania, all four of which were in the final stages of accession negotiations with NATO during the Iraq crisis.\textsuperscript{26} Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that either partisan patterns were not as pronounced among these countries or that alternative factors explain why their governments decided in favour of military participation when one would have expected a

\textsuperscript{25} The result differs from the theoretical model in that it does not include a rightist executive in the minimized formula. However, an examination of the cases reveals that five out of the seven countries in this path comprise unified rightist governments.

\textsuperscript{26} The Czech Republic and Hungary also hold membership in Path 3, but their military contribution was restricted to non-combat units (see Table 1).
different outcome based on their institutional and partisan configuration. I will return to these points in the concluding section.

In order to demonstrate the validity of the results and the empirical pattern across cases it is helpful to construct an x-y plot (Schneider and Grofman 2006). Figure 2 shows the position of each country, tracing membership in the solution term against membership in the outcome. The diagonal line demarcates points that hold equal membership in both sets. More importantly, it separates cases with a higher value in the outcome than in the solution (above the line), from those where membership in the solution exceeds that of the outcome. While the former indicates a potential sufficient condition, the latter can signal a necessary condition. In set-theoretic terms, it is crucial to distinguish whether a case holds membership in a given set ($X_i > .50$) or whether it is situated outside that set ($X_i < .50$). This lets us divide the x-y plot into six distinct zones, which differ in their theoretical relevance, depending on the analytical aim of the research (Schneider and Rohlfing 2009: 37).

Figure 2 demonstrates that the complex solution provides an (almost) sufficient condition for military participation since the majority of countries are placed above the main diagonal. The x-y plot shows three distinct groups of cases. Countries in the lower left corner hold low membership values in both the outcome and the solution and can thus be considered substantially irrelevant for the analysis of sufficiency. By contrast, of the thirty democracies under review, eighteen hold membership in the solution term (zones 1-3), twelve of which can be considered typical cases for (zone 1). Arguably, Denmark could be included in this group of countries, despite its position slightly below the main diagonal. In contrast, five deviant cases are placed in zone 3, which are countries that hold membership in the solution but do not show the expected outcome.
Military Non-Participation in the Iraq War

Under which conditions did governments abstain from military participation in the Iraq War? How do patterns of abstention differ from those that participated? To take up these questions I apply the procedure of the previous section to the outcome military non-participation. As for the preceding analysis, the first step is constructing the truth table, which comprises the same conditions and thus also contains \(2^4 (V, C, E, P) = 16\) rows. Each country’s membership score in the configurations of conditions is identical to the values reported in Table 2. However, since the analysis is now directed toward the negation of the outcome the consistency scores inevitably differ. Table 4 displays the truth table for military non-participation. The table shows six configurations of conditions that are sufficiently consistent before a substantial drop in consistency occurs. Hence, I set the consistency threshold at .81 to proceed with the minimization algorithm.
Table 4 Truth Table for the Outcome Military Non-Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>~MP</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Norway (.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Japan (.52), Austria (.51)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Germany (.64)</td>
</tr>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Greece (.86), New Zealand (.77), Canada (.70), France (.68), Belgium (.67)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Australia (.81), United States (.80), United Kingdom (.65), Netherlands (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Australia (.81), United States (.80), United Kingdom (.65), Netherlands (.60)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V: Parliamentary Veto, C: Constitutional Restrictions, E: Right Executive, P: Right Parliament, ~MP: Military Non-Participation

Next, the truth table is minimized to identify combinations of conditions that are sufficient for the outcome. Based on this procedure a complex solution term is derived that yields two paths toward military non-participation. Path 4 comprises parliamentary veto rights and constitutional restrictions (V*C), whereas Path 5 combines unified left partisanship (~E*~P) with an absence of parliamentary veto rights (~V). Both paths are characterized by high unique coverage values, indicating distinct patterns with little empirical overlap between the paths. These add up to a complex solution with a consistency of .88 and coverage of .73. Table 3 states the full solution term, consistency and coverage values, as well as the countries that hold membership in each respective path.

How to interpret the solution for military non-participation and to which extent does it match theoretical expectations? In brief, both of the paths identified are congruent with theoretical expectations on the effects of institutions and partisanship. The solution is consistently sufficient in explaining the outcome of military non-participation. Path 4 strongly confirms the constitutional restrictions hypothesis. Countries with legal provisions on the scope of permissible operations have, without exception, abstained from military participation in the Iraq War, due to the controversial legal status of the intervention as an unauthorized preventive war and because it was conducted in an ad hoc coalition framework that lacked a multilateral structure. Hence, it was, as I would argue, not a military operation that the governments of Ireland, Sweden, or Germany could have authorized without raising serious constitutional controversy at home. This problem is exemplified by the case of Japan where the conservative government led by Junichiro Koizumi sought to find a way to contribute to the war in support of the United States, but was substantially constrained by the Japanese constitution. Eventually, the government sent non-
combat ‘reconstruction assistance’ after several UN resolutions had passed and the operation could be characterized as a peace support operation to the domestic opposition (Miyagi 2009).

Path 5 indicates a partisan pattern that resembles the left executive model outlined in Figure 1. The actual configuration of empirical cases is more differentiated, however, than the theoretical argument. This path includes, among others, Canada, Greece, and New Zealand as countries with left executives and left-leaning legislatures but no parliamentary veto rights. It shows that, even when there is no mandatory legislative approval, left partisanship led toward non-involvement in the Iraq War. The left’s stand on the Iraq issue is illustrated by the position taken by New Zealand’s Labour government under Helen Clark, who stated throughout the crisis her demand for a UN mandate, a multilateral operation, and that force should only be used after all other options are exhausted (Hansard 2003a; 2003b).

Finally, based on the theory one would have expected to find evidence for the interaction between parliamentary veto rights and left partisanship ($V^* \sim P$) as a mechanism that creates a veto point against military participation in the Iraq War. This pattern can be discerned from the solution only indirectly as it overlaps to a certain extent with Path 4. In fact, countries with membership >.50 in $V^* \sim P$ include Austria, Ireland, Japan, and Sweden. These countries, however, are already geared toward non-participation due to their constitutional restrictions. Hence, due to this empirical configuration it is difficult to distinguish between constitutional restrictions on the one hand, and the interaction of parliamentary veto rights and left partisanship on the other. In addition, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania also hold membership in $V^* \sim P$ and for these countries the assumed mechanism has apparently failed to produce a veto point against military participation.

In order to demonstrate the fit of the solution term for military non-participation, another x-y plot is constructed. Figure 3 shows the position of each country, tracing membership in the solution against membership in the outcome. The x-y plot demonstrates that the two paths identified are almost sufficient for the outcome as the vast majority of cases are placed above the main diagonal. Thirteen democracies hold membership in either Path 4 or 5 and all of them show the expected outcome. Ireland is placed just below the main diagonal which does not affect the theoretical argument but lowers the consistency score. Unlike for the outcome military participation there are no deviant cases for non-participation. There are, however, several cases in the upper left corner, indicating countries that show the outcome but which are not explained by either of the two paths. While this does not affect consistency, since the countries hold low membership values in the solution term, it reduces the coverage score.
Conclusion

The case study in this paper departed from the observation that democratic governments responded in different ways to the Iraq crisis as it evolved in the months preceding the war and after its initiation – while some decided to join the *ad hoc* coalition, others opposed the war plans or chose not to deploy forces to Iraq, whereas still others sent military units during the occupation and reconstruction phases that followed upon the invasion. In an attempt to account for this variance, this paper applied fsQCA to explain military participation and non-participation in the Iraq War based on an analysis of domestic political configurations in thirty democracies. The results demonstrate the utility of an integrated theoretical framework that draws on institutions and partisanship to explain democratic variance in conflict behaviour. In essence, three findings with theoretical implications can be derived from the foregoing fuzzy-set analyses. I will discuss these in turn before addressing limitations of the present study and outlining prospects for future research.

First, democracies that retain constitutional restrictions on the scope of permissible military operations have, without exception, abstained from military participation. While regulations vary
across countries, requirements of UN authorization and multilateral frameworks effectively constrained seven of the countries under study. This paper’s approach departs from previous studies on parliamentary war powers by separating legislative veto rights from more general constitutional restrictions. Arguably, these two forms of institutional constraints are governed by different mechanisms. While the former is dependent upon the preference distribution in parliament, the latter presents a structural constraint that is difficult to overcome in the absence of a stable political consensus across parties.

Second, the focus on party politics revealed distinct cross-country patterns, most notably among Western democracies. For those countries that participated in the war the predominant pattern combined a right executive with the absence of both types of institutional constraints. An unconstrained right executive was found, for instance, in Australia, the United States and Spain. By contrast, countries that did not participate in the war were either institutionally constrained or had a unified left government, as was the case, for instance, in Greece, New Zealand, or Canada.

Third, regarding the interaction of institutions and partisan politics another pattern concerns the conjunction of parliamentary veto rights, a right executive and a right parliament. Findings indicate that this partisan configuration can override institutional veto rights on the use of force. This constellation was found, for instance, in Denmark, Estonia, and Italy. These countries’ war participation challenges the parliamentary peace argument, which holds that parliamentary veto rights should amount to an effective constraint against war participation irrespective of legislative preference distribution (Dieterich et al. 2009). This conclusion complements the results of previous studies in specifying the scope conditions under which a parliamentary peace can be expected to hold. Rather than expecting a uniform effect for institutional veto rights, the analysis in this paper indicates that it is critical to examine executive and legislative partisanship in addition to institutional rules. Under conditions of broad executive majorities or partisan convergence mandatory parliamentary approval is unlikely to amount to a legislative veto point.

While the present study identifies distinct patterns in the interaction between institutions and partisanship, its conclusions do not apply equally to all countries under study. It is apparent from the analysis that partisan patterns are less reliable for Central and Eastern European countries. This could imply that the left-right dimension, which has proven meaningful in other regions, does not capture the structure of political competition within CEE countries. A viable alternative could be conceptions of partisanship that are not based on manifesto data. However, previous studies have also reported an absence of reliable partisan patterns among CEE countries (Schuster and Maier 2006), while their coding was based on party family affiliation and expert judgment and thus independent of the CMP data.
Due to its focus on institutional constraints and partisan politics this study neglected viable alternative explanations. For instance, regarding the finding that several countries with parliamentary veto rights and left executives participated in the Iraq War (Table 3, Path 3). Here, an explanation might be found in the historical circumstances of the respective countries on this path, which comprise Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania – all four of which were in the final stages of accession negotiations with NATO during the Iraq crisis. Arguably, governments in these states faced strong incentives to prove their ‘reliability’ in terms contributing to their future alliance partners in the West. While this paper focused on institutional and partisan factors as domestic sources of foreign policy, prospective studies could include alliance factors and threat perception to further investigate the interaction between the domestic and the international level.

References


